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ABSTRACT 
PSYCHOTHERAPY AS CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE: A DETAILED 
INTERACTION ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGE PROCESS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
 
 
By 
Cody L. Maddox 
December 2013 
 
Dissertation supervised by Martin Packer, Ph.D. 
Psychotherapy is concerned with changing individuals: it is a practice devoted to 
the constitution of certain kinds of subjects. Although the various therapeutic schools 
have their own explanations of psychotherapeutic change, more empirical work needs to 
be dedicated to understanding how this process takes place. In this study, a fine grain 
research methodology is used to produce an account of the change process that occurred 
over the course of two psychotherapy sessions. The data consists of naturally occurring 
video recordings of a single therapist and client dyad. The goal of this research is to 
examine the relationship of mutual formation between the practice of psychotherapy and 
the client as it unfolds across time. This process of mutual formation is what Martin 
Packer (2011) refers to as constitution. A new research method was developed for this 
study. The methodology is grounded upon Heidegger's (1927/1962) understanding of 
 v 
 
practical engagement and Foucault's (1983) method of genealogical interpretation. The 
research procedure combines conversation analysis with de Rivera’s (1977) Structural 
Theory of Emotion, and Wortham’s (2001) action based theory of narrative positioning, 
to form a coherent methodology called Detailed Interaction Analysis. The study 
demonstrates how conversation analysis can be augmented in order to better analyze 
emotion and subject positioning. There were four major findings. First, the study shows 
how psychotherapy constitutes the client as a deep emotional subject who must 
understand her emotions in order to be an ethical being. Second, interpretation was 
shown to be a pragmatic practice that asserts the therapist’s subjective perspective into 
the conversation. This allows the client to respond with her own interpretation. This 
collaborative process was found to be an important change process in psychotherapy and 
these findings conform to the more interactional understanding of interpretation (Aron, 
1992; Winnicott, 1971). Third, the analysis provides a description of how Foucauldian 
problematizing occurs through the deployment of conversational actions that shift the 
location of the therapeutic problem and encourage the client to think about herself as an 
emotional being. Last, this study demonstrates how the indeterminacy of talk is used as a 
creative resource for both the therapist and the client during problematizing.  
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chapter 1 
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTITUTION IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
"If we are indeed to have evidence-based psychotherapies grounded in 
systematic, well replicated research…and evidence-based training for 
psychotherapists…– both of which I approve – then it would be very nice 
(in fact, I would think essential) for that research to be based on a 
standard model or paradigm which more adequately matches the actual 
experience and lived reality of what it presumes to study. I don’t know 
what a more satisfactory paradigm or model for research will turn out to 
be. Constructing it is the task of the next generation – but from it will 
come the sort of psychotherapy research I think I would like to read.” 
David Orlinsky, Comments on 
the State of Psychotherapy 
Research (As I See It) , 
(2006, p. 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
Interpretation as a Way into Psychotherapy 
Prior to being trained as a therapist I studied sociology and was interested in the 
postmodern critique of language, subjectivity, and institutional practices. It is ironic that I 
chose to become a therapist because psychotherapy is a practice that has been highly 
scrutinized and critiqued by postmodern theorists. At times, these critiques can be quite 
discouraging for a therapist. However, therapy has played an important role in my own 
life. At a time when life was most chaotic I turned to therapy and found it to be 
transformative. Years later, I chose to become a therapist because I believed in its 
importance as a cultural practice that plays a vital role in peoples’ lives. Yet, when I 
made this decision I was also very aware of how psychotherapy operated on certain 
assumptions about what human beings are and what they should be. My interest in 
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critical theory – in the critiques of Foucault and Nietzsche for example – fostered an ever 
present suspicion of the very practices that I found to be so vital in my own life. Out of 
my passion for critical reflection and my passion for psychotherapy came a conflict that 
has driven my own constitutional process of becoming a therapist and a researcher. This 
project is my attempt to use this conflict to understand psychotherapy. My goal is to 
understand the institutional practice of psychotherapy, taking seriously the postmodern 
critique of representationalism, and to produce an account that can convey the humanity 
and wholeness of contemporary psychotherapeutic practice. 
One difficulty with a large project such as this is how to start, where to start. The 
impossible task of speaking about psychotherapy arises because of the overwhelming 
complexity and diversity of practices. We might be tempted to capture the complexity by 
creating flow charts and lists in an endless effort to define the discipline by difference. 
However, my task is not to describe psychotherapy, but to find a way into it—to speak 
about it in a way that is limited, yes, but that grasps the discipline securely. My route into 
the practice will serve two functions. First, I would like to approach psychotherapy on its 
own terms and use the traditional constructs (such as interpretation) as pivot points that 
allow new understandings to emerge. And second, the path must be carved out by a 
research language that is useful for the researcher, but still speaks to practitioners and 
patients. In other words, this path must be able to speak to all the parties in a way that 
takes into account cherished assumptions not as givens, but as access points through 
which a new understanding can be forged. I believe that this is a promising intention, and 
yet I am well aware of the difficulties. 
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The search for a way to talk about psychotherapy has been an ever present 
problem facing researchers and scholars. Psychodynamic, existential, cognitive, family 
psychotherapy all have a different theoretical understanding of human beings and 
psychology. The differences can be exhausting. Furthermore, each one of the above 
categories can be cracked open to expose numerous theoretical differences inside similar 
schools of thought.  
Psychodynamic therapy is a prime example. Since the time of Freud there has 
been a warring proliferation of approaches, apparent even to the casual observer. Freud, 
Klein, Lacan, Kohut, Reich, and so on all hold contrary visions of psychology and 
psychotherapy. Again, this diversity often leads to a cataloguing or taxonomy of 
differences (Herink, 1980). Some have taken another approach. Contemporary theorists 
such as Gabbard (2005) and McWilliams (1994) have tried to integrate many of the 
prominent schools of psychodynamic psychology and form a holistic theory that can 
guide contemporary psychotherapy. Where some are tempted to point out the differences 
between various schools of thought, Gabbard and McWilliams want to find commonality. 
Their works can be seen as an attempt to mitigate differences by creating inclusive 
frameworks and identifying common ground. 
As one can guess from my introductory paragraph, I too am integrationist of sorts. 
I like compromise and commonality as opposed to defiance and difference. However, the 
initial problem that this project poses, finding a way into psychotherapy, is not an attempt 
to identify an underlying structure or essential element hidden behind the consulting 
room door. Rather, I am faced with articulating a means of understanding psychotherapy 
that is new, offering a fresh glimpse at something we are familiar with. I do not need to 
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capture all of psychotherapy, but I need to speak towards its primary aim. That aim is 
obvious, I believe: psychotherapy is concerned with changing people, it is a practice 
devoted to the constitution of certain kinds of subjects. 
Making the case that psychotherapy is a constitutive practice can be done in many 
ways, but I believe that by examining interpretation we will see one such avenue emerge. 
Lynn Harper (2006) in her doctoral dissertation acknowledged many of the difficulties 
with psychotherapy scholarship that I have been discussing. The initial question that she 
posed was: "What is it that the analyst does in psychoanalysis that makes the process 
work?" She goes on to state, as I have, that various schools of thought identify different 
important aspects and fundamental concepts, which makes finding an underlying 
commonality difficult. However, she contends that "interpretation, as a key ingredient in 
a psychoanalytic work, does seem to provide one way to compare various schools of 
analytic thought around the issue of therapeutic process" (p. 1). From here, she goes on to 
compare and contrast Freud, Klein, and Lacan, charting the similarities and differences in 
both theoretical understanding and professional practice. I empathize with her struggle to 
find a common ground and agree that interpretation is an important concept that can help 
us to understand psychotherapy. However, this is not because it bridges various schools 
of thought, but because it is a pivotal construct that can be reinterpreted and put to work 
for both the researcher and the practitioner within each school.  
Interpretation has always been seen as basic to psychotherapy. It was the central 
construct in Freud's (1900/1998) The Interpretation of Dreams and it has been a subject 
of concern for psychotherapists ever since. However, since Freud's time psychotherapy 
has changed. Our understanding of interpretation has shifted and some have even 
 5 
 
declared that interpretation is relatively unimportant compared to relational factors such 
as the therapeutic alliance (Bohart & Tallman, 1999; Orlinsky, Grawe, & Parks, 1994). 
The psychoanalysis, Lewis Aron (1992) states that this shift toward a relational 
understanding of interpretation was initiated by Winncott who thought that “the point of 
interpreting [was] to show the patient that the analyst was fully alive and imperfect” (p. 
487). Winnicott (1971) expressed his opinion of interpretation this way: “I think I 
interpret mainly to let the patient know the limits of my understanding. The principle is 
that it is the patient and only the patient who has the answers” (pp. 86-87). This is what 
has happened inside psychoanalysis. Outside psychoanalytic or even psychodynamic 
circles interpretation has pretty much been forgotten. CBT and behavioral therapies have 
their own languages and pet constructs. However, in my experience as a psychotherapist I 
can say that interpretation is alive and well in modern-day therapy. Granted, my training 
and supervision has been largely psychodynamic. This makes it difficult or almost 
impossible to speak for CBT or behavioral therapists. Therefore, throughout this project 
I'll be sticking to what I know, which is a psychodynamically oriented psychotherapy, 
which relies on interpretation to provoke therapeutic change in the client. Keep in mind, 
that my analysis of interpretation is simply a way into psychotherapy, allowing us to see 
how therapy is a constitutional practice. CBT and behavioral therapies are also 
constitutive. It is possible that these therapies shaped the client in different ways, but like 
psychodynamic therapy, CBT and behavioral therapy aim to change the client. By 
examining interpretation I am simply opening the door that is most familiar and therefore 
most accessible to me. I hope that by the end of the dissertation we can begin to think of 
all psychotherapies as constitutive regardless of how we initially imagined the project. 
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That being said let us begin by examining interpretation in psychotherapy. 
Often, when we talk about interpretation in psychotherapy we are referring to 
something specific: the method of understanding the meaning of our client’s symptoms, 
behaviors, and dreams, and then conveying that meaning to our clients. In the theory, the 
meaning is carefully packaged and delivered through language. This package, which 
consists of a statement or a question, is called ‘the Interpretation’. The Interpretation, 
carrying the true meaning of the symptom or dream, is thought to impact the client 
consciously or unconsciously and so cause a psychic shift, which eventually leads to a 
new understanding that is helpful in some way—possibly by relieving symptoms, 
decreasing problematic identifications, or by causing a reorientation of the client’s desire. 
Freud and his work provide the clearest demonstration of this method of 
interpretation. For example, in The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud (1900/1998) makes 
his classic distinction between "the manifest and latent content of dreams" (p. 168). One 
cannot take the dream at face value. The characters, objects, and actions of the dream do 
not provide the true meaning or cause of the dream. In fact, the manifest content -- what a 
person might describe to a friend or to a therapist -- is really a series of masks meant to 
fool the dreamer, to keep hidden the forbidden desires that prompted the dream in the 
first place. These desires, or wishes, foment dreams and symptoms in both the 
psychologically healthy and unhealthy. It is a universal process that lies at the center of 
what it means to be human.  
Human beings experience desires that are contrary to their self-image and threaten 
to damage their social relationships and obligations. Therefore, these desires are 
repressed, pushed down and forgotten. However, these desires return in disguise. In the 
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unhealthy person they return during the day as psychological symptoms -- hysterical 
paralysis, obsession, and so on -- and in the healthy (and unhealthy alike) the desires 
return during the night in dreams. At night our defenses are weaker and we are more in 
touch with what is commonly forgotten and forbidden. However, our desires are still not 
able to stand in plain sight. Therefore, even in dreams our desires are transformed and 
hidden from us.  
The disguise can be simple or can be complex. As Freud stated: "The stricter 
censorship, the more far reaching will be the disguise and more ingenious too may be the 
means employed for putting the reader on the scent of true meaning" (p. 176). Here, 
Freud is hinting at the complex machinery of interpretation that he will construct during 
the next four decades in order to uncover the true meaning of dreams and symptoms. This 
sentence is quite revealing. Not only is it prescient, predicting the course of a career that 
only Freud could have imagined, but it also highlights a central metaphor that Freud 
employed during the course of his career. Here we can clearly see how he positioned 
himself as the "reader" of his patients, who are texts in need of interpretation. 
The use of this metaphor is not surprising as it aligns with the classic 
understanding of interpretation as described by Schleiermacher and others. Interpretation 
as a discipline existed long before Schleiermacher. The term hermeneutics, a method of 
interpretation, originates from the exegesis of biblical texts. Schleiermacher took up the 
general principles of biblical hermeneutics and applied them to creative human activity, 
such as texts, speeches, and music. Martin Packer (2011), in his discussion of the 
hermeneutic project, summarizes Schleiermacher’s aim: "Hermeneutics, as 
Schleiermacher intended to define it, would systematically employ the skills of 
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interpretation that operate within all occasions of understanding" (p. 84). 
Schleiermacher’s analysis consisted of two parts: the study of language and the 
psychological study of the subject. Schleiermacher viewed language as the medium 
through which thought was expressed. Language was objective whereas thought was a 
creative instance derived from pure subjectivity and uniqueness. The interpreter, or 
"reader" as Freud put it, needs to understand the objective system of language and the 
creative subjectivity. The latter is more essential and privileged. According to 
Schleiermacher, to grasp the creative core the interpreter must engage in a "divinatory" 
process where she empathetically understands the author better than the author herself (p. 
88). 
However, Schleiermacher did not have the last word on hermeneutics. His 
position was taken up and critiqued first by Dilthey (1990) who widened the scope of 
hermeneutics by stating that all cultural artifacts are in need of interpretive 
understanding. This is because all of our worldly activities derive from "the same  human 
spirit [which] addresses us and demands interpretation"  (cited in Packer, 2011, p. 89). In 
some ways, this position is directly in line with Schleiermacher. However, Dilthey 
contended that every act of interpretation is grounded in our experience which is "always 
concrete and historical" (p. 89). This position distanced Dilthey from Schleiermacher. In 
many ways it undermined the central notion in Schleiermacher’s theory; namely, that 
interpretation requires the meeting of the human spirit, which occurs during the 
empathetic union of interpreter/reader and author. Packer notes the impact of Dilthey's 
turn to history by stating that: 
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Understanding is not merely a contact between minds, or a reconstruction of the 
author’s mental state, it is a reconstruction of the historical process that has 
shaped a cultural product…. Interpretation is not simply penetrating an 
individual's mind, but contact with a manifestation of the life process. (p. 91)  
Packer notes that Dilthey’s emphasis on the historical nature of interpretation became 
somewhat of a poisonous pill that damaged his goal of erecting a science of interpretation 
that would produce objective meanings that were universal and ahistorical. To Dilthey 
this was devastating because his analysis undercut his aim. You could not have one 
without the other, he thought, and hence hermeneutics was lost. 
Others, such as Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960/1986) disagreed. The insight that our 
understanding is based upon our history has profound consequences, which should not be 
overlooked simply because it undermines the quest for universal, a-historical knowledge. 
This was Gadamer's basic stance. Gadamer critiqued Schleiermacher and Dilthey for their 
desire to reproduce the original creative intention as if it was preserved somewhere inside 
the text or cultural artifact. According to Packer (2011), Gadamer proposed that 
interpretation "is a productive process, a mediation between text and interpreter, a 
dialogue between past and present….neither interpreter nor text can step outside of their 
historical context" (p. 93, Italics in original). During this dialogue new meanings are 
produced, which are always practical, aligning with the needs and concerns of the 
interpreter’s everyday life. Therefore, "a true interpretation is one which points out 
something relevant in [the interpreter's] present situation which we have not noticed" (p. 
94). The interpretation is true because it involves a practical concern. The meaning 
allows us to do certain things that we weren't able to do before. This might be the 
implementation of a new skill that manipulates the physical world or it might be a new 
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understanding of ourselves as human subjects. As Packer puts it "meaning is always an 
experience, an event, a moment of application" (p. 94). 
Now, if we return to Freud and psychodynamic interpretation we can see certain 
parallels as well as avenues of critique. First, it is worth noting that describing Freud's 
method as hermeneutic is not new. Forty years ago, Ricoeur popularized the phrase, 
“hermeneutics of suspicion” as a way of describing Freud's general intent (Ricoeur, 1970, 
1974; Scott-Baumann, 2009). Ricoeur’s basic claim was that Freud's project was 
concerned with uncovering deep structures hidden under the surface appearances of 
psychic life (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, pp. xxii-xxiii). Here we can see parallels with 
Schleiermacher. Great works of art, like our dreams, capture our attention because hidden 
deep within them is the essential truth of ourselves—the creative spirit. Where 
Schleiermacher claimed that one could commune with the human spirit of the author, 
Freud argued that psychoanalytic interpretation was able to uncover the unconscious 
desires of the patient. Both men placed emphasis on the interpreter's ability to 
systematically decode the complicated texts before them. Therefore, meaning can only be 
found by a capable interpreter who employed the correct methodology. Schleiermacher 
and Freud developed different systems of interpretation for the tasks they undertook. 
However, there can be no doubt that they both believed that the truth of text (dreams or 
symptoms in the case of Freud) lay in the interpreter’s efforts. For Freud, the patient 
automatically produces a text for the analyst to examine and excavate. In many ways the 
description that Freud gives in The Interpretation of Dreams is of the patient as a passive 
medium through which the text manifests. Therefore, the patient is in dire need of the 
analysis because, much like Schleiermacher, Freud believed that the 
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analyst/reader/interpreter could understand the author better than the author herself. 
However, if we take Dilthey and Gadamer seriously then Freud's depiction of how 
psychoanalytic interpretation works cannot hold. For Gadamer the meaning of a text is 
not found underneath its manifest content as Schleiermacher and Freud would contend. 
Rather, “the meaning of the text is an effect” that is produced during the act of 
interpretation (Packer, 2011, p. 97, Italics in original). It is an effect upon the interpreter 
that occurs during the act of reading.  
In psychotherapy, interpretation is often discussed in a manner that aligns more 
with Freud and Schleiermacher. The client comes in and presents her symptoms, stories, 
and dreams while the psychotherapist silently interprets. Eventually the therapist 
ascertains certain meanings that only implicitly connect to the manifest content that the 
client provides. The therapist then devises a way to tell the client the meaning of her 
symptoms. This interpretation is then thought to impact the client. It might startle them, 
or make them angry, or possibly the client will simply dismiss it outright, but regardless, 
we hold that the interpretation does its work whether it is conscious or unconscious. Our 
training and our methods are concerned with refining our skills of interpretation and our 
method of delivery. How do we understand the client and how do we convey our 
understanding? We concern ourselves with these questions because we believe that 
speaking the true meaning of the client's symptoms will produce an effect on the client. 
However, if we follow Gadamer then we have to admit that our understanding is slightly 
askew. Meaning is an effect, this much all parties agree on, but Gadamer stated that 
meaning is produced during the act of interpretation and it affects the interpreter. 
Therefore, if we are concerned about how meaning produces effects in psychotherapy 
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then we need to realize that the most important interpreter in the room is not the therapist 
but, the client. 
Following Gadamer, the client is affected by meanings which are produced during 
her own act of interpretation. With this shift we now see the psychotherapist 
interpretations as texts that are read and interpreted by the client. It is during this reading 
that the meaningful effects of psychotherapy occur. Furthermore, we must remember that 
the meaning of the text is grounded in the historical constitution of the interpreter. The 
meaning grabs us because it has immediate practical concern, allowing us to see things in 
different ways and do things we could not do before. Yet, our practical concerns are not 
given, universally; they are constituted by the very practices we engage in. Therefore, if 
we want to better understand how psychotherapy works we need to understand how the 
client is constituted as a particular kind of interpreter during psychotherapy. This 
interpreter is not simply someone who thinks in a certain way, but is a certain way 
depending on the practices in which they are engaged. It is, therefore, better to refer to 
this interpreter as a certain kind of subject. The subject that we are referring to here is not 
a universal subject of essentialism, but the distributed subject who comes into being 
through concerned engagement with others within their form of life.1 Hence, the question 
                                                            
1 Psychotherapy is a not a benign tool of understanding; rather it is a practice that constitutes the 
very subjects with whom they engage. And yet, it is important to understand that psychotherapy 
is one of many discursive practices that have constitutive effects on the subject. Therefore, we see 
a "dispersion of subjectivity" across different ways of speaking and acting, rather than a classic 
subject of essentialism (Packer, 2011, p. 349). This is not to say that the subject is in pieces, or 
lacks freewill and initiative. Rather, it means that the subject comes to be through certain 
discourses that are related to one another in a complex web of actions. This web of actions is not 
stagnant, but is part of an ongoing historical process. Later in The History of Sexuality, Foucault 
(1978) talks about this "action upon action" as the field of power (quoted in Packer, 2011, p. 
413). 
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that confronts us is: How is the client constituted as a certain kind of subject during the 
practice of psychotherapy? 
Constitutional Research on Psychotherapy   
I have left the term constitution undefined up to this point because I wanted to 
avoid the discussion prior to introducing my project. Although the term is familiar to 
most, I am following Martin Packer's use of the word. Packer (2011) defines constitution 
as "the relationship of mutual formation between people and their forms of life" (p. 20). 
By focusing on constitution we hold that people are always part of their cultures and 
communities. Communities are not simply a benign container but are integral to how 
human beings change and develop. Simply put, different communities use different 
practices that involve people, tools, institutions, ideas, and discourse. These practices 
have constitutive effects which bring rise to different ways of seeing and acting -- being 
and becoming. Psychotherapy is one such practice. By focusing on constitution we can 
see psychotherapy as part of a larger field of practices, all producing their various, yet 
related, constitutive effects. Hence, in order to understand psychotherapy we need to 
attend to the details of the practice itself, while also attending to its larger constitutive 
aims. In conventional terms, if we want to understand psychotherapy we have to 
understand how it changes people. Hence, I will often talk about how this study 
explicates change and how it explicates constitution. In part, this is because I see change 
and constitution as synonymous. I prefer to talk about the study as a constitutional 
approach to change. The difference between the constitutional approach to change and 
the standard approach to change will be discussed in the methodology chapter (chapter 4, 
sub-section: studying constitutional change).  
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Carl Rogers (Rogers & Dymond, 1954) was one of the first therapist/researchers 
to study whether psychotherapy produced measurable change. After nearly 50 years of 
outcome research it is clear that psychotherapy does produce change (Lambert & Bergin, 
1994; Orlinsky, Ronnestad, & Willutzki, 2004). However, as one of the leaders of 
empirical psychotherapy research, Allan Kazdin (Kazdin, 2009), states:  
 A randomized controlled trial may show that treatment compared with no 
treatment leads to therapeutic change. [Hence] we can say that the treatment 
caused the change, as that term is used in science. Demonstrating a cause does not 
say why the intervention led to change or how the change came about. (p. 419) 
Kazdin goes on to call for a type of analysis that can provide a “meticulous description” 
of how psychotherapy produces change (p. 421). These accounts would be aimed at 
describing what happens in psychotherapy, but when the description reaches the level of 
meticulous detail, the “what” would become a sufficient case for “how”.2 Psychotherapy 
researchers are developing the “fine-grained” analysis that Kazdin identifies as the new 
frontier of psychotherapy research (Elliott, 2010; Howard, Lueger, Maling, & 
Martinovich, 1993). However, approaches that originated outside of psychology have 
long been interested in examining what happens in psychotherapy. 
Conversation Analysis (CA) is a research approach that combines the 
phenomenological focus of Harold Garfinkel’s Ethnomethodology, with the attention to 
conversational detail characteristic of discourse analysis (Garfinkel, 1967; C. Goodwin & 
                                                            
2 Interestingly, Kazdin demonstrates how descriptive research was used to change public policy 
and shift public norms about smoking. He claims that an analogous type of research could be 
used to understand how change happens in psychotherapy: A chemical (benzo[a]pyrene) found in 
cigarette smoke induces genetic mutation at specific regions of the gene’s DNA that is identical 
to the damage evident in lung cancer cells. This finding is considered to convey precisely how 
cigarette smoking leads to cancer at the molecular level. This is an example of where ‘‘the what’’ 
(description) can be sufficiently fine grained as to convey ‘‘the how.’’ (p. 421) 
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Heritage, 1990; Packer, 2011). CA has been used to examine psychotherapy at a level of 
detail not found in conventional psychotherapy research. The current movement to apply 
CA to psychotherapy is part of a long history of the exploration of therapeutic language. 
This history includes foundational linguistic studies such as Labov’s Therapeutic 
discourse: Psychotherapy as Conversation, which was published over 30 years ago 
(Labov & Fanshel, 1977). One change worth noting is that conversation analysts are no 
longer just sociologists, but now also psychotherapy researchers, and psychotherapists 
hoping to influence how we understand and practice psychotherapy. Their work has 
shown a lot of promise. CA allows us to see psychotherapy as a negotiated series of 
sequential actions between the therapist and the client that unfolds in real time. 
Researchers have shown how different utterances have different effects. Furthermore, 
they have begun to show how the participants’ understanding of what is being said 
greatly depends on the unfolding context.  
So far most of the research has relied on the CA method of finding numerous 
cases of one type of utterance or sequence and then developing a normative structure and 
functional explanation. Few attempts have been made to understand psychotherapy 
sessions as a whole or how multiple sessions relate to one another. Furthermore, CA has 
just begun to explore the role of emotion in conversation. This is problematic for 
conversation analysts studying psychotherapy because the majority of therapeutic 
conversations involve implicit, as well as explicit, emotional topics and displays. A focus 
on the sequence of the conversation, rather than the content of the conversation also 
limits CA’s ability to study the role of narrative positioning in psychotherapy. Despite 
these limitations, CA provides a powerful methodology that is based on ontological 
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assumptions of a constitutional approach to change.  
Hence, CA forms the backbone of the methodological approach for this study. 
However, certain changes and additions to the basic methodology had to be made in 
order to produce an account of constitution in psychotherapy. These changes profoundly 
shifted the way I saw, thought, and talked about the interactional process I observed in 
the dataset. These additions do not violate the basic ontological assumptions central to 
CA. However, the changes are significant and as a result the methodology cannot be 
classified as a pure CA study. Rather, in order to achieve the goal of producing an 
account of the constitutional processes in psychotherapy, I had to develop a new 
methodology, which uses the procedures of CA, yet incorporates other akin approaches so 
as to expand CA’s analytic power and increase its suitability for studying constitution.  
In the following chapters, I will describe how I analyzed video recordings and 
transcripts of two psychotherapy sessions between a single client and therapist, in order 
to show how the client is constituted as a certain kind of subject during psychotherapy. 
Hence, this study uses a case study approach. At times, case studies have been criticized 
by those who see them as unable to provide generalizable findings. Yet, I will argue that 
the results are valid descriptions of a real constitutional process in psychotherapy and 
therefore generalizable. The four major findings of the study are as follows. First, the 
study shows how psychotherapy constitutes the client as a deep emotional subject who 
must understand her emotions in order to be an ethical being. Second, interpretation was 
shown to be a pragmatic practice that asserts the therapist’s subjective perspective into 
the conversation. This allows the client to respond with her own interpretation. This 
collaborative process was found to be an important change process in psychotherapy and 
 17 
 
these findings conform to the more interactional understanding of interpretation (Aron, 
1992; Winnicott, 1971) Third, the analysis provides a description of how Foucauldian 
problematizing occurs through the deployment of conversational actions that shift the 
location of the therapeutic problem and encourage the client to think about herself as an 
emotional being. Last, this study demonstrates how the indeterminacy of talk is used as a 
creative resource for both the therapist and client during problematizing.  
The analysis is preceded by three chapters that provide the necessary context and 
background for this study. In chapter 2, I discuss the ontological assumptions that ground 
a constitutional approach to change. This is followed by chapter 3, which provide the 
reader with an overview of CA, as well as a review of the rich research that CA has 
generated on psychotherapy. This chapter ends with a reflection on how CA in its current 
state is unable to describe important aspects of psychotherapy. Hence, in chapter 4, I 
show how CA can be combined with de Rivera’s (1977) Structural Theory of Emotion 
(STE), and Wortham’s (2001) action based theory of narrative positioning (NIA) to form 
a new methodology capable of explicating the constitutional process in psychotherapy. I 
call this methodology Detailed Interaction Analysis. In chapter 4, I argue that CA, STE 
and NIA all share ontological assumptions that are in harmony with the constitutional 
approach to change. This methodology, which was developed over the course of this 
study, is one of the major achievements of this project. With the methodology described, 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are devoted to the analysis and findings of the study. Chapter 5 
concerns the first session, session A, while Chapter 6 covers the second session, session 
B. Chapter 7 will be an overview of the findings. The final chapter, chapter 8, provides a 
reflection on the research project and possible future research. Now, let’s take a careful 
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look at the ontological assumptions of constitution and how this can be translated into a 
methodology capable of explicating the change process in psychotherapy.  
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chapter 2 
THE ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH 
TO CHANGE 
 
"Our conception of the psyche, Foucault contends, has been sculpted by the 
techniques that we have devised to probe its secrets, to oblige it to give up hidden 
knowledge that will reveal to us the truth about who we are. Psychoanalysis is from a 
historical perspective a later addition to that enterprise, born of a long but erratic linage 
of techniques of the care of the self.” 
Patrick Hutton, Technologies 
of the self: A seminar with 
Michel Foucault ,(1988b, p. 
121). 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: Ontological Assumptions and Constitution 
The goal of this chapter is to describe the ontological assumptions of a 
constitutional approach to change. These assumptions create the foundation on which the 
following chapters will be built. My understanding of constitution is grounded in the 
work of Martin Packer, Heidegger and Foucault. To begin let’s define ontology. 
Ontology is the branch of philosophy that tries to define the kinds of entities that exist 
and has its historical roots in the metaphysics of Aristotle (van Inwagen, 2012). We all 
hold ontological assumptions. These assumptions are active when we make claims about 
the world and in addition we always say something, directly or indirectly, about ourselves 
as certain kinds of beings. This is especially true of research. When research makes 
specific claims about people or the world, it inevitably carries certain ontological 
assumptions about what human beings are. These assumptions impact the kind of 
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research we conduct and the results we obtain. This chapter uses plain language to 
explicate the ontological assumptions that ground this study. In short, these ontological 
assumptions are that humans are relational, historical beings whose fundamental nature is 
not given, but constituted through the social practices of a form of life. Psychotherapy is 
one such practice, and consequently this chapter ends with a brief summary of Foucault’s 
genealogy of psychotherapy. 
Human Beings are Relational and Part of a Form of Life 
This study assumes that human beings are relational, first and foremost. Our 
understanding of things and of ourselves arises out of our relational form of life. Form of 
life can be defined simply as all of a person’s worldly relationships past and present. This 
encompasses the person’s culture as well as her idiosyncratic history. I think of a form of 
life as synonymous with Heidegger’s “Being-in-the-world” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 
78). However, the term form of life is most often attributed to Ludwig Wittgenstein, who 
employed the term to emphasize how language is interwoven into our historically rich 
and complex contextual world. Hence: “Forms of life can be understood as changing and 
contingent, dependent on culture, context, history, etc” (Biletzki & Matar, 2011). This is 
echoed by Martin Packer (2011) who describes a form of life as “‘cultural processes,’ 
distributed dynamically” through time and space, which are both constituting and 
constituted through human participation (p. 234).3 In other words, living is a way of 
participating with our form of life. This is a process that constitutes us as certain kinds of 
people. However, through this process we change the form of life itself; therefore 
                                                            
3 Packer points out that he uses the term ‘form of life’ in the place of culture because it helps 
remind us that culture is a process rather than a circumscribed thing. 
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allowing for new and future ways of living and being. 
An individual’s form of life encompasses both personal/cultural history and 
present context. Hence, context is part of the form of life, but refers to one’s most 
immediate engagement. When we talk about context, we narrow the scope from large 
historical patterns to the immediate practices in which one is engaged. For example, in 
psychotherapy the context is first and foremost: what is happening and what has just 
happened. This includes what was just talked about and how the participants were just 
relating to one another. However, the context can be extended by the participants as they 
refer to previous sessions, or past events from their lives. 
This means that context is observable. Now one might ask if some elements of the 
context are invisible or implicit. Maybe there are things that have happened to the person 
or things that were said previously that have an effect on what is happening in the 
session, and maybe these invisible processes are very important. This might be the case, 
but we must remember two things. First, absolute knowledge is impossible as a 
researcher and as a human being in general. One does not need absolute knowledge to 
conduct a meaningful examination of a phenomenon. If this were the case, no knowledge 
or research would be meaningful. Just because Newton could not explain the “first” 
movement does not mean that his theories and research were meaningless. Second, we 
are concerned with how actions (action on action) are used in the practice of 
psychotherapy to make change. When we talk about context, we are talking about the 
context that the participants build through their actions on each other. This 
contextualizing is really what we are looking at rather than the static mass of things that 
have happened in the past.  
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The way participants use elements of a given context acts to reproduce or change 
the current order within a form of life. The form of life is not given, but constituted 
through our concernful engagement in day-to-day practices. Practices are, simply, the 
things we do: the activities we engage in, which serve some purpose or address some 
problems. I will use the terms ‘practices’ and ‘activities’ interchangeably throughout this 
project. However, ‘practices’ is in many ways preferable because it helps to convey the 
historical nature of the things we do. Although practices might be something we do in the 
present moment, they have a history and this history is important. Furthermore, practices 
are always part of one’s social life and therefore they are often referred as social-practices 
to remind the reader of the grounding ontological assumption that humans are relational 
beings. 
The First Aspect of Constitution: The Hermeneutic Circle 
When we are engaged in a practice that is free of problems, we can commit 
ourselves to what we are doing fully. We are concerned, engaged, and focused. Our 
attention might wander, but our bodies and effort are focused on the task at hand. This 
concernful engagement is what Heidegger called “understanding” (Heidegger, 
1927/1962, p. 182). 
Understanding is a type of knowing that is fundamental to what human beings are, 
and it amounts to an implicit pre-reflective grasp of the world that we find ourselves in. It 
is a kind of knowing where there is no mind body split. The hand grasps and the mind 
attends in concert and without reflection. There is only concernful action with the task at 
hand. When you grab a hammer there is no need to sort out what it is for and what it 
does. When you grab the hammer and begin to work, the hammer and nail are 
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understood. The understanding is tied up with the project you are working on. You build 
the house for your family, for your future. The hammer, as it is understood, is bound up 
with this project. 
Hence, one of the core existential facets of our existence is that through our 
engagement with the world all sorts of possibilities emerge. A rock can be a weapon, a 
cooking utensil, a seat, a composition of minerals, a geological time capsule and so on. 
What the rock is depends on our engagement with it, and this engagement is made 
possible by a certain understanding that arises out of our form of life, which is socio-
historically unique. Hence, our actions, the way we think, work and relate to others, self 
and world, is constituted by the form of life to which we belong. However, understanding 
is not simply a cognitive process. It is a way of being-in-a-form-of-life and actively 
participating within an unfolding context. Thoughts, behaviors, and emotions are actions 
that arise out of the unfolding context and in turn shape the unfolding context (i.e. the 
contextualizing of the form of life). Participants can change the context, renew the 
context, or make certain things more or less important and it is through this process that 
we work out the possibilities that are implicitly grasped by our understanding. This 
process of working out possibilities can be described as a Hermeneutic circle. Through 
this hermeneutic process we are shaped by our context (which is grounded in our 
understanding of our form of life), but we in turn shape our context through our actions. 
This process is the first aspect of Constitution: we are shaped by our socio-historical 
form of life, yet through our engagement we reproduce or reconfigure the order within a 
given form of life. As Packer writes: “People are not merely products of a form of life; 
their actions sustain that form of life, and can transform it” (Packer, 2011, p. 288). 
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The Second Aspect of Constitution: Changing Ourselves through Problematizing 
Foucault’s research can be separated into three stages or types of research: 
Archaeology, Genealogy, and Ethics. All of these can be seen as attempts to describe 
how the hermeneutic circle in the constitutional process actually works. To do this, 
Foucault developed what he called: “‘A critical history of thought’” (quoted in Packer, 
2011, p. 374). For Foucault, thought is not limited to the realm of internal 
representations. Thought takes many forms: tools, words, actions, institutions. Therefore, 
thought is something that is in the world. It is observable because thought is social and 
interpersonal—even our private thoughts are connected to our form of life, which is 
fundamentally interpersonal and social. 
This view of thought is influenced by Heidegger. When we are concernfully 
engaged with a given social practice, things are understood. We grab our tools without a 
thought and begin working away. When we are in this mode, our tools, the project we are 
engaged in, and even ourselves are understood. When something, such as a hammer, is 
understood in this way Heidegger referred to it as “ready-to-hand”: readily available for 
use and understood in terms of one’s form of life and the unfolding project in which one 
is engaged (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 99). 
Yet, if a problem arises, if tools break-down, then our engagement with the world 
changes. If you are hammering away and suddenly the hammer breaks, everything stops. 
The hammer is no longer a hammer, it is a broken piece of wood and a chunk of iron. The 
hammer is no longer ready-to-hand. It is no longer un-reflectively understood as part of 
an unfolding project (context) and the form of life; rather it is “un-ready-to-hand” (p. 
103). It becomes something for our thought. We look at it and wonder what happened 
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and what to do. This is what Heidegger referred to as “circumspection” (p. 98). 
Therefore, thought arises when there is a problem. The way a person relates to the world 
shifts from concernful engagement to concerned circumspection: concerned thought 
directed toward the project at hand in order to assess the possibilities that one has 
available. 
However, problems do not simply occur when things break. Problems arise out of 
the form of life, “when how we live becomes a matter of concern” (Packer, 2011, p. 376). 
And problems do not just pop-up as clear and understood. When problems occur there are 
all sorts of responses. Different views of what the problem is and what caused the 
problem are explored. Different solutions are devised. Organizations, movements, and 
institutions are created. Practices are developed to address the problem. People are 
trained and re-trained based on new thoughts about what the problem is and what the 
solution may be. Hence, where there is a problem, there is thought in all its forms. 
Furthermore, problems and thought have to be seen as active social processes. For 
Foucault, trying to separate problems from thought is impossible. As Packer puts it: 
“thought is problematization” (p. 376).  
From this viewpoint, psychotherapy and constitutional research are both forms of 
thought, which problematize what human beings are. The goal of constitutional research 
is to expose the contingency of subjectivity and the relationship between human subjects 
and social practices. This process frees us up to find new possibilities, new ways of 
thinking, living, and being. Yet, constitutional research also problematizes psychotherapy 
and depicts it as a contingent historical practice that is used as a mechanism of productive 
power. This description moves against many of the common assumptions that 
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psychotherapy is simply a ‘helping profession.’ This demonstrates how at the heart of 
problematizing is action on action—different ways of thinking about a problem, which 
change the problem, as well as all those who are engaged in these acts of problematizing. 
In sum, human beings are historical beings who are born into a certain socio-
historical form of life where living and the problems of living have already been 
established.4 Yet, these conditions are not axiomatic or unchangeable. Rather, they are 
contingent because the form of life and the problems in it are always changing. Changes 
happen when new ways of thinking, of problematizing, arise and lead to new practices. 
From large scale institutions to the smallest aspects of our daily activities, all forms of 
thought are part of the process of problematization. The process is hermeneutic and all 
our thoughts and actions are in response to the unfolding context, yet how we act changes 
the context. By engaging in problematizing we change who we are in relation to the 
unfolding context that is, itself, changing in response to our actions. This leads to the 
second aspect of constitution: Thought and understanding are not just things we do, they 
are processes through which we become certain kinds of subjects.  
Understanding Constitution through Historical Ontology 
In order to understand this constitutional process, empirical research needs to be 
guided by the work of both Heidegger and Foucault.  For Heidegger (1927/1962), human 
beings are their understanding: a clearing in which things light up, become available for 
use, and have meaning. Heidegger states:  
when we talk in an ontically figurative way of the lumen naturale in man, we have 
in mind nothing other than the existential-ontological structure of this entity, that 
                                                            
4 What Heidegger (Heidegger, 1927/1962) referred to as “thrownness” of Dasein (p. 174). 
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it is in such a way as to be its 'there'. To say that it is 'illuminated'… means that as 
being-in-the-world it is clear... in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a 
way that it is itself the clearing.... Dasein brings its 'there' along with it... Dasein is 
its disclosedness….In understanding and state-of-mind, we shall see two 
constitutive ways of being the 'there'; and these are primordial. (p. 171) 
In other words, Human beings are pure possibility, which allows things to show up as 
meaningful and useful. When we understand something as something, its meaning 
depends on our actions, our intentions, and how it fits into the unfolding context of our 
form of life (for-sake-of-which). Yet, because human beings are pure possibility, the kind 
of person we are is contingent and always subject to change. As Heidegger writes: 
“Dasein is the entity which, as Being-in-the-world, is an issue for itself" (p. 181). There is 
no human nature or given human condition. Who we are gets worked out through 
participating in practices within our form of life. Any type of action we take is a way of 
constituting who we are in relation to others, self, and world. Hence, by engaging in 
practices we constitute ourselves as certain kinds of people in relation to others and the 
world. 
Foucault’s historical research shows us how constitution occurs in the varied acts 
of problematizing. Archaeology explicates how, for example, discursive practices shift 
along with our understanding of the other, who now might be called mentally ill, but at 
one time was call the madman. This shift is part of the discourse of reason, which has as 
its counterpart the discourse of madness. Yet, madness changed along with the practices. 
The medieval notion of mad wisdom faded with the ship of fools and the animality of 
madness went away with the rise of hospitals in 1657 and the humanistic liberation of the 
‘mad’ in 1794 (Foucault, 1988a). This liberation marked the transition from madness to 
mental illness and the development of practices that are aimed at subduing madness 
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through internalization of rational control. All the confluences of practice and discourse 
can be uncovered by the archaeologist and serve as time points when things were 
different. The conclusion is that we are now is contingent on the unique history of our 
form of life. Genealogy was developed to map the changes and show how practices and 
people change. Genealogy is a method that describes the two elements of constitution: the 
dialectical relationship between participants and their form of life and how people 
become certain kinds of subjects through their engagement in the practices of their form 
of life. In other words, genealogy maps the actions on actions, what Foucault described as 
power, which occurs within any given social practice. Hence, archaeology describes the 
order with a form of life and genealogy describes how this order changes. The order and 
the changes to the order occur through problematization. Ethics is related to genealogy 
and archaeology, in that it is a description of how problematizing affects people. 
However, its focus is on how people work on themselves in order to become ethical 
beings. 
The Four Elements of Foucault's Ethics 
In one of his last interviews, Foucault (1983) stated that there are four elements to 
ethics. These elements are the way that ethics shows itself to the researcher and the 
means by which subjects fashion themselves into ethical beings. These elements are not 
the ethical code a prescribed to each generation. Foucault remarked that these codes stay 
relatively stable; what changes is our relationship to ourselves—the means by which we 
see ourselves in light of the ethical code. Let's look at each of these elements individually 
so we get a better understanding of what Foucault was trying to convey. 
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The first element is what Foucault called the "ethical substance" (p. 238). It is the 
‘substance’ that is manipulated by ethics. For example, Foucault stated that the substance 
manipulated by modern people is feelings. If the modern person acts against the ethical 
code he can still be moral as long as his feelings are in the right place. "You can have a 
girl in the street or anywhere, if you have very good feelings toward your wife," Foucault 
once stated (p. 238). Here, Foucault was making a distinction between, on the one hand, 
the ethical code and its relation to prohibited acts, and on the other hand, the relationship 
that one is supposed to have with oneself in order to be a moral subject. The latter is what 
Foucault described as Ethics. Both the ethical code and the ethical self-relationship are 
part of any morality, but they don’t always align perfectly. Hence, even though cheating 
on a spouse is against the ethical code, one can examine one’s own feelings in order to 
understand the violation and through this process of self understanding one can regain or 
reaffirm their own morality. The ethical substance in this example is one’s feelings: it is 
what has to be examined in order to remain moral. Foucault contrasted this with the 
Greeks. For them the ethical substance was "aphrodisia....[which are] acts linked to 
pleasure and desire" (p. 238). "For the Greeks, when a philosopher was in love with a 
boy, but did not touch him, his behavior was valued. The problem was does he touch the 
boy or not. That's the ethical substance: the act linked with pleasure and desire" (p. 238).  
This brings up an important question for this project: What is in question ethically 
during psychotherapy? What substance is interrogated so as to determine if one's 
behavior is ethical? Foucault hinted that the substance I will find is feelings; however, we 
must only use this as a guiding thought and let the analysis discover the problematic 
ethical substance that is being constituted in the practice of psychotherapy. 
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Next, is the "mode of subjection:” how people are encouraged to recognize their 
“moral obligations” (p. 239). Foucault pointed out that this mode has changed over the 
centuries. During the Enlightenment, people were interested in how rationality could 
guide behavior; hence reason was the mode. Before that the mode was God's law or the 
natural order. These different modes of subjection incorporate various discursive 
practices. Foucault stated that “political power, glory, immortality, and beauty are all 
linked at a certain moment" and that moment is marked by the mode of subjection at play 
within the practice at hand (p. 239).  
The third, element is the means by which we become ethical, the devices we 
employ as ethical beings. This is a reference to the practices that are prescribed to a 
person in order to change. Once we have identified the problematic ethical substance and 
the standard by which we recognize our deficiencies, we may ask what we can do to 
change. How are we "to moderate our acts, or to decipher what we are, or to eradicate our 
desires….and so on -- all this elaboration of ourselves in order to behave ethically" (p. 
239). Therefore, I will be examining what tools the client takes up in order to change. 
One focus will be how the client uses the therapist’s interpretation or other inventions in 
order to understand herself.  
Last, Foucault suggested that we need to be interested in the end or goal, the telos, 
what kind of person we imagine we will become through the application of ethics. Will 
we "become pure, or immortal, or free, or masters of ourselves, and so on" through 
ethical practices? (p. 239). Hence, I will be attending to the kind of person that the client 
aspires to become through the practice of psychotherapy. This requires attention to ethics 
as well as a genealogy of power as it is enacted during the course of the dataset.  
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The rest of this chapter, as well as, chapter 3 and 4 will be devoted to describing 
how we can conduct a genealogy that can attend to how psychotherapy uses actions on 
actions to constitute the client as a certain kind of subject. This current chapter ends with 
a brief overview of Foucault’s understanding of psychotherapy as a practice of power and 
his method of genealogical interpretation. This review will provide a general overview of 
power and different types of hermeneutic strategies that can be used in psychotherapy. 
Then, in chapter 3, I will discuss how conversation analysis as a research methodology is 
designed to describe how actions on actions affect participants within a given practice. I 
will argue that conversation analysis, with some modifications, is an ideal method for 
studying constitution in psychotherapy. 
A Brief Genealogy of Psychotherapy  
James Miller (1993) describes an encounter between Foucault and his graduate 
students who were vacationing at a mountain cabin. He writes:  
After the group had gathered….another one of the young men said that he felt he 
needed psychotherapy, and asked Foucault what kind he would recommend. 
“‘Freudian will be fine,’” said the philosopher…. “I would have thought 
‘schizoanalysis’ would be more in order,” said Wade, alluding to the…vision of 
psychology that Deleuze and Guattari had elaborated in Anti-Oedipus….Foucault 
roared with laughter. Finally composing himself, he said, as Wade recalls, 
“‘There cannot be a general theory of psychoanalysis—everyone must do it for 
themselves.’” (pp. 281-282) 
The disbelief of Wade and the other students is understandable given what Foucault 
wrote about psychoanalysis over the course of his life. Foucault’s position toward 
psychotherapy is not uniform, but it is clear that he viewed the depth hermeneutic of 
psychoanalysis as troubling. Much of his later work was devoted to exposing the way that 
psychoanalysis typified a way of constituting people as having deep selves that needed to 
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be understood in order to heal and become ethical beings. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) 
pointed out that the deep self is aggressively targeted by Foucault because, given the 
socio-political climate, it is ripe for historicizing “in order to open the possibility of the 
emergence of a new ethical subject” (p. 254). Hence, Foucault did not see the depth 
hermeneutic of psychoanalysis as the most vital threat facing the modern subject, but he 
did see it as a pervasive way of constituting ourselves that has certain dangers. 
Furthermore, this depth hermeneutic has become so much a part of us that we have 
forgotten that it is contingent on a history of human practices. In other words, it is 
contingent and capable of transformation given the proper circumstances. What will 
follow will be an overview of the historicizing that Foucault conducted on psychotherapy 
in order to explicate its contingency. Then we will look at how Foucault’s view of 
psychotherapy as a modern practice was not as dogmatic as one might expect and how 
Foucault can be seen as acknowledging the benefit of psychotherapy aimed at enlarging 
the scope of personal freedom. 
Although critical of psychology and psychiatry, Foucault spoke favorably of both 
Freud and Binswanger in his early writings (Foucault, 1984, 1987). In his first book, 
Mental Illness and Psychology, Foucault (1987) outlines how mental illness became 
constituted through the exclusion and silencing of the modern asylum. He credits Freud 
with breaking this silence, stating that madness “entered a phase of silence from which it 
was not to emerge….until Freud….opened up once again the possibility for reason and 
unreason to communicate” (p. 69). However, this kindness toward Freud began to shift in 
his book, Madness and Civilization. There, Foucault (1988a) concluded: “To the doctor, 
Freud transferred all the structures Pinel and Tuke had set up within confinement….he 
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created the psychoanalytical situation where…alienation becomes disalienating because, 
in the doctor, it becomes a subject (p. 278). This critique of Freud continues through 
Foucault’s genealogies of sexuality and his examination of modern ethics; however he 
always delivers Freud and psychoanalysis a nuanced verdict. 
For example, in his genealogy of sexuality, Foucault (1978) elaborated his theory 
of power. Foucault sees power as a manifold of "force relations" that are connected in a 
uniform manner, which have their strategies, which are its effects (p. 92). He elaborates 
by saying:  
It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the 
multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate in 
which constitute their own organization; as a process which, through ceaseless 
struggles and confrontations, transformations, strengthens, or reverses them; as 
the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain 
or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate 
them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, 
whose general design or institutional crystallization is embedded in the state 
apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies. (pp. 92 
-93) 
In other words, "there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and 
objectives.... the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case 
that no one is there to have invented them" (p. 95).  
He then goes on to discuss two great strategies of power in western history: the 
“deployment of alliance” and the “deployment of sexuality” (p. 106). He notes that there 
is a trans-cultural tendency for sexuality to be used to strengthen family and societal 
relationships. This results in a field of power-relations that actively enforces communal 
law regarding sexual behavior. There is an emphasis on what can and cannot be done and 
the strategic end is the reproduction of the prevailing power-relations, such as patriarchal 
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domination, and heteronormativity. This is the deployment of alliance. Foucault states 
that this great strategy dominated the western world through much of the modern age. 
However, in the 19th century this strategy gave way to the deployment of sexuality. 
Foucault clarifies that this strategy of power differs in that, “its reason for being [is] not 
in reproducing itself, but in proliferating, innovating, annexing, creating, and penetrating 
bodies in an increasingly detailed way, and in controlling populations in an increasingly 
comprehensive way” (p. 107). The deployment of sexuality is made up of a host of 
practices, which constitute the modern subject as a deep self, full of unknown desires that 
must be understood in order to become an ethical being. 
 This strategic shift of power did not happen suddenly. Rather, practices that were 
developed and used to strengthen social structures in the 16th and 17th century made the 
shift possible. Foucault details how the Christian confessional became a powerful tool for 
maintaining the structure of the family and of western society (p. 116). This practice was 
based on turning every whim, inkling, or fancy “into discourse” and then providing 
pastoral instruction for how to atone for the sin. In the 18th century this way of turning 
every detail of one’s soul into discourse became, more and more, secular until it was no 
longer in the domain of the church, but the domain of medicine and the state. It seems 
that for Foucault this is when the deployment of sexuality was at its most dangerous 
juncture. 
Across his work concerning psychotherapy and psychology, Foucault returns to 
the danger of locating sexuality, madness, or humanity in biology (Foucault, 1978, 1984, 
1987, 1988a). He argues that in the 19th century medicine tried to inscribe sexual desire 
into biology, which created “the opening up of the great medico-psychological domain of 
 35 
 
the ‘perversions,’ which was destined to take over from the old moral categories of 
debauchery and excess” (p. 118). In other words, the practice of turning sexual desire into 
discourse, along with the moral undertone of sin, were adopted and transformed into a 
biological science that equated moral degeneracy to heredity. This is where 
psychoanalysis plays a more nuanced role. Although psychoanalysis is a practice based 
on the confessional, it did not locate sexuality in biology and for this Foucault 
acknowledges psychoanalysis as a counter-force that stood against the strategy of power 
as was historically deployed: 
It is very well to look back from our vantage point and remark upon the 
normalizing impulse in Freud….but the fact remains that in the great family of 
technologies of sex, which goes back into the history of the Christian West, of all 
those institutions that set out in the nineteenth century to medicalize sex, it was 
the one that…rigorously opposed the political and institutional effects of the 
perversion-heredity-degeneresence system. (p. 119) 
Foucault goes on to show how psychoanalysis played a differentiating, yet pivotal 
role in the deployment of sexuality. It acted with and against prevailing deployments of 
power in ways that shifted the overall strategy. Beyond opposing biologism, 
psychoanalysis realigned the deployment of alliance and the deployment of sexuality 
under the banner of secular science. As Foucault writes: “psychoanalysis whose technical 
procedure seemed to place the confession of sexuality outside family jurisdiction, 
rediscovered the law of alliance, the involved working of marriage and kinship, and 
incest at the heart of this sexuality” (p. 113). Hence, it is through the “interrelatedness of 
the law and desire” that psychoanalysis constituted the 19th and earlier 20th century 
bourgeoisie as deep selves with unknown desires that could be interpreted by medical 
professionals and understood in ways that established the bourgeoisie as a unique social 
class (p. 129). The upsurge of discourse regarding sexuality is used to direct the 
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bourgeoisie on how they are to become ethical and good people and through this process 
they strengthen the class alliances—those of family and business—that define and 
distinguish them as a class. Foucault quips that the aristocracy of old Europe maintained 
power through blood and inheritance, yet on the contrary: “The bourgeoisie’s ‘blood’ was 
its sex” (p. 124). 
Hence, Foucault held a nuanced opinion of psychoanalysis seeing, it as a practice 
that opposed some dangers (biologism), while creating others (self-surveillance and 
normativity). Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) point out that at the end of his career Foucault 
became more and more convinced that psychoanalysis, and for that matter 
psychotherapy, furthered the deployment of a restrictive and insidious form of power that 
needed to be critiqued and transformed (or abandoned). They write:  
As long as the interpretive sciences continue to search for a deep truth, that is, to 
practice a hermeneutics of suspicion, as long as they proceed on the assumption 
that it is the Great Interpreter who has privileged access to meaning, while 
insisting that the truths they uncover lie outside the sphere of power, these 
sciences seem fated to contribute to the strategies of power. (pp. 180-181) 
In other words, Foucault became highly suspicious of psychotherapy, yet left open the 
possibility of a type of therapy that would not conform to the deployment of sexuality. 
Psychotherapy as a Hermeneutics of Suspicion 
For Foucault, therapists should not engage in a hermeneutic of suspicion. Both 
Ricoeur (1970) and Habermas (1968) describe psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic practice. 
Habermas contrasted Freud's hermeneutic method with Dilthey’s. He pointed out that 
Freud was not solely interested in the conscious intention of a person’s story (i.e. text). 
He was interested in the mistakes, omissions, and errors. These were conceived not as 
accidents or meaningless corruptions of the text, but as meaningful symbolic actions that 
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must be understood in order to comprehend the text (patient) as a whole. Habermas wrote 
that, "the symbolic structures that psychoanalysis seeks to comprehend are corrupted by 
the impact of internal conditions. The mutilations have meaning as such…. this 
distinguishes…[psychoanalysis as] a hermeneutics that unites the linguistic analysis with 
the psychological investigation of causal connections” (p. 217). Habermas viewed 
Freud's method as a depth hermeneutic. The symptoms that bring the patient into therapy 
are seen as "the scars of a corrupted text that confronts the author as incomprehensible" 
(p. 219). The “scars” and the text itself are then interpreted producing a final 
understanding that might be quite contrary to the original intent of the text. In this way 
the depth hermeneutic questions what lies underneath the text because its relevancy is of 
utmost importance if we are going to understand the text itself.  
This is similar to Ricoeur’s description of Freud's method as a hermeneutics of 
suspicion comparable in structure to interpretive investigations of Karl Marx or the 
second division of Heidegger's Being and Time (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. xxii). 
Ricoeur (1970) stated that "psychoanalysis is a modification of the Spinozist critique of 
free will; analysis begins by denying that the apparent arbitrariness of consciousness is 
anything more than the nonrecognition of underlying motivations" (p. 391). Freud’s 
grand suspicion is that what we take as free choice is actually motivated by unconscious 
dynamics only to be understood by analysis of a patient’s textual corruptions. Therefore, 
for both Habermas and Ricoeur we can describe psychoanalysis as an active suspicion of 
underlying motivations behind consciousness and a practical hermeneutic method that 
attempts to understand these motivations by interpreting the text via its scars. The 
symptom presents itself as incomprehensible and it is the hermeneutic practice that 
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attempts to comprehend the symptom in relation to the text. In the end, the symptom 
decodes the text itself, giving a fuller picture of the patient's psyche. 
The unconscious is an essential idea, which guides psychoanalytic hermeneutics 
and the dialogue that unfolds between therapist and patient. It sets a bearing towards the 
past. Through the interpretation of present day symbols, psychoanalysis discovers the 
repetition of childhood fantasies and fixations. In many ways, the "unconscious is 
fate"(Ricoeur, 1974, p. 118). This hermeneutic bearing towards the past can be directly 
contrasted with what is found in the hermeneutics of phenomenology, which looks 
toward the future. Like psychoanalysis, phenomenology states that there is no certainty to 
consciousness. However, unlike psychoanalysis, phenomenology sees consciousness as a 
"task" (p. 108). "Consciousness is a movement which continually annihilates its starting 
point and can guarantee itself only at the end” (p. 113). Here, Ricoeur is influenced by 
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit where the present can only be understood by future 
figures that are able to look back upon the process of history. In other words, ‘human 
nature’ is never set, or determined; rather what human beings are gets worked out 
through existing, which up unfolds temporally. This idea is a mainstay of most 
phenomenology. We can see it in the work of Heidegger (1927/1962), where he 
emphasizes how Dasein essence is existence: the living out of one's possibilities. We can 
also see this idea in the work of Medard Boss, Ludwig Binswanger, and Merleau Ponty. 
Dreyfus (1987) argues that it is this hermeneutics of phenomenology that 
Foucault seems to advocate for, as opposed to the hermeneutics of suspicion. After 
reviewing Foucault’s writing on psychotherapy, he states that Foucault never took back 
his endorsement of Ludwig Binswanger and existential psychotherapy. Instead, Foucault 
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hinted that psychotherapy should be concerned with opening up one’s present freedom in 
order “to give one's life the stability and uniqueness of a work of art” (p. 321). This 
means freedom from the universal norms (i.e. heteronormativity) and restrictions that 
people often take to be a matter of fact, but are themselves constituted and therefore 
contingent. Dreyfus points to the work of Anna Freud and the ego psychologists along 
with the notion of the “restricted clearing,” found in Boss and Binswanger, and 
“emblem,” found in the work of Merleau Ponty. The basic idea is that possibilities open 
to us remain foreclosed because of misunderstandings and sedimented ways of relating. 
Dreyfus writes: 
Merleau-Ponty, who was one of Foucault's teachers, offers a more plausible 
existential account of pathology that Foucault seems to integrate into his account 
of Binswanger. In Merleau-Ponty's ontological view, pathology occurs when a 
particular way a person relates to some people or some objects becomes a way of 
relating to all people and all objects, so that it becomes the form or style of all 
relationships, i.e., some aspect of the epistemological relation of a subject to other 
persons and objects, which should take place in the clearing, becomes a 
dimension of the clearing itself. (p. 325)  
Hence, therapy would look a lot like genealogy, in that it would expose the contingency 
of our current way of being and then, through historicizing, discover times in which the 
client acted different and counter the restrictiveness characteristic of his presenting 
problem. 
This concludes my overview of constitution and the brief genealogy of 
psychotherapy. I have described constitution as having two aspects. First, constitution 
occurs because of the dialectical relationship between a person and their form of life. 
People are shaped by their form of life (i.e. cultural practices and unfolding context), yet 
their actions also shape the form of life. A form of life is therefore contingent on the 
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social action of participants engaged in shared practical activity. Even when these 
practical activities reproduce the basic order within the form of life (relationships of 
status and the means through which people become ethical beings), this order is re-newed 
or re-constituted by the participants themselves. This leads to the second feature of 
constitution: by engaging in social practices where we act on others and ourselves we 
constitute ourselves as certain kinds of people. This type of constitutional activity occurs 
at the level of micro-practices and it is here that power is generated as people act on one 
another in ways that align with strategies of power manifesting within the form of life. 
However, we are not only constituted by the actions of others. Our own actions on 
ourselves and others are constitutive of who we are as certain kinds of subjects. This was 
described by Foucault as ethics. This refers to the way in which who we are, is 
problematized through certain practices that are meant to make us good people. These 
actives are undertaken by us and therefore it is through our own actions that we become 
certain types of people. 
This led into a short overview of Foucault’s writings on psychotherapy. Over his 
career, Foucault held a nuanced and shifting view of psychotherapy. It the end, Foucault 
was skeptical of psychotherapy because of its adherence to the depth hermeneutic 
typified by psychoanalytic therapy. This type of hermeneutics was shown to extend 
beyond psychoanalysis and originate in the Christian confessional of the 16th and 17th 
century. Dreyfus argued that for Foucault, therapy should be about expanding one’s 
freedom so as to allow one to live as if one’s life is a work of art. However, it is 
important to point out that for Foucault there is no perfect practice or system of ethics 
that is free of danger. As Dreyfus and Rabinow write, “any new ethical system will 
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presumably bring new dangers which it will be the job of interpretive analytics to 
discover and resist” (p. 263). Hence, we will always need critical research to uncover the 
way in which practices constitute us as certain kinds of subjects. This, research exposes 
the totality of the practice and allows for transformations to occur that diminish old 
dangers. Yet, these transformations, which lead to new practices, carry new threats and 
therefore perpetuate the need for critical research.  
The next chapter will be a review of theories and research methodologies that can 
be used to conduct a critical examination of psychotherapy. Consistent throughout the 
next section is a critique of language as representation and a grasping for a pragmatic 
understanding of language and human interaction. This is key. Psychotherapy that relies 
on the depth hermeneutic is based on the “Cartesian/Kantian conception of the 
mind….[as] a set of ideas….which represent the outside world” and when this is “used to 
account for pathology [it] becomes a depth psychology concerned with representations” 
(Dreyfus, 1987, pp. 316-317). Hence, a critical research methodology needs to re-
problematize language in order to offer a compelling critique that allows us to see 
psychotherapy differently. 
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chapter 3 
CONVERSATION ANALYSIS ON PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
"The fundamental coherence of conversation is reflected in connections 
between actions rather than connections between utterances.” 
William Labov and David Fanshel, 
Therapeutic Discourse: Psychotherapy as 
conversation , (1977, p. 333). 
 
 
 
 
 
Constitutional Research: the Original Problematizing of Harold Garfinkel 
This chapter will provide an introduction to conversation analysis (CA) and 
review the conversation analytic research on psychotherapy. In order to show how this 
research methodology aligns with the ontological assumptions discussed in chapter 2, we 
will begin by looking at the ethnomethodology of Harold Garfinkel and discuss how a 
pragmatic understanding of language is fundamental to constitutional approaches to 
change. Then I will give an overview of CA and of CA applied to psychotherapy, which 
takes on the form of a traditional literature review. The chapter will end with a discussion 
of the current limitations of CA and this will open up new methodological possibilities 
that can be used to study change in psychotherapy. 
Harold Garfinkel’s work blossomed in the shadow of the sociological giant 
Talcott Parsons. During the 1950’s and 1960’s, Parsons seemed like the only sociologist 
of importance in America. Knapp (1994) writes that this somewhat unimposing man 
wielded an inexplicable influence that could not be explained by his abilities as a writer 
or a researcher. In fact, most of Parsons’ writings were very abstract and convoluted. 
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Furthermore, his empirical research rarely produced any results of significance. However, 
Parsons himself explained that the social sciences in America were influenced by a 
number of different theories, all of which had a different explanation for the relationship 
between individuals and society. These theories were fragmented and ranged in scope: 
what they lacked, according to Parsons, was a unifying theory. Hence, Parsons equated 
his influence with the desire and need for an overarching theory that could explain the 
relationship between individual action and societal structure (p. 189). 
Parsons (1937) argued in his first work, The Structure of Social Action, that the 
social sciences needed a of common frame reference that could guide theory and 
research. According to Knapp (1994), it was here that Parsons put forward his classic 
theory of “volunteerism.” Volunteerism is the view that "people act on the basis of their 
values; their actions are oriented and constrained by the values and norms of the people 
around them; and these norms and values are the basis of social order" (p. 191). At the 
time, the social sciences were dominated by crude theories that reduced human action to 
natural or biological laws. Parsons argued that these theories (or even the more 
sophisticated utilitarian theories that viewed human action as a reasoned choice based on 
self-interest) failed to take into account the importance of societal values in explaining 
individual behavior. It might seem common sense to claim that people are influenced by 
their values, but for Parsons the crucial insight was that values are created by the societal 
structures. In his view, in America, the social structure is largely influenced by religion 
and capitalism. Individuals internalize a large array of values from this social structure, 
but the structure itself is not stagnant. Rather it is a complex dynamic structure and, at 
times, it can be at odds with the values of any one individual. As Knapp points out: "the 
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master problem within Parsons’ theory is the relation between a theory of action, at the 
level of individual and differentiation as a theory of institutions and large-scale 
structures" (p. 193). In other words, if there are competing values (a competition between 
micro and macro concerns) how can we explain individual action? 
Parsons’ influence was so complete that sociology solely concerned itself with 
how macro social structures transferred values to individuals. This was the sociological 
domain. Goodwin and Heritage (1990) argue that by carving out large-scale social 
structures and institutions as the purview of sociology, linguistics was able to claim 
authority over the micro interactions between individuals. This seemed like a natural 
division of labor that allowed the two disciplines to adequately analyze the totality of 
social life. But, during this time, linguists were more interested in the particulars of 
language rather than the practicality of language use. As Goodwin and Heritage write: 
"Both sociology and linguistics thus defined the scope of their subject matter in such a 
way that the relevance of in-talk-interaction fell between disciplinary boundaries" (p. 
285). 
It was between these two disciplinary boundaries that Garfinkel placed himself. 
His theoretical position was first mapped out in his dissertation, which Parsons chaired. 
There, Garfinkel argued against Parsons by claiming that individuals are constantly 
revising and applying social reason. Therefore, commonsense understandings are always 
up for revision. Furthermore, the way people come to a mutual understanding is 
influenced by the context, yet their newly formed understanding also changes the context 
(i.e. the first aspect of constitution). Uniquely, Garfinkel created “procedures with which 
he was able to show not only that mutual understandings are highly contingent and 
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revisable, but also that participants invoke a vast array of background understandings to 
make sense of the course of activity" (p. 286). In other words, when we examine people 
talking to one another we see that they are not simply animated by competing social 
values. They are more active, constantly examining the interaction at hand by referring to 
the context. This context, therefore, is subject to change as the participants actively 
constitute the context through their interaction. This approach was a radical departure 
from Parsons because it placed more importance on everyday social interaction as 
opposed to the internalization of macro social values.  
Garfinkel's turn to everyday experience was influenced by his interest in the 
phenomenology of Alfred Schultz. Yet, unlike Schultz who argued that every day 
interaction creates "‘commonsense constructs’….[that] enable us to make sense of the 
world," Garfinkel argued that all kinds of social order are constituted through social 
interaction (Packer, 2011, p. 165). We might say that Schultz thought everyday 
interaction changed the way we see the world, where Garfinkel thought that it produced 
the world. These are not minor differences; they are fundamentally different ontologies. 
With Schultz we see the continuation of the representational view of language, which is 
predicated on the subject and object dualism that Kant introduced (pp. 164 – 166). For 
Garfinkel to move beyond this perspective he had to adopt and develop a new 
understanding of language which jettisoned the old Kantian assumptions. 
Language: from Dualism through Representation to Pragmatics 
The representational view that language is a series of statements, which attempts 
to describe the external objective world, is inherently tied up with Western philosophy 
and subject and object dualism. We can trace this dualism to Plato who claimed that there 
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was a true and constant world behind our perceived reality. In the Republic, Plato (1994) 
uses the allegory of the cave to describe human beings as bonded and lost in an illusory 
world of shadows which we take for reality. Yet, reality is beyond the cave where the sun 
shines and gives light and life. We are slaves to the shadows, but we can see reality if we 
take "the upward journey and the sight of things up on the surface of the earth,” which is 
analogous to “the mind’s ascent to the intelligible realm” (p. 244). In this allegory we see 
two important ontological assumptions that have shaped the way language and reality 
have been understood ever since. First, our initial understanding of the world is false and 
we must develop a process (science) that will uncover the true nature of reality. And 
second, whether we human beings remain as bonded slaves or become free people 
perceiving the true light which animates the world, we are always looking out upon a 
world that is separate from us. 
Each generation since Plato has grappled with this dualism in one way or the 
other, yet it is fair to say that the divide between subject and object entered into its 
modern form with the work of Immanuel Kant. By the time Kant entered the stage, 
philosophers such as Locke and Descartes, had put forward a representational theory of 
knowledge (Fancher, 1979/1996). The basic idea of representationalism is that objects 
that are independent from us impinge upon our senses and cause us to form 
representations. Representations have been described as images or ideas, which reside in 
the subject’s mind, but have the capacity to accurately represent the external world. 
Therefore, it is possible for human beings to find a process through which they can know 
the world-in-itself via their representations. At first, Kant, who started his career as a 
scientist, agreed with the representationalists. However, after Hume destroyed the 
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certainty upon which empiricism (and therefore representationalism) was built, Kant 
began to rethink the relationship between human knowledge and the external world.  
Kant felt that we can and must assume that the independent world exists, however 
we cannot assume that our ideas about the world correspond to the world in itself. The 
problem comes down to this: human beings proceed by testing our ideas against the 
world. Hence, we might assume that good ideas conform to the world in itself. However, 
we are unable to know the world in itself because we proceed by first forming concepts 
about the world. In other words, we come into the world through ideas and there is no 
way of getting beyond or behind this fundamental aspect of our existence. Human beings 
have no way of knowing the world independent of thought and, therefore, searching for 
ways to prove that our concepts conform to the mind-independent world is a futile quest. 
As Kant (1781/2007) stated: "I can assume either that concepts through which I arrive 
at…conform to the object [or the world], and I would again be perplexed about how I can 
know anything about it a priori; or else that the objects, or what is the same thing, the 
experience in which alone they are known (as objects that are given to us), conform to 
those concepts" (p. 18). Hence, by testing our ideas against the world we assess whether 
our ideas and theories conform to our experience, but our experience is not made up of a 
mind-independent world. It is a constructed world already understood by and through our 
concept latent mind.5   
Kant argued that in order to understand science and human knowledge, we have 
to understand how our ideas are constituted. As Packer (2011) states, Kant would go on 
                                                            
5 The Model Dependent Realism of modern physicists is a prime example of Kantian ontology 
(Hawking & Mlodinow, 2010). 
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to claim that "our experiences are not merely ideas but representations, related outwardly 
to objects and inwardly to a subject" (p. 144-145). These representations are not simple 
pictures. Rather, they are the means by which our experience of the world is constructed. 
These representations are built from sensory experience, but they are always shaped and 
organized by concepts. According to Packer, Kant's "concepts are innate and universal, 
the same for all people at all times. They include space, time, causality, and object -- each 
of which seems to be a property of the world but in fact, Kant argued, are concepts the 
human mind brings to experience" (p. 145). Therefore, for Kant the most important factor 
when attempting to understand human knowledge and experience is not the world, which 
impresses itself upon us through our empty and transparent consciousness 
(representationalism); but rather it is reason, which actively constructs our experience by 
way of universal concepts (transcendental realism). 
Upon this foundation we built our understanding of language and this has created 
quite a stumbling block. First, what may be referred to as ‘mainstream’ science holds a 
representational theory of knowledge and language. Packer (2011) points out that the 
Vienna Circle attempted to purify scientific inquiry so they could accurately describe the 
objective world (p. 22). One of their first orders of business was to distinguish between 
meaningful and nonsensical statements. Statements would be designated as meaningful if 
they could be tested empirically. The Vienna Circle used Wittgenstein's theory of 
language, developed in Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus. As Packer summarizes it, in the 
Tractatus Wittgenstein describes language as "‘atomic propositions’ that ‘mirror’ or 
‘picture’…the world. Such propositions —each of them either true or false—can be 
systematically combined in ‘truth tables’” (p. 25). Here we can clearly see how the 
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Vienna Circle was trying to fulfill the representationalists’ dream that a specialized 
process could be developed through which we could accurately know the world via our 
own representations. However, this proved to be very difficult. First of all, by the time 
the Vienna Circle met with Wittgenstein in 1927 he had already began to repudiate his 
earlier understanding of language. Also, the circle found themselves mired in Hume’s 
critiques of induction. The scientists became quite unsure how their simple empirical 
statements, which were supposed to accurately mirror the world, could be deemed 
infallible (p. 26). In other words, how can we be sure that what one scientist sees is an 
accurate reflection of the world? This is exactly the question that Kant had attempted to 
answer by offering his fundamental critique that we can never know if our 
representations are accurate because we can never know the world in itself. 
By that time the Vienna Circle finally spoke to Wittgenstein, he had turned away 
from the idea that language could be used to make atomic propositions that mirror the 
external world, and, instead, suggested that language could only be understood by 
considering the larger context in which it was used. He described language use in this 
context as a "language game" (Wittgenstein, 1994, p. 42). Others, such as the American 
pragmatist Richard Rorty (2000) followed a path similar to Wittgenstein, yet Rorty took a 
more Darwinian approach. He states that by "looking at language in this Darwinian way, 
as providing tools for coping with objects rather than representations of objects, and in 
providing different sets of tools for different purposes…makes it hard to be an 
essentialist" (p. 65). Rorty (1991) also said that his view of language was influenced by 
the great 20th-century philosophers in both the analytic and continental traditions. He 
argued that Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Derrida’s collective contribution to philosophy, 
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and to the world, has been to move us away from the idea of language as representation; 
towards the view of language as transformative and potentially therapeutic. Rorty states 
that metaphors are “a call to change one’s language and one’s life, rather than a proposal 
about how to systematize either” (p. 13). 
Although Rorty's work has influenced many in the social sciences, conversation 
analysis is more indebted to the work of the language philosopher John L. Austin. In How 
to do Things with Words, Austin (1962) examined language as speech acts, rather than a 
system of signs. He argues that in order to understand how language works, we have to 
consider the context in which language is used (p. 52). He begins by looking at 
contrasting statements and performatives. Statements are utterances that can be seen in 
representational terms, which are either true or false. Performatives are utterances that by 
their very nature do something. He states: "the uttering of the words is, indeed, usually a, 
or even the, leading incident in the performance of an act" (p. 8). For example, when a 
bridegroom says: "I do," he is performing an act -- promising -- which is done solely by 
the utterance itself within its proper context. Now, surely the groom's act of promising, 
which is extended into the future as all promises are, can go wrong and therefore the 
performative utterance can fail, but this is different than conceiving of it as either true or 
false. When a performative utterance goes wrong, Austin describes the utterance as 
"unhappy" and he lists a series of infelicities, which make an utterance unhappy (pp. 14-
15).6 
A statement can be reduced to a single word as a description of an object or event. 
                                                            
6 These infelicities are: a conventional procedure in which the words used to make sense, the 
presence of particular people and circumstances, the completion of the procedure, proper 
intentions and feelings of the participants, and adherence to the performed acts in the future. 
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As we have discussed, the word ‘rock’ names an object in the world and the description 
can be determined as either true or false. However, Austin argues that even our most 
simple statements are very ambiguous. If the word ‘rock’ is spoken, it could be that the 
speaker is simply describing a rock in the field and we can judge as true or false based on 
whether he is referring to a rock or a cow patty (dried cow manure that looks a lot like a 
rock). However, the speaker could also be referring to a rock that was hurling toward the 
hearer’s head. In this case the statement would actually be a performative because it is 
performing an act—a warning. Austin argues, counter intuitively, that statements are 
primitive utterances. He claims that the development of the performative utterance is 
actually an attempt to be more precise and that this linguistic evolution reveals how 
language is always some kind of action. "Language…in its primitive stages is not precise, 
and it is also not…explicit: precision in language makes it clear what is being said—its 
meaning: explicitness…makes clear the force of the utterances, or 'how... it is to be taken' 
" (p. 73). 
For Austin the meaning of an utterance is directly tied up with the action it 
performs within a certain context. Therefore, the meaning of the utterance does rely on 
the world within which it is spoken, yet not because it describes this world but because it 
changes it. Furthermore, the meaning of the utterance has to do with its effect on other 
people. To clarify this point Austin states that there are three actions the utterances can 
perform: (1) locutionary -- the traditional sense of an utterance which has "sense and 
reference," which carries a certain meaning, (2) illocutionary "utterances which have a 
certain force" such as "informing, warning, ordering", (3) and perlocutionary acts, which 
are what has been brought about by saying something: persuading and deterring (p. 107). 
 52 
 
Next he states that illocutionary acts produce effects, but not in a straightforward way of 
changing the "natural course of events" (p. 117). Rather they —if they are happy—require 
a certain response from others who are involved with the act. For example, if I name my 
child Monroe, I do so by performing an illocutionary act, "I name her Monroe." Now, 
assuming that this utterance is happy certain things must occur. First, “…the performance 
of the illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake" (p. 117). That is, the nurse, 
doctor, and my wife all have to hear me and agree that I have named my child. Second, 
"the illocutionary act 'takes effect' in certain ways…,” such as by naming my child 
Monroe it is from that point forward wrong to call her by another name (p. 117). This is 
the subtle way in which utterances are fundamentally actions on actions, yet are different 
from physical acts because utterances usher in, or reproduce, a state of affairs which has 
certain consequences and obligations. Last, “illocutionary acts invite by convention a 
response or sequel” (p. 117). Therefore, when I name my child, my wife responds with an 
agreement, "Yes, Monroe," which then is responded to simultaneously by the doctor and 
nurses nodding their heads to acknowledge that they heard us and that the utterance was 
indeed happy.7. 
In the end, Austin argues that the old notion that utterances truly or falsely 
represent the world fails because utterances always have a force (performative dimension 
that does something) and it is impossible to form an exact statement that conforms to the 
world. The first part has been detailed above, but let me point out that even our most 
                                                            
7 If, for example, I coughed as I was naming her: "I name her Hch!hhl,” everyone would look at 
me and wait for my coughing to subside instead of agreeing that I named my daughter “Hch!hhI”. 
This example of coughing in the middle of an utterance shows how a performative can be 
unhappy when the procedure is interrupted and left incomplete. 
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precise scientific statements such as: “The speed of light is 299,792,458 meters per 
second,” is a claim that is implicitly being argued, exclaimed, or denounced. By 
prefacing the statement with "I argue…" or “I exclaim…” that “The speed of light is 
299,792,458 meters per second,” I only make a statement more clear, explicating what 
was implicit to begin with. Therefore, locutionary acts are by their very nature are also 
illocutionary acts. As Austin states: "In general the locutionary act as much as the 
illocutionary is an abstraction only: every genuine speech act is both" (p. 147). As for the 
second point, if our criterion for whether a statement is true or false relies on its exact 
conformity to the object that it describes, then all statements would be false. This is 
because it is impossible to exactly describe any object. Austin asserts that, "in the case of 
stating truly or falsely, just as much in the case of advising well or badly, the intents and 
purposes of the utterance and its context are important; what is judged true in a school 
book may not be so judged in a work of historical research" (p. 143). Here he uses the 
statement "France is hexagonal” as an example. He considers the statement to be a "rough 
truth" that is appropriate for elementary school education, but not for professional 
geographers. Statements such as this are used all the time and their truth or falseness has 
more to do with the context than with its ability to exactly represent the object that it 
addresses. 
Austin's work can be seen as a solution to the problems created by dualism. It is a 
paradigm shift that moves away from attempts to salvage the view of language as 
representation toward the vision of language as action, based in context. As we have 
seen, Austin was only one among many philosophers, linguists, and social scientists who 
were moving towards this new understanding of language. As we now turn back to 
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Garfinkel, we can see how his view of language coincides with Austin’s. As Packer 
(2011) describes, Garfinkel saw words "as indexes, not as symbols or representations" (p. 
199). Words point (much like pointing with one’s index finger) to the context in which 
they are being used. Yet, as stated previously, participants are always revising and/or 
reproducing the context in which all interactions are couched. In short, participants are 
always constituting their form of life as well as actively responding to the form of life in 
which they dwell. Garfinkel's focus on constitution led him to develop what he called 
ethnomethodology, which Packer describes as "the study (logos) of the methods used by 
folks (ethnos) and their commonsense everyday activity” (p. 190). Ethnomethodology, 
with its focus on how "things are..... produced and accomplished" was grounded in the 
new understanding of language as action, based in context. As Packer writes 
"ethnomethodology pays attention to language as a dynamic, social phenomenon and to 
speech not as an inert vehicle—the expression of inner meanings—but as fundamental to 
the constitution of social life" (pp. 198-199). 
From Garfinkel to Sacks and Schegloff: the Birth of Conversation Analysis 
Harvey Sacks and Emanuel Schegloff are typically credited with creating 
conversation analysis (C. Goodwin & Heritage, 1990; Liddicoat, 2011). For some, 
discovery might be a disagreeable word. It is not as if conversation analysis lay buried in 
some remote crevice, lying in wait for humans to discover her. Nonetheless, creating is in 
an apt description. Paul ten Have (1999) points out that in Kuhnian terms the creation of 
conversation analysis was nothing less than a paradigm shift, which uncovered nascent 
possibilities on the horizon of academic sociology and linguistics (p. 7). These 
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possibilities, which Sacks and Schegloff grabbed on to, were largely created by the work 
of Garfinkel. 
When Sacks and Schegloff began developing conversation analysis they were 
both students of Irving Goffman, but all three men were in constant contact with 
Garfinkel. In many ways conversation analysis can be seen as a combination of the 
phenomenology/ethnomethodology of Garfinkel with the interaction analysis (Bateson, 
1972; Scheflen, 1973) that emerged during the 1970s (cited in C. Goodwin & Heritage, 
1990, pp. 286-287). The empirical method used by conversation analysis today was 
largely developed by Sacks while conducting his dissertation research. In this early work, 
Sacks analyzed telephone calls placed to a suicide prevention hotline. When Sacks began 
lecturing on conversation analysis he used much of his work to explain his theory and 
methodology. One of the most important discoveries that Sacks made was the way in 
which callers avoided giving their names (ten Have, 1999). As Sacks (1989) explained: 
I [had] a large collection of these conversations, and I…looked at these first 
exchanges...A series of persons who called this place would not give their names. 
The hospital's concern was, can anything be done about it? One question I wanted 
to address was, where in the course of the conversation could you tell that 
somebody would not give their name? So I began to look at the materials. It was 
in fact on the basis of that question that I began to try to deal in detail with 
conversations. (p. 35) 
For a crisis worker it is vitally important to get the name of the person in crisis. The crisis 
workers would often offer their name first. This utterance, as Sacks came to note, can be 
seen as a pragmatic action because it forces the recipient to reply by giving their own 
name (see excerpt below). Sacks observed that the callers would avoid giving their own 
name by offering an "occasional usable device" such as "I can't hear you"(ten Have, 
1999, p. 15). The fact that callers had to use tactics to avoid giving their own name, 
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supports the claim that a conversational sequence was initiated by the crisis worker. This 
might seem benign at first, but when looked at closely, what it reveals is a way of 
constraining the speech of the caller. 
Excerpt from Sacks’ Work Analyzing Crisis Phone Calls (Sacks, 1989, p. 35) 
Example 1 
This is Mr. Smith, may I help you 
Yes, this is Mr. Brown 
Example 2 
This is Mr. Smith may help you 
I can't hear you 
This is Mr. Smith  
 
In this early work, Sacks pointed out two conversational features that would 
become central to CA studies. First, he recognized that by being able to speak first, the 
crisis worker gains an advantage over the caller. The crisis worker has a certain amount 
of freedom to choose how he or she initiates the conversation, but the caller has an 
obligation to respond to the crisis worker’s initial utterance. This observation led to the 
proposal that the initial utterance by the crisis worker opens up a “slot” into which the 
caller has to insert a reply. This coupling of the initial utterance and the reply has become 
known as the "adjacency pair" (p. 20). It is a fundamental procedural rule of 
conversation. Over the years conversation analysts have found that certain replies are 
more preferred than others and that participants can use a number of tactics to avoid 
giving the preferred response (Schegloff, 2007). The adjacency pair has become the 
fundamental building block of CA's empirical methodology. Each conversational 
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sequence can be analyzed as a series of adjacency pairs so as to continually show how the 
participants are orienting to previous utterances. This discovery is exactly what Austin 
was talking about when he said that utterances require a sequel or response. Require is 
the key word because participants have to give some kind of response or end up having to 
make excuses for why they changed the subject or did not respond at all.  
This leads us to the second discovery that Sacks made in his early study. When 
participants do not give the preferred response or there is some breakdown in the 
conversation (such as when participants don't hear each other), the participants will make 
what has become known as a “repair” (ten Have, 1999, p. 116). In Sacks's initial work he 
found that callers used repairs to avoid giving their name (see table 1, line 5). Over the 
years conversation analysts have shown the complex ways in which repairs may be 
initiated by all the participants in the conversation. For conversation analysts the repair is 
of primary importance because it demonstrates how participants are aware of the 
conversational sequence even when that sequence begins to break down.  
Sacks’ prototypical study introduced many of the core concepts in conversation 
analysis. Also, it defined the basic methodological procedures which would guide 
research. Sacks’ basic method was to identify a common conversational sequence (in this 
case the initial utterances of a crisis call) and then examine all variations that could occur 
during the sequence. In most cases researchers might see variations from a common rule 
or pattern as anomalies, but Sacks claimed that the divergent examples could be 
understood as variations of the sequence. By offering a repair and straying away from the 
typical answer/reply sequence participants were actively trying to shape the conversation 
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in a way that fit their own needs. Therefore, changes in the sequence became evidence of 
the sequence itself. This has now been codified as a core methodological procedure. 
Researchers identify sequences they are interested in and then examine how participants 
both comply with and disrupt the sequence of interest. 
This methodology is an inductive approach to data analysis. Heritage (1988) 
argued that by using "inductive search procedures," researchers build a collection of 
regularly occurring sequences that the participants orient themselves to (cited in ten 
Have, 1999, p. 39). This can be seen as a collection of ‘specimens’ rather than a 
collection of ‘facts’ (p. 37). Data from surveys and interviews are seen as facts about the 
outside world. This is based on a representational understanding of language and 
thinking. On the contrary, conversation analysts hold what is called a radical realist 
perspective (Packer, 2011, pp. 204-205). They see each conversational sequence as a 
specimen of a real species. As Alasuutari (1995) writes: 
Unlike data seen from the factist perspective, a specimen as a form of research 
material is not treated as either a statement about or a reflection of reality; instead, 
a specimen is seen as part of the reality being studied. Therefore, honesty is the 
irrelevant concept to be used in assessing the material. A specimen may be badly 
representative of the whole, or it may be technically bad, but he cannot lie. (cited 
in ten Have, 1999, p. 38) 
This brings us to some of the defining features of ethnomethodology; namely, the 
importance of membership and a focus on social interaction as a constitutional process. 
Both ethnomethodology and conversation analysis focus on how the world is 
constituted by participants. Therefore, there is no search for hidden forces, such as 
beliefs, libido, or personality traits, which lie behind social interaction. They are 
interested in the practices that the participants themselves use to generate their world. 
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These practices are not hidden, but on the surface of day to day life. As Packer (2011) 
writes: "Ethnomethodology is about the work of producing a phenomenon and ‘coming 
upon’ the phenomenon in and through this work; it is a matter of describing how people 
produce and display, how they demonstrate, the local phenomena of order" in everyday 
life (p. 193). Hence, recorded conversation is an analyzable specimen of the 
constitutional processes that participants use to make sense of themselves, each other, and 
the world. 
The participants of a conversation orient to each other’s speech as members of a 
form of life. In ethnomethodology there are no individuals or subjects, but members who 
share competencies that allow them to mutually order their world (p. 195). This principle 
is also foundational in conversation analysis. Members are seen as actively interpreting 
each other's speech in terms of their mutual competencies and the surrounding context. 
The ways that members make sense of each other is displayed in their utterances. These 
utterances are best understood as actions in response to actions. These actions are 
available to the researcher because she, in a sense, is in the position of a bystander. By 
listening and watching, the researcher imagines her own reaction and becomes affected 
by the participants’ actions. It is through this active involvement with the data that the 
researcher first grasps what is being said. In order for the researcher to achieve this type 
of understanding, she must have a certain amount of membership knowledge. The 
research process involves members of a form of life who are actively making sense of the 
conversational actions. The researcher must attend to her own reactions, while also 
attending to the actions of the participants. By documenting both her own reactions and 
the actions of the participants, the researcher builds a case of how the participants 
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actively reproduce the social order, through actions and tactics visibly displayed. 
Conversation analysis can be seen as a rigorous empirical method that attempts to 
explicate social interaction from an ethnomethodological perspective. Attention to 
conversational sequence allows the empirical study of how members use procedures to 
interpret the here-and-now context and actions of their conversational co-participants. As 
Goodwin and Heritage (1990) write:  
adjacency-pair framework described by conversation analysis is not a description 
of statistical regularities in the patterning of action, or a specification of an 
internalized rule drives behavior. Instead it describes a procedure through which 
participants constrain one another, and hold one another accountable, to produce 
coherent and intelligible courses of action….Within this framework of reciprocal 
conduct [i.e. adjacency pair organization], action and interpretation are 
inextricably intertwined. Each participant must analyze the developing course of 
others actions in order to produce appropriate reciprocal action. (pp. 287 - 288) 
When something is said the words attain a certain meaning because they are part of a 
sequence. The participants are responding to this sequence, which is part of the here-and-
now structure of the context. Participants have an active understanding of this context and 
perform speech acts that can shift the context. As Goodwin and Heritage described, 
speech acts are "context shaped and context renewing" (p. 289). By studying the detail of 
conversations captured and transcribed we can follow this act of ordering. In this sense, 
conversation analysis and ethnomethodology are interested in constitution. As Packer 
argues: "Each person involved in a conversation has their own interpretation of what is 
going on, but these interpretations are intersubjective in the sense that every person treats 
the adjacent utterances in similar ways. People share an understanding of the ‘game’’ 
they are engaged in and its ‘order’” (p. 256). In this sense, CA is interested in the 
"ontological work accomplished in practical activity" (p. 263). CA takes into account 
how reason is a product of practical human activity (Hegel), how understanding and 
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interpretation are grounded in practical activity (Heidegger) and how meaning is a result 
of an embodied act (Merleau-Ponty). All these forebears find a place in the empirical 
methodology of CA.  
Context and Subjectivity in Conversation Analysis 
Earlier, context was defined as the actions that participants use to constitute the 
order of a form of life. Hence, we cannot think of context as a static container inside 
which all interactions unfold. “Time and transformation are essential constituents of 
context” (C. Goodwin & Heritage, 1990, p. 289). The essential idea is that the actions of 
the participants typically renew (or reproduce) context, which implies that even the 
renewal is something new, even if nothing seems to be changed. Also, it implies that the 
context is never given, that it could always change. Because context as a term is 
frequently employed, it can become quite a buzz word. This is because it stands for and 
replaces familiar words such as culture, subculture, and environment. In conversation 
analysis, context is an encompassing term that refers to the here and now conversational 
sequence, institutional setting, participants’ identities, subculture, culture, macro global 
politics, and so on.  
By studying the organization of adjacency pairs, conversation analysts see all 
aspects of social life woven together. For example, identities are intimately woven into 
the structure of conversation. As Goodwin and Heritage point out:  
The organization of the speaker's action not only provides positions for recipients 
within it; it also specifies attributes that should be possessed by a proper 
incumbent of that position—i.e. the action embodies a categorization of its 
recipient.... some of these categorizations take the form of discourse identities. (p. 
293) 
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The way we organize our speech positions the participants in the conversation as 
therapist/client, officer/civilian, teacher/student and so on. These are identities are 
implicitly recognized and taken on, but this does not mean that the roles are stagnant or 
the result of lopsided power relations. Instead they are a product of the discourse that is 
co-constituted by both participants in light of their particular form of life. Hence, context 
is a process of ordering a form of life and this ordering involves the positioning of 
participants in relation to one another as certain kinds of people. Interestingly, the idea 
that identity is intimately tied up with the overall context leads to the idea that identity is 
dispersed across various discursive practices, which aligns with Foucault's understanding 
of subjectivity (Packer, 2011). 
Pure vs. Applied and Institutional vs. Ordinary 
There are two binaries used to describe CA research (ten Have, 1999). The first 
binary is institutional conversation versus ordinary conversation. Early on conversation 
analysts began to notice was that speech in institutional settings was more constrained 
than what one would find in ordinary conversation (ten Have, 1999). Ordinary 
conversation can be defined as conversation in everyday settings outside of large-scale 
institutions.  
Earlier, we looked at Sacks' initial study of calls to a suicide hotline. You will 
remember that from the beginning the crisis worker and the caller played a conversational 
game where the crisis worker attempted to obtain the caller’s name. This pattern arose 
because of certain institutional constraints—the need to get the caller’s name because the 
caller was in crisis and possibly a danger to themselves or others. If this was an ordinary 
conversation the pattern might not have been so prominent because the initial opening of 
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the conversation would have enjoyed a certain amount of freedom. Later, conversation 
analysts argued that the fundamental premise, which allows us to study institutional talk, 
is that institutional talk is a variation of ordinary conversation (p. 163). This idea was put 
forward by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974) in a paper on turn taking. They 
described conversational specimens as on a linear array with ordinary conversation at one 
extreme and institutionalized conversation at the other. "For it appears likely that 
conversation should be considered the basic form of speech exchange system, with other 
systems of the array [more constrained institutional talk like ceremonies or debates] 
representing a variety of transformations on conversation’s turn taking-system” (quoted 
in ten Have, 1999 p. 163). 
 The second binary is the distinction between pure and applied conversation 
analysis. Pure conversation analysis examines interactions as an entity in its own right, 
while applied conversation analysis examines how interactions are influenced by, or 
maintain, an institution. According to ten Have, applied analysis also includes "CA-
inspired studies" that attempt to improve social life or to identify and critique social 
problems (p. 162). The binaries do overlap, but obviously there are differences. One can 
conduct a pure conversation analysis on institutional talk if they are only interested in the 
mechanisms of conversation. Likewise, applied analysis can be done on ordinary 
conversation if the researcher is interested in, for example, how gender roles are 
maintained between a husband and wife in ordinary conversation. 
Psychotherapy is certainly a form of institutional talk; however, it is not as 
structured as medical interviews, news interviews, or courtroom proceedings (Peräkylä, 
Antaki, Vehviläinen, & Leudar, 2008a; Rae, 2008). It would most likely fall somewhere 
 64 
 
in the middle of the array of institutional talk discussed above, depending on what type of 
psychotherapy was being practiced.8 Researchers do examine clinical practices with the 
sole interest of understanding the conversational mechanisms employed. Sacks' pivotal 
study is one such example. However, CA on psychotherapy is largely a form of applied 
analysis. Peräkylä and his colleagues (2008b) state that the goal of CA research on 
psychotherapy is to “show the embeddedness of psychotherapy in generic interactional 
practices having to do with questions, answers, comments and the like and the related 
interactional consequences that therapists and their clients employ" (p. 6). Peräkylä states 
that all therapeutic schools have "professional stocks of interactional knowledge (SIKs)" 
and in order for CA to be relevant to psychotherapy, researchers need to "enter into a 
dialogue with the SIKs—extending, specifying or correcting the picture of the direction 
given by them" (p. 23). This type of analysis aims to correct or improve the institutional 
interaction and therefore it fits ten Have’s definition of applied research.  
Schegloff (1997) argues that this kind of applied CA is a preferable alternative to 
discourse analysis, which tends to use external variables to make sense of social 
interaction. Schegloff claims that any object of study (therapy being one such object) is 
always constituted first by the participants, and this original constitutive event should be 
our object of study. As he states: "it is those characterizations which are privileged in the 
constitution of the socio-interactional reality, and therefore have been a feature claim to 
being privileged in efforts to understand it" (pp. 166-167). Therefore, if you start with a 
Freudian perspective of unconscious group processes, then you are studying what is 
                                                            
8 There is a vast array of psychotherapy practices. Certainly manualized treatment practices 
would be highly institutional whereas collaborative therapies such as narrative analysis might be 
quite similar to everyday conversation.  
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relevant to you, not the participants. At the very least you should start with CA and then 
move on to an academic analysis of that data. This latter step would not be CA because it 
“would be grounded in and answerable to concerns extrinsic to the interaction,” but it 
would be grounded in what is important to the participants (Schegloff, 1998, p. 415). By 
grounding research in conversation analysis and then interpreting the findings based on 
certain interests of the researcher, we limit the risk of leaving behind the constitutive act 
of interaction for our academic interests. 
Before we begin looking at CA research on psychotherapy it may be helpful to 
review the difficulties that researchers face when they attempt to apply analysis on 
institutional talk. One of ten Have's research interests is medical interviews (ten Have, 
1999). He notes that findings from many studies on institutional talk have found that the 
turn taking systems are pre-established, allocating prescribed turns to the institutional 
agents and the other participants (p. 166). In other words, in medical interviews, 
courtroom interviews, and so on, the institutional agent is given the right to ask questions 
and the other participants (client, defendant interviewee) are expected to provide answers. 
Ten Have points out that many researchers looking at medical interviews have attributed 
this turn allocation to institutional power. Yet, he warns that by quickly jumping to the 
conclusion that it is institutional power that creates the pre-allocation of turns, one begins 
to interject assumed external factors (e.g. power) that are not present in the conversation. 
Here we have an example of researchers who assume that the social structure influences 
a conversational structure. However, as ten Have points out: "the distributional fact that 
doctors ask patients more questions than patients ask doctors can be discussed in 
institutional terms, as an aspect of ‘professional dominance’… but it can also be analyzed 
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in terms of the overall sequential organization of the encounter" (p. 167). Medical 
interviews can be viewed simply as "a request for assistance" (p. 167). This creates a 
“request/service” adjacency pair that can be lengthened by a number of insertion 
sequences, which are used to gain diagnostic information. Ten Have concludes by stating 
that: "The questioning of patients by doctors….would be…an issue not of turn-type 
preallocation, but rather of a sequential-organizational…of institutional activity 
allocation" (p. 167).  
The move to interpret the sequence of medical interviews as a result of 
professional dominance is not improper in itself. However, this example points out how 
easy it is to neglect important conversational features, which would then shift the 
researcher’s interpretation in important ways. It is a reminder that CA moves slowly and 
methodically before reaching the interpretive phase where the researcher can confidently 
began to ask her own research questions based on the conversation analytic examination 
of the data. 
Conversation Analytic Research on Psychotherapy: The Beginnings 
Many studies predating CA have focused on the interaction that occurs in 
psychotherapy. Peräkylä, Antaki, Vehviläinen, and Leudar (2008a) point out that case 
reports, such as those made famous by Freud, attend to the interactions that occur in 
psychotherapy. However, as we all know, case studies summarize hundreds of sessions 
and are reliant on the memory and personality of the therapist. Researchers interested in 
clinical interaction began to move away from the case report in the 1950s. It was during 
this time that a handful of pivotal studies emerged. These researchers employed linguistic 
analysis to psychotherapy while also attending to the therapeutic importance of 
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interaction. However, Peräkylä et al. distinguishes these early studies from CA in that CA 
focuses on the “sequentiality of social action" (p. 13). 
For example, an early study conducted by the linguist Charles Hockett and 
psychiatrists Pitterger and Daheny (1960) examined the first five minutes of therapy 
sessions, between patients and a psychiatrist. Analyzing audio recordings of the sessions 
the researchers examined lexical choice and grammatical passivity as clues to implicit 
meaning of the utterances. Yet, the claims were not systematic and analysis had little to 
do with the coordinated sequence of utterances between the patient and therapist 
(Peräkylä et al., 2008a p. 8).  
More in line with conversation analysis, William Labov, a linguist, and David 
Fanshel, a social worker, (1977) performed a detailed analysis of a 15 minute therapy 
segment between a psychodynamic practitioner and an anorexic patient. They conducted 
a detailed analysis that looked at actions that utterances perform such as "meta-linguistic 
action (initiating, continuing, or ending action), representation, request, and challenge" 
(Peräkylä et al., 2008a, p. 9). One major finding indicated that the client creates what can 
be described as “resistance” by avoiding direct discussion of the problem (Labov & 
Fanshel, 1977, p. 334). This turns out to be, in part, an avoidance of emotion (p. 341).9 
Labov then goes on to describe how the therapist uses “factual contradictions” and 
“emotional displays” as sources of therapeutic insights, where as the client uses the close 
connections of topics, “interpretation”, and “direct suggestion” as sources of insight (pp. 
337-345).  
                                                            
9 This aligns with the analysis and findings discussed in chapters 5, 6, and 7.  
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However, what has been most influential for conversation analysts studying 
psychotherapy has been the distinction between what Labov called A-events and B-
events (Peräkylä et al., 2008a). A type A-event is a representation of the speaker’s past, 
such as narratives and commentary about biographical events. As Labov (1977) states: 
“[the client] has privileged access to these events and can deal with them as an expert 
without fear of contradiction” (p. 62). A B-event is different. It is a “description of a 
matter in another speaker’s experience, and the speaker thereby has limited access to 
it”(Peräkylä et al., 2008a, p. 10). Elsewhere Peräkylä and Silverman (1991) have shown 
how the ownership of experience affects sequential organization and turn taking rights. 
For example, “participants, in orienting to the owner's privileged right to response, can 
also make use of this right, in order to manage the interactional contingencies and 
sensitivities related to the issues addressed in the sessions” (p. 466). In psychotherapy, 
the client is expected to produce A-event utterances, while the therapist responds with 
questions, reflective statements and interpretations. Hence, unlike ordinary conversation, 
only one participant (the client) produces A-event statements and this greatly affects the 
sequential organization of the therapeutic conversation. However, as Labov (1977) points 
out: “The therapeutic session is designed to produce a great deal of talk” which leads to 
an accumulation of shared experience that both participants have access to (p. 122). 
Utterances concerning shared experience are called “AB-events” and they accumulate 
quickly as the therapist learns more and more about the patient’s experience and have 
greater access to the patient’s biography (p. 122). The importance of this distinction will 
be discussed in the next section dealing with formulations in psychotherapy. 
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The impact of Labov’s study cannot be understated, and yet Peräkylä et al. 
(2008a) points out that much like The First Five Minutes, Labov did not "seek to offer a 
systematic view of recurrent practices in psychotherapy" and the conclusions were very 
abstract (p. 10). According to Peräkylä et al., the study that really bridges the gap 
between linguistic analysis and conversation analysis was conducted by Kathleen Warden 
Ferrara. In Therapeutic Way with Words Ferrara (1994) analyzed 40 hours of therapy 
sessions between six different therapists (cited in Peräkylä et al., 2008a) . She identified 
"recurrent discourse strategies" such as certain narration techniques and repetition of 
different types of talk (p. 10). This study attempts to produce a systematic account of 
recurrent patterns in psychotherapy, which Peräkylä et al. consider to be the goal of CA. 
However, again, the Ferrara study, like the other linguistic analyses, only paid limited 
attention to the sequential organization of conversation.  
Many conversation analysts researching psychotherapy attempt to identify the 
predominant conversational structure in psychotherapy and then interpret how that 
structure affects the client therapeutically (Antaki, 2008; Antaki, Barnes, & Leudar, 
2005; Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2008; Peräkylä, 2004, 2005, 2008; Vehviläinen, 2008). 
Peräkylä et al. (2008a) states that conversation analysts describe how conversational 
actions are used for therapeutic ends. Hence, applied CA on psychotherapy assumes "a 
distinction between action, local consequence, and therapeutic function" (p. 189). The 
action has to do with the sequential structure of the talk, the local consequence describes 
the immediate effect of the talk, and the therapeutic function refers to the overarching 
goals of the therapy. Vehviläinen, Peräkylä, Antaki and Leudar (2008) state: "what we 
mean by action can be conceived as moving a piece in a chess game, while local 
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consequence can be conceived as the move’s contributing to the overall tactic, and 
therapeutic function as the move’s contribution to the overall strategy" (p. 189). In other 
words, they are interested in understanding how certain forms of talk are connected with 
certain therapeutic strategies. By mapping the overall structure of the therapeutic 
conversation, researchers identify effective tactics and connect those tactics with 
overarching institutional goals.  
For example, summarizing the research compiled in Conversation Analysis and 
Psychotherapy, Vehviläinen et al. (2008) listed numerous therapeutic actions, which were 
all correlated with “possible therapeutic functions” (p. 191).10 This process of correlating 
conversational interactions with therapeutic functions has been put proposed as an 
important way for CA to be relevant to psychotherapy (Peräkylä et al., 2008a, p. 22). 
According to Peräkylä et al., each therapeutic school has its own theory about therapeutic 
interaction. As mentioned previously, these have been referred to as professional stocks 
of interactional knowledge (SIKs). Hence, in order for conversation analysis to be 
relevant to psychotherapy, CA research needs to "enter into a dialogue with the SIKs-- 
extending, specifying or correcting the picture of the direction given by them" (p. 23). 
This description of CA research on psychotherapy has been echoed elsewhere. 
Forrester and Reason (2006) summarize conversation analysts’ interest in psychotherapy 
as threefold. First, to examine it as an institutional interaction like conversation analysts 
have done with news interviews and medical interviews. Second, to translate 
                                                            
10 The therapeutic actions are as follows: lexical substitution, extension, formulation, 
reinterpreted statement, optimistic questions, follow-up question using zero person, answers that 
resist the question presuppositions, defensive responses to topicalizations of prior action, 
elaboration, and extended agreements. 
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psychotherapeutic terms into conversation analytic terms. And third, correcting 
therapeutic theories that are used in the practice of psychotherapy (p. 44). This is similar 
to McGee, Del Vento, and Bavelas (2005) who state that conversation analysis “can help 
to identify possible discrepancies between theories of what happens and what we can 
observe when therapists and clients do therapy” (p. 382). Again, we see that researchers 
are using conversation analysis to correct psychotherapeutic theory. However, McGee et 
al. see conversation analysis lending empirical support to larger theories about human 
life. They state: “We are proposing an empirical approach to social construction in which 
the process of construction is examined in the details of the interaction.” (p. 382).  
In sum, all these authors describe CA research on psychotherapy as applied 
research. The goal of this type of research is to understand, refine, and critique the 
institutional practice of psychotherapy. It can be distinguished from pure analysis of 
institutional talk such as Harvey Sacks’ examination of group psychotherapy (Sacks, 
1992a). There, Sacks produced a detailed analysis of the interactions between teenagers 
and their group therapist, but his interest was uncovering the machinery of conversation, 
not understanding or critiquing psychotherapy. 
Applied Conversation Analysis on Psychotherapy 
So the question remains: How does one actually conduct an applied analysis of 
institutional talk? Heritage (1998) advises that applied CA of institutional interactions 
should attend to how the conversation is constrained by the institution. He states that by 
examining turn taking organization, overall structural organization of the interaction, the 
sequence organization, turn design, lexical choice, and epistemological or other forms of 
asymmetry, analysts will find examples of institutional constraints. For example, turn 
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taking is "the construction of turns, pauses, overlaps, etc" (ten Have, 1999, p. 104). In 
ordinary conversation participants enjoy a certain amount of freedom in negotiating their 
turn taking. Both participants can easily ask questions and provide answers for each other 
depending on the nature of the conversation. But as Heritage (1998) points out, when we 
look at institutional interactions such as news interviews, the turn taking becomes highly 
regimented. The news anchor is expected to ask questions of his interviewees who 
provide answers. The conversation follows a question/response sequence, and if there is a 
disturbance in the sequence, the participants offer repairs pointing toward the fact that 
there is a disturbance in the conversational order. For example, an interviewee will 
apologize after asking the news anchor a question because this is an institutional privilege 
granted to the news anchor and not the guest.   
By examining the turn taking pattern in the example above, Heritage is simply 
doing pure conversation analysis similar to the works of Schegloff and Sacks. His 
analysis turns into applied research when he begins to interpret why these regimented 
patterns occur. His explanation for the turn taking system found in news interviews is that 
it has a practical purpose. He explains that the turn taking system helps the interviewer 
control the interview, giving the audience a clear understanding of the issues and also to 
help inexperienced interviewees answer questions. Furthermore, it allows the anchor to 
keep experienced politicians and pundits from using the news as their soapbox. Here we 
can see that Heritage has made a functional analysis of the institutional talk (p. 15). Later 
in the article he discusses how the notion of the news anchor neutrality actually 
constrains both the interviewees (they are not allowed to ask the anchor questions) and 
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the anchor (any utterance that seems personal can be called into question by the 
interviewees). 
Most CA on psychotherapy follows a pattern similar to the example above. For 
example, Peräkylä (2010) conducted a study examining the adjacency pairs that occur 
during sequences involving interpretation. He examined how psychoanalytic 
interpretation can be seen as a three step process. First, the analyst makes an 
interpretation of the client’s behavior, symptoms, or dreams. Next, the client responds to 
the interpretation by extending what the analyst said or simply by disagreeing. Last, the 
analyst makes a third response, replying back to the client. By studying these sequential 
patterns and comparing them across therapies, Peräkylä  found that the "third interpretive 
turn” has two basic effects: "one is towards showing that the patient's experience is 
emotionally more intensive than what the patient indicated in the elaboration, and the 
other towards showing that the patient's experience has more layers in it” (italics in the 
original, p. 18). Hence, by examining the adjacency pairs, Peräkylä was analyzing the 
sequential organization as discussed above by Heritage. This type of research attends to 
the local level organization, which is the way in which conversational objects are 
organized by the sequence of the adjacency pairs, rather than larger sequencing structures 
such as the ending of the overall topic of conversation (ten Have, 1999, p. 21). After the 
sequential organization was identified as a reoccurring pattern, Peräkylä went on to 
interpret how this action contributes to the overall strategy of therapy: making therapy 
more emotionally intense. 
Sequential organization is a central interest of many conversation analysts 
studying psychotherapy. Researchers working with a variety of therapeutic approaches all 
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point to the power of conversational sequence as central to the practice of therapy. 
Charles Antaki (2008) has pointed out that therapists can respond to a client's turn by 
using challenges, corrections, extensions, reinterpreted statements, and formulations.11 
All of these are attempts to grasp what the client has said while also making subtle, or 
not-so-subtle changes in the original utterance. Of these, Antaki has paid particular 
attention to formulations (Antaki, 2008; Antaki et al., 2005; Antaki, Barnes, & Leudar, 
2007).  
The formulation has a long history in conversation analysis. It was first 
introduced by Garfinkel and Sacks (1970), who were interested in how participants 
comment on what is happening between them and make certain ways of interacting 
explicit. Meta-comments such as: ‘I knew you would not understand’ or, ‘you got me, I 
was trying to cheat,’ are “public display[s] of agreed intersubjectivity, a kind of 
sociological glue” (Antaki, 2008, p. 31). Later, Heritage and Watson (1979) broadened 
the definition to include all utterances used to comment on what was being said and done 
during an interaction (Antaki, 2008). Formulations are common in psychotherapy and fall 
into the AB-events class as described by Labov (Labov & Fanshel, 1977).  
During my training I was taught to use reflective statements, which are an 
important type of formulation. The reflective statement is used to ‘reflect’ back what the 
client has said. The therapist might say: "So you're saying that you were upset at your 
mother because she was not attending to your needs." Yet, conversation analysts point 
                                                            
11 Antaki and other researchers like Bercelli et al. (2008) often use the term reinterpretation 
instead of interpretation. These two terms in many ways seem synonymous, but they insist on 
using different terms because interpretation is thought to apply only to psychoanalytic or 
psychodynamic therapies. This distinction is confusing and seems to me to be a product of old 
antagonisms, rather than a necessary empirical distinction. 
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out that the formulation is no mere reflection. It uses "local editing" to change what was 
previously said or add a different emphasis (Antaki, 2008, p. 33). Formulations have been 
found to be used quite regularly in institutional talk such as radio talk shows and news 
interviews (p. 34). Therapists offer formulations to convey that they are listening and 
they understand the client’s story. Even though formulations seem non-coercive and 
benign, the sequential power can exert a lot of influence on to the client. Antaki states 
that this is not simply because formulations modify the client's original utterance: "I 
already mentioned the power of the formulation to delete, select, and transform, but now 
let me emphasize what Heritage and Watson identified as its sequential power -- its 
projection of agreement" (p. 31). Antaki argues that formulations have a constraining 
effect on the following utterance, encouraging the client to agree with the therapist. This 
occurs because the formulation is designed as an accurate summary of what was said and 
hence there is an assumption of agreement between the participants. It is expected that 
the utterance that follows the formulation will reaffirm this agreement. In other words, 
agreement is the preferred response12 in a formulation adjacency pair. 
In CA, the observation that different types of conversational sequences have 
preferred responses referred to as “preference organization” (ten Have, 1999, p. 120). 
One can respond to an utterance in various ways, but depending on how the utterance was 
formed (turn shape), there are preferred and dis-preferred responses. Formulations are 
designed as a gloss of what the client has said to the therapist. Hence, formulations 
comment on a shared experience. The therapist and the client both have access to or 
                                                            
12 Preference is not a matter of what an individual wants, but the norms built into conversation. It 
means that extra work has to be done in order to make a non-preferred response. 
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“ownership” of the experience and therefore it is hard for the client to flat out disagree. 
Again, this type of utterance is what Labov referred as an “AB-event.” It is designed as a 
statement of what has happened between participants. Yet, formulations in psychotherapy 
also concern the client’s personal experience. It is a ‘reflection’ of what the client thinks 
and feels and therefore the formulation acts to modify the account of the client based on 
the local editing done by the therapist.  
Hence, formulations occur in both ordinary and institutional talk, but in 
psychotherapy the formulation is used strategically to enact therapeutic change. Antaki's 
work has shown how the sequential power of formulations project agreement even when 
one is actually modifying what was previously said. By focusing on the sequential 
organization, conversation analysts have been able to demonstrate how ordinary 
conversational mechanisms are used in therapy. 
Today, focus on sequential organization is being directed toward different types 
of utterance used in psychotherapy. There is not enough time or space to discuss all this 
research here. However, the reinterpretation, or interpretation, is central to this research 
project and therefore demands some attention. According to Bercelli et al. (2008), 
reinterpretations can be distinguished from formulations. Reinterpretations are a way of 
addressing material that the client is familiar with, but the utterance is framed as coming 
from the therapist’s perspective. Bercelli et al. differentiates between formulation and 
reinterpretation by stating that the therapist's reinterpretation displays an "independency" 
from the perspective of the client (p. 48). These two types of utterances can be further 
distinguished by their sequence and design elements. Formulations are marked by phrases 
such as "you mean, you say, you told me" (p. 47). Reinterpretations can be identified by 
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their epistemic markers (“I think,” “it is clear to me”) signifying that the statement 
derives from the therapist's understanding (p. 49). However, they can also be marked by 
neutral figures of speech (“it seems,” “all things considered”). 
Being able to distinguish between formulation and reinterpretation is helpful. 
Bercelli et al. demonstrates how formulation is often used to create agreed-upon material 
that can be brought up later and utilized by both the therapist and client (p. 48). Bercelli 
et al. admits that formulation and reinterpretation are not universally distinct categories 
and that it is difficult at times to distinguish between the two. However, beyond the 
epistemic markers that distinguish them, reinterpretation is often followed by an extended 
agreement or disagreement where the client offers her own understanding of the 
therapist’s statement. It is this kind of interaction that I am most interested in, not as a 
means of identifying a universal adjacency pair, but as the site where the therapeutic 
problem is being worked on and actively constituted by both the therapist and the client. 
Bercelli et al. lists various ways that reinterpretation can be extended, beginning with the 
most minimal extension: acknowledgment tokens (p. 51). These are "neutral or 
uncommitted responses" that can be offered when the client, for whatever reason, is not 
inclined to offer a strong agreement or disagreement with the therapist’s statement (p.  
51). The client can also extend their agreements from acknowledgment tokens to mere 
agreements, agreements with descriptions, and qualified agreements. Here Bercelli et al. 
have noted that: 
through their responses to reinterpretations, clients can display a change of 
perspective on their own events and experiences, and display it as triggered by the 
therapist’s utterances. Such changes are, quite obviously, precious stuff in 
psychotherapy, especially when manifestly triggered by the therapist’s 
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interventions. Indeed, one of the institutional tasks of the therapist's action is to 
facilitate such changes. (p. 60) 
In other words, change in psychotherapy occurs intersubjectively; it is a collaborative act 
of constitution—something that we will attend to in greater detail later on.  
However, now I would like to discuss in more detail the CA research on 
interpretation. This research, in many ways, ties interpretation, collaboration and 
resistance together. It is my perspective that the research being done on interpretation 
brings to light a central aspect of psychotherapy that we are only now just beginning to 
understand. It is truly the “precious stuff in psychotherapy.” 
Interpretation, Collaboration and Resistance 
This focus on sequential organization has often resulted in an exploration of 
collaboration and resistance. It is no wonder that conversation analysts have found 
collaboration to be a central element of psychotherapy. Remember, that one of the basic 
assumptions and findings across conversation analysis is that reality is being 
collaboratively constituted through interaction (C. Goodwin & Heritage, 1990; Heritage, 
1998; Packer, 2011; Sacks, 1989; Schegloff, 1997; ten Have, 1999). Therefore, studies 
have consistently found collaboration unfolding in almost every aspect of psychotherapy. 
McGee et al. (2005) found that questions can be seen as interventions because they 
constrain "the recipient to answer within a framework of presuppositions set by the 
question” (p. 371). Again this is a focus on the sequential organization of the adjacency 
pairs; the way in which questions about pathology lead to responses about pathology or 
questions about health lead to answers about health. McGee et al. defined this as 
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collaborative because both the therapist and the client have a hand in the construction of 
the content of the talk. 
Collaboration and resistance are often paired together as a binary, with 
collaboration held up as therapeutically positive. A study by MacMartin (2008) looked at 
how client’s resist optimistic questions by giving answer-like responses, and non-
answers. Answer-like responses are downgrades such as joking or refocusing, whereas 
non-answers are complaints or flat out refusals to answer. In the face of this resistance, 
therapists respond, most of the time, by recycling the question and reincorporating some 
of the new material that came out of the client's response. These sequences lead to more 
nuanced utterances that incorporate both the therapists’ and patients’ previously spoken 
material. If, however, the therapist sticks to her original statement, the interaction usually 
becomes stifled. A number of other studies also found that therapists tend to align with 
the client when they face resistance (Lepper & Mergenthaler, 2007; Madill, Widdicombe, 
& Barkham, 2001; Saladin & Grimmer, 2009; Viklund, Holmqvist, & Nelson, 2010).  
Madill, Widdicombe, and Barkham (2001) found that resistance can be 
understood at the level of interaction as a set of strategies that attempts to negate the prior 
turn. These strategies "include reasserting or revising the prior case, non-uptake of 
aspects of a prior turn, managing and rejecting topic shifts, and the withdrawal of 
cooperation" (p. 429). Their research led them to make two basic claims about resistance: 
first, the client and the therapist have different perspectives about the central therapeutic 
problem, and if these perspectives cannot be reconciled the therapy will deteriorate.13 
                                                            
13 The difficultly of the problem of “negotiation” has also been discussed elsewhere by Antaki, 
Barnes, and Leudar, (2004) and will be relevant during the forthcoming chapters (p. 136). 
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Second, that simply by pointing out resistance as defensive the therapist might be 
damaging the therapy. Here we can see that they are using their detailed study of 
therapeutic interaction to make claims about how we can make therapy more successful. 
As she states quite eloquently:  
Successful therapy may rest on the client complying with the therapist’s topic 
shifts or else on the therapist abandoning protocol in the face of the client’s 
continued opposition. This, in turn, requires sensitivity to the strategies through 
which the client and therapist may try to resist the other’s projects. Conversation 
analysis provides a way of identifying such strategies and therefore of sensitizing 
the therapist to their use and role in therapy. (p. 431) 
In order to make this claim, Madill et al. appealed to how their own research was 
in line with many other studies, both quantitative and qualitative, on therapeutic 
resistance, alliance, and positive therapeutic outcomes (Bergin & Garfield, 1994; Bohart 
& Tallman, 1999; Kazdin, 2009; Lepper & Mergenthaler, 2007; Muntigl & Horvath, 
2005; Orlinsky et al., 2004; Saladin & Grimmer, 2009; Streeck, 2008; Viklund et al., 
2010; Voutilainen, Peräkylä, & Ruusuvuori, 2010; Wynn & Wynn, 2006). Tying 
traditional psychotherapy therapeutic alliance and outcome research to conversation 
analysis can also be seen in the work of Kozart (1996) who “suggests that ‘collaboration’ 
in psychotherapy consists of methods that establish an impression of common sense 
between patient and therapist” (p. 361). Like Madill et al., Kozart has shown how this 
‘common sense’ is constructed interactionally. 
Researchers who have studied interpretation also focus on collaboration and 
resistance. However, they tend to have a more complex understanding of resistance. 
Remember that conversation analysis typically refers to interpretation as a specialized 
practice unique to psychoanalysis and psychodynamic therapy (Peräkylä, 2004). 
Vehviläinen (2008) has stated that CA research lines up with psychoanalytic theory quite 
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well. When studying interpretation he has found that psychoanalysts do preparatory 
work, which builds a foundation upon which the interpretation is made. This preparatory 
work usually focuses on areas of resistance as classically understood in a psychoanalytic 
theory. "The analyst, in response to something the client has said and using a formulation 
and a noticing statement, topicalizes the client's action" (p. 126). This idea of "noticing," 
which was first put forward by Harvey Sacks (1992b), refers to how a speaker can 
comment on experience that both parties have access to (cited in Vehviläinen, 2008, p. 
123). Therapists make comments (“noticings”) on how their clients are late, fall into long 
silences, change the subject, or make slips of the tongue. In psychoanalytic theory these 
behaviors are thought to be signs of resistance to the therapeutic work. The therapist 
comments on these behaviors, using his turn to make a "complaint" (p. 145). However, 
the complaint calls for a response and the client is free to agree, disagree, or elaborate. As 
Vehviläinen describes, this is a way of encouraging the client to think about herself as a 
kind of puzzle:  
The analyst does preparatory work to create the relevance, and an interactional 
"slot," for the interpretation, thereby co-constructing it with the client. 
Connections and contradictions in the associated materials, pointed out by the 
analyst, provide puzzles: noteworthy, enigmatic issues calling for exploration and 
explanation. (pp. 121-122) 
When these puzzles are offered by the therapist, the client typically accounts for her 
action. Interestingly, these accounts are also actions that are available for both the client 
and the therapist and therefore they provoke further noticings by the therapist. If the 
client is resistant toward accepting the analytic puzzle, then the therapist and the client 
engage in a sequence that is argumentative. However, if “the client collaborates and 
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aligns with the analyst’s invitation to treat her own action as a puzzle to explore, free 
association or self reflection follows" (p. 137).  
Here we can see the similarities between the collaboration and resistance research 
I mentioned above. Vehviläinen’s research shows how clients continue to resist topics 
introduced by the therapist, or offer preferred responses. This type of resistance is usually 
considered to be negative and indicative of a weak alliance and poor therapeutic 
outcomes (Voutilainen et al., 2010; Wynn & Wynn, 2006). Some interactional outcome 
research outside of CA paints a more complex picture, showing that it is not the ability of 
the dyad (client and therapist) to change topics that is important, but the ability of the 
dyad to follow the topic changes at least for a period of time (Tracey & Ray, 1984, p. 24). 
Furthermore, as stated before, resistance in psychoanalysis is complex. First, it is 
recognized and pointed out by the therapist using formulations, noticings, and why 
statements14—this is an institutional way of seeing the client’s action. This preparatory 
work then creates a puzzle that is offered for both the client and the therapist to consider. 
Here the client can resist this puzzle or accept it. This latter form of ‘resistance’ is what is 
conventionally studied by conversation analysis.  
Vehviläinen (2003) has stated that all this preparatory work and the interpretation 
that follows is part of the "interpretive trajectory" (p. 573). In a nutshell, this preparatory 
work can be seen as creating "relevance" for the interpretation, which functions, as 
Vehviläinen has stated, "as an explanation, which attends to the accountability or the 
puzzle established in the prior talk" (p. 580). Obviously, the interpretation does not end 
                                                            
14 “Why were you late?”” 
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the conversation. As we have seen with Peräkylä's work (2010) on the interpretive third 
turn, both the client and the therapist continue to rework the interpretation even after it is 
initially offered by the therapist. 
Interpretation Sequence and Client Elaboration 
Most of Peräkylä's work has also been on interpretation and he has come to some 
interesting conclusions. First, Peräkylä (2005) has shown that interpretation cannot be 
thought of as a single utterance. Rather, what we see occurring is the construction of 
"multiple unit organization of interpretations" where both the analyst and the patient 
create new therapeutic objects (p. 173). As he states: 
The analysts actively pursue extended responses to their interpretations and in 
doing so are informed by the patient's initial responses. Interpretation is often not 
one entity, but consists of a series of attempts by the analyst to elicit a response 
from the patient (p. 175). 
In other words, Peräkylä has found that analysts actively seek to extend the elaborations 
of their clients. Analysts reply to their patient’s responses in ways that solicit further 
elaboration beyond minimal agreement with the initial interpretation. This can be done 
through the use of silence, asking the client to "reveal what is in his mind," or offering a 
"formulation of the patient's actions as problem-indicative" (e.g. “you don't sound 
excited") (p. 166). Also, analysts simply offer their own elaboration on the client’s 
response to their initial interpretation. Peräkylä states that based on the research 
"elaborations appear to be the kind of responses" that analysts seek (p. 168). 
Hence, it is not enough for the client to simply hear the interpretation, have it 
wash over them, and produce some kind of effect. Interpretations are not blunt 
instruments designed to make an impact. Rather, they are strategic devices designed to 
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elicit a response. While studying interpretive interactions Peräkylä found that clients 
respond to interpretations in three different ways: (1) by offering acknowledgment 
tokens, (2) by "expressing their attitude towards interpretation in a compact form" such 
as clear disagreement, showing skepticism, or simply showing that they are thinking 
about interpretation ("wonder if it could be like that"), (3) by offering elaborations which 
display agreement with the interpretation, and yet the content of the elaboration can differ 
substantially from the interpretation itself (italics in the original, pp. 164-165). The 
client’s elaboration can "involve different degrees of discontinuity with the initial 
interpretations" (p. 168). For example, Peräkylä shows how a client makes a "distinct 
topical shift" from the "dynamics of the patient's inner world," as suggested by the 
analyst to more mundane complaints about his parent’s inability to fulfill their prescribed 
gender roles (p. 171). Many times analysts elaborate on these topical shifts in ways that 
are divergent with the original interpretation. Hence, Peräkylä’s work relies on the 
research previously cited that examines how the client and therapist initiate and follow 
topic changes. This focus on collaboration and resistance is common in CA research on 
psychotherapy. However, Peräkylä goes beyond collaboration and resistance and uses his 
findings to critique the stock interactional knowledge of psychotherapy.  
Peräkylä argues that CA provides empirical support for the interactional 
understanding of interpretation, rather than the traditional notion that interpretation is 
aimed at making the unconscious conscious. The interactionist perspective holds that 
“interpretation does not lead so much to the patient discovering something, but to the 
patient and the analyst together creating new ways of understanding and experiencing. 
Here, the psychoanalytic process is understood as a thoroughly interpersonal one,” where 
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the goal is, “joint creation of [a] new reality” (pp. 163 & 174). Hence, according to 
Peräkylä’s research, interpretation is designed to elicit an elaboration sequence where the 
client and the therapist constitute the ‘reality’ of the therapeutic problem. This new reality 
is not a continuous one-sided production, but an elaboration between two participants 
with somewhat divergent points of view. 
This is in line with many of the theorists in the relational school of 
psychoanalysis. Peräkylä (2008) cites Donald Stern’s concept of a "mutual penetration of 
minds” where there is a "moment of meeting” which is followed by convergence of the 
perspectives displayed in the participant’s talk (p. 114). Although there is no evidence for 
dramatic change in the participants’ ways of relating to each other, Peräkylä has found 
brief moments where the participants’ perspectives touch one another and then move 
away along divergent paths. For example, clients and therapists have been observed using 
extensions (adding more and more to the story) to create a kind of intersubjectivity where 
both the client and the therapist are responding to "expressions of mind" (p. 115). 
Peräkylä describes this as a “complementarity of actions” (p. 118). Yet, this 
complementarity ends when, for example, a therapist shifts his comments from talking 
about other people to talking about the client herself. This is followed by a long period of 
silence and an argumentative sequence that is quite different from the complementarity of 
the talk that the two participated in previously. 
The divergence between the client and the therapist can be overt or subtle, 
depending on the design of the conversational turns. Peräkylä has shown how a client can 
extend the therapist's interpretation with language that suggests that the client is neither 
simply clarifying what the analyst was saying, nor fully endorsing it as her own 
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experience. For example, Peräkylä examined an exchange where the therapist’s is trying 
to show how a dream signifies the client’s fear of death. In response to the therapist 
elaboration, the client says: "So that I fight fiercely against that?" referring to her 
attempts to avoid thinking about death (p. 117). Now, the client could have said: "do you 
mean that I fight fiercely against that?" which would be a clear attempt at clarifying what 
the analyst meant, distancing herself from the interpretation, but she did not. The turn 
initiator: "so that" indicates that her comments are about understanding what the analyst 
has said, yet the utterance seems to endorse the analyst’s perspective at least in part. 
Peräkylä points out that the entire sequence can be seen as an insertion sequence where 
the client works to clarify what the analyst meant when he said "in the shape of death." 
The analyst does not clarify his utterance by directly saying "I mean that;" rather he 
extends his description and the description of the client and collaboratively constitutes the 
meaning of previous comment. 
In sum, Peräkylä’s work explicates how interpretation is an interactional practice 
that serves an institutional function. Peräkylä (2004) states that interpretation deals with 
three different temporal orders: "other" involving current or recent past, "transference" 
involving here and now, and "parent involving usually the distant past." (p. 292).15 It is 
the job of the therapist to make links between these temporal orders even though the 
patient is usually not ready to see these links. This link of temporal orders is the central 
difficulty that multi-unit interpretation and the interpretive trajectory attempt to address. 
Therefore, interpretation, states Peräkylä, is the central institutional act of psychoanalysis. 
                                                            
15 Based on David Malan’s interpretative triangle (Malan, 1979). 
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This task is achieved because the interpretation calls for elaboration by the client. This 
elaboration process involves both the therapist and the client, and requires them to 
collaboratively constitute the therapeutic problem. Hence, interpretation is an invitation 
for further interpretation by both the client and the therapist. 
Methodological Possibilities and Limitations  
CA is a promising tool that sheds light on the working mechanism of 
psychotherapy, but, as Peräkylä et al. (2008a) admit, conversation analysts have struggled 
to identify an overarching structure in psychotherapy. Conversation analysts are not sure 
why identifying a structure in psychotherapy has proven to be so difficult. Possibly it is 
because the field of research is so new or because psychotherapy is a diverse field of 
practices, making it impossible to identify one single structure (p. 22). It seems logical 
that psychotherapy would function like many other institutional discourses. Peräkylä et 
al. frequently compare psychotherapy to medical consultation, which has been heavily 
studied by conversation analysis. Medical consultation proved to be highly structured and 
this allowed conversation analysts to make claims about the function of the structure and 
its direct ties to institutional medicine. For example, conversation analysts have been able 
to show how both doctors and patients expect the medical consultation to proceed 
"through a number of distinct phases: opening, presenting complaint, examination, 
diagnosis, treatment, and closing" (p .17). 
But psychotherapy has not been as cooperative. So far, conversation analysts 
"have investigated separate practices without gaining much understanding about the ways 
in which different practices are related to each other so as to produce a psychotherapeutic 
session as whole" (p. 22). For example, at the end of Conversation Analysis and 
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Psychotherapy, Vehviläinen et al. (2008) identifies the different types of utterances used 
by both the therapist and client and how they relate to certain therapeutic functions. 
Again, this is a way of using conversation analysis to refine or critique the stock 
interactional knowledge of psychotherapy. In other words, conversation analysts have 
been able to identify various tactics and then argue for how these tactics fit into larger 
institutional strategies. However, few have taken the further step and used conversation 
analysis to explicate the inherent institutional strategy as it unfolds within a given 
specimen of psychotherapy. 
I contend that this only furthers the fragmented nature of psychotherapy. 
Although it is worthwhile to identify how certain types of talk serve certain therapeutic 
functions, there are other ways that conversation analysis can interpret psychotherapy so 
as to produce a more coherent depiction of its aims. Namely, conversation analysts would 
profit by focusing on how psychotherapy works as a constitutive practice. By focusing on 
constitution, researchers can examine psychotherapy as a process through which the 
client and her world fundamentally changes. In some ways, by focusing mainly on how 
therapeutic interaction correlates with therapeutic function, conversation analysis moves 
backwards not forwards. I understand that this type of analysis is helpful in many ways. 
As a therapist I realize that we often do not know how our interactions serve the goals of 
therapy. But, by focusing on therapeutic functions, we learn nothing about psychotherapy 
that is all that new. We gain competency over our practices, how they work at a minute 
and detailed level, but we do not learn how psychotherapy changes people. We are 
interested in people: the people that our clients hope to become through the process of 
therapy. This is what constitution as a guiding research framework allows us to examine. 
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In the next chapter the methodology for conducting constitutional research will be 
described. CA will be the core methodological approach. However, if CA is going to be 
used to study constitution, there are a few changes that need to be made. First, 
conversation analysts have avoided explicitly studying how emotion factors into human 
interaction. There are exceptions. Most recently, Goodwin and Goodwin (1999), as well 
as Sandlund (2004) have used CA analysis to study emotion. In the next chapter, their 
work will be examined and their insights, as well as their limitations, will be used to 
construct a methodology capable of understanding both conversation and emotion as 
forms of human action. This requires a theory of emotion that holds similar ontological 
assumptions about language and human interaction. The Structural Theory of Emotion 
developed by de Rivera is such a theory. By incorporating the Structural Theory of 
Emotion into conversation analysis, emotion can be understood as a visible transaction 
that is used as part of an overall constitutional strategy. This ability to examine emotion 
from an interactional standpoint will prove pivotal during the analysis. 
The second limitation of CA that needs to be addressed is the reluctance of 
conversation analysts to examine how conversational practices constitute people as 
certain kinds of subjects. This is a result of the traditional focus of pure CA as an 
empirical methodology aimed at explicating the mechanics of both everyday and 
institutional conversation. Applied studies have expanded the scope of CA, but there is an 
overall conservatism when it comes to interpreting how power, gender relations, 
hegemony and so on can be understood in light of conversation analytic findings. Neill 
Korobov’s (2001) positioning analysis, which originates out of narrative studies, can be 
used to study subjectivity. He writes in positioning analysis, “identity is seen as the local, 
 90 
 
or ‘ethno’-ways in which talk is used in interactive contexts to evince the local display of 
perspective, or the positioning of self vis-à-vis the other, and vice-versa” (p. 9). 
Examining this way of positioning oneself as a character within a story, as well as 
positioning oneself vis-à-vis the other participant will prove to be important during the 
analysis. In order to ensure that we are on strong methodological footing I will use 
Stanton Wortham’s method for studying narratives in action. His approach aligns with 
the positioning analysis discussed by Korbov and also shares similar ontological 
assumptions with the constitutional research. This methodology, along with conversation 
analysis, and the structural theory of emotion will be discussed in chapter 4. The chapter 
will end with a detailed account of how these different methodologies can be 
incorporated into a single research procedure. However, the chapter begins with a 
discussion of how the ontological assumptions discussed in this chapter influence the 
epistemological stance of the researcher. 
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chapter 4 
 METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYZING PSYCHOTHERAPY AS A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 
 
“The pure ‘that it is’ shows itself, but the “whence” and the “whither” 
remain in darkness” 
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time 
(1927/1962, p. 173) 
  
"It is investigation not of a hidden, underlying structure of the rich, 
teeming surface of life.” 
Martin Packer, The Science of Qualitative  
Research (2006, p. 389)  
 
 
 
 
Grounding the Methodology in Radical Realism  
All studies are guided by ontological assumptions. Regardless of whether these 
assumptions are made explicit, they are fundamental because they allow us to understand 
the phenomenon that is being studied and set the horizon at which this understanding 
ends. In chapter 2, we discussed the fundamental ontological assumptions of this study. 
Namely, that human beings are their understanding, but this understanding is constituted 
by socio-historical practices. These practices develop through thought, which 
problematizes what it means to be human in relation to things, others, and oneself. By 
engaging in these practices we become certain kinds of people within our form-of-life. 
This chapter details a methodology that can be used to explicate how this constitutional 
process works in psychotherapy.  
The research methodology developed in this chapter is based on a constitutional 
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understanding of human change. The ontological assumptions discussed in chapter 2 
influence everything from the epistemological stance of the researcher (my understanding 
of how human beings come to know themselves, others and the world) to the very design 
of the research question. In this chapter, we will discuss the epistemology assumptions of 
the study. This stance will be characterized as a “Radical realism,” which takes seriously 
the role that culture plays in shaping who we are, but avoids the relativism that has 
plagued other approaches. Based on these fundamental assumptions, we will then set 
down four core methodological principles that will guide the study: (1) Detailed-
Interaction-Analysis (DIA) as the appropriate methodological approach for study 
constitution, (2) specimen approach to data collection, (3) researcher access through 
form-of-life membership, and (4) research account as re-problematization, not 
representation. 
After this, we will review the inability of current research to provide a detailed 
account of the change process in psychotherapy. This will lead to a consideration of how 
the research methodology discussed in this chapter can explicate the change process in 
psychotherapy because it allows us to examine narrative, emotion, and conversation 
utterances as actions. Last, we will end the chapter with a detailed look at the research 
process, examining the decisions made during the data collection and the basic research 
procedures used to analyze the dataset. To provide clarity the research procedures will be 
described as a linear step-by-step process, yet in practice, research is always hermeneutic, 
with constant refinement of assumptions and methodology. 
This refinement process can be seen in evolution of the research question. 
Originally I had phrased the question as: How is the client constituted as a certain kind of 
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interpreter during psychotherapy. However, during the data collection process I realized 
that I was most interested in therapies that I viewed as psychodynamic. Hence, the 
question was changed to: How is the client constituted as a certain kind of interpreter 
during psychodynamic therapy. Yet, as I moved to a case study approach during the data 
collection process and I began to reevaluate the purpose of the study and I came realize 
that this was not simply a study focused solely on the constitutional process in 
psychotherapy. Rather, this was a project aimed at developing a methodology that could 
be used for examining constitution in psychotherapy. In other words, this project is a case 
study aimed at answering whether DIA can be used to show how a client is constituted as 
a certain kind of subject in psychotherapy.16 The sets up the basic task of the dissertation 
as developing and demonstrating a methodology derived from Martin Packer’s 
explication of constitution (Packer, 2001, 2011). The project will be completed when I 
have answered the research question and will be judged by the quality and rigor of my 
methodological approach, application, and final account. 
Radical Realism and the Hermeneutic Circle  
Let us now turn to the epistemological principles that arise out of the ontology in 
chapter 2. These principles answer two fundamental questions about knowledge. First: 
what is knowledge and second: how do we come to know? The ontological framework of 
this study is based on Heidegger’s phenomenology and Foucault’s historical ontology. It 
aligns with the perspective that both Heidegger and Foucault are realists who see the 
                                                            
16 The shift in language from “interpreter” to “certain kind of subject” is reflective of the 
importance of Foucault in Packer’s work and the centrality of Foucauldian genealogy and ethics 
in my understanding of constitution. 
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material world as real, extant, and immediate, but also accept that any knowledge about 
the world is a product of culture. This incorporation of both realism and idealism into a 
coherent theory is why Heidegger’s phenomenology is so novel and often misunderstood 
(Wilkins, 1984).  
Packer (2011) has referred to this type of realism as “radical realism” because it 
holds on to the concept of an “objective world,” but fundamentally changes our 
relationship to this world (pp. 204-205). First, it rejects the independency thesis, most 
notably held by G.E. Moore (1903), that we can know the world as it is, independent of 
our knowing. Moore’s argument is complex, but basically he concludes that our 
perception is not mediated by representation, which is culturally configured, rather it is 
direct awareness of the world in-itself. As he states: "what I am quite sure of is that [our 
awareness] is of blue; that it has to blue the simple and unique relation the existence of 
which alone justifies us in distinguishing knowledge of a thing from the things known, 
and indeed in distinguishing mind from matter" (p. 450). But, Moore has a hard time 
explaining how we come to know this independent world without going through culture. 
For example, how do we decide what the true blue is: a primary color, reflected light 
waves, a chemical compound, expression of mood, and so on. These are all perfectly fine 
ways of defining blue and they all arise out of a particular cultural-historical epoch.  
In Moore’s defense he is simply trying to say that there has to be a real world out 
there because we are aware of it—the world cannot simply be something that is in our 
heads. This is what happens when we take representational thinking to its inevitable ends. 
As Moore exclaimed, "What do we know?.... What reason have we for supposing that 
there are things outside the mind corresponding to these that are inside it?" (p. 449). The 
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answer is that we do not. If we continue to assume that our relationship to the world is 
based on forming representations that may or may not conform to the world in-itself, then 
we end up here with Moore trying to prove that there is a real world despite the fact that 
all knowledge arises out of a cultural-historical process as described by Hegel, 
Heidegger, and Foucault (Foucault, 1978, 1988a; Hegel, 1952/1977; Heidegger, 1966; 
Packer, 2011).  
Radical realism avoids this quandary because it holds that practical activity, not 
representational cognition, is how human beings come to know the world. This not only 
eliminates the need for the independency thesis to prove that the world really does exist, 
but also moves away from subjectivism which, in itself, is a product of representational 
ontology.17 As Packer writes: 
The standard view is that individuals in different cultures form different concepts, 
so they lived in different subjective worlds. For radical realism, in contrast, an 
object becomes something of significance by virtue of its incorporation into 
human practices. It is incorporation of objects, both fabricated and natural, into 
human practical activity that gives them significance with which they show up as 
objects of a certain kind. Heidegger said, being — what something is — is an 
issue only for humans. What something is — that this object in front of me is a 
cup, for example — is an anthropocentric fact, dependent on the continued 
existence of human kind, but it is a fact independent of any individual mind. (p. 
204) 
In short, we never know the world in-itself, yet our knowing is not a mere 
                                                            
17 Radical relativism avoids subjectivism, not cultural relativism. Radical realism does shift our 
understanding of cultural relativism. Namely, cultures have different practices that change over 
time and these differences matter because it is through these practices that people become 
constituted as certain kinds of subjects. There will always be differences both between and within 
cultures, but there is no personal practice that cannot be shared because all practices (and objects 
tied up with those practices) are social. This is important because as researchers, we develop 
membership through the local practices within a given form of life. This membership process 
changes us and allows us to grasp the phenomenon we are studying. Our findings will always be 
relative to the form of life that is being studied, but what is being studied is a real object that 
matters within the given context.  
 96 
 
representation. It arises out of our concernful engagement with the world. It arises out of 
our everyday practices—practical activities—and our relationships with others. These 
practices are not a single person’s, but shared and therefore mark on the mutual horizon 
of human knowledge. 
As discussed in chapter 2,  Heidegger (1927/1962) argued, that at a core 
existential level—or structure as he refers to it—human existence is “possibilities as 
possibilities” (p. 185).18 In a sense, we are pure possibility. But, for actual, everyday 
people this unlimited possibility has been diverted into a practical understanding that is 
part of the person’s cultural-historic, form-of-life. All knowing is a process of working 
through the implicit assumptions that arise out of how people engage with each other and 
the world. Therefore, we can never come to know something without cultural 
assumptions. This does not lead to nihilistic relativism because our engagement with the 
world is the fact of our existence: it defines what it means to be human. Fundamental to 
human existence is that we are in a world that matters to us. This mattering is what 
Heidegger refers to as “understanding” (p. 181). Human beings find themselves in a 
world that already makes sense. Objects are understood pre-reflexively and available for 
use.19 This understanding is a result of ever evolving historical practices that mark the 
horizon of intelligibility for any given form-of-life, which comes before reflexive 
cognition. It is that very sense of being at home in a material world that seems altogether 
familiar, comfortable, and human. Hence, things like rocks, birds, hammers, and 
freeways become something only through our practical engagement, which is cultural. 
                                                            
18 And since at the core of our human existence we are the possibility of possibility, what we are 
essentially—Our existence, our being — “is at issue” (p. 32). 
19 A type of engagement that Heidegger called ready-at-hand (pp. 191-912). 
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When we try to understand what something is we are inevitably working-out how the 
object has come to be something useful. Hence, if we study rocks, we are not getting at 
the rock in-itself, but the totality of relationships the rock has within our culture. Hence, 
any study, whether it is of horses, humans or rocks, is an examination of the form of life 
within which those things have meaning. In short, when we study things, we study 
culture and when we study culture, we study ourselves. 
The interpretive process through which we come to understand ourselves and our 
world is a circular progression. It proceeds from understanding, toward the objects of our 
inquiry, and then leads back to a new understanding of ourselves and our form-of-life. 
This is the hermeneutic circle. Heidegger states that: 
Interpretation….is grounded in something we grasp in advance—in a fore-
having….[and] when one is engaged in a particular concrete kind of 
interpretation…one likes to appeal... to what 'stands there' in the first instance [but 
this] is nothing other than the obvious undiscussed assumptions....our fore-having, 
our fore-sight, and are fore-conception (pp. 191-192).  
Hence, for Heidegger the task of science should not be to get outside of the 
hermeneutic circle (i.e. outside of culture), but to approach it in the right way. Science 
must recognize itself as a cultural practice that arises out of our particular form-of-life. 
This is not meant to denigrate science. Heidegger was very clear that science is a 
necessary practice that can systematically uncover the totality of relationships embedded 
in our understanding of ourselves and our world. Without science we rely on trite 
platitudes and empty assertions that obscure rather than illuminate our existence.20 
                                                            
20 As Heidegger states in Being and Time: "What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to 
come into it in the right way. The circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any random 
kind of knowledge may move; it is the expression of the existential fore-structure of Dasein 
itself….To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we 
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Radical Realism and Psychological Research 
How we understand realism is important because it influences how we do 
research. If we hold the independency thesis then we will need to eliminate all of our pre-
existing assumptions in order to get to the things-in-themselves. However, this is 
problematic because human beings cannot understand their world except through their 
form-of-life. Furthermore, this also leads to research that is blind of its own interests and 
ethical underpinnings. The independency thesis is an attempt to avoid the idealist 
assertion that there is no way to prove the existence of the material world. However, 
radical realism offers a perspective that can honor the primacy of both culture and the 
material world. 
Psychological research influenced by radical realism looks somewhat different 
than research that holds to the independency thesis. We are not interested in what people 
are essentially, but how people live. We want to examine the practices that people engage 
in and how they become certain kinds of people within their form-of-life. Hence, a 
science based on radical realism would rely on empirical research. Human beings are 
beings-in-the-material-world. They become the kind of people they are by engaging in 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
have understood that our first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, 
and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make 
the scientific themes secure and working out the support structures in terms of the things 
themselves" (p. 195). Regardless of the clarity of this quote, some, including Dreyfus (2001), 
have argued that we can follow Heidegger’s ontological project, but still hold onto the 
independency theory. He states that when understanding breaks down, as Heidegger describes in 
the state-of-mind of anxiety, things exist in their raw, in-themselves form. Hence, if we could 
develop scientific practices that foster this state than we would be able to understand objects in-
themselves. The problem is that this would still involve developing practices that are themselves 
part of a certain form of life. Furthermore, Glazebrook (Glazebrook, 2001) critiques Dreyfus 
stating that this would lead to a techno-science that denies its own interests and that Heidegger’s 
radical realism allows for ethical reflection and critique, which is increasingly important in our 
modern age. Glazebrook goes on to state that science is the modern expression of our own must 
being: a practice of asking and inquiring into our material existence. 
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practices that are worldly. Action is at the heart of being human. People are doers: 
Thinking is doing, talking is doing, emotion is doing. These actions are observable. In 
order to understand what people are we have to examine the actions; the practices that 
people engage within their form-of-life.  
Furthermore, as researchers, we understand that we are not outside of the form-of-
life in which we study. Therefore, our assumptions, biases, and intuitions need to be 
acknowledged and systematically reflected upon in order to illuminate the object of 
inquiry and the process through which it is understood. Yet, this reflection on 
assumptions is not an attempt to trim away unnecessary biases. From a radical realist 
perspective these biases and assumptions are the essential way in which we understand 
the phenomenon being studied. It is our membership in a given form-of-life that gives us 
access to the object of inquiry. If we reflect on our assumptions simply to remove them 
from the research process we lose critical empirical data. Also, we create the illusion of 
the unbiased observer void of ethical and cultural interests. When we allow our 
assumptions to become empirical data we complete the hermeneutic circle. We can test 
our assumptions against the data and begin to refine how our understanding of 
phenomenon and ourselves. 
Scientific research has to be understood as a social practice aimed at answering 
the old and fundamentally human question: What is the meaning of our existence? In 
other words, what does it mean to be human? If we understand that this question is 
embedded in all scientific research then we can start to reflect on the ethical and moral 
interests of our research. Hence, psychological research would be able to reflect upon 
itself as part of a field of practices through which people understand themselves, others, 
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and the world. This would amount to what Packer (2011), following Foucault, refers to as 
Historical Ontology. Packer states that "qualitative research is good for historical 
ontology" because it can “attend to the complex interrelations of knowledge, politics, and 
ethics…[and] foster personal and political transformation without resorting to violence. It 
would be an investigation that could create new ways of being". (p. 6). Hence, 
psychological research based on radical realism would see itself as a type of practical 
action aimed at opening up the ways of existing in our form-of-life. 
Four Methodological Principals Derived from Radical Realism  
1. Detailed Interaction Analysis (DIA) as a methodology well suited for studying 
constitution. First, in order to understand how a client is constituted as a certain kind of 
subject in psychotherapy, we will need to develop a method that attends to the details of 
interaction during psychotherapy. Broadly speaking, Detailed Interaction Analysis (DIA) 
can make explicit the actions that both therapist and client use during the practice of 
psychotherapy. This new methodology draws from similar approaches that share 
ontological assumptions central to the constitutional approach to change. During the last 
half of the 20th century different approaches for studying interaction gained favor in the 
social sciences (C. Goodwin & Heritage, 1990; ten Have, 1999; Wodak & Meyer, 2009). 
Both Narrative Analysis and Discourse Analysis can now be seen as general categories 
containing similar, yet varying methodological approaches to studying social interaction. 
However, many of these methodologies still hold onto a representational framework, 
even if this is not explicitly acknowledged (Packer, 2011; Wortham, 2001).  
Conversation Analysis (CA) is one of the many discourse methods that attempts 
to make the details of social interaction sensible. In chapter 3 we discussed how CA 
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avoids the problems that plague representational based methodologies because of its 
focus on language as action and social order as produced through everyday interaction. 
CA’s intellectual roots go back to the phenomenology of Alfred Schutz and Heidegger 
and, hence, the fundamental assumptions are akin to those of radical realism (Packer, 
2011). Most important is the relationship between the participants and unfolding social 
context. CA "articulates the work of ordering," the way in which participants are skilled 
agents who interpret and understand each other's conversational moves and design their 
utterances with the context and identity of both themselves and the other parties in mind 
(p. 267). In this framework, meaning is not what someone intends, but something that 
gets worked out through the participants’ own understanding of each other’s talk and 
subsequent action. The relationship between the context and the participants is dialectic. 
The context sets the ground rules for what is excepted and acceptable, but the participants 
have to play along in order for the context to persist. Every interaction can be an act of 
reaffirmation or reconfiguration depending on the actions of the participants. 
 Remember that the context is the local-level, temporal unfolding of a social 
practice (e.g. a specific psychotherapy occurring in time with its own unique participants, 
history, and unfolding possibilities). Hence, what we are talking about is the hermeneutic 
circle of the constitutional process. Participants engaging in social practices act in ways 
that respond to the rules and expectations. In this way they become certain kinds of 
people depending on the practices they engage in. However, they are not passive subjects. 
Their actions not only affect the context (reproducing or altering it) but also affect how 
they are constituted as certain kinds of people. Last, and most importantly to 
psychotherapy, is that social practices are obviously social. People do not enact practices 
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in isolation from others. In all social practices, including psychotherapy, participants are 
acting on one another based on the unfolding context and the previous actions. As Packer 
states, "Each person involved in a conversation has their own interpretation of what is 
going on, but these interpretations are intersubjective in the sense that every person treats 
the adjacent utterances in similar ways. People share an understanding of the ‘game’ they 
are engaged in and its ‘order’” (p. 256). Whether in psychotherapy or in the checkout line 
at Walmart, participants act on one another based on an understanding of the rules of the 
practices and the result is a constitutional process that brings into being certain kinds of 
people. 
2. Data should be a natural occurring specimen. In Chapter 3 we discussed how 
CA takes an inductive approach to data and views each conversation as a specimen. 
Individual specimens might be good or bad, but they are never wrong because they are all 
examples of real conversations that have occurred (ten Have, 1999). From a Radical 
Realist perspective every human practice is a specimen that can be studied in order to 
understand how the participants are being constituted. Ideally, data should be naturally 
occurring, not staged, and researchers should have access to both audio and video so the 
interaction can be studied as an embodied, temporal event.  
The goals of this present study are to describe the change process in 
psychotherapy and develop a methodology capable of providing such an account. Hence, 
we want to collect the best specimen available, rather than seeking out a certain kind of 
psychotherapy that seems universal or indicative of a certain approach. This is different 
from typical CA studies of psychotherapy. Most researchers analyze large quantities of 
conversational specimens and then make claims about normative sequences. This 
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inductive approach tends to focus on certain sequences in the conversation; rather than 
the conversation as a whole. This is typically how studies are conducted across CA. As 
Jefferson (1988) reflected, “While the analysis of conversation which I practice tends to 
focus on very small, crystalline bits of the conversational machinery, I also have an 
ongoing interest in the analysis of what Harvey Sacks has discussed as the ‘big packages’ 
” (p. 418). This study will be an examination of psychotherapy as a “big package” and 
therefore we will have to go beyond the typical approach used by conversation analysis in 
order to demonstrate the methodology. 
3. Our Membership in the form-of-life that we are studying provides vital 
assumptions and basic understanding. The roots of conversation analysis stretch back to 
the ethnomethodology of Harold Garfinkel. For ethnomethodologists, participants and 
researchers or not individual subjects, but members of a shared form-of-life or at the very 
least share a basic understanding. As Packer (2011) writes, "Ethnomethodologists speak 
of ‘members’ ….[with] ‘vulgar competence’ …necessary to gain the ‘membership 
knowledge’ that enables the researcher to recognize the relevant phenomena….‘Vulgar’ 
is used here in the old sense of ‘belonging to people’“ (p. 195). The data for the study is 
of a therapist-in-training and client, where I was also a therapist-in-training. Therefore, I 
am a member of multiple relevant communities. I am a therapist-in-training and, in my 
personal life, I have been a client. These experiences provide rich assumptions that will 
inform how I understand and interpret my data. Ignoring this would impoverish the study 
by eliminating rich, empirical data. 
4. The researcher as active stance and research account as action. The stance of 
the researcher and our understanding of the research account have to be re-conceptualized 
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if we are going to grab hold of radical realism and let go of the independency thesis. 
According to Packer, "Foucault ….offered a powerful conception of the project for a 
critical scientific inquiry, and of the appropriate stance for an investigator. This stance is 
always a way of life….A way of being in the form-of-life" (p. 377). Just as the therapist 
and the client are active participants engaged in the social practice of psychotherapy, so is 
the researcher. However, the research and the researcher are very different from therapy 
and the therapist. The researcher takes a critical stance aimed at changing the way we 
understand the object of study (i.e. psychotherapy). As the researcher it is my role to take 
an active stance and make an account the can affect the reader. 
Hence, within this paradigm the research account is no longer conceived of as a 
representation. Rather, it is seen as an action. Truth, is not a question of correspondence 
rather it is conceived of in terms of effects. As Packer writes, 
These accounts will have truth not to the extent that they correspond with how 
things 'really are, ‘but insofar as they point out things we haven't noticed because 
of the illusio (the false consciousness, the alienation) that our practices and duties. 
Such as, these accounts will have the potential for phronesis: practical relevance 
that his political in the original sense of guiding activities (p. 389) 
Research is a re-problematization that allows us to see things differently and open up new 
ways of being (pp. 376-377). It is an action, among other actions, in a field of power that 
aligns itself with and against other practices, all of which have their constitutional effects, 
shifting the overall culture and changing what it means to be human (Foucault, 1978). 
Hence, the methodology developed for this research project re-problematizes one of the 
core concepts of psychotherapy research—change. In following sections, change will be 
described as here-and-now process of actions that position participants in dynamic 
relational matrices. 
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Studying Constitutional Change 
At first glance it seems unlikely that this study can show change occurs in 
psychotherapy. Having only two sessions and no outcome or subjective reports, the 
reader might wonder how this dataset and methodology can even identify change. 
Outcome studies show that a person has changed over the course of treatment, most 
commonly by comparing changes in symptom inventories (Kazdin, 1994; Lambert & 
Bergin, 1994; Orlinsky et al., 2004; Wachtel, 2010). This is change over time. Similarly, 
this study will chart the course of 2 session and attention will be paid to how things shift 
over the course of time. However, the promise of this study is that it can illuminate how 
change occurs in psychotherapy. Therefore, the idea that change is something that simple 
happens and can be measured based on 2 data points has to be challenged. In order to 
show how change occurs we have to let go of the notion that a study must provide at least 
two data points were difference can be clearly assessed and ideally quantified. Hence, to 
let this notion go we have to shift our attention from how a person is changed to how a 
practice changes the participants. The difference is not simply semantic. Following 
radical realism, participants are active agents engaging in a practice where they act on 
one another in ways that constitute them as certain kinds of people. Certain ways of 
being, acting, feeling and relating are put forward as how to be (good). Participants are 
engaged in a process through which they acted on one another creating ways of being in 
relation to each other’s actions. Just walking into a therapy office, sitting down and 
providing a psychosocial history is a way of being a certain kind of person that is 
uniquely configured (in her relationships toward the therapist, family, friends, and self) 
by the social practice. Before a person is changed, a person changes. This occurs 
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naturally when we engage in a practice. Hence, when we look at the data we will be 
asking the following: 
● What is emphasized as important and how is this importance made evident? 
● What is the relationship between the client and herself and how is this 
constituted? 
● What is the relationship between the client and others and how is this constituted? 
● How do the client and therapist align and dis-align? 
● What are the emotions between the therapist and client and how do they manifest 
and what is their function? 
Because outcome studies are a way to looking at how a person has changed over 
time, they envision change as something the person possesses, it is part of them, and is 
often thought of as something internal (Sa t-> S(a-i)). Radical realism allows us to break 
apart change and view it as an active process rather than a passive possession. Talk and 
emotion are seen as tools. By talking and feeling we are doing something that affects the 
other participant and ourselves. In CA studies on psychotherapy, they describe the 
client’s speech as resisting, extending, and elaborating. Likewise they described the 
therapist as formulating, interpreting, questioning, extending and so on (Vehviläinen et 
al., 2008). Furthermore, using the Structural Theory of Emotion (to be describes in the 
next section) emotions can be described as transactions that bring people closer or push 
people for their part. Hence, anger pushes the other away, desire draws the other closer, 
contempt recognizes the other as not belonging, shame recognizes the self as not 
belonging (de Rivera, 1977).  
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When taken as a whole, use of talk and emotion constitute a field of action on 
action — a field of power. Psychotherapy has to be understood as a historical practice 
with a certain configuration of power relations. In psychotherapy personal/everyday 
problems become therapeutic problems, which ideally allow the client to gain more 
control over their symptoms and more satisfaction and their life. Yet, through this process 
the client is positioned as a certain kind of person. Hence, our study is concerned with 
how psychotherapy actively positions (i.e. changes) the person during the practice itself. 
This amounts to an assessment of the constitutional function of the practice. Following 
Foucault (1978, 1983) we might frame the question as the relationship between power 
and ethics: How is power used to create a certain kind of subject that engages in a certain 
kind of ethics?  
The Problem of Explicating Emotion through Conversation Analysis 
Conversation Analysis has avoided studying emotion for good reason. Influenced 
by both ethnomethodology and phenomenology, researchers avoid introducing external 
constructs in their research. By focusing on what our utterances do, rather than the 
intentions behind what we say, conversation analysts only attends to what is transparent 
to the participants and the researcher. Power, false conscience, and emotion might be of 
interest to the researcher, but if they are not visibly present in the conversation then they 
are not relevant to the participants or practical activity being studied. In other words, 
unless the participants are explicitly talking about emotion, conversation analysts has 
shied away from speculating on what emotions are present and how they are relevant to 
understanding the interaction. Hence, CA has difficulty identifying emotion and this 
limits its ability to describe emotion as a social action. 
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Regardless, a few studies have attempted to explicitly look at emotion by using 
conversation analysis. Sundland’s (2004) analysis of emotional displays during graduate 
seminars attempts to understand how emotions are social actions that conversation 
analysts have overlooked. The study is quite good and unique; however, Sundland still 
holds onto the idea that emotions are, at least in part, subjective experiences. This can be 
seen in her methodological decision to use participant interviews to identify and 
distinguish different emotional experiences. Although her overall analysis is solid and 
insightful, her struggle to re-conceptualize emotion as a completely social phenomenon is 
problematic. Another study is Goodwin & Goodwin’s Emotion within Situated Activity 
(M. Goodwin & Goodwin, 1999). They use various examples to demonstrate: “how 
emotion is a social phenomenon…organized and made visible…through systematic 
practices which are lodged within the processes of situated interaction, used by 
participants to build in concert with each other the events that make up their lifeworld” 
(pp 24-25). 
 From little girls playing hopscotch to the emotional displays of an aphasic adult, 
they use pitch height changes, tone, and non-verbal gestures to identify the occurrence of 
emotion. This way of identifying emotion is not an attempt to decontextualize emotional 
indicators from the unfolding context; on the contrary, a “pitch height does not function 
as an isolated, decontextualized display. Instead it becomes visible as a specific, 
meaningful event, by virtue of the way in which it is embedded within a particular 
sequence of action.” (p. 6). Goodwin & Goodwin make this point because they want to 
distinguish themselves from the trend in affective research to treat emotional displays as 
decontextualized elements (Ekman & Friesen, 2003; Ekman & Rosenberg, 1998). And 
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yet, the fact that this distinction needs to made, indicates how both Goodwin & Goodwin 
take similar approaches to other researchers such as Ekman when it comes to identifying 
emotion. 
By relying on distinct, observable data such as pitch changes, gestures, facial 
expressions, and so on, Goodwin and Goodwin utilize strategies similar to those 
employed by Ekman, yet avoid implementing an explicit coding system to identify 
emotion. Many methods have been developed to identify emotion, so much so, that 
affective science, has become an interdisciplinary field of study (Coan & Allen, 2007). 
Methods have been developed to study emotion in a wide range of contexts using 
different techniques. Most relevant to this present study are the techniques to identify 
emotion through observation (as opposed to physical measurements or subjective 
reports). John Gottman, who developed one such method, stated that there are basically to 
types of approaches: those that rely on the intuition and background knowledge of the 
observer and those that decontextualize the event into discrete micro-features. The 
following quote indicates which method Gottman (1996) prefers: 
I did not want my summary codes to read something like: “Husband shows 
zygomatic major contractions on face with contraction of the cheek raiser muscle, 
with shift downward in fundamental frequency, decrease in amplitude and voice 
in a major key and rapid inhalation and exhalation of breath with hut hut 
vocalizations.” Instead, I wanted to say that the husband laughed. (cited in Coan 
& Gottman, 2007, p. 268) 
One of the most important tenets of this study is that context and basic human 
understanding matters. People feel and understand emotions even if this feeling is hard to 
put into words. These unformalized hunches and intuitions are assumptions that ground 
our understanding of any given situation (whether we are engaged in an argument with 
our spouse or watching a therapy session where the client becomes angry at the 
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therapist). Coding methods such as the Facial Action Coding System (FACS), developed 
by Ekman and his colleges (Cohn, Ambadar, & Ekman, 2007; Ekman & Friesen, 2003; 
Ekman & Rosenberg, 1998) eliminates the surrounding context and only pays attention to 
small facial movements (called Action Units (AU)) to systematically identify different 
emotions. This type of approach also eliminates the researcher’s assumptions and instead 
relies on recipes of combined AU’s that are correlated with different emotions. 
Gottman’s (2007) approach differs in that it “requires the use of human beings with a 
personal history of interpersonal, affective communication. Such a personal history 
provides access to subtle cues that even many years of strict training in the identification 
of discrete physical features may neglect” (p. 268)  
However, neither Gottman’s approach nor the methods used in CA or DIA 
completely leave behind the use of discrete movements or vocal changes. Coders 
utilizing Gottman’s Specific Affect Coding System (SPAFF) use a dialectical process 
that moves back and forth from an intuition based understanding of the emotional event 
to an analysis of discrete behavioral movements. Gottman states:  
Thus learning to observe emotional behavior means, on the one hand, learning to 
identify multiple discrete indicators,21 any one of which may or may not be 
present during a particular emotional episode, and, on the other hand, drawing 
from one’s own personal history of affective communication in order to spot the 
complexities of behavior that remain outside the grasp of highly detailed discrete 
analysis. SPAFF coding means learning to integrate voice, physical features, 
verbal content, and more—indicators that are sometimes hard to describe (e.g., 
“positive energy”) but that are easily grasped by most coders (p. 268) 
                                                            
21 For Gottman: “An indicator is an objective piece of evidence that any observer can see or hear 
directly” (p. 268). The indicator indicates that the emotion (which is conceived of as a latent 
construct) is present. 
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Because this is an exploratory study there will inevitably be areas left uninvestigated due 
to time and competing concerns. Using SPAFF coding requires extensive training and 
practice. Because of this I will not be using it as a coding method for this study, but I do 
think it is worth exploring in future research. That being said, we still need some way of 
identifying emotion.  
Goodwin & Goodwin have shown that emotion can be conceptualized and studied 
as a social action. The data that they chose were situations where emotions were clearly 
present and important to the interaction. And yet, the method they used to identify the 
emotion seems like a lite version of SPAFF (except that the indicators are chosen based 
on studies in sociology and anthropology). Goodwin & Goodwin have the right idea, but 
what they lack is a theory of emotion that aligns with their fundamental assumptions. 
Such a theory is necessary because it can assist researcher identify and distinguish 
emotion without having to rely on coding system that has fundamentally different 
ontological assumptions. 
The Structural Theory of Emotion: An Action Based Interpersonal Theory of 
Emotion 
As stated above, psychology has been stuck in a debate as to whether emotion is 
psychological or physiological (or both) for the past 120 years. We need a theory that 
goes beyond this debate and can adequately conceptualize emotion as a form of social 
action. In the late 1970’s one such theory arose and despite its potential it has remained 
unrecognized in discursive research. Joseph de Rivera’s Structural Theory of Emotion 
(STE) was derived from contemporary theories of emotion, psychoanalysis, and 
interpersonal phenomenology (de Rivera, 1977). For de Rivera, emotions are 
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conceptualized as interpersonal phenomena, which always have a directional movement 
that extends or constricts the psychological space between self and other or subject and 
object. The object or subject of the emotion can be either explicit or implicit. Meaning 
that emotions can be directed toward real individuals in the present moment or they can 
be directed towards oneself. In the latter, the individual who manifests the emotion is 
both the subject and the object. In this case, either the subject or the object is typically 
implicit. This definition of emotion and the structural relationships between emotions 
were developed out of an empirical research methodology called “conceptual encounter” 
(de Rivera, 1981, 2006; Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera, & Mascolo, 1995). Here researchers 
work with individuals as “research partners” to examine “some aspect of human 
experience” in order to arrive at “an abstract conceptualization that really comprehends 
[the] experience” (de Rivera, 1981, p. 3). This research oscillates between abstract 
conceptualization and the concrete experiences of the research partner and the 
researcher.22 During the process the conceptualization can change, but so can the 
experience of emotion on the part of the participants. Initially, de Rivera developed this 
methodology to explicate the experience of anger; however the fruitfulness of the work 
led to the entire theory of emotion.  
                                                            
22 This research methodology is ultimately a hermeneutic method that privileges pragmatism. It 
acknowledges the dialectical nature of the research process whereby the object of study and the 
participants are transformed. Conceptualizations that proved to be useful for the participants and 
the researcher are privileged over others. Reflecting on his research de Riviera stated “in the 
course of this encounter, the existence of concrete instances of anger may change one’s 
conceptualization of what the essence of anger is. On the other hand, the existence of a good 
conceptualization may change how a person experiences concrete instances of the phenomenon. 
Thus, a dialectical process is involved in the encounter” (de Rivera, 1977, p. 77). 
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Besides their directional aspects, de Rivera states that emotions are distinguished 
as occurrences that provide specific instructions to modify the “relationship between 
person and other” (p. 118). Taking a cue from Sartre and other phenomenologists, de 
Rivera (1977) describes how emotions are not isolated subjective experiences, but world 
transforming events: 
The experience of emotion reflects the transformation of our relationship to the 
world — to the persons, objects, events, and actions that are important to us. 
These transformations are the movements of emotion and each type of emotion 
reflects a different kind of transformation. The transformation is not a passive 
reaction to a given stimulus situation, rather it is a transaction between the person 
and his environment, a way of organizing the relationship between the person and 
the other so that the response itself gives meaning to the stimulus situation — e.g., 
‘a hole is to dig’. (pp. 35-36)  
Therefore, our subjective experience of emotion is only one aspect of a world 
transforming event that is visible because it modifies our present-moment relationships. 
When examining discourse we are able to identify movements toward and away initiated 
by participants. This is the first step toward identifying emotions that are not simply 
referred to, but experienced and processed through social interaction.  
Conversation analysts studying emotion avoid using theories of emotion to 
ground their findings. Most likely this is because many theories of emotion hold 
ontological assumptions that are contrary to those held by conversation analysts. I argue 
that by not having a theory of emotion, researchers limit their ability to talk about the 
variety of emotion and relationships between emotions. Furthermore, some researchers 
might unknowingly rely on subjectivist assumptions about emotion when designing 
studies. De Rivera’s theory is necessary because it allows us to make our assumptions 
about emotion explicit. Furthermore, the theory is compatible with CA because it views 
 emot
a type
under
use in
 
Figur
Pitch
ion as a type
 of action. 
To show h
standing em
 their study
Emotion a
Budwig (
their socia
position th
example o
bilingual 
American
Union/Ko
Data are t
(1974: 73
will take t
opposition
 
e 1  
 Height Cha
No
ac
 of action, w
ow STE ca
otion, let’s 
. Below is a
s Embodied
1995) has ar
l worlds the
emselves in
f how emot
Spanish/Eng
s) in grades 
reatown dis
ranscribed u
1-733) descr
he next turn
 from Glori
nges during
te. From G
tivity. In N. 
hich aligns
n provide a 
look at one 
n excerpt fro
 Performan
gued that if 
n we need t
 actual inte
ion is situat
lish speakin
2-5 in an el
trict near do
sing the con
ibed in the 
. This is imm
a, who claim
 a Display o
oodwin, M.,
Budwig, C.
114 
 with the im
guiding fram
the example
m their pap
ce 
we are to vi
o look at ho
ractive situa
ed within ch
g girls (prim
ementary sc
wntown Los
ventions of
appendix. In
ediately an
s that Carla
f Anger 
 & Goodwin
 Uzgiris & V
portant assu
ework for i
s that Goodw
er including
ew children
w language 
tions. The fo
ildren's lang
arily secon
hool located
 Angeles, a
 Sacks, Sche
 the followi
swered by a
 is usurping
, C. (1999)
. Wertsch (
mption in C
dentifying a
in and Goo
 the origina
 as agents in
is used by c
llowing pro
uage activit
d generation
 in the Pico 
re playing h
gloff and Je
ng Carla say
 very strong
 her turn: 
 
. Emotion w
Eds.), Comm
A that talk i
nd 
dwin (1999
l diagram: 
 constructin
hildren to 
vides a first
y. Three 
 Central 
op scotch. 
fferson 
s that she 
 display of 
ithin situate
unication: 
 
s 
) 
g 
 
d 
 115 
 
An arena of development (pp. 33-54). Stamford, CT: Ablex. Copyright 
2000 Marjorie Goodwin. Reprint for educational fair use.  
The oppositional turn contains no emotional terms whatsoever. 
Nonetheless it vividly displays a strong emotional stance on the part of its 
speaker, e.g. what we might gloss as outraged indignation at the despicable 
behavior of the first speaker. How is this stance made visible? The oppositional 
turn begins with a preface,"N'ai" , announcing at the earliest possible opportunity 
in the turn that the prior move is being objected to. Moreover this preface is 
spoken with a dramatic pitch excursion. Such forms of "emphatic speech style" 
resemble what Selting (1994:404) has described as 'peaks of involvement' within 
the domain of storytelling: "sudden shifts from an unmarked normal style to a 
marked emphatic style." Within the single syllable of the preface the second 
speaker's voice leaps from 400 to 600 Hz. The display of outrage, with its 
associated emotional components, is made visible as an embodied performance -- 
that is, through the way in which second speaker controls her voice and 
intonation. (pp. 5-6) 
 
As you read this excerpt there is a clear sense of the process used to identify an emotional 
event. They write “it vividly displays a strong emotional stance on the part of its speaker, 
e.g. what we might gloss as outraged indignation at the despicable behavior of the first 
speaker.” This first step is simply to find places where one’s intuition clearly says, “Oh, 
that got heated” or “There is some real feeling”. Hence, just as Gottman found that 
people who share similar backgrounds are really good at intuitively identifying emotion, 
Goodwin and Goodwin use their pre-reflective understanding to identify data sequences 
that involve emotion. Next, they highlight certain observable indicators (i.e. pitch height) 
that denote the presence of emotion. And last, they contextualize all the different features 
of the interaction and demonstrate how emotion is social and embodied, not physiological 
and subjective. This process of moving from (1) the intuitive assumptions that arise as we 
co-participate with the data, toward (2)  highlighting analytical details and last, (3) 
refining our original assumptions in ways that change our overall understanding, is the 
hermeneutic circle we discussed previously. 
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Similar to Goodwin and Goodwin’s work, this study will use a hermeneutic 
process to identity and explicate emotion in psychotherapy. However, the process 
detailed above could be improved by using STE as a guiding framework. STE could be 
used as a theoretical reference backing up the emotion identifications made during the 
study.23 But more importantly, STE allows the researcher to look at the data in a new 
way. Becoming aware of how the participants move toward and against each other 
becomes a way of understanding the interaction. Clear emotional transactions like the 
example above are plain to see, but difficult to describe using emotional language. Is this 
anger, contempt, or mixed emotions that we are seeing? 
STE allows us to make these difficult distinctions. The interaction we see above is 
clearly a transaction. Gloria moves against Carla as she calls for an another turn. 
According to de Rivera (1977), anger arises in a situation where “the others’ behavior 
constitutes a challenge to what a person believes ought to exist” (p. 78). Ought is the key 
term. de Rivera bases his analysis on the work of Fritz Heider who argued that oughts 
derive from shared values that are experienced as an objective aspect of reality. This 
implies that the individuals involved in the situation have the capacity to understand these 
shared values and act upon them. Furthermore, the individuals have to be part of the same 
group from which the values derive. De Rivera points out that groups can be both large 
and small, but that the fundamental unit is the self-other dyad (p. 80). 
Here we have just such a group. Carla’s ‘calling for another turn’ and Gloria’s 
                                                            
23 A reference is simply a source that has shown that something, such as a pitch height change, is 
an indicator of emotion. Step two in the hermeneutic process above, is accomplished by finding 
some behavior, or action in the data that has been previously identified as an indicator of emotion. 
The reference can be an external study, theory of emotion or coding system (such as SPAFF and 
FAS). 
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‘angry refusal’ are possible because both girls belong to the same form-of-life, which 
includes the hop-scotch rules, the unfolding interaction, and the history of games 
previously played. Emotional transactions are unwilled, spontaneous transformations of 
the relationships within an unfolding context, but other emotional “choices” are always 
present. Hence, instead of anger, Gloria could have fallen into a depressive withdrawal 
(sadness, defeat). She could have just sat there and said nothing because she felt like 
Carla would yell at her if she would have said anything. Furthermore, she could have 
remained silent, but rolled her eyes at Carla and then commented: “Have all the turns you 
like.” According to STE, this would be an indication of contempt, rather than depressive 
withdrawal, or anger.24 All of these differences are detailed in STE and this provides a 
theoretically grounded and holistic way of looking at emotion.  
Goodwin and Goodwin were correct in that emotions occur as embodied, practical 
activity embedded within a social context. STE allows us to distinguish between the 
different types of emotion and to understand how an emotion occurs as an unwilled 
response that transforms the participant’s relationships (to self, other, and the world) 
within a given context. Also, as will be shown in the analysis, STE allows us to better 
identify, distinguish, and analyze emotion as it is transacted between participants and as it 
is enacted during narration. This allows us to see how emotions relate to one another as 
they are transacted and enacted during the therapy session. Furthermore, it allows us to 
                                                            
24 Two components of STE that will be discussed during the analysis are the three emotional 
dimensions: Belonging, Recognition, and Being; and the structural relationship of emotion. For 
now let me just say that anger and depression are ways of claiming or disclaiming one’s right as a 
member who belongs to a certain group. Contempt is a way of recognizing someone as Other. 
These differences distinguish anger, depression, and contempt, while also indicating how the 
emotions relate to one another. 
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understand that emotional choices are not made by the participant per se, but arise in 
unique situations in order to change one’s relational world. Hence, adopting a theory of 
emotion allows the researcher to see emotion more clearly and completely. Also, by not 
adopting a theory of emotion the researcher could unwitting allow the research to be 
influenced by implicit assumptions about emotion, which hold onto subjectivist models 
of emotional phenomena.  
The Hermeneutic Circle of Emotional Identification 
Below is a diagram that illustrates the process that will be used to identify 
emotion during the study. It proceeds according to the three-part hermeneutic process 
discussed above and relies on indicators that are both empirical and theoretical. Although 
SPAFF coding will not be used for the study, I will use the empirical evidence that this 
system has amassed in order to justify certain emotional identifications. 
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situation that led to an emotion for example), and the audience then acknowledges that 
the point was understood. Hence, CA has worked extensively to show that the narrative 
itself occurs across several turns and the meaning of a narrative is not contained within a 
discrete monologue decontextualized from the preceding or following conversation. 
Hence, CA allows us to understand how narratives are sequential, mutually constituted 
phenomena that place the participants in positions (story-teller and audience) that are 
different, yet related to each other. 
Yet, this focus on the storytelling sequence ignores a majority of the narrative 
content. Labov (1977), who took an extensive look at narratives in psychotherapy, stated 
that stories in psychotherapy are typically designed to do something specific. For 
example, narratives can be complaints, agreements, or protests. Hence, the content, as 
well as the sequence of the narrative are important in understanding what type of action 
the narrative is trying to achieve. 
This idea that narratives do something is actually quite radical. Narratives are 
classically understood as a form of representation. As Labov states, “we define a 
narrative as one means of representing past experience by a sequence of ordered 
sentences that present the temporal sequence of events by that order” (p. 105). Hence, the 
narrative has meaning because it represents something that has happened in the past. 
Furthermore, this representation might not be a dry history of events, but a recalling of 
feelings attached to the events. From a therapeutic perspective, it might even point back 
to unresolved conflicts that the client is keeping out of consciousness. The point is that 
the content of the narrative has typically been seen as a representation. This is a major 
reason why CA has avoided dealing specifically with content and instead has focused on 
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the sequential structure of narratives. However, there are ways in which the content of the 
narrative can be analyzed as more of an action. 
Wortham (2001) contends that in order to understand narrative, and its ability to 
construct the self (as he puts it), we have to understand the representative content as well 
as the interactional positioning that it creates. He agrees that this enriches narrative 
research which primarily focuses on the representational function of narratives. Wortham 
writes: “the predominant explanation for a biographical narrative’s power sites their 
representational functions. Telling the story of his or her life gives the narrator an 
opportunity to redirect that life when the narrator tells a coherent story that foregrounds a 
certain perspective or direction” (p. 5). This perspective has been endorsed by many 
theorists and researchers throughout human science. Although there are individual 
differences, most explain that: “an autobiographical narrative selects from among many 
events of the life and places them in a sequence that leads toward an ending or 
resolution.” (p. 7). Importantly, this idea has been advanced in psychology and used to 
explain important aspects of the self and how psychotherapy can create change (Epstein 
& White, 1990). Wortham (2001) argues that this account is too simplistic. It ignores 
postmodern and feminist critiques of the self as uniform and holistic. Rather, the self is a 
series that stretches both horizontally across time and vertically in the present moment. 
In order to understand how autobiographical narratives construct the self, we have 
to understand their interactional effects and the relationship these effects have with the 
represented material. Wortham proposes that narrators create a “doubling of roles” where 
“the narrator has at least one role in the represented content of the story and one role in 
the ongoing interaction between the narrator and the audience” (p.13). This creates a 
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“parallelism” where patterns in the narrative (represented material) align with how the 
narrator is acting in the interaction. This can be simple, such as telling a story about being 
assertive and then being assertive during the storytelling. However this can also be much 
more complex. 
Wortham’s methodology is based on Bakhtin’s understanding of the relationship 
between the novel (i.e. narrative) and the narrator. He claims that typically narrators do 
not speak for themselves. Rather, they speak through their characters. This is referred to 
ventriloquation and it gives the narrator the ability to speak with many voices. 
Furthermore, characters establish certain positions in the narrative by forming 
relationships with one another. In other words, cops have their robbers, lovers have each 
other and families have mother, father and child. Even if the narrator does not speak for 
herself, she also takes a position in relation to her characters by virtue of the ways she 
crafts the narrative. In natural conversation, these positions are always being negotiated 
and are never finished.  
Wortham has developed the concepts of mediation, voicing, and emergence to 
show how this process unfolds. To illustrate these concepts Wortham uses an excerpt 
from a classroom discussion in which the students and teachers were discussing the social 
structure ritual infanticide in Sparta. The conversation centered on how powerful elders, 
Ephors, would judge whether a child was strong enough to live and if a child was judged 
to be sickly it would be left out to die. In Wortham’s excerpt a student protests, saying 
that it is unfair for them to decide whose child could live. The teacher then plays devil’s 
advocate, arguing for the merits of such a practice. For this analysis, Wortham divides the 
interaction into the two events: the storytelling event and the narrative event (p. 19). The 
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former is the interaction in which the narrative is being told and the latter is the narrative 
being told. The need for such a division goes back to the claim that we need to 
understand the relationship between the interaction and the represented content of the 
narrative. In this example, Wortham points out that the participants make use of the 
original narrated event about the Spartans, which was assigned to them as a reading. 
Through their interaction the participants create other narrated events that parallel the 
structure of the original narrative (i.e. reading assignment). By structure, Wortham is 
referring to the relative position of the characters in the narrative. For example, the 
original narrated event has the relationship of masters, privileged subordinates, and 
unprivileged subordinates. The complaining student shapes her complaint as a 
hypothetical narrative. “What if,” she states, “they sentence my baby to death and not my 
friends. Then there would not be equality.” In response, the teacher creates a narrative 
about Asian students, stating that maybe we should just focus on Asian students (as 
opposed to lazy students on welfare) because they will turn out better. 
These narratives are developed over the course of the interaction. Wortham claims 
that by the end of the excerpt there is a parallelism between the narrated events that draws 
on previous “voices” (social positions) that denigrate those on welfare as being lazy and 
leeching off of society (see figure 3). If we look at the figure we see that the narrated 
events are related to social positions held in our society. Wortham acknowledges that 
connecting the narrated event with social positions can be difficult. We cannot assume 
that certain utterances correspond with a social position on a one-to-one basis. Utterances 
can be appropriated and used by an infinite number of others, towards different ends. 
Therefore, these parallels have to emerge during the interaction. 
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important to understanding the narrative itself. In other words, "Narratives often cohere 
only with reference to preceding and subsequent conversation. In such cases, the segment 
of conversation relevant to understanding the meaning of the narrative is larger than the 
narrative itself." (p. 62). This is something that we see quite often in psychotherapy. 
Clients will tell a story that may be quite short, but it becomes the catalyst for a great deal 
of conversation. Oftentimes both the client and therapist continue to comment on the 
narrative long after is has been closed. Comments are conversational turns that elaborate 
on the character’s behaviors and feelings first introduced in the narrative. Comments do 
not have the temporal structure or sequential order indicative of storytelling, but the they 
are used to shape the client’s relationship to herself, others and the world first established 
in the narrative (Ochs & Schieffelin, 1989). Hence, commenting in psychotherapy is a 
process of mediation whereby both participants work out what the narrative means as part 
of within a therapeutic dialogue. 
How to Use NIA to Study Constitution 
Wortham’s method will be used to understand (1) how the client creates a 
relational structure by positioning herself within her own stories, (2) how this positioning 
aligns with the relationship between the client and therapist, and (3) how this changes 
based on the sequential interaction. This aligns with our approach to studying emotion. 
Remember that emotion is conceptualized as a relationship that is transformed and 
modified. Therefore, the basic approach to analyze the ways in which relationships are 
created in narratives, and how they form parallels with relationships in the interaction 
will be important. This approach will allow us to understand how the client’s way of 
relating to others is constituted. For example, we want to pay attention to how the 
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therapist and the client shift the structure of the relationships found within the narrative. 
If the client depicts herself as a victim, does the therapist then depict her as a hero? If the 
client positions herself as a rational actor, does the therapist depict her as an emotional 
creature? How do these shifts parallel or conflict with the relationship between the 
therapist and the client? Last, what is the relationship between the emotions discussed in 
the narrative and the emotions between the therapist and client? 
In summary, Wortham has developed a method for analysis of how the relational 
structure of the narrative positions the narrator in unique ways that also parallel the 
relationship between the participants. The narrative has the power to change a person not 
because the narrator simply represents himself in a certain fashion, but he begins to 
interact in the same manner. Hence, narratives are actions that accomplish certain things 
depending on the unfolding context of the conversation. The narrative itself might be 
brief but the implication of the narrative, what it does and how it is to be understood, can 
unfold over time and across various sequences through the commenting. The content of 
the narrative is not important because it represents some past event or even because it is a 
way of speaking with from a social position, but because the relational structure of the 
narrative positions the client in an emotional relationship with the narrated character and 
the therapist. As discussed at the end of chapter 3,  Korobov (2001) claims that this kind 
of positioning analysis can be used to augment CA and allow researchers to better study 
the constitution of subjectivity. 
Data Collection: A Case Study of Psychodynamic Therapy 
As might be expected, my vision for this project has changed over the course of 
time. While working through the proposal, pilot work, literature review, and data 
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selection, I came to realize that some of the original parameters needed to be changed. 
For example, when I began the project I did not want to confine myself to one particular 
type of therapy. Working with archival data has its advantages, but it also has a 
downside: you have to work with what is available because you are unable to solicit 
therapists and clients into your study. Because of this, I worried that if I defined the study 
around a certain therapeutic orientation, I would limit the possibility of collecting the best 
data available. Furthermore, I originally envisioned collecting data from two different 
dyads. I feared that finding two dyads with the same orientation would be difficult, if not 
impossible, and therefore I constructed the project in a manner that did not emphasize 
clinical orientation. 
This desire to examine two dyads came out of my early reading of conversation 
analysis. From classic CA all the way through to the recent work on psychotherapy, 
datasets are typically large, often hundreds of hours in length. Therefore, I originally 
thought that I needed at least 8 to 10 hours of data in order to conduct the study. Because 
I knew that it would be improbable to find that many sessions of the same dyad, I decided 
to use two dyads. Yet, as the project developed it became clear that there was a critical 
difference between my project and most of the work being done in CA. Most CA studies 
examined large amounts of data in order to find multiple examples of unique 
conversational sequences. By identifying multiple examples of a specific conversational 
sequence, researchers could build the case that a normative structure guides the 
conversation. I am, on the other hand, primarily interested in how conversational 
sequences are linked together over the course of time. I will not be looking for individual 
sequences in and across multiple therapies. Because my interest is in the temporal 
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sequence of a particular dyad (as opposed to common conversational sequences across 
multiple therapies), collecting multiple dyads became unnecessary and even problematic. 
For example, by collecting two dyads and examining each temporal sequence I would 
have to inevitably compare my findings. As interesting as this might be, a comparison 
study with only two datasets is quite small, limiting the conclusions that can be made. In 
the end, it became clear that a single case study was more appropriate, methodologically 
speaking, for the study. The decision to pursue a single case study, instead of a 
comparative study, was made prior to data collection during a consultation with my 
dissertation chair. 
Needing only a single case allowed me to be more selective and I soon realized 
that I was choosing therapies that felt psychodynamic. Looking back, this should not have 
been a surprise. I began this project by examining psychoanalytic interpretation through 
Gadamerian Hermeneutics. Also, my proposal, pilot work, and literature review have 
primarily focused on psychodynamic psychotherapy. To not make this implicit interest 
explicit would have been a grave oversight, which could have damaged the integrity of 
the study. However, this created a new problem: Why do certain therapies feel more 
psychodynamic? To answer this question I had to reflect on my assumptions and clarify 
what psychodynamic therapy is and what influences me to feel that one therapy is 
psychodynamic and another is not. 
It turns out that distinguishing between different types of therapies is very 
difficult in practice. As Alan Kazdin (1994) points out in his overview of methodology 
and design in psychotherapy research: 
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In many cases, it may be difficult to select and evaluate treatments that are known 
or established as faithful renditions of the treatments. Perhaps the main issue is 
that rarely is there a single, agreed upon, or standardized method that can be 
gleaned from prior research or clinical practice. Thus, investigators usually 
develop treatment guidelines and manuals to make explicit those procedures that 
are poorly specified or highly variable in clinical work. (p. 36)  
In other words, researchers have found that the best way to distinguish been different 
therapeutic models is to intervene on the front end and have therapists conduct therapy 
following a step by step instruction manual. According to Kazdin, this differs from 
naturally occurring clinical practice where the therapist is able to work more 
spontaneously, changing her approach whenever she deems necessary. Therefore, 
manualized treatment distorts the natural practice of psychotherapy, flattening its nuance 
and spontaneity. Furthermore, by manipulating therapy on the front end, researchers 
knowingly and intentionally affect their data. The data is now intimately tied up with the 
research itself, which forces us to question the quality of the data and the results of the 
study. If a researcher’s primary concern is comparing different therapeutic approaches, 
then possibly they would be willing to accept these concerns for the sake of being able to 
demonstrate orientation fidelity. 
My research differs from the orientation comparison studies significantly. My 
goal is not to isolate a prototypical example of psychodynamic therapy, but to study a 
natural occurrence of psychodynamic therapy as it was practiced. Archival data gives us a 
window into this type of therapy because it was recorded during the normal course of 
daily practice. The specific or direct impetus for recording was not to collect data for this 
particular study. Therefore, neither the therapist nor the client was influenced by my 
research question or concerns. Here we have naturally occurring data untainted by the 
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research process. This is essential for the validity of the study. By using DIA to examine 
constitution, our foremost concern is that we have data from an ordinary, everyday 
therapy. This goes back to the idea that we are examining a specimen of institutional 
interaction that is part of, but does not stand for, the entire species. If we were pursuing a 
comparative study then we might be more concerned with isolating a certain therapeutic 
orientation. Even though we are still burdened with answering the basic question of how 
we identify and define a psychodynamic therapy, ensuring orientation fidelity is less of a 
concern. Furthermore, ensuring absolute fidelity would pose a danger to the integrity of 
the study itself because this would require restrictions, imposed by the researcher, which 
degrade the quality of the naturally occurring data we seek. 
So, how do researchers identify psychodynamic therapy when they are accessing 
archival data and are unable or unwilling to rely on manualization? Furthermore, is there 
a satisfying definition of psychodynamic therapy that helps us recognize this type of 
therapy in practice? These are difficult questions, but ones that need to be answered. 
Let’s begin with the second question. To define psychodynamic therapy we have to 
distinguish it from other therapeutic techniques (CBT, Behavioral, Gestalt, and so on), 
while also encompassing the fractured field of psychoanalysis. Many theorists have tried 
to give an integrated view of psychoanalysis while also recognizing the irreconcilable 
differences among many of the theories. Stephen Mitchell and Jay Greenberg (1983) 
addressed this problem head-on in their book Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory. 
The impetus for their book was a desire to teach their students the important differences 
between psychoanalytic theories while also providing a larger framework inside which 
the theories could be understood as responding to a universal clinical concern -- i.e. 
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object relations. They contend that object relations, a term used to refer to our 
relationships with other people, is a helpful way to examine the various clinical theories. 
After all, the relationship between the patient and the therapist or the patient and her 
family are of central concern to clinical practice and theory. This focus on object 
relations allowed Greenberg and Mitchell to examine how each theorist contends with 
interpersonal dynamics. They show how each theorist struggles with a choice between 
the drive/structure model, first put forward by Freud, and the relational/structure that was 
developed by theorists such as Melanie Klein and Henry Stacks Sullivan. After a 
laborious and productive discussion they tentatively put forward a lengthy definition of 
psychoanalytic theory which I will quote here at length : 
Each of the theorists discussed embraces a dynamic view of the process of human 
living, considering our lives determined by the complex interplay of a variety of 
motivational forces which may operate concordantly or conflictually. Each 
believes in a concept of the unconscious…endorses the idea that many or most of 
our motives that move us function outside of normal awareness. Each believes 
that the most effective way of studying man is through the kind of intense, 
collaborative inquiry that defines the psychoanalytic situation…. The models 
within psychoanalysis differ with respect to the content each attributes to the 
operative dynamic forces, especially to those which are commonly a part of the 
repressed unconscious. For the drive/structure model theorists the repressed 
unconscious consists of the derivatives of phylogenetically determined sexual and 
aggressive impulses which have for one reason or another been deemed 
“unacceptable” within…society. For the relational/structure model theorist the 
unconscious consists of particular images of self and other which have been 
summarily rejected. (p. 382) 
This definition is similar to how psychodynamic therapy is distinguished from 
other approaches in clinical practice. The Bible of psychotherapy research, Bergen and 
Garfield's Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behavior Change, added an entire chapter on 
psychodynamic therapy to their 1994 edition (Bergin & Garfield, 1994). In that chapter 
the authors struggled with defining the clinical practice of psychodynamic therapy, but 
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settled on a succinct definition from Glenn Gabbard (1990): “an approach to diagnose 
and treatment characterized by a way of thinking about both patient and clinician that 
includes unconscious conflict, deficits and distortions of inner psychic structures, and 
internal object relations” (quoted in Henry, Strupp, Schacht, & Gaston, 1990, p. 468). 
According to the authors, this definition applies to both psychoanalysis and 
psychodynamic therapies. Historically, a division has been created between classic 
psychoanalysis and psychoanalytically inspired therapies. However, the authors point out 
that empirical research examining these two types of therapeutic practices has shown few 
differences. For example, the influential Psychotherapy Research Project of the 1950s 
showed that there were equal amounts of interpretive and supportive interventions in both 
psychoanalysis and psychodynamic therapy (p. 468).  
Where quantitative research has struggled to distinguish psychodynamic therapy 
for other approaches, qualitative methods, such as CA, have shown how psychodynamic 
therapists practice a depth hermeneutic, recognizing slips, errors, pauses, and thematic 
similarities between symptoms and other events. Researchers have shown how these 
therapists actively create and solve therapeutic puzzles. As reviewed in chapter 3, 
Vehviläinen (2003, 2008) has referred to this practice as an “interpretive trajectory”. 
Currently, this practice has only been identified in psychodynamic psychotherapy. The 
interpretive trajectory is complex and it utilizes many common conversational tactics 
found throughout psychotherapy (i.e. formulation, lexical substitution, and so forth). But 
the way that analysts seek to create psychoanalytic puzzles out of symptoms and 
corruptions of speech and then offer solutions by way of interpretation is unique 
according to current research. Briefly, it is worth noting that researchers have also found 
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that these interpretive solutions encourage clients to extend the original interpretation and 
engage in a collaborative discussion (Peräkylä, 2005, 2008). This discussion seems to be 
a collaborative self-reflection that allows both the client and the therapist to shape the 
ongoing clinical narrative. 
Taking all this into consideration, we might add to our definition that 
psychodynamic psychotherapy is a depth hermeneutic practice that utilizes 
psychoanalytic puzzles and interpretation in order to foster self reflection. This way of 
understanding the practice of psychodynamic therapy greatly influenced the data 
selection. As I watched various dyads I realized that I was looking for a therapy similar to 
the ones described by Peräkylä and Vehviläinen. I was looking for a therapist that was 
working to create analytic puzzles that could be solved by interpretation, which would 
then lead into a collaborative discussion.25  
And yet, it would be misleading to claim that this criteria could be used to 
distinguish psychodynamic therapy from other approaches. Typically, comparative 
studies that examine what actually transpires during the clinical hour reveal as many 
similarities as differences (Kazdin, 1994). This is why it has always been difficult to 
                                                            
25 I found it difficult to view these psychotherapy sessions solely from a researcher perspective. 
Inevitably, I observed each interaction from a clinical perspective. I, myself, attended to the 
transference and countertransference, imagined interpretations and applauded the therapist’s 
skillful moments. Inevitably my clinical intuitions informed how I selected my dataset. I found 
myself looking for transference interpretations and the use of dream interpretation. Furthermore, I 
was interested in therapies that upheld a practical blank screen, keeping clear boundaries between 
the patient and therapist, and therapies that used minimal educative and supportive interventions. 
As past researchers have pointed out, all therapies have supportive elements. But during data 
collection I came upon therapies that were primarily supportive and pedagogical and this was not 
in line with my interests in therapeutic interpretation. However, the question is whether these 
clinical hunches that arose during data selection process (informing my decision-making process) 
have any empirical grounding in the data itself. These are questions that will bear out over the 
course of the study. 
 134 
 
distinguish therapies based solely on the empirical criteria. As stated previously many 
have attempted to solve this problem by turning to manualization. Others, hoping to 
avoid the negative consequences of manualized treatment, have simply tried to solicit 
"therapists [who] were experienced and respected exponents of the respective 
approaches” (p. 158).26 This quote is from Lambert and Bergin's (1994) review of the 
quantitative research on psychotherapy effectiveness. Here, they were discussing a well-
respected study comparing the effectiveness of different therapeutic orientations. In part, 
this study was highly regarded because of its method of selecting therapists with specific 
orientations. Similarly, Kazdin (1994) points out that a therapist’s training and 
supervision can also be used to identify clinical orientation (p. 38). Therefore, knowledge 
of a clinician's subscribed orientation, training and supervision can be used as a criterion 
for identifying used to determine a psychodynamic dyad. This is where my relationship 
with the training clinic and my firsthand knowledge of the other therapists in training was 
useful. The therapist of the selected dyad was a well-known advocate for psychodynamic 
psychotherapy. This is something he spoke of many times in public and private and it was 
well known throughout the training clinic. Although many influences affect our clinical 
practice, this therapist could be labeled as strictly psychodynamic when it comes to 
clinical practice.  
To summarize, during the data collection process I selected therapies that felt 
psychodynamic. After reflecting on what psychodynamic therapy is, in theory and in 
                                                            
26 These therapists also fill out a survey where they could endorse or not endorse statements that 
applied to various clinical positions (i.e. psychodynamic therapy, CBT, behavioral therapy, and 
so on). Those know to be psychodynamic practitioners who also endorsed the psychodynamic 
statements were categorized as psychodynamic therapists for the study. 
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practice, it became clear that two criteria guided this process. (1) Knowledge of clinician 
clinical orentation: similar to some comparison studies of psychotherapy orientations, 
knowledge of the clinician's subscribed orientation can be part of the criteria used to 
determine if a therapy can be considered as psychodynamic. (2) Find dyads utilizing 
conversational practices identified in previous CA research on psychodynamic therapy. 
Following the work of Peräkylä and Vehviläinen, I looked for the creation of analytic 
puzzles that could be solved by interpretation, leading to collaborative discussion. 
Data Collection and Selection 
All the data for this study was collected from a training clinic in the northeast 
United States. Most of the therapists were students pursuing graduate degrees 
psychology. Occasionally, students will work with couples, adolescents, and children; 
however the major treatment was individual long-term work with adults. Services are 
provided on a pay-for-service, sliding-scale model, and therapy is allowed to unfold with 
relative freedom. There is no time limit or session cap and since the theoretical 
orientation privileges the in-depth work that can be done over time, long therapies are 
common. Demographically, clients are both students and members from the community. 
Clients came to the clinic with a wide array of presenting problems from schizophrenia to 
adjustment disorder. 
All the therapists in training are under the supervision. Students make audio-video 
recordings of their sessions to review with their supervisors. When clients consent for 
treatment they agree to be videotaped for training and research purposes. Out of the five 
consulting rooms in the clinic, three have video equipment installed. Filming occurs 
unobtrusively. The camera and microphone always remain in the room; they do not 
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appear suddenly when the student decides to record. Recording practices vary between 
students. Sometimes students record individual sessions which are viewed during 
supervision and then erased. Other times students record a series of sessions, intakes or 
individual sessions, which are then placed into the video archive. The archives are tapes 
stored for supervisory and research purposes in the clinic office.  
The data for this study consists of video recordings from this archive. The archive 
was relatively new when I began collecting data. Because of this, the overall size of the 
archive was small, roughly about 30 tapes ranging from 1 to 5 sessions per tape. Also, a 
consistent archival procedure, such as documenting the therapist, client and session date, 
was not yet part of the clinic culture and documentation ranged widely. Some tapes were 
labeled accurately listing the therapist (by name) and the client (by two letter pseudonym, 
such as TR) with dates that correlated well with the session material. Others were poorly 
labeled. For example, a tape might be labeled as a single client and therapist dyad, but 
then have four sessions with multiple clients. Or multiple tapes might be labeled as 
sessions by a certain therapist, but all the material on those tapes was of a different 
therapist altogether. 
The relatively small size of the archive and the unsystematic documentation made 
data collection difficult. Initially, I spent two days viewing tapes. I viewed 12 tapes 
containing numerous dyads. Five of these tapes were mislabeled and excluded from the 
study. Mislabeling made it impossible for me to know the session sequence and the 
duration between sessions. Because I am interested in understanding the temporal 
sequence of therapeutic practice—understanding how earlier therapeutic sequences are 
linked to later interactions—knowing the order of the therapy sessions (session 1, session 
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2, session 3, and so on) is a vital. Even though these five tapes were excluded, the 
remaining data still seemed promising. 
However, after viewing the tapes in depth, further problems emerged. Many of 
the tapes had very poor audio quality, making transcription impossible. Two tapes were 
immediately excluded because of their poor audio quality, which left me with only 3 
dyads on the remaining tapes (Dy-B, 2 sessions; Dy-A, 2 sessions; and Dy-C, 4 sessions). 
I was initially very interested in Dy-C because it was the longest of the 3 series. 
However, the audio quality of the sessions was also poor and even after extensive 
engineering I was unable to improve the quality of the audio to the degree necessary for 
transcription. This left only Dy-B and Dy-A. Dy-B was actually mislabeled, but after 
watching the tape it seemed likely that the sessions were in sequential order because the 
second session referenced the first session directly. However, I could not be entirely sure 
and, therefore, the complete lack of labeling made this dyad undesirable. Hence, Dy-A 
seemed the most promising: both sessions were very active, and the therapist was a 
fourth-year student primarily interested in psychodynamic psychotherapy. However, 
since I originally planned to only use a therapy series if it contained four sessions, two 
sessions seemed far too little. Therefore, I decided to wait for a month and allow new 
tapes to be added to the archives in hopes of collecting a longer series. 
Shortly after this first attempt at collecting data, I contacted the clinical director 
and discussed some of the problems I was having. We collaborated on a memo sent out to 
all the therapists currently practicing at the clinic. The memo, sent via e-mail, restated the 
importance of consistent documentation and the importance of building the archive for 
current and future research. Then, a month and a half later, I returned to the archive. 
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Although only a handful of new tapes had been added, they were properly labeled and the 
audio quality, for the most part, was much improved. During this visit I collected two 
more therapy series, Dy-D (three sessions) and Dy-E (four sessions), which brought the 
total number of analyzable series to four: 
1. Dy-A, 2 sessions 
2. Dy-D, 3 sessions 
3. Dy-E, 4 sessions 
4. Dy-B, 2 sessions 
I have placed dyads in the order that corresponds to the best material for this 
project. There are a handful of factors that I considered while choosing between the 
dyads. First and foremost was audio quality. Without adequate audio quality, 
transcription and analysis would have been impossible. Second, was having multiple 
sessions of the same dyad. Third was adequate labeling. And last, was clinical orientation 
as identified by the criteria stated previously.  
Out of all the data in the archive only these four dyads met the above criteria. 
After that, it was matter of assessing which dyad would be best for this project. I chose 
Dy-A because the sessions were very interactive, providing ample data despite the 
limited number of recorded sessions. Furthermore, the therapy being conducted was 
identified as psychodynamic by the criteria stated previously. Also, the therapist was in 
his fourth and final year of clinical training. Fourth-year students, having completed their 
comprehensive exams and clinical position paper, are competent therapists on the cusp of 
transitioning into the field of professional psychology. And, although there are always 
individual differences in level of professional maturity, being able to analyze data from 
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advanced students more than likely provides a better example of psychotherapy as it is 
professionally practiced. 
However, the Dy-A dyad was not the only data set with a fourth-year therapist 
practicing from a psychodynamic perspective, Dy-D also fit this criteria. The choice 
between the Dy-D dyad and Dy-A was difficult. At first I thought that the Dy-D sessions 
would probably be my first choice because the dataset had more sessions than the Dy-A 
dyad. However, in the Dy-D series there is very little interaction between the therapist 
and the client. Actually, the entire second session is a long client monologue with very 
little therapist interaction. The third session is much more active and the therapist and the 
client discuss a dream throughout, which seemed to do some interesting therapeutic work. 
However, after watching all three sessions there seems to be very little analyzable data as 
compared to the Dy-A series.  
Again, the Dy-A sessions are very interactive. The therapist is making 
formulations, interpretations, and asking the client to engage in self-reflection. Many of 
the sequential phenomena as identified by conversation analysis studying psychodynamic 
psychotherapy (formulation, reinterpretation, interpretive trajectory, circulation figures, 
and so on) are present during the sessions. Because conversation analysis focuses on the 
sequential interaction between participants (i.e. client and therapist), therapies where 
interactions are few and far between pose a methodological problem. This project is 
primarily interested in understanding how therapeutic interactions constitute a mutual 
understanding between the client and therapist. The question at hand is: how is this 
understanding worked out through a specialized form of talk that has therapeutic intent 
and, ideally, therapeutic effect? Although this process is, presumably, still occurring in 
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low activity therapies, higher activity sessions would make for a richer analysis based on 
the research method being employed.  
Now, I would like to briefly address why the other two datasets were excluded 
from the final analysis. The Dy-E sessions do have some promising moments, but the 
therapist is very hard to hear because she spoke in a whisper. If this dyad were chosen, an 
alarmingly high percentage of the utterances would have been inaudible and therefore 
non-transcribable. Also, the therapist was not a vocal advocate of psychodynamic 
therapy, and her reputation was more of a humanisticly oriented practitioner.27 Again, 
because of my interest in psychodynamic therapy, both as a research object and as a 
therapeutic practice, this makes the Dy-E series less attractive as compared to the other 
datasets.  
Last, the Dy-B series also had some promise, but ultimately the poor 
documentation and the availability of better quality datasets eliminated it as a front 
runner. As mentioned before, this tape was originally labeled as a completely different 
therapist and patient dyad. Therefore, we have no dates for the sessions, making it 
impossible to know for certain what year the therapist was in during the taping and the 
order of the sessions. 
                                                            
27 5 Here again are some clinical intuitions that will need to be flushed out during the empirical 
research. My feeling was that the therapist was often trying to counsel the client by explaining to 
him what human beings are in explicit terms. This is quite different from what you see in the Dy-
A sessions where the therapist seems more interested in provoking the client to engage in self-
reflection. The question that I'll have to resolve is if the Dy-A sessions do seem to be doing 
something other than supportive, pedagogical work, informing the client about who she is as a 
human being. 
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Critical Reflection on Data Selection 
Because of the above reasons I chose to analyze the Dy-A series, yet the data set 
was far from problem free. First, obviously, is its length: it is only two sessions and one 
of the sessions is only about 35 minutes long. However, the point has already been made 
that the level of activity in this series provided ample data for the study. Many studies 
have successfully demonstrated that lengthy interactions are not necessary for producing 
quality research. This is because methods that examine the intricacies of interaction 
attend to the expansive nuances of discursive practices, turning what might seem small 
into something quite extensive and illuminating. For example, the renowned linguist 
William Labov partnered with the social scientist David Fanshel to produce their classic 
discursive examination of psychotherapy: Therapeutic Discourse: Psychotherapy as 
Conversation (Labov & Fanshel, 1977). This book, considered a precursor to 
conversation analysis, is based solely on a 15 minute recording of a psychodynamic 
therapy (Peräkylä et al., 2008b, p. 8).  
Another concern is the collegial relationships I have with the therapists at the 
training clinic. As therapists, we often consult on cases and we sometimes have group 
supervision where we discussed our clients and our approach to therapy. This provided an 
extensive web of preconceptions that informed the data selection process and analysis. As 
stated before, this became clear when I watched the archive tapes. I found myself leaning 
toward those who I knew were psychodynamic practitioners. This information is part of 
the tapestry that makes up my hunches and guides my inquiry. It is part of my 
membership knowledge and it will be incorporated into the study as such.  
To conclude, let me summarize the process of data collection detailed above. I 
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collected data on two occasions, gathering multiple therapy dyads to analyze. There were 
no major problems, but some changes were made. In the proposal I stated that data would 
be from two different dyads in the hopes of getting 8 to 10 hours of analyzable data. This 
stemmed from my earlier understanding of conversation analysis, where researchers 
would analyze large amounts of data in order to identify multiple instances of a single 
conversational sequence. I came to realize that my research differed from previous 
studies in that I was interested in how the therapist and the client affect each other over 
the course of therapy. In other words, I was interested in the temporal dimension of 
therapeutic talk and its effects, and therefore I would be examining how sequences evolve 
over time. Prior to collecting data, Dr. Packer and I came to the conclusion that a classic 
case study would be the most appropriate way to analyze this research question. At that 
point, collecting two dyads became unnecessary. Also, it raised concerns about validity. 
Collecting two dyads would inevitably force my analysis into a comparison. This 
comparison would be weak since I would only have two datasets upon which to base the 
analysis. 
Needing only a single dyad, I was able to be more selective during the data 
collection process. Originally I avoided specifying what theoretical orientation I was 
interested in studying. I feared that by specifying a specific orientation I would decrease 
the chances of finding the two dyads that I needed. Having only to collect a single case, I 
decided to seek out dyads that had a more psychodynamic feel. This aligned with my 
interests as a researcher and as a clinician.  
As I began to collect data there were multiple technical problems with many of 
the dyads such as improper labeling and poor audio quality. Many dyads were excluded 
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because of these issues and only four remained in the final pool. Of those four, two were 
excluded because of a combination of technical issues and an inability to identify the 
therapist as psychodynamically oriented. The choice then was between a three session 
dyad and a two session dyad. Although the three session dyad was preferable because of 
its length, the interaction between the therapist and the client was minimal. Because 
conversation analysis examines the exchanges between participants, active sessions with 
frequent verbal exchanges are preferable. Therefore, the two session dyad was chosen for 
analysis. 
One question that had to be resolved during this process was how to identify a 
psychodynamically oriented dyad. Because I was relying on archival data I was unable to 
guarantee orientation fidelity through measures such as treatment manualization 
(manualized treatment would also raise validity issues because conversation analysis 
privileges naturally occurring talk over scripted conversation). In the past, researchers 
wanting to avoid manualization have relied upon the reputation of the therapist to 
indicate the overall therapeutic orientation (Lambert & Bergin, 1994). Therefore, the 
number one criterion used to identify a psychodynamic dyad was to seek out therapists 
who were known proponents and practitioners of psychodynamic therapy. Because I have 
both personal and professional relationships with all the therapists in the study I was able 
to identify those practitioners who were strongly psychodynamic and consider their dyads 
for the study. Furthermore, while watching the tapes I looked for conversational practices 
that CA researchers have identified as unique to psychodynamic therapy, such as the 
interpretive trajectory (Vehviläinen, 2003, 2008). Finding instances of the interpretive 
trajectory was also a criterion for data selection. 
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Research Procedure: Using DIA to Examine Constitution in Psychotherapy 
The research procedures used for the study were developed based on the 
theoretical assumptions and methods discussed in this chapter. What follows is an outline 
of the research process. It is an attempt to systematically explain how the research was 
conducted and inevitably this will oversimplify the process. However, this provides a 
faithful map for those who are interested in understanding or replicating the study. One 
way to understand the research process is to simply view it as a succession of steps that 
unfold over time. This is a linear perspective. From this viewpoint, the procedure is a 
two-step process with each step containing a number of sub-steps (see figure 4). The first 
step involves a systematic reflection on initial assumptions and biases held by the 
researcher. This involves keeping a “field Journal” where the researcher can jot down 
assumptions and thoughts during the data collection, transcription, and analysis stages. I 
found that during the data collection and transcription; assumptions, intuitions, and biases 
arose quite frequently and I spent a good deal of time jotting down various thoughts in 
journals and as well as using transcription software to “tag” specific points on the tape. 
Looking back, it is clear that transcribing the data was a turning point. It changed the way 
that I saw the data and hence recording my experience during this time was important. 
After the sessions were transcribed I moved into the data analysis phase. This can 
be seen as a three part process. First, I analyzed the data using conversation analysis. The 
initial step was to map the sequences. I created visual maps that showed the different 
types of utterances used by both the therapist and the client. I was able to break the 
sessions into a series of interpretive sequences ending in an interpretation similar to what 
has been described by Vehviläinen (2003, 2008). Second, I used the hermeneutic-analytic 
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procedure to identify emotion within the relationship and in the discourse. And last, I 
examined narratives and the narrative commentary produced by the participants and 
looked for shifts in relational patterns and for parallels between the relationships 
described in the narratives and the relationship between the therapist and the client. As 
mentioned before, this analytic procedure goes beyond conversation analysis and is best 
described as Detailed Interaction Analysis, which incorporates a theory of emotion and a 
theory of narrative as action.  
The last step was to look at all of the data and begin to ask how the client is being 
constituted as a certain kind of subject. Following conversation analysis, this can be seen 
as a move from pure analysis to applied analysis (ten Have, 1999). Applied CA aims to 
examine institutional conversation in order to develop a critical understanding that can 
enact change. Hence, we are now asking questions that are ethical and political in nature. 
In order to understand psychotherapy as a constitutional practice, we have to see it as a 
site of power where problems are introduced, worked on, and transformed. How these 
problems become constituted affects the kind of person the client can be in psychotherapy 
and hence creates the initial condition for change, i.e. forges a way of being (in relation 
to self, others, and the good) that is not readily possible in everyday life.  
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Figure 4  
Linear Map of Research Procedure 
 
● Reflecting on assumptions 
● 1st viewing (details in data collection) writing down assumptions and 
thoughts 
● Transcribing and writing notes 
● Initial analysis and notes 
● Detailed-Interaction-Analysis 
● CA 
● Analyzing adjacency pairs 
● Mapping conversational actions and sequences 
● Analyzing relationship between sequences 
● STE 
● Looking for emotional transactions between the client and 
therapist 
● Looking for emotion transactions between characters in the 
discourse 
● NIA 
● Relationships between characters 
● Relationships between participants 
● Shifts in relationships 
● Parallels in relationship (participants and characters) 
  ————————————————————————— Move to applied analysis  
● Constitution  
● How is the problem advanced and changed (Genealogy) 
● When do major changes happen? 
● Where is the problem made clinical/therapeutic 
● What is the relationship of power/knowledge/resistance? 
● How do we relate these findings to our understanding or psychotherapy 
as a larger historical practice? 
● If psychotherapy is a type of thinking, how is it used to think in a certain 
kind of way and in turn foster a certain kind of person? 
● Possibly: the client has ownership of the problem 
● A more individualistic understanding of emotion 
 
By looking at the research process from a linear perspective we can see how the 
methods used to understand conversational sequences, emotions, and narratives can be 
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understanding of psychotherapy. Each time the procedures are refined and the process 
begins again as you try to understand this complex practice.  
In the next chapter I will lead the reader through the analysis of the two sessions 
of the dataset. However, it is worth noting that the procedure itself is a major finding, 
something that was developed in response to problems and discoveries. Because one of 
the goals of this study was aimed at demonstrating a methodology; hence this chapter 
makes up a significant portion of the findings. 
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chapter 5 
 A DETAILED INTERACTION ANALYSIS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AS 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE: ANALYSIS OF SESSION A 
 
 
 
I want to just decimate something (.) And…I decimate me 
((gaze))…instead…ya↓…((croaking))…Yea I just get really angry, I guess 
it’s anger? 
Sarah (client), Session A, Line 285-287 
 
 
 
 
 
Introductory Remarks on the Research Process 
Now, after the second interpretation she seems to start working therapeutically. 
What I mean by this is that she uses a dream to interpret her situation. The dream is used 
to further explain how she feels. Dreams are saturated with affect and the dream that she 
talks about is no different. Although I was not there when she talked of the dream 
originally, nor did I have the dream myself, I know that the issues between herself and 
her mother-in-law are quite intense and that her mother-in-law is often used as an object 
of her rage. The therapist even talked to me about how the client’s mother-in-law stands 
in the place of the client’s own mother and how she constantly works out many of her 
infantile needs and anger through her mother-in-law (this is an example of displacement 
and projection). In other words, the mother-in-law is the bad object externalized. 
Ultimately, this is the projection of the torturous internal object that often berates the 
client through internal dialogue. Here we might begin to wonder about the associative 
links that brought the dream to mind. Possibly, the internal dialogue that she has been 
discussing and the mother-in-law are all a manifestation of the bad object. So, with this 
dream the client is becoming conscious of her complex object relations and she is talking 
about her subjective position vis-à-vis these objects. This is a very powerful statement by 
the client, that in some ways he [the therapist] blows over by trying to dig deeper and to 
point out her role as the victim of the externalized object. 
Reflection on Session B, Lines 76-87 
February 20, 2012 
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This was one of my initial responses to the sessions, written from the position of a 
therapist. As I mentioned in chapter 4, because I am a therapist, client, and researcher I 
have many different implicit assumptions about psychotherapy. In some cases these 
assumptions are at odds with one another and this makes thinking about, let alone writing 
about, psychotherapy difficult. The above example is how I think about therapy from a 
therapist’s perspective. It relies heavily on the notion of language as symbolic 
representation and the client as a deep self. The ontological assumptions that ground DIA 
differ, in that language and emotion are types of action and the client has no essential 
self, but is rather constituted as a kind of self by actively participating in the practices of a 
form of life. Hence, the analysis that follows looks very different from the excerpt above. 
DIA is a fully integrated methodology that uses language common to 
conversation analysis, narrative analysis, the Structural Theory of Emotion, as well as 
Foucault and Heidegger. The analysis is presented so as to emphasize this integration. 
However, I try to alert the reader (through citation or by prefacing the sentence) when I, 
for example, shift from conversation analytic language to the language of the Structural 
Theory of Emotion. Furthermore, because my own assumptions and reactions as a 
therapist are important, I have added in my own thoughts during the analysis. These 
comments are often found in the footnotes, but at times they are woven into the analysis. 
 I have also tried to avoid writing in a way that conveys that I know what the 
participants are thinking and intending. Instead, I have focused on describing their 
actions, the consequences of those actions, and how that relates to constitution. This, at 
times, was very difficult. One word in particular kept popping up and I struggled to 
eliminate or clarify the term. The word is ‘deep’. As in the reflection above, I felt 
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compelled to use this word and over the course of the analysis I realized that it was futile 
to try and strip it from the study. Instead, I chose to use the word. The more I thought 
about it the more I realized I had no clue what I meant by it. Sure I could translate it into 
therapeutic language, but how could I understand the word and its implications from a 
research perspective? I chose to use the word as an indicator of important therapeutic 
assumptions that I held as both a therapist and a client. While watching the tape I would 
have an intuitive feeling that some parts of the session were deeper than others. The more 
I studied the tapes I was able to spot moments that felt particularly deep and then quickly 
ended. I noted these spots and tried to understand what happened in these moments. What 
was the empirical evidence that could have contributed to these feelings that occurred as I 
watched this moment in time? By the end it became clear that these were moments of 
emotion, or at least where emotion seemed possible. As you will see, these moments are 
rare, yet important constitutional events. Hence, subjecting my implicit assumptions to 
empirical explication allowed me to access psychotherapy at the level of participant 
understanding and gain important insights that were used to further back up claims made 
by this research. 
The major claim that will be demonstrated throughout the analysis is that 
psychotherapy problematizes the client as a deep emotional being. Emotion will be 
shown to be a powerful, yet practical form of action that can take different forms 
depending how it is constituted by the participants. Emotion is, therefore, a pliable 
‘substance.’ For example, there are varied of ways that emotion can be used by the 
participants. First, emotion can be transacted; transforming the relationship between the 
participants in the here-and-now (e.g. gets angry, feel ashamed, be compassionate). This 
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is what is described by de Rivera (1977) in STE and it is what people commonly think of 
when they talk about emotion. These are the rare deep moments mentioned above. The 
infrequency of these transactions should not lead the reader to assume that participants 
are unconcerned about emotion. On the contrary, the analysis that follows shows how 
emotion can be used in ways beyond the here-and-now transactions.  
Hence, the second way emotion is used by the participants is to directly refer to 
emotion by using emotional language. This is most often done by the therapist, but is also 
used by the client. In this chapter, the therapist consistently uses emotional language 
when responding to the client’s storytelling or commentary. This can be interpreted as a 
constitutional tactic aimed at foregrounding how client feels. This tactic does not simply 
elicit feelings; rather it shifts the location of the problem being discussed. As will be 
shown, the client talks about John, her partner, who is have trouble holding down a job. 
The narrative is told is such a way that the problem (i.e. what is wrong, what needs to be 
worked on and fixed) is with John, not the client. Hence, the use of emotional language 
changes the location of the problem. The problem is constituted as an emotional problem 
that is owned by the client. It is her problem; what is problematized is what she feels in 
response to the partner not having a job. Hence, in session A the client is constituted as 
an emotional being in order to locate the problem in the client’s experience. This is the 
major constitutional objective in session A and is most prominent during the first 
sequence of session A (SAS1). This finding is in line with other studies (Davis, 1986; 
Goicoechea, 2013; Madill et al., 2001) that have described how psychotherapy can shift 
the location of a problem through a “process of problem (re)formulation and 
individualization” (Davis, 1986, p. 47). However, what is unique about this present study 
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is the description of how emotion is used within an overarching constitutional strategy. 
The use of emotional language is one tactic that is used and throughout the analysis other 
tactics will be demonstrated. However, emotion will be shown to be an important ethical 
substance that can be used to problematize the way the client relates to herself and others. 
The third way that participants can use emotion is talk about emotion through 
storytelling and commentary. In the analysis, attention will be paid to how the client 
crafts relationships between characters when telling a story. Emotion can quickly emerge 
and disappear as characters and situations are described. The analysis will show how 
emotional possibilities are created and then used when participants talk more directly 
about the emotional relationships that were only hinted at initially. This is most apparent 
in sequence 3 of session A, but can be seen across the dataset. 
Above I discussed how this feeling of therapeutic depth occurred during moments 
that were emotional. However, this feeling was not simply a divining tool used to identify 
emotion. As the analysis proceeded, I began to see the myriad of ways that emotion could 
be used by the participants. These events were often complex fabrics of action that bound 
together different temporal orders and emotions that were being talked about while also 
being transacted by the participants. This was most apparent in session B, which is 
analyzed in the next chapter. Whereas the problematizing in session A primarily focused 
on problem location, in session B the participants were more or less in agreement on the 
location and type of problem. In session B the problem is emotional and owned by the 
client. We might say that session A is concerned with recognizing the problem as 
emotional, where as session B is concerned with understanding how to be an emotional 
being. In session B we see the therapist introduce a past emotional event, which the client 
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avoids discussing directly by using temporal shifts. We also see the client narrate feelings 
of shame and rejection while also making explicit an emotional transaction of 
compassion that transpires in the here-and-now. The therapist encourages the client to be 
“curious” and reflect on all of these instances of emotion. This produces talk about the 
ways the client can recognize and reflect on herself (relationship-to-self), as well as 
respond and act on others (relationship-to-others) in order to be a good, ethical person. 
This constitutional process is a way of thinking about emotion as an alluring substance 
that must be recognized and understood in order to change and heal. Because emotion is 
unwilled and can take many different forms; it can be constituted as a powerful, yet 
foreign substance that is complex in its pervasiveness. Hence, this intuitive sense of depth 
is not a simple sign of recognition, but a grasping of the constitutional process in which 
emotion becomes an alluring ethical substance whose depth is better understood as an 
expansiveness of actions present on the surface of psychotherapeutic thought. 
What follows is the analysis of session A, beginning with the opening sequence 
and then proceeding through all seven sequences and ending with the conversational 
closing. The analysis is presented to the reader in the form of a visual map and as a 3rd 
person narrative. There is a map for each sequence place at the beginning of the analysis. 
The logic of the maps is described in a footnote attached to the map of the first sequence 
of session A. These maps are meant to supplement the body of the analysis. The analysis 
is written in the present tense in order to convey the sense of a by-standard’s account of 
the conversation. Whenever possible I have used the participants own words in the 
description; however I have taken out all the transcription codes and made edits to 
improve readability and flow. Most of the transcript has been excerpt and placed with the 
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corresponding analysis to give the reader access to the unedited version. The complete 
transcript is located in the appendix. Furthermore, the analysis does contain references to 
and review of literature not addressed previously. My hope is that having this information 
during the analysis will be more useful then confining it within a traditional literature 
review and forcing the reader to continually look back for defined terms. Hence, the 
analysis starts with a discussion of trouble talk, which is a type of conversation studied in 
CA. However, I argue psychotherapy differs from everyday conversation, in that the 
tendency to move away from trouble talk is replaced with a type of problematizing that 
locates the trouble inside the client. In other words, psychotherapy keeps the focus of the 
conversation on the trouble talk in order to constitute the problem as individualized and 
personal. 
Conversational Structure of Opening and Sequence 1 (S1) 
As a therapist, one of the first things I came to realize is how difficult it is for 
people to talk about what bothers them. In everyday conversation there is also this 
tendency to move away from “trouble talk” and try to keep social interaction at the level 
of “business as usual” (Jefferson, 1988, p. 419). Therapists and clients have to figure out 
how to move from everyday talk to therapeutic talk. This is what we see occurring in the 
opening and initial sequence of session A. The client begins by talking about a problem 
that she has been struggling with during the past week. In everyday conversation most 
listeners try to be polite, but they look for ways to change the topic from the problem 
being discussed. In the initial sequence of session A we see the opposite occurring. The 
therapist continually brings the client back to the problem and highlights the possible 
emotional and personal impact it could have on the client. The client resists this, but 
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eventually she begins to talk about the problem as a “chaotic feeling” that occurs when, 
as the therapist puts it, she feels “evaluated” (Lines 96 and 109). Below is a map of the 
basic conversational structure of the Opening and Sequence 1 (S1) (see S1 sequencing 
diagram).28 What follows is a detailed description of how therapeutic talk is different 
from everyday talk. Although there are more powerful moments later on in the session, 
this sequence is described in detail because it demonstrates how participants act with and 
against one another in order to create a different type of social interaction that ultimately 
changes how the client relates to herself. It is a prime example of how problematizing is 
uniquely performed during psychotherapy. 
  
                                                            
28 In the diagram below the therapist's turns are represented by different symbols. This is because 
the therapist uses different types of utterances (questions, formulations, extensions and so on) that 
are well studied in the CA literature. On the contrary, all the client’s turns are represented by 
ovals. For the most part, the client uses commentary, storytelling, and elaboration during her 
turns. Most of her turns are in response to the therapists questions and formulations. Yet, this 
does not mean that the client simply follows the therapist’s lead. She has many ways to change 
topics, to take hold of the conversational floor and influence the therapist. This, I hope, is clear in 
the analysis. In the conversational maps I have tried to document some of the client’s tactics, if 
you will, that stand out. Naturally the map leaves out data, but I hope it helps the reader grasps 
the temporal flow of the sequence and the dance that unfolds during the session. Time marks 
correspond to the therapist's turn and were taken from the video data. Notice that session A starts 
at 3:29, when the participants enter the room and begin talking. 
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Opening Pre-sequence 
As session A begins, the client enters the room and casually sits down. She yawns 
and stretches, taking her time, as the therapist sits silently. She ends her opening 
utterance by saying:“…it is a hectic week” to which the therapist responds: “What is 
going on?”(see Excerpt 1, line 3). This is what conversation analysts call an opening pre-
sequence. It is a specific type of sequence that prepares the participants for the sequences 
to come (ten Have, 1999, p. 114). There are many types of pre-sequences, but this one is 
special. It is called a “gloss,” which is often used to initiate conversations about a 
difficult subject know as “trouble talk.” Jefferson (1985) defines a gloss as a 
“'generalization' and/or somewhat inaccurate and/or incomplete and/or a masking or 
covering-up of 'what really happened'” (p. 436). This gloss is enticingly incomplete and 
compels the therapist to show interest.29 His response demonstrates his interest and allows 
the client to easily tell her troubled story about her family, in-laws, and her boyfriend. 
Hence, the client initiates the pre-sequence to open the session and this allows her to 
select the problem to discuss. 
                                                            
29 At first glance it might seem like the client is testing the attentiveness and concern of the 
therapist. However, I do not think that it is that simple or deliberate. Rather, she is drawing upon 
aspects of the unspoken, but shared interactional context. The practice of psychotherapy is based 
on a relationship of interest. The client is an object of interest. Her stories and behavior are 
displayed and observed by the therapist. He is interested in the client and he has a desire to know 
her (Fink, 1997, 2007; Habermas, 1968; Ricoeur, 1974). 
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and this job stuff on top” (lines 7-8). The rest of N1 focuses on the “job stuff.” All the 
preceding concerns (or circus acts) fade into the background. Turning her gaze toward the 
therapist she says, “John got let go at work” (see Excerpt 2, line 8). As her tone changes 
and becomes calm and measured, she begins to shift her positioning as a narrator. This 
shift is hard to convey through transcription, but we can see some evidence in her 
language. John was not “fired,” “kicked out,” or “canned”—he was “let go.” The term is 
not biting, nor aggressive. In other words, it is a neutral way to put it. As she continues, 
the client takes a very fair and measured assessment of the situation. She does not 
villainize or idealize her boyfriend or his employer. She says that the “boss is meeting 
with [John] today to try and relocate him” (lines 8-9). This was put in motion because 
John was able to admit that he was not a “good fit” for the position (In the story, John 
actually meets with his boss and says: “I don’t think I’m a good fit for this position,” 
lines 9-10). According to the client this creates an agreement (“they agreed”) between 
John and his boss and they decide “to try to see if they can’t put him somewhere else and 
put him to use” (lines 10-11). The client’s narrative describes the characters as rational 
actors coming to rational conclusions. The characters are able to assess their own and 
each other’s weaknesses and act without emotion or hurt feelings. They don’t blame each 
other for their problems and they do not experience shame or anger when they admit 
them publicly. However, this does not mean that the client approves of the decisions that 
the characters make. 
At line 11 she offers a commentary on the job stuff problem by saying: “I don’t 
think it’s a great idea, (looking at therapist) but…you got to try, you know” (lines 11-
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12).31 At first glance this comment might seem benign. However, it is vitally important 
because it strengthens the position that is being constituted during the storytelling of N1. 
During the description of how John was “let go” the client positions herself as a fair and 
rational subject, similar to the characters in the story (John and his boss). She describes 
the situation as if she is a rational executive, fairly describing both the difficulties of the 
situation and the genuine effort of all parties to find a solution. The commentary at line 
11 is spoken to the therapist and is a personal comment (“I don’t”) akin to what is said 
between peers behind closed doors. While looking at the therapist the client says, “You 
got to try, you know.” The “you know” projects agreement. What I mean is that the 
phrase  is designed in such a way that it presupposes that the other participant agrees 
because what is being said is so typical. This is powerful because it creates a similarity 
between the client and therapist as well-informed, thoughtful, and understanding 
individuals. This similarity should be thought of as a relational position, a way of acting 
on and relating to other, self, and world. Hence, relational positions are established and 
transformed through thinking, which as we can see is a practical activity. So far, N1 has 
introduced narrated characters (John and his boss) and established a commonality been 
these characters and the participants (therapist and client). They are all rational subjects 
able to unemotionally assess their situation and make good judgments. 
However, this commonality is briefly broken apart as the client continues her 
commentary, which appears to be critical of John: “it’s a job I think that he’d be really 
                                                            
31 A narrative is a way of representing an event (Labov & Fanshel, 1977). It has a temporal order 
and characters. This combination of characters relating to one another across time is what we see 
prior to line 11. Here the client steps away from the story to offer a commentary. This comment is 
inserted in the narrative but it does not end the narrative. 
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good at, but he is not” (lines 12-14). At this point there is a breakdown (or slip). She 
suddenly shifts away from what sounded like a criticism of her boyfriend, into an 
explanation about how another employer “approached him about doing a job,” but John 
“didn’t do anything really conclusive” (because he was employed) and now he is having 
difficulty getting “a call back” (lines 14-16). It is important to note that the breakdown 
transforms her negative commentary on John into a transition back into the job narrative, 
which is more positive. In other words, it initially sounds like a continued assessment of 
John’s failure to reach his potential at his current position: “it’s a job I think he’d be 
really good at, but he’s not.” Yet, it awkwardly transitions back into the “job stuff” 
narrative about how there is a better job for John, but he is having difficulty getting a 
“call back.” This abrupt transition is created by two repairs (Schegloff, Jefferson, & 
Sacks, 1977). First, after saying “he’s not” she seamlessly makes a repair and says “he is” 
(line 14). In the actual utterance these two contradictory statements are set side-by-side: 
“he’s not, he is.” The second repair occurs after the transition. After the client already 
mentions that John is “having some difficulty getting a call back” she backtracks and 
explains that “someone approached him about doing a job.” This is necessary because the 
client transitions back into the “job stuff” narrative while she was also making a critical 
commentary. The breakdown and repairs are important because they highlight the two 
positions ascribed to John. First, John is a rational and responsible person who still needs 
to find the right position. The second, John is a failure who was unable to reach his 
potential. These two positions will become even more important as the therapist uses his 
utterances to focus on how this impacts the client emotionally. 
Hence, the first narrative that the client introduces is not a continuous story. It 
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consists of an introduction, main narrative, commentary, and conclusion. The 
introduction is about herself and her family. Here, she is positioned as an overwhelmed 
ringmaster who has to manage everything including John. In the main narrative, John and 
his boss come to a rational decision about his poor fit with his current job. In the 
conclusion, John is still searching for the right job. The reason he has not found the right 
job is due to bad timing, rather than his own fault. However, between the main narrative 
and the conclusion the client makes a commentary, which contradicts John’s position in 
the main narrative and conclusion. Making her assessment as a fair and rational manager, 
the client (as narrator, aligned with the therapist) views John as a failure who is unable to 
reach his potential. However, this is quickly disowned and the more predominant position 
is reestablished through a repair sequence. Up until the slip, there is a parallelism being 
created between John, his boss, the client, and the therapist. Similar to what Wortham 
describes, the characters (John and his boss), and the participants (the client and the 
therapist) are positioned as belonging to the type: fair and rational actors. The slip breaks 
this parallelism. John is not like them, he is not capable or competent. This is similar to 
the emotionally laden introduction where John is another thing to manage (see figure 7). 
This is a clear example of how the client thinks about herself and others during 
psychotherapy. She creates multiple possibilities for how the problem should or could be 
understood. She highlights how John, his boss, the therapist, and herself are rational 
people and the problem is circumstantial. However, she hints at how the problem could 
be personal, i.e. it is a problem about John's capability as a worker. There are other hints 
or what might be called latent problem possibilities that are created, yet not addressed.  
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as usual” (Jefferson, 1988, p. 424). Hence, what we see unfold after N1 would be atypical 
outside of therapy. Instead of moving away from trouble, the therapist moves toward it. 
He does not let the conversation move toward business as usual and instead he focuses on 
possible problems, which are nascent in the client's previous speech, yet remain implicit 
because of the focus on John and his "job stuff." 
Formulation (4:28). The client’s turn ends when she utters a conjunction followed 
by a process token “but hum.” The “but hum” is what Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 
(1974) called a transition relevant place (TRP). This marks the possible end of an entire 
turn, typically referred to as a turn construction unit (TCU). Here the client signals that 
N1 is more or less complete. The TRP allows the therapist to offer a formulation that 
connects N1 to material from the previous week. Remember that a formulation is a way 
of commenting on what is being said. The therapist jumps in to offer a reflective 
statement32 about how the “job stuff” affects the client, saying, “This is kind of what you 
feared last week” (line 18). Hence, he glosses what she “feared last week” and connects 
this to N1 (“this is”), formulating N1 as a being stuff that she has feared. However, the 
utterance is not a perfect formulation. It is very similar to an extension, which is a way of 
extending someone’s speech (e.g. P1: “I want to go to the store” P2: “But you are too 
tired after a long day”). Hence, the utterance could also be taken as the client’s own 
words. We can imagine the client extending the process token by saying, “but hum this is 
what I feared last week” which would have been a different way of talking about the 
problem: the problem would not simply be John’s “job stuff,” it would be how the “job 
                                                            
32 By reflective statement I mean an utterance that is used to comment on the speaker. Hence, the 
speaker becomes the object of the commentary (e.g. "I guess when I think about the job stuff, it 
makes me feel anger and I take it out on my family"). 
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observer, some distance from her emotions. Fear is clearly a negative emotion. According 
to de Riveria (1977), fear is an “it” emotion in the belonging dimension (p. 45). It is one 
of the emotions that most people can clearly understand in terms of its basic structure. In 
fear, an object or other, which does not belong has come too close to the subject (de 
Rivera, 1977; de Rivera & Grinkis, 1986). The subject recoils, creating distance from the 
object or other. This is the emotional transaction. The instruction is to move away by 
creating distance, but this can be transformed. For example, in fear a person can act to 
eliminate, destroy, or confront the object/other. This is not done in anger (to assert your 
version of what ought to be), but in a fearful attempt to reestablish a safe distance. Yet, 
for the most part, the instruction is simply to turn and run. 
On the other hand, anticipation is not clearly negative or positive and a case can 
be made that it is not an emotion at all. Merriam-Webster defines anticipation as “the act 
of looking forward.” It continues by adding: “especially : pleasurable 
expectation.”(Anticipation, n.d.) Therefore, in desire we anticipate the next meeting with 
our lover; in anger we anticipate a future confrontation with a foe; and in fear we can 
anticipate the reappearance of an undesired object or other that has the potential to do us 
harm. In other words, anticipation is a cognitive act that accompanies many different 
emotions. It can accompany emotion, but is not emotion itself. Hence, the client’s move 
quickly dissects the emotion that the therapist introduces with his formulation. By 
equating fear with anticipation she transforms fear into a cognitive act. The quick and 
clear acknowledgment token offered by the client now seems less like an agreement and 
more like momentary appeasement. 
After this initial utterance, the client turns back to the main narrative of N1 and 
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elaborates on John’s behavior and motivation. She says, “I was fearing 
slash…anticipating…this because…it was very clear he was quitting…mentally” (lines 
19-21). The therapist does give a verbal acknowledgment token, which can be interpreted 
as an affirmation that he understands what John was going through (line 24). From lines 
23-27, the client then elaborates further on John’s behavior (“he wasn’t barreling into the 
work anymore”), his thought process (“He was sort of just saying, ‘If I didn’t make it to 
this meeting, I think I’d be okay with that’”), and his emotional state (“He was getting to 
that sort of checked out place”) (see excerpts 3 and 4). She characterizes John as being in 
a state of depression33: he gives up his claim or identity as a hard working employee by 
not “barreling into the work” and gives up on making to “meeting[s]” and being “okay 
with” being let go. The client goes to great length to compel sympathy for John and he 
continues to be in the center of the narrative as she does her best to present him in a 
positive light. Yet, while doing this the client, as character in her own story, fades into the 
background. The therapist’s formulation at line 17 brought the client back into the story, 
but only briefly. After quickly dispatching the emotion ascribed to her, she turns back to 
John and the “job stuff”. This contrast clearly displays the different ways that the client 
and therapist are trying to think about the problem. As we can see, this is not a passive 
cognitive exercise. Rather, it is process of action on action that constitutes the problem, 
and therefore the participants, in very different ways.  
Extension (5:13). At line 28 the therapist again uses his turn to bring the client 
back into her own story. The therapist offers a strong interest token (Hum, line 28) that 
                                                            
33 A movement away from the world, where the instruction is to give up one’s claim of belonging 
(de Rivera, 1977, p. 46). 
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conversation, or at least it attempts to. Participants can always resist each other’s turns 
even in an institutional setting such as psychotherapy (Vehviläinen et al., 2008; 
Voutilainen et al., 2010). Here, the client continues to talk about the “job stuff” as John’s 
problem and does not turn toward discussing how this “wasn’t okay with [her].”  
After the extension she says quite pointedly, “He was sort of looking for 
permission to stop working” (line 30). “He was looking to get fired” (line 32). 
Previously, the client positioned herself as a rational and fair person. This was done in 
part by describing John’s “job stuff” in neutral terms. She talked about John being “let 
go” and “relocated.” These terms are soft, non-abrasive, and neutral in terms of positive 
and negative attribution. However, here she shifts to direct language. “He was looking to 
get fired.” The term fired is abrasive, angry, final, and accusatory. No one wants to get 
fired. It is a negative thing. It implies confrontation and attributes qualities to those who 
are fired—i.e. John. This change is subtle and short lived. She follows the “get fired” 
utterance with a paternalistic comment: “And I think that’s unfortunate” (line 32). The 
comment feels paternalistic and contemptuous. Although the tone and the word choice 
imply a neutral position, it is a judgment. It is a recognition that John is not acting as he 
should. He is no longer a rational person, but someone who is judged as “unfortunate”. 
This transformation is what we see hinted at in the slip described in figure 7, and it draws 
on ways of thinking about the problem, which are implicitly present. 
  
 “unfo
therap
expla
own f
my m
since
circu
now r
          
34 A v
Excerpt 5
From line
rtunate” (fro
ist. Rather,
in her statem
eelings. She
ind” (line 4
 she briefly 
s” life (exce
eturns with 
                        
entriloquatio
, S1, Session
s 32 to 54 (e
m line 32).
 the client o
ent that Joh
 says that th
3). This is th
positioned h
rpt 2, lines 4
more force 
                       
n of herself a
 A, lines 32
xcerpt 5) th
 As far as I c
ffers it up. A
n’s behavio
e fact that “
e first time 
erself as a fr
-5). The fra
and immedi
   
s character.
172 
-54 
e client elab
an tell, this
lthough we
r is “unfortu
‘no one has
the client ha
antic ringm
ntic emotion
acy. The “sh
orates on w
 elaboration
 can interpre
nate,” the c
 a job’”34 cre
s returned t
aster “coord
ality in the 
itstorm” is 
hat she mea
 is not called
t this as her
lient also di
ates a “shit
o her emotio
inating” her
narrative int
wonderfully
ns by 
 for by the 
 attempt to 
scusses her 
storm…in 
nal life 
 “three ring
roduction 
 descriptive
 
 
 
, 
 173 
 
yet vague. It is chaotic, violent, and uncontrollable. With this utterance she moves away 
from the rational position she has established as a narrator as she begins to talk about 
herself as a character in her own story. 
Questions and a shift in the problem (6:50-7:34). Up to this point the participants 
have primarily been dealing with the “job stuff” that has been collaboratively selected as 
the problem at hand. This problem has been advanced by the client as John’s difficulty 
securing a job. This affects her, but she has tried to keep herself at the margins both as a 
character and as a narrator. The therapist has attempted to shift the spotlight onto the 
client and focus on how the “job stuff” problem makes her feel. At line 54, the therapist 
continues this effort by asking how the client “[has] been dealing with it.” The “it” is an 
index pointing back to the “job stuff.” The short and direct question is a more strong 
handed attempt to get the client to talk about herself. By asking: “So, how have you been 
dealing with it?” the therapist makes it extremely difficult for the client to keep talking 
about John. It is true that she could have offered a superficial reflection and then moved 
back to the old narrative (Something like, “I have been trying to be understanding. John 
went in the other day and said…”). However, she instead breaks from her previous focus 
on John and begins talking about herself. It is worth pointing out that she sets this up in 
the last utterance where she exclaims, “Now nobody is employed again” (line 41). The 
difficulty of finding a good job is a shared problem and in the next utterances the client 
talks about her own struggles looking for a job. This is a turning point. The question at 51 
marks a shift in the relational positioning that is constitutive of the problem. She not only 
foregrounds herself as a character, but she begins to tell a new story about her own 
struggles. Although the therapist question was vital in making this shift, it was setup by 
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really “hard time with” it). She closes the utterance with a pointed jab, mocking her own 
feelings. 
The therapist responds to this utterance by quickly turning his head as if curiously 
provoked and then asks: “Why?” In response to this question the client shows us a side of 
herself that we have not seen. Instead of the confident, rational actor, we see an insecure 
person unable to “talk about” herself or her feelings. Elaborating on why she has a “hard 
time” looking for a job and why she feels like an “asshole,” she comments that she is 
“really bad at” the “process” of looking for a job (lines 58-59). During her delivery she 
cuts herself off and stumbles. Eventually, she acknowledges that she is having a problem 
explaining herself and says: “I don’t know how to explain this—ya got me” (lines 59-60). 
We have discussed how therapists use formulations as therapeutic tools, but here we see 
the client also using a formulation. This is a special type of formulation where the 
participant comments on what is going on in an interaction, making explicit what is 
implicitly happening. This type of utterance was what Harvey Sacks originally identified 
as a formulation. Later Heritage expanded this to include the reflective glosses that we 
see in psychotherapy and everyday conversation (Antaki, 2008). 
The client’s formulation highlights the action on action dynamics that we have 
been seeing throughout S1. Although the client has tried to get the therapist to align with 
her (as a rational actor), there has been an adversarial dynamic throughout this initial 
deepening of the troubled talk. We can see this in the adjacency pairs. The therapist’s 
utterances are always pushing the client to tell her story in a different way. He indicates 
that there is more to say, that something is left out and needs to be discussed. Mainly, the 
therapist has been directing the client to talk more about herself and her emotions. Yet, 
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the client avoids talking about herself even when she agrees with the therapist’s 
formulation (recall the exchange about what she “feared,” lines 19-23). By saying “ya got 
me” the client comments on this dynamic. She does so in a non-confrontational way that 
is hard to convey through transcription. She is not quite joking, but it is humorous. It is as 
if the two were both playing a game, but they were pretending that it was real. The 
comment exposes the game of psychotherapy for what it is: a micro-practice of power 
where participants use actions on actions to think about a problem in ways that shape 
how the problem is understood. 
Even though the client formulates the therapy as a sort of game, this does not 
relieve her from the expectation that she needs to explain her feelings. The client’s 
struggle to explain herself stretches beyond the utterances discussed above. Right after 
she ends her utterance at line 63, the therapist and the client both offer process tokens. 
This double process token pair rarely occurs across the dataset. It further distinguishes the 
sequence and can be interpreted as a mutual acknowledgment that something important is 
being said. The therapist then asks, “What do you make of that?” (line 66), indexing her 
previous utterance about having a “hard time” “trying to talk myself up” (lines 62-63). In 
response the client stumbles: “Ahh it probably doesn’t speak good things to me” (line 
67). The utterance has a tortured delivery, accompanied by laughter and a long gaze at 
the therapist. It comes off as strange and is hard to understand, and the therapist quickly 
asks for a repair (“I’m sorry I didn’t catch that” line 68). The client’s repair is shaky at 
first, but she eventually rights herself and returns to the more articulate delivery that was 
so apparent during the beginning of the sequence. It is worth noting that this return to a 
confident and competent delivery comes at a cost: she turns on herself with the pointed 
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ventriloquation: “And then the employer would ask, ‘Prove it’ and I’d be like—smile.” 
But, it can also be read as an emotional transaction: how the client “feels” when she 
imagines being questioned about her qualifications. She is saying “It feels like ‘prove it’” 
when she has to talk about herself. The utterance is about what she “feels” when she is in 
a situation where others have to recognize her worth and desirability. Second, as stated 
above, the “prove it” and coy smile can be understood as an imagined enactment of 
herself as a job interviewee. After the client lists her basic qualifications, the employer 
says, “prove it” and to this the client responds with a coy smile and look of innocence. 
The implication here is that instead of having a response the client would fain child-like 
innocence hoping the employer would forget the question and simply find her endearing. 
However, this is not a personal daydream. It is an action in response the unfolding 
context and aimed at the therapist. It occurs directly after the client’s awkward stumble 
and therapist had to call for a repair. For the first time the client was not polished, but 
unsure, lost for words and struggling. The formulation that she used (”ya got me”) 
establishes that the therapist is watching and evaluating the client. Hence, the coy smile 
sets up a parallel relationship between interviewee-employer and client-therapist. In both 
cases the coy smile is aimed at transforming the feeling of being evaluated into 
something more tolerable (see positioning figure 8).39 
  
                                                            
39 For de Rivera, the feeling of being evaluated would fall into the recognition emotions. These 
feelings like shame, guilt, and contempt. Shame and contempt are prominent themes that will be 
discussed in greater detail later on. 
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an employer. She has moved from being inarticulate to confident articulation. However, 
we need to acknowledge that this comes with a price.  
First, she turns on herself with sarcasm, which then evolves into a narrative about 
herself as a competent victim. This positioning unfolds within the context of the previous 
utterances where the client begins to think about the problem as emotional and personal. 
While she talked about her discomfort with being evaluated, she created a parallel 
emotional relationship with the therapist where he was also positioned as an evaluator. 
These difficult feelings are then transformed into confidence. This is performed by a 
commentary that reestablishes the relational position of the client as an employee. This is 
a way of thinking about who she is as a certain kind of person. What this demonstrates is 
how this thinking is a process that uses narrative positioning and emotion to change how 
the problem is constituted. Furthermore, this demonstrates that emotion is both talked 
about (and therefore fundamental to the positioning in the commentary or narrative) as 
well transacted between the participants in ways that parallel the emotion of the narrative 
(i.e. being evaluated). Hence, this demonstrates the way that problematizing involves 
narrative positioning and emotion in ways that are complex, contextual, and most of all 
relational. What occurs next is that the client makes a rare explicit statement that 
summarizes the problem that has been constituted. The relationship between the complex 
problematizing described above and the explicit formulation of the problem is an 
important dynamic in the constitutional process of psychotherapy. 
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shifts back and forth in her seat as if she is searching for the right word. When she finally 
says “chaotic thing” she says it in a slow, deliberate tone. The phrase “chaotic thing” 
characterizes the movements she was making during the pause: chaotic, unanchored, and 
shifting back and forth. Although we might not initially refer to chaos as an emotion, 
certainly chaos has a certain feeling to it. It is unpleasant and unwanted. The client’s 
pauses and bodily movements add to her account. She is describing the “job stuff” 
problem as something that occurs during the job interview “process.” It is a “chaotic 
thing:” a personal feeling that is unpleasant, yet not a clear emotional transaction. 
This feeling aspect of the problem is further reinforced by her next utterance. She 
continues by saying, “And I…don’t like feeling judged.” This statement adds on to the 
“chaotic thing.” It is unclear if feeling judged is central to the “chaotic thing” or 
secondary, but the direct reference here to “feeling” reinforces that the problem is being 
constituted as emotional. “Feeling judged” and “having to explain” imply other people. 
One cannot be judged without, at the very least, an implicit other. Hence, because of the 
parallel positioning demonstrated earlier, this utterance has here-and-now implications. 
Leading up to this point the therapist was positioned as an evaluator. Although the client 
is summarizing the “job stuff” problem, the entire commentary is like a job interview 
where she has to explain herself to an interviewer. Hence, it is also a commentary on her 
relationship with the therapist who is positioned as an evaluator. She feels “judged” and 
has to “explain” herself and this is a very “chaotic thing.” 
Extension (9:26). After the client summarizes the problem the therapist tries to 
speak, but he is cut off. She quickly offers a clarification by saying, “Not that I don’t like 
describing things like that,…but when it comes to justifying myself I have a hard time 
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with that” (lines 99-101). The clarification changes how the therapist chooses to address 
the client’s utterance. When the client cuts off the therapist he was offering a formulation 
(“So you” is the turn initiator commonly used to formulate what was just said). Yet, after 
the clarification the therapist shifts tactics and offers an extension. At line 102 he says: 
“Being evaluated.” He offers this immediately, and delivers it smoothly. The extension 
actually refers back to the index that the client used to end her clarification: “I have a 
hard time with that.” By removing the index and replacing it with a concrete experience 
the therapist brings the problem into the light, rather than continuing to understand it at 
the margins. The “job stuff” problem that started the sequence now emerges as a problem 
with “being evaluated”.41 The client demonstrates this mutual recognition in her response 
to the extension. She immediately offers a strong acknowledgment token saying, “Ya, I 
don’t like it, I don’t like it at all, it makes me queasy” (line 103). The strong 
acknowledgment token is reinforced by how she does not “like it” (the index here 
pointing back to “being evaluated”).  
Yet, she goes beyond agreeing with the therapist, she adds that “it”—“being 
evaluated”—makes her “queasy.” Queasy is a visceral word. It implies a bodily 
experience, something that is felt, that is personal and unpleasant. The “queasy” utterance 
continues the constitutional work on the problem, focusing on the personal emotion 
aspect that has emerged. Previously, she described the problem as a “chaotic thing,” 
which was shown to have emotional implications. This was furthered by talking about 
                                                            
41 The therapist describes the problem as “being evaluated,” whereas the client describes it as 
“feeling judged.” These are very similar, demonstrating a evolving co-understanding of the 
problem. However, it is worth pointing out the they are not the same. “Feeling judged” is a 
personal emotional experience. “Being evaluated” an interpersonal act indicative of certain 
situations (job interviews, first dates, performances of all kinds) where one can feel judged. 
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“feeling judged.” The problem seems to be becoming clear to the participants. Their 
coordination and collaboration has increased as there is little resistance at the end of the 
sequence. The therapist can seamlessly offer an extension that is fully owned and carried 
forward by the client. The “job stuff” problem has been constituted as a “hard time” with 
being “being evaluated” and “feeling judged.” This is not only something she experiences 
in her day to day life, but it is also something that she experiences here with the therapist. 
He can be positioned as an evaluator that she stumbles in front of and then has to explain 
herself.  
The interpretation sequence S1 (9:40). The double acknowledgment tokens at 
lines 104-105 reinforce the importance of the previous “queasy” utterance. The client 
creates a pause in the conversation by offering a confirming, “Hum yea” instead of 
continuing to elaborate upon the problem. This can be seen as an attempt to close the 
sequence. “Closings” are a series of utterances that end a sequence or conversation (ten 
Have, 1999, p. 17). Closings are typically negotiated rather then forced, which is what we 
see happening here. The attempt to close the sequence indicates that the problem, to a 
certain extent, has been understood. This adds to the importance of the previous 
utterances and the implications identified above.  
This calling for the closing of the sequence does not, however, create a clear 
demarcation between this sequence and the one to follow. A complete abandoning of 
what had been said would be very strange. Rather, the participants must make a 
transition. The transition marks the end of the first sequence and sets the groundwork for 
the next sequence. The therapist provides the transition by offering an interpretation.  
In this project I follow Vehviläinen’s notion that psychodynamic therapy proceeds 
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by way of an interpretive trajectory, which creates analytic puzzles that are eventually 
solved by the interpretation (Vehviläinen, 2008). Therapy sessions can be seen as a 
procession of interpretive sequences each ending with an interpretation. However, when 
we look at the interpretation that ends S1, it is clear the interpretation does not provide a 
clear ending. After the client calls for a closing, the therapist takes a deep breath and then 
begins to setup his interpretation with a formulation, which pulls in material discussed in 
a previous session. He tells her, “You know, I’m thinking back to…when we were 
talking about, how it is difficult for you to talk about yourself” (lines 106-107). This 
formulates what the client has said (presumably in a previous session because they do not 
talk about this here), while positioning himself (“when we were talking”) as a 
witness/participant and therefore making it hard for the client to disregard his 
recollection. To this, the client offers a strong acknowledgment token (“Yea”), which 
allows the therapist to continue to offer his interpretation: “I’m wondering if it’s related 
to this uncomfortable feeling that you’re being evaluated” (line 109). The interpretation 
does many things (which I will get to) but what it does not do is end the sequence in any 
clear way. Therefore, we cannot think of Vehviläinen’s interpretive solution as an ending 
of a certain problem, but as an expansion, drawing upon present material and making 
connections across the session(s) in order to foster further conversation that will expand 
upon the ongoing constitutional work (Vehviläinen, 2003, 2008). 
Conclusion S1 and the “job stuff” problem. Even though the solution does not 
end the conversation, it still offers a ‘solution’ to something that has been constituted as 
problematic. The therapist puts forward that the client’s problem of “talking about” 
herself is “related to this uncomfortable feeling of being evaluated.” The problem is 
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formulated as something from a previous session and the solution comes out of the 
current conversation. Hence, the interpretation does not, on its face, solve the “job stuff” 
problem constituted during S1. Rather, it uses the emotionality (“feeling uncomfortable”) 
and relational positioning (“being evaluated”) to solve the previous problem of “how it is 
difficult to talk about [herself].” In other words, her emotions and the relational context in 
which they arise are used to understand a persistent behavior: having a hard time talking 
about herself.  
And yet, as we have seen, not being able “to talk about [herself]” has been a 
persistent problem during the first sequence. All of the therapist’s utterances have been 
directed toward foregrounding the client as the main character in her own story. This has 
frequently been accomplished by highlighting the emotionality of certain narratives and 
utterances. Furthermore, the therapist and client are positioned in an evaluator-evaluatee 
relationship, which the client feels is chaotic. This problem remains implicit even in the 
interpretation that discusses it directly. By placing the problem back in previous work, 
the therapist makes inter-session connections, but avoids talking about the problem in the 
here and now—at least directly. From a therapeutic perspective the therapist is missing an 
opportunity to talk about something in a more immediate and genuine fashion. By talking 
about the problem in the here-and-now we might hope that the client would experience 
and process the problematic emotions associated with her behavior. However, by being 
more direct the therapist could invoke strong resistance and sidetrack the course of the 
conversation. It is hard to know. Regardless, it is quite remarkable how the therapist 
offers an interpretation that brings in past material, while also implicitly addressing the 
“job stuff” problem and the here-and-now relationship parallelism that has been 
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constituted during the sequence. 
A major task facing the psychotherapist is to move from "business as usual" to 
"trouble talk". The first sequence of session A shows what the therapist must do to 
sustain and even deepen the trouble talk. The preceding analysis makes explicit my 
intuitive assumption of therapeutic depth. A session becomes deeper when the client 
begins thinking about the problem as personal and emotional. From my experience, this 
depth is hard to sustain for an entire session. Admittedly there are moments when the 
topic shifts to concerns that feel more superficial. Hence, some parts of the session are 
more important than others. As we move forward we will limit the scope of our analysis. 
To describe the entire session with the same level of detail used to examine S1 is 
infeasible and unnecessary. This is where the assumptions of the researcher are 
important. By closely examining the moments where the session feels deeper and more 
powerful, I will explicate the initial assumptions about the data and attend to the 
overarching constitutional strategy of psychotherapy. Namely, depth psychotherapy is a 
constitutional process where the client must think about herself as certain kind of 
emotional being. As in S1, this is will be continually demonstrated across the dataset. The 
question, however, that will need to be answered is why must the client think about 
herself in this way? And, how does psychotherapy constitute the client as a certain kind 
of emotional being?  
Sequence 2 (S2) 
The client’s response at line 106 marks the beginning of the second sequence (S2) 
of session A. It is far shorter than the first sequence, lasting for 5:28 (9:40-13:14 session 
time) and overall felt superficial compared to the depth at the end of S1. Below is the 
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basic structure of the sequence. After the client’s response, the therapist uses questions 
and formulations to foreground aspects of the client’s speech. He continues to make 
formulations that index material discussed in previous sessions, while his questions call 
for the client to expand on what has just been said. The client’s speech also indexes 
material discussed in therapy, yet she seems to be referencing work done with a previous 
therapist. However, the bulk of the client’s speech is about her past. She talks about how 
she was taught not to do anything that she was not good at and she talks about how 
getting bad grades was hard on her during high school. Interestingly, she finishes the 
sequence by offering insightful comments about herself and then tells a story about how 
in one instance she did not let her bad grades affect her. The therapist acknowledges this 
by using his interpretation to focus on how: “if things don’t go right you…see them as a 
reflection on yourself” (lines 183-185), which again is a way of making the problem 
personal. 
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the client is. First, the “adjudication process” mentioned above is contrasted with a 
situation where “no one is really watching, [and] no one loses” (lines 127-128). She then 
relates the “no one is really watching” to “the way I play most of my games” (line 128). 
She continues by describing that when she plays games “nobody keeps score and things 
are just for…shits and giggles” (line 129). She rationalizes this by saying that the rules 
make the game “overly complicated or competitive” and says that this is opposed to her 
more “copacetic…nature” (lines 133-134). Hence, the client’s utterance links present 
behavior to her basic “copacetic…nature,” contrasting this with her childhood 
relationship with her mother, and the difficulty with being “evaluated.” In this subtle turn, 
the client tries to background the negative emotions and lack of confidence she was just 
discussing and instead emphasizes her “copacetic…nature.” She frames herself as relaxed 
and free spirited, rather than anxious, fearful, depressed, or any other negative emotion 
that might be driving her behavior. 
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remember maybe a couple sessions ago you said that you have your standards for 
everybody else and you have your standards for yourself” (lines 135-137). The client 
offers a strong acknowledgment token and then begins to talk about how she “was really 
hard on” herself (line 138). The formulation ends up diverting the client’s attempt to 
frame herself as being “copacetic in nature” and instead steers the client toward more 
problematic aspects is her life (i.e. being hard on herself). Although the formulation 
follows directly after the “copacetic” phrase, it is responding to the description of how 
she throws out “half the rules” (line 130). The therapist’s formulation uses the word 
“standards” which is a synonym for rules. His choice of the word “standards” is 
interesting because it creates a tacit, rather than explicit link between the two utterances. 
He could easily have said “rules” rather than “standards”. We might speculate that a more 
explicit connection could come across as forceful and create resistance, where as a tacit 
connection creates an opportunity of the client to change her focus. 
In response to the therapist’s formulation the client offers a strong 
acknowledgment token followed by a narrative (N2) about how she was “hard on 
[herself]” in “middle school or maybe early high school” (lines 138-139). Similar to N1, 
N2 is introduced using Labov and Fanshel’s (1977) classic rule of narration. The 
narrative is introduced by a “proposition” that is “affective” (p. 105). After the strong 
acknowledgment token the client delivers the proposition: “I was really hard on myself.” 
According to Labov, the narrative introduction tells the listener that a narrative is going 
to be told. Furthermore, the narrative “functions as [a]…single speech act” that might 
challenge, respond to, or resist the implications of the therapist’s utterance (p. 106). In 
this case, the client uses the narrative to agree with the therapist, while also 
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contextualizing how her high “standards” for herself have been distressful. 
Question 12:23. However, when the therapist uses his next utterance (“And that’s 
what you seem to do?”) to summarize this as a current problem (line 155), the client 
resists. Initially she pauses and then she says, “I have done [it] in the past, I think I’m 
slightly better at it” (line 156). In other words, the high standards that the client was 
discussing previously were more of a problem in the past and she has gotten slightly 
better at not being perfectionist. With the therapist’s question answered the client then 
launches into a story about how her physics teacher “didn’t teach” and she ended up 
getting a bad grade (line 159). In the story the client depicts herself as a hard-working 
student that would not give up even though she had a bad teacher. She describes how the 
teacher, “stopped writing the answers down and I started failing” (lines 164-165). The 
story actually demonstrates a moment where she was not holding herself to too high of 
standards. She says, I only got a “high C in the course…which didn’t break me up all that 
much” (line 179). 
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Interpretation 13:40. The therapist then makes an interpretation by saying: “Well 
I wonder if in that situation…you see that it was maybe not a reflection on you, but a 
reflection on the teacher. But it sounds like in a lot of things, that if things don’t go right 
you…see them as a reflection on yourself” (lines 182-185). To this the client offers a 
strong acknowledgment token saying “Ahh definitely, definitely” (line 186). The 
acknowledgment that the client offers here is one of the strongest agreements we have 
seen so far. And yet, what the therapist does with his interpretation is foreground the 
problem of ‘being hard on herself,’ while backgrounding the more positive depiction that 
the client has put forward. Again we see the therapist attempting to keep the conversation 
focused on the problem as personal.  
By steering the conversation toward the client’s negative depictions of herself the 
therapist problematizes the client’s story differently than the client. When the client tells 
a story about how she had a bad teacher who was responsible for her bad grade she 
foregrounds a type of experience where she is a victim that survived. Yet, she is not 
responsible for her bad grades. Hence, the problem is with the teacher, not herself. The 
therapist could offer his support, empathizing with her experience, but ultimately if 
therapy is going to continue the problem has to reside, to some degree, with the client in 
order to give therapy direction and motivation. To this end, the foregrounding that the 
therapist performs in S2 changes the location of the problem. For example, it shifts the 
problem from the teacher to the client (lines 180 — 185), and works to disregard a non-
problematic depiction of the client for a problematic one, such as when he disregards the 
client’s “copacetic in nature” comment and instead highlights how she has different rules 
for herself. 
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How these problems are related to those in S1 is unclear. The therapist continues 
to focus on problematizing, yet there is no clear connection between the problems being 
discussed. As we move into S3 we will encounter even more unexpected changes that 
seem to take us further and further from the “job stuff” problem of S1. This is an 
important finding. There is no essential or underlying problem that evolves during the 
session. Hence, we will not find the problem of “being evaluated” behind every utterance. 
Numerous problems exist, but a few stand out because of the way they are talked about—
the way they become constituted in the conversation. The “job stuff” problem comes out 
of the initial narrative. The problem becomes important as its very nature is contested by 
the client and therapist. By the end of S1 the “job stuff” problem is so transformed that it 
almost seems like something else entirely. It is a problem with “being evaluated,” a 
“chaotic feeling” when the client feels “judged” rather than a problem with John losing 
his job and no one in the family having a job. The “job stuff” problem of S1 is initially 
elaborated upon in S2, but when we examine the entire sequence the only connection that 
we can make is that the phrase “adjudication process” is synonymous with “feeling 
judged” and “being evaluated”. Yet, this is the only prominent connection to the 
problems in S1. Therefore, going forward we must remain focused on the process of 
problematizing, rather than attempting to identify an underlying problem that evolves in a 
linear fashion throughout the session. When we look at this process we see that the client, 
over time, begins to think about herself, others, and the world in ways that constitutes her 
as an individual emotional subject—a type of subject, which is a necessary condition for 
therapeutic change.  
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Sequence 3 (S3) 
In responding to the therapist’s S2 interpretation the client offers a strong 
acknowledgment token, “Ahh definitely, definitely” (line 186). The tone of her voice is 
solemn. A listener might interpret her tone as acceptance. The pace of her speech is 
average, but deliberate. After the initial acknowledgment, she begins to ventriloquate 
herself: “‘Why couldn’t I have it held down?’” “‘Why couldn’t I have made it?’” She 
pauses between each ventriloquation reinforcing her solemn deliberateness. She 
continues ventriloquating by saying: “‘Why couldn’t I have fixed things?’” At this point 
she makes an essentializing comment: “I have a lot of fix in me. I want to fix things” 
(lines 186-188). She emphasizes the word “fix” by saying it with more force. It stands out 
in comparison to the solemn, deliberate tone the utterance. She also leans forward, 
clutching and shaking her fists as she utters: “a lot of fix…”. This comment construes the 
desire to “fix things” as something more or less essential to the client. By turning “fix” 
into a noun the client changes the desire to “fix things” into a possession. It is something 
that she has “in her”. This is important, not because it represents something internal, but 
because the client is shaping the problem as something that she personally possess and is 
emotional. By emphasizing the word “fix” with both the force of her speech and by 
shaking her fists she displays her frustration. Yet, as a listener the utterance does feel a 
little playful. 
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This initial elaboration on the therapist’s interpretation is different from what we 
saw with the S1 interpretation. There the client immediately started commenting and 
narrating. Here she displays frustration (even if she retains her playfulness) and talks 
about herself and her feelings. As will see, S3 is a unique sequence. The utterances are 
more ambiguous, yet the participants do not call for repairs. Furthermore, there is more 
talk about emotion and negative behaviors (in this sequence the focus is on self injurious 
behavior). In a nutshell, the sequence feels less ‘canned’ and more spontaneous. 
Watching the tape I felt that the session got deeper during S3 and I came to see this 
sequence as a pivotal moment that changed the focus and emotionality of the session. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
she described herself as an emotional character who has “a lot of fix” that causes her frustration. 
The first part of the utterance allows this character to voice her frustration: “Why couldn’t I have 
fixed things”. The second part explicitly acknowledges this frustration by emphasizing the word 
“fix” as described above. The last part of the utterance is an evaluation of this quality. The 
sarcastic tone establishes the narrator’s position towards the character. This is not the first time 
that the client has talked about herself in emotional terms infused with irony and sarcasm. 
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Explanatory gloss formulating past session (14:16). In response to the 
elaboration, the therapist does something unique (lines 191 and 194), and if we were 
simply examining the content of the response, it would seem off-topic. At no point in the 
previous utterance had the client discussed hitting herself, yet he proceeds to introduce 
the topic right after the client’s initial elaboration. In order to understand this response we 
have to look at the client’s previous turn as a TCU (Turn Construction Unit) (Sacks et al., 
1974). Turns are not attempts to represent something, but actions. A TCU is complete as 
soon as the action is completed. When we look the client’s utterance from lines 186-190 
we see that she agrees with the therapist’s previous interpretation, and then begins to 
extend this agreement by ventriloquating herself. Then she sums up the basic point of the 
ventriloquation, which is to convey how she wants “to fix things”. At this point (line 190) 
the action is complete. This is the first TRP (Turn Relevant Place): the point where the 
therapist could speak, but he does not. Instead, the client continues by saying that having 
“a lot of fix” is both “good” and “terrible”. Furthermore, it is “terrible” “because I drive 
myself crazy”. This statement acts as an addendum. The primary action of the utterance is 
to convey how frustrating it is to have to fix things and to constitute this as an essential 
aspect of the client’s personality (rather then something she does based on 
circumstances). The addendum stands as a related, yet secondary action. It evaluates this 
aspect of her personality. Once the evaluation is complete the therapist responds. 
Therefore, in order to understand the therapist’s response we have to see it as a response 
to the client’s evaluation that this aspect of her personality is a “terrible thing…because I 
drive myself crazy”.  
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By saying: “Yea, because…last week…you said that you…hit yourself”(line 
192), the therapist expands on the evaluation made by the client. It’s like saying: “Yea, 
you drive yourself so crazy that you hit yourself, that it is pretty bad”. Listening to the 
exchange as a non-participant (such as myself) you might feel a little lost because you 
were not there when this was previously discussed. However, we know that that the 
therapist’s response made sense to the client because there was no call for a repair. As 
Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974) point out, participants craft their utterances with a 
“orientation and sensitivity to the particular other(s) who are the coparticipants” (cited in 
ten Have, 1999, p. 111). Utterances are recipient designed. Although it might not be 
entirely clear what the therapist means to do with his utterance, it seems to fit, at least 
enough for the client to agree and offer her own response. 
Question (14:24). Even though the therapist’s utterance was ambiguous, we are 
able to make sense of it when we analyze it in terms of action. However, when the client 
responds to the therapist’s utterance she does so in a way that is even more ambiguous. 
Initially she offers a strong acknowledgment token, despite the fact that the therapist tries 
to repair his original formulation. Eventually, the client extends her agreement by 
brushing her fingers over her left forearm and then saying “there are remnants of that 
still” (line 195). When she says “still” she looks right at the therapist. He returns her gaze 
and asks: “What do you make of that?” (line 197). The question is as ambiguous as the 
client’s extension. It is unclear what “that” is, which might help to explain how the client 
answers the therapist is question. 
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off as he says “comes”. However, because the therapist uses this question repeatedly a 
listener can have a clear understanding of what he was going to say. This is something 
that conversation analysts call projection: the way in which full words can be cut off and 
yet the listener can still understand what was going to be said based on the context (C. 
Goodwin & Heritage, 1990). The context here is the history of this and other similar 
conversational actions, which incite the client to talk about herself—what she is feeling 
and thinking. The client is encouraged to elaborate in an autobiographical or personal 
manner, which is an example of the conversational action that Labov (1977) referred to 
as a type A-event. The therapist’s questions and the client’s personal elaboration are not 
random. Instead, they are actions granted to them based on their roles. In short, the 
context here includes the kinds of people they are in psychotherapy—clients and 
therapists—which come into being through their tactically different actions on actions.  
Question (14:56). Right after the therapist repeats the client’s words she offers a 
strong acknowledgment token and then begins to expand on the feeling of being 
“completely overwhelmed”. She actually begins this elaboration prior to the therapist 
trailing off and in this sense we can see the therapist was giving up his turn in order to let 
the client continue. It is a unique moment where the client asserts herself. I do not think 
that it is a coincidence that in this assertive moment the topic of conversation is clearly 
emotional. The client and therapist are talking about being “overwhelmed”. The client 
continues by talking about how she feels like she “is full of chaos”. Previously at the end 
of S1 the client talked about how having to explain herself and being evaluated was a 
“chaotic thing”. In S2 during N2 (line 142), the client describes herself as a “chaotic 
mess” when she got a 97 on an exam. Here, six minutes after first using the term ( 
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“chaotic thing” t=9:01, “chaos” t=15:12), the client echoes her previous talk by referring 
to herself as being “full of chaos”. Previously, during S1, she talked about the experience 
of being evaluated as a “chaotic thing”. Here we see a shift. It is not the experience or 
situation that is “chaotic”, rather the chaos is something that resides inside, it is 
something “you’re full of”.43 
An interesting thing about the client’s response from lines 207 to 209 is that she 
elaborates on the experience of being “overwhelmed and releasing” and then goes back to 
talking about how her child’s scream “drives [her] crazy”. She tries to keep these two 
things separate by placing the “releasing” in the past tense. She says: “It is sort of 
like…you’re just full of chaos ((shaking hands back and forth)) and…I don't know why it 
works it just did” (lines 207-208). By saying “I don’t know why it works, it just did” the 
client switches from present tense to past. This verb confusion fits in with the ambiguity 
throughout the sequence. Immediately after this change in tense the client returns to 
talking about how and why her daughter drives her crazy. Again, the sudden shift back, 
without a clear explanation is very apparent when looking at the transcript. However, 
neither participant looks to be all that confused. When looking at the details of the 
interaction I find myself asking what the connections are between her screaming child, 
cutting, being overwhelmed and releasing, and hitting herself? 
At line 209, the client returns to talking about her daughter and gives more 
context to the “noise” that Wanda makes, which is so bothersome to her. However, the 
client does not simply talk about the noise she makes, but instead describes how she acts. 
                                                            
43 Notice how the client uses the universal “you” rather than saying I. This is a way of distancing 
herself from the experience as well as a means of normalizing it (Du Bois, 2007, p. 28). 
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She sets up her description by saying that what bothers her is “not being able to…reason 
with her.” Her description is centered on how Wanda will “work herself into…such a 
lather that she won’t let you give her what she’s demanding” (lines 213-215). She goes 
on to talk about how she sometimes makes “jokes about it” (line 215) and then 
ventriloquates the things she has “said” to Wanda such as “Wah wah wah, I’m gonna die 
of mild discomfort” (line 217). It is worth pointing out that this is a double 
ventriloquation. The “Wah wah wah, I’m gonna die” is actually Wanda’s speech 
ventriloquated by the client both in the past as well as in the present. This story is about 
how the client deals with her daughter’s cries and frustrating behavior by “mocking her.” 
Again, the connections between cutting, hitting, crying, being overwhelmed, and 
releasing are not clear, but if I were the therapist I would conceptualize the mocking as a 
higher order defense that alleviates the client’s frustration and keeps her from cutting or 
hitting herself.  
Extension/Question (16:07). The therapist responds to the client story by saying 
“but when things feel chaotic” (line 227). The therapist’s utterance is difficult to classify 
from a conversation analytic perspective. On the one hand, it can be seen as an extension, 
continuing the client’s speech and acting as a bridge between the preceding and 
forthcoming utterance. However, the utterance functions more like a question. It is 
actually a sentence fragment and it lacks the necessary predicate in order to be a complete 
sentence. By offering only the first part of the sentence the action initiated by the 
utterance remains stalled. Therefore, it is left up to the client to finish the action. In this 
case she is explaining what she does “when things feel chaotic”. Therefore, the utterance 
feels like an extension, and yet also acts as a question. Furthermore, it is a response to the 
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begins by saying “Ahh really, really, sort of overwhelming” (line 228). The way she 
initiates her turn is as if she was asked: “What does it feel like when things are chaotic?” 
At line 206, when the therapist repeated her words “overwhelmed and releasing” she 
similarly initiates her turn by saying that it’s like being “full of chaos”. Although we can 
quibble over the differences between feeling chaotic and feeling overwhelmed the client 
uses these almost interchangeably in order to convey the distress she feels. To fully 
elaborate what it feels like to be overwhelmed and feel chaotic she takes almost an entire 
minute. Even though a minute might seem like a short period of time, in conversation, 
where the other participant speaks in short bursts that last less than 5 seconds, a minute 
feels longer than one would expect. During her elaboration the client uses ventriloquation 
and an analogy to describe what it feels like to be overwhelmed. The analogy not only 
compares being overwhelmed to another kind of experience, but also incorporates the 
here-and-now to illustrate her point. 
She starts with a ventriloquation. As she initiates her turn and says the word 
“overwhelming” she brings her hands to her head and begins to shift them back and forth. 
She does this while she strains her face in a way that looks painful. She then 
ventriloquates yourself by saying: “‘I don’t know what to do, I don’t know how to make 
this situation better’” (lines 229-230). When she does this she looks like an actor acting 
out a scene. She looks away from the therapist and gazes out at a distance. She has a 
painful and stressed look upon her face. She emphasizes the words “what to do”. 
Watching this you get a sense of panic, confusion, stress, and uncertainty. She continues 
to describe the experience by saying it’s like “everything just stops…there’s too many, 
too many things happening” (lines 230-231). 
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240). The first part of this quote is probably the most important. The “so like the noises 
we are able to filter out” indexes the client and therapist in the here-and-now because it is 
using the present tense. Of course, she could be talking in general terms, which would not 
necessarily be specific to the here-and-now, but when she indicates examples of sounds 
such as the music, the buzzing of the lights, or the air brakes she’s actually pointing to 
things that are happening right there in the session. When she says “air brakes” you can 
hear air brakes on the recording for example. This way of illustrating what feeling 
“chaotic” is like by bringing in the here-and-now and indexing both the client and the 
therapist is a powerful tool used by the client. As a listener, I had a visceral experience 
listening to her description. You can follow her logic and attend to the experience along 
with her as she guides you. It is a powerful moment that brings emotion into the here-
and-now experience of feeling overwhelmed and “chaotic”. It is a way of enacting 
emotion so it can be experienced mutually44, yet still emphasize what it is like for her to 
personally feel overwhelmed.  
She finishes by tying her analogy to the experience of feeling overwhelmed by 
saying “and it’s sort of similar to that, but only more panicked for me, so sort of like just 
feeling like you are going to drown because all these things are just bombarding you” 
(lines 240-242). The “it’s sort of similar to that” contains two indexes: the first referring 
                                                            
44 As a therapist it is very hard to work when there is very little feeling. Maybe this is not the case 
for all therapists, but I am constantly trying to feel what is being said. The client tells her story 
and I tune into what I feel. Although this feeling relies on many things, it is also a response to the 
client’s story. How does the story move me as both a therapist empathizing with the client and as 
a person with my own stories? Can I identify with the client, can I imagine what it would be like 
to be them in the situation they describe? Most importantly, do I feel moved? If I don’t have this 
data I am lost and I flounder. That is why I see this moment as so important, the client really 
shows the therapist how she feels. This is something that she does to act on the therapist. 
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to being overwhelmed, and the second referring to the experience of having your hearing 
return. But more importantly the second index refers to the experience that was just 
shared by both the therapist and the client. The importance of this moment is that the 
client was able to talk about how she feels during her day-to-day life in a way that 
construes emotion as powerful and personal. Emotion is shown to be something that she 
experiences as problematic, and it is further constituted as what Foucault (1983) called 
the "ethical substance" that needs to be selected, identified, and worked upon (p. 238). 
How you work on this is substance is by sharing your personal experience with the 
therapist, which she does here in an evocative manner. This transforms the client’s 
personal experience into a shared experience, which can be used later for further 
therapeutic work. This is the process through which type A actions can become later 
constituted as type AB actions, and be used to formulate the client’s previous experience 
(Labov & Fanshel, 1977). 
Extension (17:02). With his next turn the therapist again responds to the client by 
offering an extension that is unfinished and therefore functions as a question. However, 
this time the client actively cuts off the therapist, overlapping his speech, and then 
finishing his turn. First let’s look at the therapist’s turn. He says: “And so cutting and or 
hitting yourself breaks that…” and is then cut-off by the client (line 244). The utterance 
relies on possible connections between discourse objects (cutting, hitting, overwhelmed, 
chaos) that have remained only possibilities up to this point. Here “cutting” and “hitting” 
become paired as a kin behavior, functioning in the same manner. He hedges this a bit by 
saying “cutting and or hitting”. This allows the ambiguous relationship to remain, while 
also, more or less, equating the two. Both the therapist and client have avoided 
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connecting these two behaviors directly. Why that is I can only speculate. What is 
important however is that both the therapist and the client are both apprehensive and they 
construct their response with this in mind. The therapist’s response is sensitive to the 
preceding context, and yet he moves to equate the two. The soft connection actually 
makes it less likely that the client will flat out disagree with him. Saying the hitting and 
cutting are the same might feel wrong to the client for whatever reason and lead to a 
discussion about how they are different. This discussion would be a side-track. The 
purpose of the therapist’s utterance is not to equate these two behaviors, but to link those 
behaviors to the chaotic overwhelming emotion that she has been describing. 
The client cuts-off the therapist right as he is forming the predicate of his 
utterance. She stops him from saying what “cutting and or hitting” does and instead says 
this herself. The transition between the two utterances is illuminating. The therapist uses 
the action verb “breaks” to describe what the “cutting and or hitting” does. However, the 
client jumps and the says “it g-” (line 245). The second word is cut off but as is often 
seen it projects a full word, which is it “it gets”. This is most apparent when you hear the 
entire utterance as the client jumps in and cuts-off the therapist in order to correct him. 
She does not hit herself to break something, but because “it gets something out”.  
The remainder of the utterance is a meditation, of sorts, on how she is trying to 
remove something. She says, “it lets me…vent my frustration” and, “for whatever reason 
it relaxes me. It gets, you know a sort of, I guess I get angry at being overwhelmed or just 
frustrated at the situation but it gets, it gets something out. I am physically doing 
something that gets me out of the moment” (lines 245-251 ). So here we see that the 
client is trying to understand the experience of being overwhelmed and feeling chaotic 
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but this is not made explicit. The client talks about how her daughter’s crying really 
bothers her and how she mocks her, but there is no explicit discussion of this connection. 
Rather, they remain possibilities that can be used or ignored as the participants talk. 
These possibilities fade when the client describes what frustration feels like because she 
talks about feeling like you might “drown because all of these things are just bombarding 
you”. This is furthered by her here-and-now analogy that evocatively conveys being 
overwhelmed by external stimuli that is non-specific and ubiquitous. In other words, what 
is characteristic of the experience is that there is no clear object. The therapist’s 
interpretation describes the hitting as a means of directing anger toward a clear object. 
Responding to this, the client emphatically agrees and then says, “I don’t want’a…to 
[hurt] my child” (lines 253-254). Here we see the client uses the possibilities, yet unused. 
She uses the connections between anger at her child being redirected toward herself. 
This all arises out the previous ambiguity as the client talked about hitting, 
cutting, and Wanda’s tantrums in ways that hinted at connections, while also creating 
disconnects. For example, when the therapist reminded the client that “you’ve hit 
yourself” (line 194) she responded by brushing her arm and saying there were “remnants 
of that still.” She might have been talking about a bruise from hitting or scars from 
cutting, the therapist (and the researcher is left to guess). Then responding to the 
ambiguous question, “What do you make of that?” she talked about her daughter. So are 
we to assume that hitting and/or cutting are related to the daughter? Both the researcher 
and the therapist can only speculate. When the therapist asked if this started “when 
Wanda was born” she said: “No….I started therapy for cutting”. So were the “remnants” 
scars or bruises, are they related, and if so how? All this is therapeutic food for thought 
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and it is not hard to imagine what the therapist was piecing together at that time. The 
cutting and the hitting are akin behaviors. They are related to her daughter and her 
screaming, but how? The client then talked about the cutting as a way to feel a release 
when she is overwhelmed. This led into the story of mocking her daughter when she 
throws the tantrum. Hence, the self-harm could be interpreted as a way of directing her 
frustration (or anger) at her child toward herself.  
As a therapist it is hard not to see the links here, but as a researcher I have to take 
a step back and assume that there are no given connections. The connections have to be 
made, they have to be forged. What we see in S3 is how associations are not simply 
something we have internally, but something that can be displayed. The client talks about 
things that are not explicitly connected, yet the way in which they are talked about creates 
a possibility for forming connections that can then be worked into therapeutic theme 
(Spence, 1982). Hence, cognitive associations can be seen as an interpersonal process 
that entails bringing forward depictions of others, behaviors, and emotion in such a way 
that connections are almost clear and therefore available to both client and therapist. At 
best the therapist might be a little ahead of the client, connecting things that are just 
coming to light (Boss, 1963/1979, 1979/1983). This is a good example of how 
problematizing involves the creation of implicit problem possibilities, which can later be 
made explicit by both client and therapist. Conversational ambiguity allows for numerous 
possible problems to arise, and therefore ambiguity can be seen as a conversational 
resource. A sequence, such as S3, where ambiguity is high, yet not so high that the 
participants are lost and call for repairs, can provide a rich context from which problems 
can be pulled and made useful across the session. 
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Sequence 4 (S4) 
As a therapist, my first impression was that S4 was a productive sequence with a 
deep beginning and ending, yet filled with defensive narratives that the client uses to 
avoid talking about emotions. There are some important moments that are worth 
spending some time on, so I will try and flush these out while summarizing the narratives 
with less detail. Below is the basic conversational structure of S4.  
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Initial elaboration on S3 interpretation. The client elaborates on the interpretation 
ending S3 by making a topical shift. She moves away from talking about herself as a 
“safe place to vent” anger (line 255) and instead begins to talk about “one of the things I 
hate about John’s mom” (excerpt 19, line 260). She goes on to talk about how John’s 
mother “acts with such impunity” and does not “even apologize for just crapping all over 
people” (lines 262-263). At line 265, the client signals that she has completed her turn by 
concluding that “I hate that about her” and then laughs. The therapist then uses a question 
to refocus the client on the content of the S3 interpretation. The therapist asks why 
“expressing anger…is difficult [and] has to be directed towards you?” (lines 267-268, 
question at 18:54). This shifts the focus of the conversation back on the client and away 
from John’s mother. The client states that, “You’re not supposed to get angry… that’s 
what crazy and mad people do” (lines 269-272). As she says the word angry she looks 
right at the therapist and then turns away laughing and gesturing with her hands as she 
associates anger with people who are crazy. She then goes on to elaborate how her 
mother never got “close to angry” (line 274) and her “dad swears, but is really 
lighthearted” (line 277). These reactions are then compared to her own expression of 
anger which she describes by saying: “meanwhile I’m…like break[ing] furniture 
and…trash[ing] your place like I’m in an 80s rock band” (lines 282-283). She concludes 
by saying: “I want to just decimate something and…I decimate me instead” (lines 283-
285). Most of the elaboration was delivered with humor directed towards her parents and 
how they express anger. This is continued when she begins to talk about herself wanting 
to “break furniture”. Yet, as she talks about how she wants to “decimate something,” her 
speech begins to slow and the smile in her voice fades when she pauses and offers a long 
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Watching this unfold I felt like this was an important moment where the client 
was having a deep emotional experience. This seemed to be building throughout S3, but 
that sequence was so filled with ambiguities that it was unclear exactly what was 
happening. This moment stands out because of its sequential relationship to S3: an 
elaboration on what was being constituted during S3. The client begins the elaboration by 
trying to shift the topic away from herself, but the therapist guides her back to her 
emotional experience. She then talks about anger in her family by using a humorous and 
somewhat sarcastic tone, but then she shifts, making eye contact with the therapist, and 
emphasizes how: “I decimate me instead,” followed by a long series of croaking 
utterances. The directness of this statement is starkly different from S3 where there were 
a number of ambiguities. I believe it is this combination that conveys emotion. The way 
the elements of the conversation contrast with each creates a relational pattern marked by 
shifts in content, tone, and clarity that make a small moment like this stand out within a 
long conversation. 
Following this emotional pause, the client says: “I just get really angry, I guess its 
anger?” (line 287). This concluding statement captures and makes explicit features of S3 
and the initial elaboration in S4. First, it is a clear reflective statement.45 The client 
reflects on herself as an object and makes an evaluation: “I just get really angry”. 
Although this might seem simple and unremarkable, when we reflect on the effort the 
therapist has made toward focusing the conversation on the client and her emotion, this 
moment becomes exceptional. S3 focused on anger direct toward herself and others. Here 
                                                            
45 I use the word reflective here because it is a moment when the client is both a subject and an 
object. She (subject) is reflecting on herself as an object. In a sense she is problematizing herself 
as a certain kind of thing, which has constitutional implications. 
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we see the client talking about her relationship with anger in a way that brings clarity to 
the previous conversation. Second, the client follows with a rhetorical question re-
infusing the ambiguity back into the conversation. She states: “I guess it’s anger?” 
Hence, the ambiguity that was so present in S3 is not completely resolved. Rather, it is 
reestablished as an ambiguity of the emotional experience. This can be seen in the 
therapist’s response. He offers what looks like concise interpretation: “I bet it’s a lot of 
things” (line 288, Interpretive 3rd, 20:11).46 The interpretation does not resolve the 
ambiguity, but accentuates it. What is so interesting about S3 is that it contains a series of 
adjacency pairs whose connections to one another are highly ambiguous. And yet, that 
sequence moved the conversation into the realm of emotion, anger, and self-injurious 
behavior. In the initial elaboration of S4 the conversation stays on emotion and anger, but 
the conversational ambiguity decreases. There is more clarity in what is being said, but 
this does not completely destroy ambiguity. Instead the client’s emotional experience 
becomes ambiguous and the therapist acknowledges this by accentuating that what she is 
feeling is “a lot of things”. Hence, emotions are being further constituted as ambiguous 
and therefore ascribed the quality of depth, which can be plumb for insight into the 
therapeutic problem. 
Narrative 3 (N3). After the therapist’s interpretive 3rd turn, the client gives a 
partial agreement token and then sets the groundwork for a narrative that elaborates on 
                                                            
46 Initially, I wondered if I should classify this as a sequence ending Interpretation. Yet, it was not 
a strong enough interpretation to mark the next sequence, but was rather another interpretive 3rd 
turn that was expanding on the elaboration, adding what Peräkylä would call “more layers” 
(Peräkylä, 2010, p. 18). So are sequence ending interpretations further spread out and responding 
to more material? It feels that way as a therapist. Often you sit back waiting to see what develops: 
waiting for some insight that seems relevant. 
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the angry, ambiguous feeling identified in her previous utterance. The introduction gives 
us a clue as to how the narrative is being crafted to have a certain effect. The client 
explains, “I just…sometimes…want to be like, ‘Fucking dishwasher,’ and just be like, 
‘No more plates’” (lines 289-290). After she says “plates” she looks right at the therapist 
and he offers an acknowledgment token. Again this is the same type of introduction that 
was used to begin N1. She offers an emotional gloss and seeks the therapist’s 
acknowledgment and interest. The emotion is conveyed as she ventriloquates herself 
cursing “Fucking dishwasher.” Because the conversation has been focusing on anger, it 
would be easy to assume that this introduction is about being angry. Yet, that is not 
certain, it is only a possibility. The client’s previous turn highlighted anger as a 
problematic emotion, but at the end of the initial elaboration the feelings were seen as 
ambiguous. The story primes the listener for a story about being angry and yet leaves 
open other possibilities. For the therapist it is a story worth listening to because it is 
primed as a story about emotion—specifically anger—which has been foregrounded 
during the session. Hence, the introduction’s effect is that the client gets permission to 
take several turns narrating. This move to story-telling allows her to structure her 
utterances deliberatively and gives her control the conversational topic. 
N3 is a story about how the client threw away some plates because John had 
“made a mess” (line 293) and their cats had gotten into the left out food. The major 
problem was that their child had a “sanitary” spot where her “clean dishes [go] and he left 
food there” (lines 303-305). The cats, who “are kind of assholes” (line 295), got food all 
over the sterile area “with their dirty feet and were making a mess and fighting over 
food” (line 307). The client ends up getting angry and throws the dishes in the garbage, 
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saying “‘God Dammit’…’Fuck this’” (lines 309-310). This portion of the narrative is told 
with a smile. She laughs on occasion and looks at the therapist keeping him engaged. 
You don’t get the sense that she is becoming angry. The physical indicators of anger: thin 
lips, clenched teeth and tempo, pitch, and amplitude increases, are not present (Coan & 
Gottman, 2007, p. 273). Yet, the story seems to be about anger. First, this largely has to 
do with the context of the conversation. We are expecting a story about anger. Second, 
the content of the narrative concerns the violation of agreed upon rules. In the client’s 
home they have a “sanitary environment [where] only clean things go with Wanda’s 
clean dishes, no food goes there….the only thing that goes where Wanda’s clean dishes 
go is also clean dishes” (lines 303-305). This is a list of rules that were violated by John 
and in response the client cursed and threw away the dishes. This is in line with de 
Rivera’s description of anger as moving against someone who has violated a shared set of 
values or rules (de Rivera, 1977, 1984, 2006). This brings us to the last indication of 
anger, which is her use of expletives. In modern English, “cursing” has been associated 
with anger and frustration (Archer, 2010, p. 398). Furthermore, if we look at the 
unfolding context of the conversation we see that the client describes her father’s anger 
by ventriloquating him cursing (line 277). Hence, the narrative projects anger even 
though the client tells the story in a tongue-in-cheek manner.47 In sum, N3 begins as the 
narrative about anger, but the emotion is contained within the narrative and does not 
affect the client or the client-therapist relationship during the retelling. 
                                                            
47 Interestingly, if you pay close attention to her speech when she says “God dammit” and “Fuck 
this” you can hear changes in the pitch and amplitude. These are the indicators of emotions used 
by Goodwin and Goodwin (M. Goodwin & Goodwin, 1999) when analyzing the anger displayed 
by girls playing hopscotch. However, these changes are controlled and have a sing song quality 
which decreases their impact. 
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walk 10 extra feet…. [and] put this in the God damn fridge, would it have really taken 
that much more effort out of your stupid day” (lines 315-319). She continues by 
challenging him: “‘How could you not think it was a problem, you have met our cats’” 
(lines 321-322). Gottman (2007) states that hostility, mockery, and sarcasm are clear 
indications of contempt. The tone of her speech during the section is that of sharp, biting 
sarcasm. There is humor in her speech, but it is sharp. Meaning she often ends with a 
strong upward inflection. The overall cadence of her speech is fast and she becomes more 
animated, quickly looking at the therapist and shaking her head. Gottman states that 
“contempt can be any statement made from a superior position” (p. 274). This is similar 
to de Rivera’s (1977, p. 53) contention that contempt occurs when we recognize someone 
as unfavorable or unlikable. Contempt is part of a class of emotions that have to do with 
recognition: how we see ourselves; and how we see other people. When we recognize 
others as similar to us, often holding ideal qualities, we pull those people closer through 
identification. However, when we see someone acting in a way counter to how we see 
ourselves, we push them away by being contemptuous. That is what we see occurring in 
the narrative. The client depicts herself as the upholder of the household rules and John as 
the neglectful, inconsiderate, and incompetent rule breaker. The positioning of John as 
incompetent was first hinted at during the slip of N1. This positioning allows the problem 
to reside with John and make him an object of contempt. Contempt, as an emotional 
transaction, locates the problem in the other, rather than the self. Hence, what we see here 
as well as elsewhere is the therapist foregrounding emotions—like anger— in a way that 
locates the problem within the client.  
 229 
 
Question (23:35). At line 339 the therapist keeps the focus on the client’s anger 
by saying: “So you do feel that you can get angry with John?” She says that she can, but 
she feels like this never changes anything. The therapist then connects this with someone 
else from the client’s life, possibly a previous boyfriend by saying “I wonder if that is 
reminiscent of how you felt with Jake?” (line 368, Question 25:08). The client uses the 
question to elaborate how: “John doesn’t know how to deal with angry people” and she 
“make[s] a point of not saying things that…are hurtful” (lines 369 & 376).48 The therapist 
asks if she “ever feel[s] guilty” and if she ever “want[s] to say those things?” (Line 375 
and 37; Questions 25:08, 25:13). The client responds by saying that she never wants to 
say these things because: “I don’t want to hurt him” (line 380). After she says this she 
signifies that she wishes to end her turn and utters the empty objects “ahh yea” (ten Have, 
1999, p. 22). This allows the therapist to quickly offer an extension, “but you’ll hurt 
yourself,” which poetically extends her speech and circulates utterances used previously 
(line 383, extension 26:23). 
The client uses the extension to complete an emotional transaction and talk about 
things that she wants to change. She starts her turn by offering two quietly spoken 
acknowledgment tokens and then states: “I don’t know what to do with that” (line 384). 
She attempts to revert back to her humorous delivery style by saying “something’s got to 
give you know, it just boils over, something got to give” (lines 384-386). Yet, it is almost 
like she has run out of steam. She is less animated and when she finishes this line she 
pauses and then makes a statement that felt very powerful as I watched the tape. In a calm 
                                                            
48 These questions keep the focus on the client’s own experience of her emotion. Furthermore, it 
is an explicit attempt to differentiate the chaotic emotions that she’s been describing as not only 
anger, but also guilt. 
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and quiet voice she says: “I want to get that under control, because I don’t want to…have 
Wanda see me…screaming and storm out of a room and just…furiously unmake the 
whole bed or…kicking things, or break things”(lines 386-390). 
The previous narrative (N3) began as a story about being so angry that the client 
was out of control and breaking things. Here we see a shift where the client depicts this 
anger as something she wants “to get under control.” Throughout the session the therapist 
has been continually focusing the client on her emotions. Even though emotions can be 
viewed as “social relationships,” the focus of the therapy has been on how the client’s 
emotions are her personal possession and therefore her responsibility (de Rivera & 
Grinkis, 1986). The “I want to get that under control” is an acknowledgment of emotion 
as something she has to take responsibility for. In a sense, the client takes responsibility 
for emotions, while also creating distance from her acts of (hurting herself, breaking 
things, screaming) during this utterance. De Rivera (1977) describes guilt as the pushing 
away of an aspect of ourselves that we do not want to belong to us. I believe that, in part, 
that is what we are seeing here. However, shame also functions in a similar way. Shame 
is experienced when distance is created between ourselves and others who we admire. 
This distance is created when we are recognized as lacking features that we admire in 
others. In this utterance we can also see the possibility of shame. The client states that “I 
don’t want to have Wanda see me screaming.” Hence, both shame and guilt are emotional 
possibilities that the client opens up with her utterance. However, instead of exploring 
these two emotions and moving towards a more complete and clear emotional 
transaction, the client swiftly moves into a story (N4), which is told with the same 
sarcastic humor that we have seen throughout the session. Although the therapist uses N4 
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by pointing out how it is a description of “intense anger,” the story nonetheless moves 
away from this unique emotional moment and never allows these possible emotions to 
come to fruition. Meaning, these emotions never fully take form within the conversation 
because the client swiftly moves back into storytelling that is sarcastic and canned. 
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objects (lines 392-399). At line 402, the therapist uses his turn to ask a question (27:30) 
that highlights the emotion implicit in the story: “So there is some intense anger?” The 
client responds with a shrug, saying, “Ah well I guess that is anger…I feel silly…I don’t 
know”. The therapist then asks her to explain why she feels silly and she replies “I should 
know what I'm feeling. If it is something so visceral…I should have some semblance of 
what's going on” (lines 403-409). At this the therapist calls for his turn by taking a deep 
breath, but the client holds on to her turn and continues to speak. This is rare and hence 
the move gives the following line more prominence: “I don't know if it is anger…I just 
feel overwhelmed and then just like this desire to break things” (lines 409-413). This is a 
circulation of the “I guess it’s anger” figure of speech used by the client prior to the 
transition into N3 (line 287). In response the therapist makes an interpretation (lines 414-
415,28:02) that marks the end of S4. He states: “I wonder if that's what maybe gives it 
this kinda chaotic feel is that you’re not really sure what you're feeling. You just know 
you want it to stop.” This interpretation also uses a circulation of figures. The “chaotic 
feel” has been used by both the client and therapist across the session (S1 client line 96, 
S2 client line 142, S2 client line 207, S2 therapist line 227). Hence, the “chaotic thing” 
(S1, line 96) that the client first introduced and has been emerging over the course of the 
past 4 sequences, has become constituted as a “feeling,” in response to not knowing 
“what you’re feeling” only that it is unpleasant and you “want it to stop.” 
As stated at the outset, my first impression was that S4 had a deep beginning and 
end, but was filled with defensive narratives that lacked emotion. For the most part, this 
analysis has produced evidence that supports those initial impressions. However, it seems 
clear that the narratives are not simply defensive. N3 moves from muted anger, to clear 
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contempt, and ends with the possibility of guilt and shame. There are defensive aspects. 
The narrative allows the client to control the conversation and talk about emotion (or 
whatever she chooses) in a way that feels most comfortable. The narrative does produces 
a topic shift. It moves the conversation away from the self harm discussed in S3, and 
toward her fights with John (N3). Hence, the narrative allows that the client to change the 
topic, but she does not stray too far. She keeps the narrative focused on emotion, but 
displays mainly contempt which locates the problem in John and not herself. 
 Watching the tape, S3 felt like a very deep and emotional sequence, yet felt 
loosely connected and strange. S4 seemed to borrow energy from S3, but I felt there was 
more clarity. The narratives combined with the comments generated by the therapist’s 
questions and extensions kept the conversation focused on emotion, and provided the 
client with conversational structure (plot and storytelling sequence structure) and topical 
control. The client is able to make some clearly powerful statements as she responds to 
the therapist. She opens up the possibility of transforming her anger and contempt into 
guilt and shame and she exercises her power as a speaker to hold her turn and state that 
she does not know what she is feeling; only that she wants to break things. The therapist 
tries to use this to constitute her emotions as an ethical substance that has depth. The 
interpretation takes this even further: the problem is this “chaotic” feeling that is caused 
by not knowing “what you’re feeling” only that you “want it to stop.” Hence, the problem 
is one of not knowing your emotions, which is a substance of depth. As this is occurring, 
the client is trying to constitute the problem differently: It is a problem of not “know[ing] 
what I’m feeling” except “I feel overwhelmed” and have a “desire to break things.” This 
is a different type of problem than the “job stuff” discussed in S1, yet by circulating the 
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really sure what you’re feeling” (S-4 interpretation lines 414-415). 
Then after roughly 1 minute and 30 seconds the client signals that she is ready to 
give up her turn by offering the empty objects “and uhum” at the end of line 442. The 
therapist quickly jumps in and offers an interpretation that is just as off-topic as the 
client’s elaboration. He states: “I wonder if there is something also kind of expressive 
about the way you hurt yourself” (lines 443-444). If we examine the content of the 
elaboration and the interpretation of S5, we see that the elaboration seems to be focused 
on the content discussed in S4 (N3, fights with partner), whereas the interpretation is 
focused on the content discussed in S3 (self harm). S5 is interesting because it juxtaposes 
the tactics available to the client and the therapist to change the focus of the conversation. 
Although the client offers an acknowledgment token, she is free to comment or narrate 
away from the topic that is brought to the foreground during the interpretation. In 
contrast, once the client gives up her turn the therapist is able to utilize an interpretation 
to swiftly shift the topic of conversation. Part of the constitutional process of 
psychotherapy is exercising certain rights that derive from the participants’ different 
roles. Clients are granted the right to narration, commentary, and elaboration, where as 
the therapist is entitled to interpretation, questions, and formulations. These utterances are 
very different types of actions, granted to very different kinds of people. Clients are to 
speak down into the depths of their experience; therapists are to light the path by which 
the client is to tread.  
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Elaboration on S5 Interpretation. The topical shift back to self harm is not 
immediately taken up by the client. Instead of responding, she initially shrugs and opens 
her hands. She says, “I don’t know” (line 445) with an upward inflection that can be read 
as dismissive. We can assume that this is the therapist’s take because he quickly offers a 
justification for the interpretation, initiating his turn with “cause” (short for because, or 
the reason for) and stating “I don’t think I would have noticed unless you pointed it out to 
me” (excerpt 23, lines 446-447). This statement is vague and the client quickly calls for a 
repair and clarification (“The bruise?”) to which the therapist offers a strong agreement 
token. The client then describes how: “Everybody else..pointed out” the bruise and 
exclaimed: “‘What happened, what happened?’” (lines 450-451). The “everyone else” 
creates a comparison between the therapist and “everyone.” The therapist is the odd man 
out, not noticing the bruise. The utterance shifts the relevance of the client’s previous 
action when she pointed out her bruise during S3. The fact that the client had to show the 
bruise says something about the therapist, not the client. This struggle over the relevance 
of the action continues until line 471 where the therapist uses a question to bring the 
focus back on the “idea that maybe there is something expressive about it [indexing self 
harm discussed in a previous utterance]?” The entire exchange is another attempt to move 
the location of the problem, but this time it is placed in the therapist, rather than John.   
Hence, what we see at the start of S6 is the therapist trying to build relevance for 
the S5 interpretation. However, this does not work. By showing her bruise the client is 
being a good client and reporting to her therapist in order to assist with treatment (lines 
464-465). Furthermore, the fact that she has to show the therapist says something about 
him, because everyone else noticed. The therapist could have followed the client’s lead 
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and apologize for not noticing the bruise or reinforced the client’s actions as that of a 
good patient. Instead, he comes back to the “expressive” nature of the self harm. Yet, he 
softens his assertion. The client does not have to agree that the self harm is expressive, he 
is only asking that they “entertain the idea that maybe there is something expressive 
about it?” (Question 31:03, lines 471-472). 
  
 Excerpt 23, S6, Session A, Lines 4
241 
45-488 
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The client responds by saying: “I’m really not thinking about anybody else when 
I’m doing it” (line 473). The response clearly shows that she does not see something 
“expressive” about harming herself, but she does play along with the therapist and 
“entertain the idea.” The therapist responds with a quick follow-up question, “What about 
to yourself?” (Line 478, 31:31). The question is vague and at line 479 the client calls for 
clarification: “What do you mean?” and immediately the therapist expands his original 
question by saying: “What are you trying to express to yourself?” (line 480). Again, the 
client rejects the question saying: “It doesn’t really feel like I’m making any big 
statement, it is just getting…the desire out of me” (lines 481-482). 
 Hence, what we see is the therapist offering questions that keep the topic focused 
on the idea that self harm is expressive, while the client uses her turns to illegitimate the 
therapist’s questions. At line 483, the therapist changes strategy and offers a declarative 
statement about the “assumption” that explains why he thinks this topic is legitimate. He 
states “I guess you know I kind of operate on…the assumption that the symptom speaks. 
And I’m wondering what it’s saying” (lines 483-485). Again, the client begins her 
response by opening her hands as if the answer is not clear. However, this time she does 
attempt to answer the question. She offers a ventriloquation that actually gives the 
“symptom” a voice. In response to the question of what the symptom might be “saying” 
the client says: “Ahh ‘everything sucks.’ That’s the way it feels [like]” (line 486). The 
ventriloquation, “everything sucks,” it is spoken with the smile, but the rest of the 
utterance is spoken quietly. By the end of the utterance it feels like there is less 
contention between the therapist and the client. This is demonstrated by the softness of 
the client’s tone and her willingness to use the therapist’s assertion that there is 
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something expressive about her hurting herself. Furthermore, the client ends her utterance 
by talking about how the therapist and client can indeed work on this together, stating 
“we can…we can think about that” (line 488), referring to the idea that the symptom 
speaks. 
Formulation (32:09). This alignment is furthered by the formulation the therapist 
offers at line 489. This is another formulation that indexes previously discussed material 
from past sessions. The therapist recalls: “I remember asking you, ‘Do you if you get 
angry in session’ and you said, ‘No probably not’ and if you can cry in session and you 
said, ‘Not if I can help it.’” The therapist and client display their alignment by 
coordinated laughter in the last ventriloquation (see excerpt 24). The therapist is actually 
ventriloquating the client here, which feels more intimate or shared. This is furthered by 
the coordinated laughter and acknowledgment token that begins the client’s next turn. 
The formulation is very important in terms of the emerging context of the session. It is an 
explicit acknowledgment of the client’s difficulty expressing emotion. We have seen 
throughout the session that bringing emotion to the foreground has been a central task 
pursued by the therapist. Here we see an acknowledgment of this as a problem for the 
client. This problem is identified through a formulation of the client’s own speech during 
a past experience that was shared by both the client and the therapist. The formulation 
relies heavily on the preceding context. Using implicit problems made possible in S3, the 
therapist returns to the topic of self harm and makes explicit that self injury is a type of 
problem that involves the client's relationship to herself. The "symptom" is trying to say 
something to the client. By converting the symptom in discourse, it is transformed into an 
action from the client, toward the client. This is the consequence of entertaining the idea 
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that the symptom is "expressive," i.e. symbolic. The symptom acts on the client. It is her 
own unwilled action. Even though the action is unwilled, it is still intentional—it has a 
purpose (it “speaks”), yet that purpose is unknown. The therapist asks the client to look 
into this unknown in order to understand herself. The client does this by giving the 
symptom a voice, which is then followed by the therapist formulation that brings in past 
shared experience to foreground the client's problem of not wanting to get emotional in 
session. This is an example of how implicit problematizing of the client as certain kind of 
emotional being is made explicit, which produces a sense of a rich and deep therapeutic 
experience.  
The client responds by offering a strong agreement token and an elaboration, 
which indicates that it is “strange” that she struggles to cry because she is “pretty 
sentimental” (lines 492-493). The therapist then marshals another formulation (32:35) 
that indexes past shared experiences. He states: “I have seen you actively try to hold the 
tears in” (line 494). At the same time the client is smiling and nodding while opening 
hands towards her face and then she emphatically agrees: “Yea, yea I do that” (line 496). 
When asked why she does hold back her emotions, she responds by saying: “I like to put 
a…brave, tough face on things” (line 498). This leads into a discussion of how she was 
raised to “soldier through,” and when she was “growing up [she] was one of the guys” 
(lines 500 & 504). The therapist quickly participates with her in the idea that guys “don’t 
talk about their feelings” (extension, lines 505-506, 33:14). Both the therapist and the 
client are laughing and joking during the section. It is one of the few times the therapist 
joins in with the client to joke around and be less serious. This is not because there is a 
lack of emotional content in the client’s speech. She states “I had some pretty terrible shit 
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“You’re supposed to be tough…or life and everyone else will get you down and get on 
top of you” (lines 519-520). Her response seems to shift away from the question of why 
she did not have many female friends. Regardless, the therapist then uses the question to 
both call for elaboration and challenge the basic idea in the client’s response. He asks: 
“Where did you come to that conclusion?” (line 521, 34:10). To this the client responds 
in a curt and direct tone: “I don't have…an instance ((curt))….If you are tough you can 
take care of yourself and if you’re not then you’re a burden to others. Need[ing] 
someone, you know, coddling you all the time, well, what the fucks the point of that?” 
(lines 522-528). At the word “coddling” and “fuck” the therapist raises his eyebrow and 
the client interprets this gesture saying: “ I said something bigger than I think I did, didn’t 
I? Because you made a face….that one, with the eyebrow” (line 530-531). At line 532, 
the therapist encourages her to reflect on what she “make[s] of it?” but she tells him: “I 
want you to tell me what it is…I don’t know” (lines 534-535). Yet, instead of telling her 
what he thinks he asks her: “What comes to mind?” (line 536) to which she responds: “It 
seems like…a very strange mentality to have had as a child.…the point of being a kid is 
to be…nurtured and coddled, and get your booboos kissed….Not run around 
with…gaping wounds and gravel on your knee” (lines 537-541). 
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response that feels different; it feels powerful. Part of this is the evocative language 
(“coddling,” “fuck”). Yet, it is also the way in which the client directly and succinctly 
lays out a firm belief about the “way things go:” You have to “take care of yourself” or 
“you’re a burden to others” who have to coddle you.49 She ends with an angry dismissal: 
“What the fuck’s the point of that?” Recall that anger is an emotion tied up with belief. 
Hence, we have an utterance where the tone changes and becomes more direct and curt. 
There is no irony, sarcasm, or wit, but a clear declaration of a belief. Although this does 
not seem like anger directed at the therapist, it does feel like the most direct expression of 
anger we have seen so far in the session. Possibly this is what the eyebrow raise was 
responding to and hence the hermeneutic work done by the client is a response to 
emotion. If this is the case, then what we see is the client interpreting the therapist’s 
response (eyebrow raise) in order to interpret herself as an emotional being. Hence, there 
is some evidence that the client uses the hermeneutics of therapy in order to recognize 
and indirectly foreground herself as an emotional being. This ends the contentious 
beginning of S6 and leads into the 3 narratives offered by the client. A sequence that was 
marked by both the client’s and therapist’s action against one another, ends with them 
collaborating and what seems to be an expression of anger that is unique so far in the 
session.  
Narrative 5 (N5). At this point the client starts a pre-sequence to open the first 
narrative (N5) of the sequence. At line 541, she again uses an evocative, emotionally 
laden gloss: “Man, childhood sucks!” to introduce and assess the therapist’s interest in 
                                                            
49 Remember the from the standpoint of STE, anger is a transaction that is enacted in order to 
assert what “ought to exist” (de Rivera, 1977, p. 77). 
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hearing her story (see excerpt 26, line 541-543). However, the therapist does not give the 
client clear permission to proceed. Rather, he calls for a repair, as if he did not hear her or 
understand. Although repair requests often occur for technical reasons (e.g. an utterance 
is muffled, or phrased in a way that does not make sense), Sacks (1989) has shown how a 
repair can also be used to resist the actions initiated by the previous speaker. The client’s 
utterance is clear. Hence, the therapist repair request can be read as resistance against the 
client’s move to begin narrating. In response to the request the client repeats herself and 
then offers another emotional gloss that is even more evocative: “Kids are vicious, kids 
are vicious” (line 545). By combining a technical repair (maybe he did not hear me so I 
will repeat myself), with another gloss aimed at opening a narrating sequence the client 
demonstrates the degree to which wants to tell her story. 
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“dressing like a dork” (lines 556-557, 563). Watching the session, the introduction 
actually seemed quite productive and deep. Possibly this is due to the implicit emotion 
hinted at during the introduction. The client depicts herself as a “huge kid” that stood out 
because of her size and because: “[my] mom dressed me….like an overgrown toddler” 
(lines 560, 564-567) and she ventriloquates her fellow children saying to her “ ‘you look 
like a clown’ ” (line 569). The content here is emotionally evocative. The idea of a young 
child being picked on because of her size and what she wears pulls for emotion. 
Furthermore, she narrates herself as misunderstood. It is her mother’s fault that she wears 
clothes that make her look like a “dork.” Even though she was a “huge kid” she described 
herself as “actually on the athletic side” (lines 561-563). In other contexts this could be 
considered a strength, but in the introduction it is something that is overlooked.50  
She also describes herself as being more intelligent than her peers. For example, 
she ventriloquates a conversation between herself and an imaginary childhood playmate: 
“‘Yea, yea I know. I know, and I read at a fifth-grade level. Don't you want to talk to 
me?’ ‘No we don’t. You don’t…watch enough thunder rangers [and] we don’t like you’” 
(lines 570-573). Hence, she positions herself as a mature child whose mother tried to 
“preserve my innocence…. By dressing me, like an overgrown toddler” (lines 566-567) 
and because of these two factors she was unfairly picked on during childhood. Hence, the 
narrative depicts her as a victim of her own development and of her mother’s desire to 
keep her “innocent.” Both the mother and the other children are described 
contemptuously. This is demonstrated by the language that the client uses, the witty 
                                                            
50 Interestingly in S1 (line 121), the client contemptuously comments on how her mother would 
not allow her to play sports during her childhood. 
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sarcastic tone, and the way in which the children and her mother are positioned as people 
that don’t see the client’s strengths or positive characteristics. This has a direct effect on 
the listener (in this case both the therapist and myself as researcher). The pull is not 
simply to feel sympathy toward the client, but to feel contempt toward the other 
characters in the story while also recognizing the client as someone who should be 
appreciated or admired. 
According to de Rivera (1977), this interplay of contempt and admiration can 
produce powerful effects because of the structural relationship of these two emotions (see 
positioning map below). Both contempt and admiration are emotions that involve 
recognizing positive or negative qualities in the other. In contempt we see the other as 
having negative qualities that makes them dissimilar from us and the emotional 
transaction is used to push the other away by accentuating these negative, dissimilar 
qualities. Admiration is the opposite of contempt in that the “person whom we admire 
embodies personal values” or “ideals” that we see in, or want for, ourselves (p. 55). 
Hence, the other is drawn closer as someone who holds similar, ideal qualities. The 
qualities that the client emphasizes are being “athletic,” “huge” and intelligent. 
Previously in this sequence we saw the client and the therapist align over being “one of 
the guys” (line 504). Uncharacteristically, the therapist laughed and joked with the client 
about stereotypically masculine characteristics such as: “guys don’t talk about their 
feelings” (lines 505-506). Hence, the client and therapist have already selected masculine 
characteristics as something that binds them as similar kind of people. The characteristic 
of intelligence is not found in the conversation but we can speculate that there is a fairly 
universal assumption that therapists are part of the intelligentsia and the notion that the 
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instead of elaborating further she moves away from the topic and quickly begins 
narrating (N5) how she was raised in “a daycare center” and that boys were her friends, 
but they would only play with her if other boys were not around. The narrative is short, 
lasting from line 578-591 (see transcript). The narrative does not evoke the same 
emotional response because it does not use admiration and contempt to position the 
characters. Hence, the narrative feels resistive in that it allows the client to move away 
from the topic of the “sad face” and hold the conversational floor for an extended turn. 
The notion that the narrative is resistive is reinforced by the therapist’s response to the 
story. Instead of focusing on any elements brought up in the story the therapist returns to 
the client’s initial response saying: “You say that…you didn’t want to go there?” (line 
592, excerpt 28, question 39:03). This circulates the client’s original figure of speech: “I 
don’t want to go there” and returns to the contradiction between the content of the 
client’s speech and her delivery, which was pointed out by the therapist’s previous 
noticing. 
In response the client says that she does not “want to think too hard on it” (line 
593). The “it” indexes the “sad face” uttered by the client and then circulated by the 
therapist in his noticing. In other words, the “it” indexes the implicit sadness in the 
client’s introduction and also her contradictory style of talking about something that is 
clearly sad. The client then offers a formulation stating: “I suppose I’m supposed to be 
going in, that is probably the purpose of all this” (lines 594-596). Although it is not 
entirely clear what she means by “all this,” my interpretation, as a listener, is that she is 
referring to the practice of psychotherapy. The therapist also seems to hears the “all this” 
index this way and he responds by saying, "Well I'm not here to, you know to force you 
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herself as an emotional being. This way of thinking about herself is made explicit by both 
the client and the therapist at this moment, but it relies on the entirety of the previous 
context where emotion as a personal substance of depth was problematized as in need of 
hermeneutic interpretation.  
Narratives 6 (N6) & 7 (N7). The remainder of S6 contains two narratives (N6 
lines 619-627,51  N7 lines 639-664, see transcript) that bring about topical changes and 
avoid the therapist’s attempts to focus on why she has to avoid “feeling emotional” (line 
603). In both cases the topic changes are abrupt (lines 619, 627). During both narratives 
the client returns to her witty, sarcastic delivery; speaking with a smile and laughing. The 
stories do have emotional undertones: N6 is about experiencing fear when she saw 
“rattlesnake pelts” (line 621) and N7 is about being so afraid of “clowns” that she 
“punched [a clown] in the nuts” when one approached her at a circus (line 661). N7 is 
more complicated because there is positioning occurring between the client’s friends who 
taunt her into going to the circus by saying: “‘Pussy, pussy, pussy’” (line 645). However, 
because of the topic changes and the style of delivery these narratives feel ‘canned’ and 
resistive. 
  
                                                            
51 N6 is extremely short and it could be viewed as part of the pre-sequence of N7. However, it 
does have the basic elements of a narrative: a telling of a past event that unfolds in time. 
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maybe I'm the clown….talking about emotions, talking about things that are difficult and 
you're saying: ‘slow up’” (lines 672-677). This interpretation answers the question posed 
by the speculative assertion while also summing up S6 as sequence concerned with 
emotion. It brings back to the foreground the problem of talking/feeling/expressing 
emotion, which the client moved away from while narrating. It does this by proposing 
that the story is not simply a representation of a past a event, but possibly something 
“expressive.” The story is interpreted as an action in the here-and-now directed against 
the therapist, or as the client put it, ‘a threat’ aimed at the therapist. In a sense, the 
interpretation converts N7 into an indirect expression of anger against the therapist. 
Furthermore, the interpretation positions the client as an active agent who is responsible 
for her actions in the present moment. This contrasts how the client often depicts herself 
as a victim and how she actively avoids enacting emotion in the here-and-now of the 
session.     
Sequence 7 (S7) 
Sequence 7 (S7) is much shorter than S6, and lasts only 8 minutes. It is the last 
sequence prior to the closing and it is important because both the client and therapist talk 
more explicitly about emotion as a problem. As we have seen emotion has been 
continually foregrounded and problematized, but up until S6 this process was implicit. 
The power of S7 comes from its relation to the previously implicit talk about the problem 
and the shift toward explicit formulation. As the therapist and the client are discussing 
this, there seems to be a possibility of the client getting angry. However, the client 
quickly changes the topic and offers a long commentary about her mother-in-law. Much 
like in S6, the therapist uses an interpretation to transform the client’s commentary, 
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Elaboration on S6 interpretation. After the S6 interpretation the client begins to 
elaborate, accepting the interpretation and then taking it further. She begins with a 
humorous denial, saying, “I don’t want to punch you,” but then she follows this by 
saying: “There might be something to that, I suppose, I suppose” (lines 678-679). She 
continues: “I really don’t want to make it seem like a threat, but the fact that I was so 
quick to fire back: ‘It’s not a threat, it’s not a threat, you’re not the clown.’ You probably 
are the clown, you are probably are the clown” (lines 681-684). In this last utterance, she 
is again utilizing the hermeneutic practiced that the therapist demonstrated in the S6 
interpretation. She is interpreting herself (“the fact that I was so quick to fire back”) in 
order to understand what the story meant and why it was being told. Hence, the client has 
taken herself as an object to be interpreted and understood. In her interpretation she even 
tries to acquit herself by saying, “it’s not a threat, it’s not a threat, you’re not the clown,” 
but then follows this up with her interpretive conclusion which is: “You probably are the 
clown.” Hence, this is a moment where we can see psychotherapy changing the client in 
the sense that she begins to adopt the hermeneutic strategy of the therapist. Interestingly, 
the client is acting as both interpreter and the object that is being interpreted; therefore 
she occupies two positions and creates a doubling. Again, this use of the therapeutic 
hermeneutic occurs when there is some evidence of anger and this furthers the notion that 
the client is taking up the hermeneutic of therapy and using it as a technology to decode 
herself as an emotional being. 
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they share together rather than one that the client has herself. This shift in ownership of 
the problem changes again when he states that she doesn’t like to stay in one space very 
long. At this point, the client takes a deep breath, similar to the way that the therapist has 
done throughout the session to call for his turn. It seems as if she wants to speak, yet the 
therapist continues. Moving on, he holds the floor in order to offer an explanation of why 
she doesn’t like to dwell in one space too long. He explains, “maybe you fear that if you 
spend too much time talking…or just reflecting on some of the things we talked about, 
…that maybe if some of the, I don’t know what you call this….” at which point he 
pinches his pointing finger and thumb together repeatedly. When the therapist gestures 
the client offers a strong acknowledgment token as if she recognizes the gesture. Then the 
therapist says “may not hold everything back” (lines 696-701). Watching this exchange it 
seems as if the pinching is a gesture the client has used in previous sessions in order to 
keep herself from becoming emotional. Hence, the gesture acts like a formulation 
indexing previous sessions. The indexing of previously shared experience furthers the 
constitution of the personal, emotional problem, and adds a historical dimension that is 
shared by the therapist who stands as an intimately involved witness to the problem that 
has continually been problematized as personal.  
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in psychotherapy. You must be curious about yourself. This curiosity is the constant 
condition of the therapeutic relationship. The therapist is curious about the client first and 
foremost. When this curiosity wanes the alliance crumbles. This curiosity is the implicit 
condition of the therapy relationship and in order for the client to be an ethical subject—a 
good client and good person—she has to be curious about herself. Hence, curiosity, for 
the client, is a relationship to herself, which further constitutes the problem as personal. 
Question (45:37). Initially the client responds with humor by saying: “Nobody 
likes the crying lady” (line 715). She says this line with a smile. By using “nobody” as 
her turn indicator she offers a response that is directed at everyone and no one at the same 
time. This gets flushed out after the therapist asks: “Who’s nobody?” (Line 716). She 
then moves on to talk about how: “you will be a bother if you…do that” (line 721). The 
index (“that”) refers back to what she doesn’t allow herself to do, which is become 
emotional. She goes on to connect this to her mother who “preemptively guilted [her]” so 
she would not have “tantrums” (lines 728-729). She does end with an emotional 
statement. The emotion is expressed through her tone and delivery. She states: “You just 
don’t do certain things, and letting myself get overwrought feels like one of those things 
you just don’t do…And I mean that with all the sort of (gestures up and down with her 
hands in a stepping motion) hard stepping percussiveness that I’m implying now, you just 
don’t”(lines 731-735). The “percussiveness” that she is referring to aligns with the way 
she punctuates her speech by forcefully saying certain words that I have tried to show in 
the transcript. Here again, we have a moment that feels like anger. However, the client is 
not angry at anyone in particular. Rather, she is passionately stating her beliefs which 
help to explain why she has problems expressing her emotion. Although this is not a clear 
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737). This is a call to close the sequence and close the session more generally. It is a 
strong topic change that occurs right at the point where we see the beginnings of what 
might be an emotional transaction of anger. Furthermore, we see a parallel between what 
happens at this point in S7 and what they have been discussing so far. Namely, that the 
client begins to skip along the surface and never goes too deeply into her emotions. 
Remember that questions are powerful because they demand responses and they give the 
questioner another chance to talk once the question has been answered (ten Have, 1999). 
Hence, the therapist does offer a response about when they will be meeting next and once 
he’s finished the client quickly introduces another topic. The client begins to discuss how 
her partner’s mother is coming to town and how much she dislikes his mother. She 
discusses this for almost 5 minutes. Hence, we can see how the call for a closing really 
was a shift away from the problem being discussed previously. This gives further 
evidence that what we saw was the beginning of a emotional transaction, which the client 
shutdown by utilizing powerful conversational tools such as calling for closing and 
asking questions. 
Discussion of her partner’s mother is told once again in a sarcastic, witty tone. 
Although this commentary does not fit the criteria to be considered a narrative, it 
functions much like a narrative because it is a discussion about other people and their 
relationships with the client. The client describes how her and her partner are “always in 
the position where we have to lie to her. Because the truth tends to make her insane” (see 
transcript, lines 746-747). She ends her commentary by saying John’s mother is “a 
torrent” who “drives me fucking crazy” (lines 799-802). The therapist then offers an 
interpretation much like he did at the end of S6. He again offers a speculative assertion 
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that is in the form of “I wonder” followed by an interpretation that offers an explanation. 
Hence, the therapist asks if there might be something about John’s mother, which “drives 
you so crazy… that you recognize in yourself” (lines 803-804). Initially she rejects this, 
but the therapist continues by connecting back to where the client talked about how she 
“got [a] 97 and all [she] could focus on was the question that [she] got wrong” (lines 806-
808). The client then offers a strong acknowledgment token, which is a clear shift from 
her original disagreement and focuses her elaboration on self-harm: “Ya, but I’m…only 
harming myself, …I think Sandy is the other way around, Sandy is hard on everybody 
else but herself” (lines 809-811). The therapist then uses another interpretative third turn 
and states: “So maybe she's like that to everybody else…, but I guess what I am trying to 
point out is that you are that way to yourself” (lines 820-821). The client initially offers 
an agreement saying she “concede[s],” but she goes on to say that “I think my way of 
doing things is better than her way of doing things, objectively speaking (lines 828-830).  
  
 interp
a ther
distin
disow
the cl
of do
Excerpt 3
At this po
retive fourt
apeutic pers
guishes the 
ned aspects
ient ends he
ing things”)
2, S7, Sessio
int the thera
h turn. Yet, 
pective it lo
client from 
 of the clien
r utterance b
 which she t
n A, Lines 8
pist offers a
this interpre
oks like a su
John’s moth
t (i.e. the ba
y offering h
hen labels a
268 
02-833: Int
n interpretat
tation feels v
pportive sta
er who repr
d object). E
er own asse
s “objective
erpretation 
ion that can
ery differen
tement that
esents negat
xamining th
ssment of h
ly speaking.
S7 
 be viewed a
t than the o
 highlights s
ive, distaste
e interaction
erself (“I th
” The therap
s an 
thers. From 
trengths and
ful, and 
 we see that
ink my way 
ist then 
 
 
 
 
 269 
 
offers his assessment (“Well I do think”) about the client: “you are curious about the way 
you do things. And I think that is one of the reasons why you’re here is to explore those 
things” (lines 831-833). Hence, the therapist does not agree with the client that her way 
of “doing things” (i.e. “only harming myself” and not others) is better. Rather, he ascribes 
the client with a quality—curiosity. “You are curious about the way you do things” is a 
clear shift away from the topic of “doing things” her way. The positivity of the quality is 
created through the design of the turns and the unfolding context. The therapist designs 
his turn as an agreement with the client’s evaluation that she does things “better” than 
John’s mother. Hence, whatever comes after the “Well I do think that you are…” will 
come across as a positive an evaluation (unless it is spoken in a way that conveys 
sarcasm). What follows is that she is curious about herself.  
Considering the context of the session, we have seen a few places where the client 
does seem curious about herself and begins to interpret her own behavior. This has been 
shown to be an adoption of the therapist’s hermeneutic strategy that he demonstrates 
again and again with his utterances. The therapist is intently curious about the client, 
always bringing the focus of the conversation back on her, rather than John, John’s 
mother or their child. In truth, this seems to be the overall strategy of the session: the 
therapist wanting to focus on the client as an object of curiosity and the client resisting 
this except in a few places. Therefore, this interpretation does not seem to be an 
“objective” assessment of a positive quality that client possess. Rather, it is a way of 
relating and understanding oneself that is being constituted as something good—
something that distinguishes her from her ‘mother-in-law’ who is a “torrent.” 
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Closing Sequence 
The S7 interpretative sequence is followed by a powerful elaboration that 
continues to makes problematizing of SA explicit (see closing sequencing diagram). It is 
what therapist’s call a “door knob statement” because it often feels emotional, authentic 
and deep, yet it is said right when the session needs to be closed. Here the client spells 
out what she wants from therapy. She explicitly formulates what she sees as the 
problem—the sticky issue of emotion regulation—and how this interferes with what she 
wants for her child. She also makes implicit the connection between herself and John’s 
mother, a similarity that she does not want:  
I don't want to be a big ball of crazy, and I don't want to be unable to give Wanda 
something to look to. Like she is very smart and she's very aware and she's gonna 
pick things up very quickly. …I don't want her getting to the place where she 
can’t, I I don’t want her thinking that something not done perfectly isn't worth 
doing. And I don’t want her thinking that not being perfect makes her worthless. I 
don't want her not being able to, you know, get it out without breaking things or 
hurting herself. And I don’t want her seeing, and I don't want her being afraid of 
me, I don't want her being afraid of setting me off because half of what John does 
is just trying to damage control his mom. (lines 834-844) 
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The statement stands out as a powerful moment for a number of reasons. First, the 
client shifts from talking about other people to speaking for herself in relation to others. 
Almost every sentence in the utterance is started by “I don’t want.” By stating what she 
does not want there is a directness and clarity that is different from most of the previous 
session. Second, there is no sarcasm or wit. As a listener I did not hear that contemptuous 
edge that often accompanies her utterances. The statement feels forthright and honest, 
and in part this is because of the tone and the use of I statements. Last, as a listener I felt 
as if there was a different emotional resonance. Again, this has to do with the tone and 
the use of I statements, as well as the long dramatic pauses at the end of the utterance 
followed by a deep inhalation by the client. Analyzing the content of this utterance we 
see that the client is talking about what she does not want to be/be seen as. She does not 
want to be “a big ball of crazy” and have her daughter be “afraid of setting [her] off.” She 
does not want to show her daughter that the only way to deal with emotions is through 
“breaking things or hurting herself.” And most importantly, she doesn’t want her 
daughter to be “afraid of” her. 
Guilt, according to de Rivera, is structurally related to the emotion of “horror.” 
Both horror and guilt are “recognition” emotions. In a later article, de Rivera (1984) 
describes these emotions as having to do with social recognition. In every form of life 
“there are different roles that different persons are expected to play” and “with an 
awareness of the emotional relationships between people, one cannot avoid being struck 
by the way in which emotional dynamics maintain the system and the positions of the 
individuals within it” (p. 129). These are classified as recognition emotions. Hence, 
horror is the emotion we experience when we “pull back from another whom we cannot 
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recognize, another who is so distorted that we can no longer identify him as a member of 
our group” (de Rivera, 1977, p. 55). In guilt there is a similar sense of pulling back in 
order to create distance; however this is done in order to pull away from an aspect of 
ourselves that we no longer recognize. As de Rivera states:  
Just as in horror the person cannot recognize the other as the person he once was 
— cannot identify him as a member of the group — so in guilt the person cannot 
recognize himself. Paradoxically, this preserves the person’s identity as a member 
of the group. Think, for example, of a person who has committed some crime: if 
he experiences guilt do we not feel less horror than if he experiences nothing? (p. 
59)  
Hence, guilt effectively distances an undesirable aspect of oneself while also 
reinforcing the person’s identity as a member of the group. Here, the client describes 
herself as something unrecognizable: “a big ball of crazy” that her daughter might be 
“afraid of” or even worse, “look to” emulate. The basic elements of guilt as described by 
de Rivera are present. The utterance is primarily about being recognized as something 
undesirable. This is something the client herself recognizes, but also that she is concerned 
her daughter might recognize. However, this is not a description of a past event that she 
feels guilty about—this is what she wants for the future. The conventional understanding 
of guilt is that it concerns a past event and this raises doubt about the utterance being a 
transaction of guilt. Yet, when we look more closely we see that the client accounts for 
why she is not, at present, feeling guilty. Even though her daughter “is very smart 
and…she’s gonna pick things up very quickly,” she is still young and not aware of her 
mother’s behavior (lines 835-836). Hence, because the daughter is not old enough to 
recognize the client’s behavior as something horrible, then the client is able to postpone 
her guilt until the future. The utterance opens up the possibility of guilt at some future 
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point, while also rationalizing why she does not feel guilty now.53 This, combined with 
the other factors above, convey emotion and makes the utterance noteworthy in the 
context of the session. However, the evidence shows that this cannot be considered a full 
emotional transaction of guilt. 
  
                                                            
53 This is a circulation of figures used in S3 (lines 219-223) where she talks about having to stop 
mocking her daughter because she is "pretty…clever" and will soon understand. 
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sessions. He states that he “tend[s] ask a lot of questions” but then “we skip along very 
quickly” and he needs to try “slowing things down and seeing what’s there, reflecting, 
and that may involve some silence” (lines 855, 867-869). This is a circulation of figures 
from their previous discussion about silence and skipping along the surface. In both 
places the therapist formulates what he does and what the client does in response. Here 
and at important moments in the session we see the client being encouraged to be 
“reflective” and “curious” about herself.  
Through our analysis we have shown that being “curious” means using a 
hermeneutic strategy where one’s own actions, thoughts, and feelings become objects for 
the client to interpret. As we see in the door knob statement above, the client is thinking 
about herself as an emotional being, but still finds ways to avoid fully transacting 
emotion. Her relationship to her emotion is problematizing as the ethical substance that 
needs to be worked on in order to become an ethical subject during psychotherapy. This 
work is accomplished by using the hermeneutic of psychotherapy as a technology of self 
understanding that makes conscious the reasons why the client “skips” along the surface 
of her feelings. This is an ongoing project that requires, first and foremost, a curiosity 
about oneself as a deep emotional being. This constitutional process can be seen during 
the original problematizing of S1 as the therapist deepens the trouble, foregrounding both 
the client and her feelings in order shape the problem. In S3 we saw how conversational 
ambiguity can create many possible problems and act as a therapeutic resource. 
Throughout all the sequences we saw how both the client and the therapist constitute their 
roles by utilizing specific kinds of utterances (e.g. the client narrates personal experience 
and the therapist formulates shared experience that foregrounds the client), which 
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contribute to the unfolding constitutional strategy. Each utterance was shown to link 
together as action on action, creating a complex field of power. These tactics can now be 
understood as part of an overall strategy through which the client is constituted as a deep 
emotional being. 
 In the next chapter this analysis continues. The data occurs approximately 2 
weeks after session A. I will continue to demonstrate how the client is constituted as a 
deep emotional being; however, the next session, session B, needs to be understood as its 
own event. It is not an extension of session A, but another enactment of the practice of 
psychotherapy. Session A is part of the history of this practice and therefore it is 
contextually important. They are close relatives whose similarities are not due to shared 
universal features, but are instead formed through the tactical deployment of power 
within the same general strategy aimed at constituting the client as a deep emotional 
subject.  
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chapter 6 
 A DETAILED INTERACTION ANALYSIS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AS 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE: ANALYSIS OF SESSION B 
 
 
 
T: I wanted to pick up on something hmm that we talked about ahh last, 
last week.  
C: ((Looks away)) Okay. ((rolls eyes)) 
Topic Change Pre-request Sequence, 
Session B, Lines 25-26 
 
 
 
 
 
Overview 
Session B (SB) occurs about 2 weeks after session A and at least one session had 
transpired between the two sessions. We do not have access to any of the sessions 
between SA and SB; however in SB the therapist brings up an event that occurred in the 
previous session and he continually uses this event to constitute the therapeutic problem 
as personal and emotional. Hence, constitutional strategy in SB is the same as in SA. Yet, 
there are differences. In SB the client often problematizes herself as an emotional being. 
This differs from SA where the client often resisted this way of thinking about herself. In 
SB both the client and therapist constitute the problem as something emotional and 
personal; however this does not mean they talk about the problem in the same way, nor 
do they stop acting against one another in ways that are both explicit and implicit. Rather, 
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the problematizing becomes focused on how the client relates to her emotion and how 
this affects her relationships with other. Hence, in session A the participants 
problematized the location of the therapeutic concern, where as in session B they focus 
on how the client relates to the problem, which has been collaboratively understood as 
personal and emotional. As a listener, I found SB to be a very deep session that was filled 
with emotion. The analysis detailed in this chapter shows how this emotional depth is 
part of the constitutional strategy across both SA and SB.     
Opening Pre-Sequence 
At the beginning of the second session the client enters the room and sits down. 
She sits upright and faces the chair where the therapist is about to sit with her legs folded 
up so they do not dangle from the couch. The therapist then trails in quickly and sits as if 
in a hurry. Yet, prior to getting situated the client begins to speak. 
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openings useful in understanding the overall context of the conversation. For example, 
Sue Fisher (1986) analyzed medical doctors interactions with female patients who are 
seeking treatment for reproductive care (this included consultations about cervical cancer 
with oncologists as well as OB-GYN consultations). She found that most medical 
consultations were initiated by information requested by the doctor. This led the patient 
to provide information. All of this might seem like a benign everyday occurrence, but 
Fisher argued that this opening structure of the conversation was a product of the 
institutional power of the doctor. Fischer stated that: “Institutional authority is revealed in 
the structure of the discourse. It is the doctor who opens and closes the interaction…It is 
the doctor who asks the questions and initiates most of the topics” (p. 60). By starting off 
a consultation with a specific question the doctor limits the conversational choices of the 
patient. A question demands answers, and if the patient doesn’t provide an answer then 
this has to be accounted for. Therefore, most often patients provide the preferred 
response, which is an answer to the question at hand. She goes on to describe how this 
differs greatly from what we find in ordinary conversation. Studies have shown that 
“there is balanced participation” in ordinary conversation where the participants are of 
equal status (p. 64). This balanced participation is, however, “disrupted when one 
conversational partner has more status and power than the other” (p. 64). This ability to 
control the conversation is evidence of the asymmetrical power relations in medical 
practice. 
Psychotherapy is a type of medical practice, but one that differs from other types 
of care. This is evident in the conversational structure at the opening of this session. Here, 
the psychotherapist does not initiate the conversation. The client begins accounting for 
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her behavior before the therapist can even get settled down in his chair. At first we might 
see this as a stark contrast from the typical medical consultation as described above. We 
might applaud psychotherapy for its egalitarian construction. Even though this is a 
compelling and hopeful conclusion, it is, sadly, not the case. 
The client accounts for her tardiness because psychotherapy is a practice that has 
its roles and expectations, which provide a mutually understood context for both the 
therapist and client. Therapists often refer to these roles and expectations as the 
therapeutic frame (Gray, 2002). One of the expectations is that the client will be on time 
and so will the therapist. This differs greatly from medical consultations where doctors 
can routinely be late. This expectation is woven into the context of psychotherapy. The 
client begins to account for her tardiness before the therapist even sits down. She states: 
“John was my ride in and my alarm clock today” (excerpt 33, line 1). The utterance by 
itself makes little sense. Yet, the therapist does not ask what she means, he asks: “What 
happened?” (line 4). There is a presumption that something happened, presumably that 
something went wrong. The context of the psychotherapy session, and hence, the mutual 
understanding of timeliness is shared by both the therapist and the client. The ability to 
speak first does afford the client a certain amount of conversational freedom. Yet, the 
context of the conversation does affect what she will say. By not meeting the implicit and 
shared expectations she chooses to account for her tardiness, rather than bringing a past 
clinical material or talk about a crisis that she experienced since the last session. This is a 
demonstration of the institutional power of psychotherapy. From my experience as a 
therapist and as a client, I know that therapists often account for their own tardiness. 
These accounts might be different; however both the therapist and the client find it 
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necessary to explain their deviations from the therapeutic frame. Therefore, what we see 
here is institutional power being exercised through the context of psychotherapy, rather 
than being exercised through the conversational tactics of the therapist. From the outset 
the client re-constitutes her role by narrating personal experience for the therapist to be 
curious about and eventually formulate and interpret. 
Question and N1 (00:41). However, the opening sequence is more than just an 
account for the client’s tardiness, it also has the potential to affect the participants by 
enacting emotion. The beginning of Session-B is very similar to Session-A. The client 
begins with a pre-sequence gloss that tests if it is okay to begin a “trouble talk” (“we are 
not doing that again,” line 1). After the therapist ‘agrees’ (his question of interest, “what 
happened?” gives her permission to proceed) she launches into the first narrative of the 
session (N1). As discussed above, this occurs in response to being late. She is 
contemptuous, sarcastic, and entertaining as she tells the story. Her boyfriend is cast as 
self-centered and neglectful. He sets “the alarm clock for himself,” she says sharply (line 
5). And he didn’t call “until after 11,” and he offers the dopey excuse: “I thought the 
phone call would wake you up” (lines 16-17). Here, she enacts his speech using a 
melodic and spacey tone. Because of his self-centeredness and neglect, she reprimands 
him and says: “‘it doesn’t count’” (line 18). She places emphasis on the word count, 
saying that: “if you're waking me up when I'm supposed to be somewhere else….even if I 
would have answered the phone I still would've overslept and been late…So no, it does 
not work that way” (lines 18-22). The story is about being angry at her boyfriend for 
being self-centered and neglectful and causing her to be late. It depicts her moving 
against her boyfriend’s actions and arguing about what his behavior ought to be. 
 285 
 
However, by telling the story in therapy it becomes a discursive object of contempt. The 
story is put on display for the therapist and the client. Its purpose is not to change the 
boyfriend’s behavior, but to paint a picture of a neglectful self-centered boyfriend that 
both the client and the therapist can recognize.54 This narrative functions to shift 
responsibility from the client to her boyfriend. He is to blame for the client’s tardiness.  
This move can be seen as a preemptive defense on two fronts. First, it makes it 
difficult for the therapist to interpret her tardiness as resistance. If she is late because of 
somebody else, then her tardiness cannot be a symbolic act aimed at avoiding, defying, or 
denying issues currently being addressed in therapy. Second, the story acts as a defense 
against contempt. The client is eager to tell the therapist that it was her boyfriend who 
caused her to be late. She changes her cadence, acts out the different parts, speaks with 
irony and wit, and delivers her lines with a smile. She is entertaining and charming and 
her utterance can be interpreted as an attempt to get on the therapist’s ‘good side.’ 
Therefore, to defend against the therapist being contemptuous toward herself, she 
performs a narrative in order to form a contemptuous alignment (between herself and the 
therapist) against the boyfriend.  
This is an interesting dynamic that the Structural Theory of Emotion brings to 
light. Although emotional transactions might be distinct, emotional potentiality is diffuse. 
As you can see in the example above, the attempt to elicit emotion does not determine 
what emotion is transacted. The client attempts to bring the therapist towards her by 
getting him to align against the boyfriend. However, the therapist might become 
                                                            
54 Anger and contempt are structurally identical emotions, belonging to different dimensions (de 
Rivera, 1977). Therefore, the transformation we see here should come as no surprise. 
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contemptuous towards her defensive blaming of her boyfriend. He might see it as 
avoidance or as resistance. Furthermore, he might withdraw into boredom because of the 
client’s inability to talk about what seems therapeutically important and professionally 
interesting.  
Actually, the therapist says very little during the opening of the session. He does 
not inquire about the significance of her lateness as you might expect from a 
psychodynamic practitioner. At first this might seem odd. When clients show up late to 
sessions, this can be seen as a sign of resistance and interpreted (Vehviläinen, 2008). 
However, we soon find out that the therapist came into the session with an agenda and we 
see this clearly when he makes his first conversational move. 
Sequence 1 (S1) 
Pre-request (1:52). At line 22 the client makes a sudden topic change and tells the 
therapist that: I have a “frog…in the back of my throat” (excerpt 34, line 24). To this the 
therapist offers a one-word question: “Still?” (line 23). The question is interesting. We 
might see it as an empathetic gesture indicating how the therapist has a history with the 
client and remembers that she was sick. Hence, the topic change does what the 
contemptuous story could not: draws a response from the therapist that is neither 
contempt nor anger. Instead, the therapist offers a question that might be seen as intimate 
interest. 
Excerpt 34, Session B, Lines 20-26 
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provisional annoyed tone—are not disparate actions strung together, but parts of a whole 
emotional transformation. According to Gottman (2007), eye rolling is almost always 
associated with contempt. Hence, in response to the pre-request the client breaks her 
attempt to align with the therapist. Initially she wanted to bring the therapist closer, but 
now she wants to keep him at a distance. The therapist’s pre-request, along with the 
opening pre-sequence and narrative, are good examples of the actions on actions that the 
participants use in the practice of psychotherapy. Much like the beginning of SA, 
different tactics are used to change the positioning of the participants, as well as the 
characters that are discussed. However, during the opening of session B the tactics are 
more directly aimed at modifying the relationship between the participants. This contrasts 
with session A, where the tactics focused on locating the problem in the client, rather 
than John. 
Formulation (1:56): Contempt, Shame, and Discursive Defense. This might 
explain the tortured structure of the therapist’s formulation that follows the client’s 
begrudging permission to proceed. The first part of the utterance identifies the topic the 
therapist wants to talk about. He states: “You were talking about the coworker you 
had…” and then he pauses for a brief moment (excerpt 35, line 27). During the pause the 
client offers a strong acknowledgment token: “Yea” (line 28). This is important. As 
Liddicoat (2011) points out, there are typically two types of preconditions that must be in 
place in order for a pre-request sequence to be granted: the “availability of the requested 
object or ability of the person to carry out the request” (p. 168). Here the therapist is 
requesting permission to return to some previously discussed clinical material. This is the 
requested object. The clinical material is an object constituted by both the therapist and 
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and she responds with a strong acknowledgment token followed by a long elaboration 
that runs from lines 32 to 68. Immediately after her acknowledgment token she says: “it's 
a kind of thing that I have that keeps me from really making changes or confronting 
people” (lines 32-33) By stating “it’s” she creates an index, which points back to the 
therapist’s previous utterance. The index is most likely referencing the end of the 
therapist’s utterance where he ventriloquates the client stating: “you were like: ‘if I keep 
talking about this I’ll blame myself’” (lines 27-31). 
This ventriloquation also has an index (“about this”), which refers to the 
“coworker….difficulties” that the client was discussing during the previous session. The 
ventriloquation (and the entire formulation in which it is set) is complex because it 
involves 3 different temporal events: the present moment, the previous session, and an 
outside event (see Figure 18).57 The formulation is purposely uttered in the present-
moment as a temporal reference to the previous session. This is done by using the past 
tense turn initiator, “You were talking about…”. The ventriloquation invoked is from the 
past session as the turn initiator indicates. However, because the ventriloquation uses the 
index, “about this,” it simultaneously points to the previous session and the outside event. 
Hence, the ventriloquation points to all three temporal events. However, in the present 
conversation the outside event is less of a concern than the previous session where the 
event was discussed. It is there that something happened: a new event, shared between 
                                                            
57 We do not know whether the client was discussing an event or a series of events, but for 
simplicity I will refer to it as an event (the difficulties with her co-worker) that the client 
discussed in the previous session. Presumably, these “difficulties” occurred outside of therapy, at 
the client’s work. 
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runs through the remainder of the session. Regardless, the client has her own agenda. She 
avoids directly addressing the past session by making her own conversational path, which 
aligns with the previously discussed material, but creates distance between herself and 
the event indexed by the therapist. This begins with her initial response to the therapist 
formulation in lines 32 - 40. As mentioned before, she begins her turn with an 
acknowledgment token followed by the turn initiator, “Yea, it’s a kind of thing…” (line 
32). We have already discussed how this is an index pointing back to the previous 
utterance. We could simply see this as a demonstration of the basic collaborative nature 
of conversation (and psychotherapy) by highlighting how participants orient to each 
other’s turns. However, the client also uses this index to distance herself from the 
therapist’s utterance (and indexes). This is done by shifting the temporal frame from past 
tense to the simple present (see the lower portion of figure 18). The therapist’s 
formulation directly references the past session in various ways. The client, instead of 
directly addressing the past session by stating, “Yeah, I was…,” she shifts the temporal 
frame by using the simple present (”it’s…”). The simple-present-index points to a thing 
that exists as a matter-of-fact. As the tense implies, the thing’s existence is temporally 
infinite—it has always, and will always, exist. Although she is still referencing the 
previous utterance (and we can assume that she is discussing something that is relevant to 
the previous event), her subtle move allows her to distance herself from the events of the 
last session. 
The client’s elaboration continues with her discussing “a kind of a thing.” This 
implies that we are dealing with an object that is of a certain class or category. This type 
of thing is quite problematic it seems. She describes how it affects the way she interacts 
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with people and keeps her from “really making changes” in her life. She states: “It’s a 
kind of a thing that I have that keeps me from really making changes or confronting 
people because I go (makes noise shrrrch and points away from her head), ‘you are 
probably overreacting. You're being an ass, you’re not acknowledging your fault in this’” 
(lines  32-36). Interestingly, she begins by linking the thing to her behavior. The thing has 
the power to “keep [her] from making…changes or confronting people.” Initially, it 
seems like she is going to clearly explain how the thing goes about affecting her behavior 
with the remainder of her utterance. She uses a subordinate conjunction (“because”) to 
connect the first and second clauses of her utterance. By using “because” the client 
indicates a causal relationship. Therefore, it seems likely that the client will use her 
utterance to establish a simple causal relationship between the thing and the content of 
the subordinate clause. However, after using the causal conjunction she states “I go…” 
and then launches into a series of non-verbal gestures and third person statements (see 
lines 35-38). In and of itself the “I go” combination is unremarkable and it can be easily 
overlooked. However, upon further examination we see that this marks a shift from 
object to subject, which complicates and confuses the simple causal relationship that we 
might expect. 
Immediately after the client indicates that the action in the subordinate clause 
comes from her ( “…because I go…”) rather than the thing, she holds her hand to her 
head with her finger pointing toward the ceiling. Then she quickly rotates her hand 
forward and ends with her finger pointing outward. While she performs this gesture she 
looks away from the therapist following the line of her finger and makes a loud clicking 
sound with her mouth. It sounds like a soda can opening. It speaks of immediacy and 
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force: something that catches her attention, but in a routine, mechanical way. She uses 
this sound and gesture to punctuate each of her statements. Eventually she drops the 
sound, but continues to punctuate with the gesture until line 40. Although the dependent 
clause ends at line 35, its content is extended and developed by the series of statements 
that follow. The statements are bound together by the continuation of the gestures and the 
grammatical similarity (see excerpt 3). After the initial gesture at line 33, the client 
finishes the dependent clause by stating: “‘You are probably overreacting.’” While 
watching the session, this comes across as a third person statement and this initial 
impression was reinforced upon a closer examination of the utterance. The entire 
utterance is self directed. This began with her description of the problem as a “kind of a 
thing that I have…”. This self-direction was continued with the subjective action 
statement “I go…,” which set up the third person reference. Hence, the “I go” functions 
in the same manner as ‘I say.’ It is used here as a simple-present transitive verb that is 
commonly used to introduce oral speech or narration (Go, n.d.). Because there is a 
continuation of the simple-present, this statement cannot be viewed as reenacted speech. 
It occurs as a matter-of-fact outside of any specific instance because it is infinite by 
definition.  
The question that confronts us is: why does this utterance arise now? Why does 
the client move away from the therapist’s initial formulation and introduce a different 
temporal order, which bypasses the shared event that the therapist was trying to discuss? 
Is this a defensive operation? Is it an ingenious strategy to avoid discussing the past 
session because she finds it anxiety provoking or disturbing? Or is it something else all 
together? I argue that with her utterance the client is attempting to grasp the emotion (the 
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phenomenon) of shame. According to the Structural Theory of Emotion (STE), emotions 
are interpersonal phenomena, which always have a directional movement that extends or 
constricts the psychological space between self and other or subject and object (de 
Rivera, 1977). The object or subject of the emotion can be either explicit or implicit. 
Meaning that emotions can be directed toward real individuals in the present moment or 
they can be directed towards oneself. In the latter, the individual who manifests the 
emotion is both the subject and the object. In this case, either the subject or the object is 
typically implicit. 
According to de Rivera, shame is a “me” emotion where the individual is both the 
subject and object. In the case of shame, the movement originates from an implicit object 
that is contemptuous towards the subject. This creates distance between the object and 
subject and can often look like a retreat or withdrawal on the part of the subject. 
Furthermore, shame is part of the recognition dimension of emotion. According to de 
Rivera, recognition emotions arise in relation to how we are seen by others. In the case of 
shame, the implicit other (object) sees the individual acting inappropriately. In other 
words, the experience is that of being viewed as not in line with the values held by the 
other.  
When we look at the utterance, we see a series of third person contemptuous 
statements directed toward the client. The other here is implicit. As we have established, 
the client’s utterance does not directly address the event of the previous session nor 
“difficulties” with her coworker that occurred outside of therapy. By changing the 
temporal order the client indexes these events, but avoids specifics. Hence, the simple-
present tense allows for the creation of an implicit, no-one-in-particular-other who stands 
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outside of time. This lends some needed clarity to our analysis. The troublesome 
complexity caused by switching from object-initiated-action to subjective-action can now 
be seen as an attempt to grasp the interpersonal relationship of shame.59 
However, enacting shame through discourse is not the same as experiencing 
shame. We have all experienced shame at some point in our lives. For example, imagine 
standing in front of a store clerk with a line of people waiting to check out behind you. 
As you swipe your credit card the store clerk waits patiently and then turns to you 
sheepishly and says, “It was denied, I am sorry.” Now, you know you pay off your 
balance every month and you are currently up-to-date. “There must be some mistake,” 
you protest as you swipe your card one more time. Yet, it is all in vain as the cashier tells 
you again, “Sorry, declined.” During this entire process you feel as if everyone in the 
entire store knows that you are broke. That you are some lowlife that can’t pay off his 
credit cards. Now, no one is saying this to you directly. If you pay close attention you 
will see that anyone within hearing range is looking away and avoiding eye contact. Even 
the cashier who could be contemptuous only sheepishly informs you that there is a 
problem. She does everything she can to look away and not make the problem worse. 
And even though you know that you are fully employed and financially responsible there 
is an experience of recognition. You feel ashamed in that moment. In that moment you 
do not get angry at the cashier or the credit card company. Instead you retreat. You pull 
away and try to get out of the situation as quickly as possible. 
                                                            
59 De Riviera (1984) explains that “me” emotions have the same structural components as 
emotions which are explicitly interpersonal and he speculates that these emotions originate out of 
interpersonal experiences where the implicit other becomes internalized. Hence, even though 
these emotions are self -originated and self-directed they are still considered interpersonal 
phenomena. 
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What we see in the client’s utterance is very different from shame itself. She is 
talking about shame, rather than feeling ashamed. What we call the experience or 
“transaction” of shame only occurs when there is a movement—a distancing between 
subject and object—along with an instruction to change the interpersonal situation (p. 
41). Here, there is no distancing indicative of shame, nor is there a transformation of the 
client’s world or object relations (at least not yet anyway). Rather, shame has been 
transformed into an object via the discourse. It is a discursive object that both participants 
can orient to and use in whatever way seems appropriate and adventitious. In many ways, 
we are seeing something quite remarkable happening. The client is able to bring about an 
emotion that is often difficult and troublesome, yet renders it innocuous. The discursive 
move allows her to talk about shame without becoming emotionally involved. Hence, she 
is able to treat this very real and powerful emotion as an abstraction. This ability to 
transform difficult emotional experiences into innocuous abstractions is indicative of 
intellectualization—a common defense mechanism found in the psychodynamic literature 
(Gabbard, 2005; McWilliams, 1994). 
With this phenomenon in view can we answer why this arises at this point in the 
therapeutic conversation? One possible explanation is that the therapist’s formulation 
oriented the client toward an emotion laden event. Feeling compelled to take her turn she 
chose (quite unconsciously I would argue) to shield herself from the onset of emotion by 
creating an intellectualizing temporal shift that could convert the event into a discursive 
object. We are at a disadvantage because we do not have access to the event that the 
therapist brings up with this formulation. This is one of those cases where the research 
participants are formulating their turns based off of previously shared experiences that the 
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researchers are blind to. However, remember that the formulation and response make up 
an adjacency pair.60 Therefore, the therapist’s formulation at line 27 and the client’s 
response makeup a concrete conversational unit. If our hypothesis is right, and the client 
is addressing shame in her response, then we would expect to see some evidence that the 
emotion was introduced in the therapist’s formulation. 
As we have discussed, the therapist begins his utterance by referring back to the 
previous session and offering an account about how the client was “talking about… all 
the…difficulties” she had with her coworker (line 30). Interestingly, the formulation is 
delivered as a sort of truncated narrative that has its own temporal order. In other words, 
the formulation is like a story that unfolds over time. He starts off by saying “you were 
talking about the coworker you had…and you said after kind of…talking about…all the 
difficulties you have had with her, you were like: ‘if I keep talking about this I’ll blame 
myself’” (lines 27-31). By using the word “after” he implies that a certain amount of time 
had passed. The implication is that the client was initially commenting or narrating about 
a coworker conflict, mostly likely issuing complaints toward the coworker. This 
movement toward the coworker changes in the latter half of the therapist’s utterance. 
After indicating that some time had passed, the therapist ventriloquates the client’s 
speech saying: “‘if I keep talking about this I’ll blame myself.’” This ventriloquation 
indicates a directional movement away from the coworker. The client is no longer 
                                                            
60 Recall that the adjacency pair has become the fundamental building block of CA's empirical 
methodology. Each conversational sequence can be broken down into a series of adjacency pairs 
that continually show how the participants are orienting to previous utterances. This discovery is 
exactly what Austin (1962) spoke of when he said that utterances require a sequel or response. 
Require is the key word because participants have to give some kind of response or end up having 
to make excuses for why they changed the subject or did not respond at all. See chapter 3 for 
more details. 
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addressing her complaints toward the coworker; rather, she is on the verge of blaming 
herself— of directing her complaints inward. Hence, the formulation tells the story of an 
emotional event. A transformation had occurred. The client initially focuses her attention 
on her coworker. Following STE, this movement toward the co-worker is in line with 
transactions of anger and contempt.61 In the latter half of the formulation, the client 
blames herself. This inward movement is in line with feeling ashamed. 
Therefore, the therapist’s formulation introduces an emotional event that the 
client must address. Formulations project agreement and make it difficult for the client to 
offer a dis-preferred response, such as disagreeing with the therapist. It is hard enough to 
disagree with a formulation when the therapist is simply summarizing what was 
previously said. However, when the formulation includes reproduced speech, 
disagreement becomes even more complicated and possibly confrontational. If the client 
wholesale disagreed with the formulation she would be calling into question the integrity 
or competence of the therapist. “No, I never said that! Did you not listen to a thing I 
said?” This could have been the client’s response. A clear disagreement and a clear 
transformation of the situation. In this alternate response the client moves against the 
therapist by challenging how he ought to behave. According to de Rivera (1977), anger 
arises in a situation where “the others’ behavior constitutes a challenge to what a person 
believes ought to exist” (p. 78). Ultimately, oughts “have the same status as a belief in 
what is real” (p. 79). Therefore, the imagined response from above would be a challenge 
                                                            
61 In anger, we challenge the other for acting inappropriately and creating “difficulties.” In 
contempt, we recognize the other as not upholding the important values of our society. 
Furthermore, we recognize them as someone we would not want to be. If we acted in such a 
manner, we would feel ashamed. 
 300 
 
directed at what transpired in the previous session and what a therapist ought to be (i.e. a 
good, curious listener who remembers). However, it would be difficult for the client to 
respond in such a way. Even in normal conversation disagreements are dis-preferred and 
rare (Sacks, 1987; ten Have, 1999). In institutional conversations where there are power 
differences, such as between patients and doctors, disagreement is even rarer (Fisher, 
1986). Although psychotherapy differs greatly from medical interviews, therapists have a 
unique authority making disagreement difficult (Bartesaghi, 2004). Clients rarely flat out 
disagree with therapists. Rather, they resist the therapist utterances by distancing 
themselves from what the therapist has said (Lepper & Mergenthaler, 2007; Peräkylä, 
2005; Saladin & Grimmer, 2009; Vehviläinen, 2008; Viklund et al., 2010). Conversation 
analysis is very good at distinguishing the subtleties of resistance, yet they are unable to 
explain why this resistance occurs. By examining utterances in terms of emotions, we can 
see disagreement as the emotional transaction of anger. By disagreeing we challenge the 
other. De Rivera states: 
The other is seriously acting as though what he thinks ought to exist is reality, and 
this differs from what the person asserts ought to exist. Since….only one of the 
oughts can be correct, there is a real conflict of wills where one may win or lose; 
the contenders occupy the same “reality space” and one must leave. (p. 82) 
Anger can be risky because the challenge could lead to a rupture. Instead of 
transforming situations as intended, the transaction of anger could lead to the withdrawal 
of the other, creating interpersonal distance and individual isolation. Or, the other could 
erupt in anger and contempt. Possibly, the individual is not prepared or capable of 
withstanding this kind of assault and fears having to withdraw in shame or dreaded 
rejection. Ultimately, anger is to be avoided and this is why disagreement is a dis-
preferred response in conversation. 
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So if the client would prefer not to disagree, then what other options are at her 
disposal? She could simply address the event that the therapist indexes in his formulation. 
In most situations this might prove to be the best option. However, here, the event is an 
emotional transaction. By directly referencing the event the client puts herself in risk of 
re-experiencing the transaction of shame as implied by the therapist’s formulation: “if I 
keep talking about this I’ll blame myself”. For some clients this might not be a problem, 
but for this client emotions have been constituted as problematic. This is addressed in the 
previous session and can be seen as the central problem being constituted across the two 
sessions of our dataset. Hence, the client finds herself in a difficult position. She has to 
make a response. By not responding the client would be breaking the conversational 
structure and normative expectations (Sacks, 1987, 1989; Schegloff et al., 1977; ten 
Have, 1999). This possibly could lead into a present moment transaction of shame (or 
embarrassment). Yet, most of her responses might also lead to an emotional transaction. 
Therefore, she performs a brilliant, defensive operation. She transforms the emotional 
transaction into a discursive object. This creates distance between herself and the emotion 
and allows her and the therapist to manipulate the object and not get their hands too dirty. 
This extinguishing of a potential emotional transaction has its own affective resonance. 
Perceivable on the recording, she responds with a mix of excitement and, what might be 
described, as the dead, flatness of objectification.  
According to Ego Psychology, defense mechanisms affect our behavior and create 
a “compromise formation” (Gabbard, 2005, p. 33). A deal is made between the desire of 
the Id and the defenses of the Ego. The resulting defensive behavior is an amalgam of the 
two movements—a dynamically motivated expression. The client’s response is similar. 
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Although she defends against directly experiencing emotion, she still addresses the 
emotion implied in the therapist’s formulation. This is done in a way that identifies the 
problem as her own. Unlike SA, the client starts off thinking about the problem as 
something personal. Furthermore, I have shown that she also constitutes the problem as 
something emotional, i.e. shame. However, she uses tactics that contain this emotion in 
generalities and therefore avoids enacting the emotion in the here-and-now. Hence, the 
move maintains her general prohibition against experiencing emotion, while still 
constituting herself as an emotional being.  
Topical change (2:34): Parallel parking. At line 40, the client begins to finish her 
turn, bringing her description of shame to a close. She finishes by exclaiming, “this, and 
this, and this, and this and this” to indicate the relentless criticisms that are used against 
her. As she speaks the last “this” she briefly looks away from the therapist. With her gaze 
broken, the therapist takes a moment for himself. He gently scratches his eye, diverting 
his attention away from the client and the therapeutic encounter. At that precise moment, 
the client redirects her gaze back at the therapist, but there is a instant where her gaze is 
unmet. She then continues her turn, but shifts her delivery and uses a humorous and 
playful tone. She says: “I’m convinced that if I get upset or if I let that feeling be known 
I’m going to be wrong and an [with a brief pause she turns to the therapist with a playful 
look and says] asshole. And I really don’t want that” (lines 42-43). At this point she looks 
away again and states that: “this is enough to normally keep me pretty angry on the inside 
and nowhere else” (lines 45-46). This last statement is again delivered with a smile while 
gazing at the therapist. The therapist returns her gaze, but not her humor. He is stoic. She 
then looks away as she offers a few process tokens (umm yea) and then falls into a long 
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pause. Watching the tape I felt like this was a sincere and deep moment. It stands out 
because of the tone change. Furthermore, the explicit reference to anger is something that 
we have not found in the client’s speech. In session A, the client directly refers to herself 
as angry only 3 times (SAS3, lines 287, 403, and 412) and in each instance she qualifies 
this with some variation of: “I guess it is anger.” Here, the poetic description of anger “on 
the inside and nowhere else” grabs the listener’s attention as the client continues 
constituting herself as a kind of person who has anger “on the inside.” She is a kind of 
subject that has internal and personal emotions that can be understood in a way that 
constitutes her as an ethical subject. The intuitive deepness of this moment is a grasping 
of this constitutional process, shaping the client as an emotional subject. However, this 
moment is short lived. 
Question (4:14). Quickly the client launches into a long story about how being an 
asshole keeps her from doing all sorts of things such as parallel parking (see transcript). 
The entire story is delivered like a scene out of a play. The client acts out the different 
parts, dramatically delivering self-deprecating jokes at her own expense.62 The story runs 
from lines 51 to 68 (see transcript). The client talks about how she has difficulty parking 
                                                            
62 Watching this I could not help but feel like the client was trying to quickly move away from 
the more sincere reflective moments by performing a sarcastic comedy directed at herself. Her 
long story about parallel parking is a prime example. However, when we examine the transcript 
we see that the story is introduced through a pre-sequence at lines 48 through 49. The client states 
that: “Feeling like an asshole…it’s very good at…stopping me from doing all kinds of things. It is 
why I do not parallel park in traffic” (line 46-49, see excerpt 35). As she delivers this utterance 
the therapist looks at her with a playful and somewhat overly curious look. We can view the 
client’s utterance as a veiled request to deliver a more expanded story about her problems of 
parallel parking. The simple acknowledgment token paired with his playful look at line 50 gives 
permission to proceed with the story. Therefore, the client did not simply force the story onto the 
therapist. Even if we see the story as a defensive moving away from the more emotional and 
reflective moments that preceded it, we have to recognize that it was brought into the session 
through an interpersonal exchange where permission was granted. 
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when there’s traffic around, but how she is actually a very good parallel parker otherwise. 
This evolves into her other driving habits, all of which seem to be related to a general 
nervousness about driving. At line 69, the therapist asks: “And this would be something 
to do with not wanting to feel like an asshole?” This question is more than simply an 
attempt to elicit information. Adams (1997) has shown how questions can be used as 
therapeutic interventions. Here the therapist is using his turn to ask a question that 
redirects the client back to the topic of “feeling like an asshole.” 
The question at line 69 does more than refocus the client on a certain aspect of her 
speech, it also reserves an interactional slot that the therapist uses to insert the first 
interpretation of the session. Much like the beginning of the session, the therapist uses his 
question tactically. Previously, he used a question to express empathy and to reserve an 
interactional slot to bring up past clinical material for discussion. The question acts as an 
intervention, but also reserves an interactional slot, which the therapist then uses to make 
an interpretation.  
Interpretation S1 (4:30). At first glance the interpretation offered by the therapist 
seems completely unrelated to the majority of the client’s extended response, or the 
answer to his more immediate question. The therapist goes right back to talking about the 
previous session where they discussed the client’s relationship with one of her coworkers. 
However, the therapist does tie his interpretation to the client’s previous utterances by 
circulating one of the most significant figures of speech that was used. He carries over the 
word “asshole” and incorporates it into his interpretation: “What I kinda noticed with 
your story about your co-worker [is] for the first part of it she was the asshole…and then 
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client feared would arise during the telling of the story. Therefore, her fear of self-blame 
arose in the present moment of the previous session. 
With the interpretation we see something similar. Here the therapist refers to the 
temporal dimension of the story-telling that occurred previously. He says that in the “first 
part” of the story the coworker was the asshole and then if the client thought about the 
story too long she would become the asshole. However, in the interpretation the therapist 
made an important shift. Instead of talking about self blame and ambiguous “difficulties,” 
he labels the coworker using the pejorative noun— asshole. By stating that the coworker 
was the asshole the therapist gives her an identity with a negative connotation. Then he 
creates a one-to-one correspondence between the coworker of the story and the client’s 
experience during her telling of the story. The interpretive utterance is a shift towards 
identity, both of the coworker and the client. It also constitutes a similarity of kind 
between the client and coworker because they can both be identified by using the same 
pejorative. Yet, it is still unclear what it means to be an asshole? If we look at the client’s 
previous utterances we see that she described herself as an asshole over and over again 
when she makes a complaint about another person’s behavior or when she 
inconveniences others. However, what an asshole is to the client and how it relates back 
to the previous clinical material is still uncertain and remains a task to be worked out in 
the clinical discourse. 
Interpretive 3rd turn (5:11). Yet, this will have to wait because initially the client 
rejects the therapist’s interpretation. She initiates the turn by stating: “I don’t think” (line 
76). However, she abruptly cuts off the end of the statement and then changes to an 
extremely qualified acknowledgment token (“ah, I feel like ya, I feel like”), which leads 
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into an elaboration of how she sees the problem. She states: “I feel like if I…put it out 
there, that I'm an asshole” (line 76). While saying this she lifts both her arms up and 
moves them outward in front of her. By saying “put it out there” the client indexes anger. 
This becomes clear when we look back to where she first introduced the word asshole at 
line 43. There she stated: “I’m convinced that if I get upset or if I let that feeling be 
known I’m going to be wrong and an asshole.” This was her response to the therapist’s 
initial formulation. Furthermore, “put it out there” is a spacial reference. In order to put 
something out it has to first reside inside. This inside/outside dichotomy was established 
by the client when she quietly reflected how she is “angry on the inside and nowhere 
else” (line 45-46). 
Consistently, the client uses her utterances to describe the problem as a general 
phenomenon that is ever-present. Yet, the therapist uses his talk to address a specific 
moment that occurred in therapy. He is focused on how she began by talking about her 
coworker as the asshole and then during the retelling she felt like she might become the 
asshole. Although they both describe a similar process, they continually use different 
temporal dimensions to talk about the problem. 
After this the client elaborates further by bringing in past clinical material about a 
dream. She closes her eyes and gestures wildly while stating: “Umm if I, if I snap then it, 
then perspective change, and you know, a paradigm shift kinda thing and now I'm the 
asshole” (lines 76-77). Then her speech quickens. She begins snapping her fingers as if 
something important and relevant just dawned upon her. She finally says: “Sort of 
like…the dream I was talking about” (lines 78-79). The last part of the utterance is said 
slowly. She looks at the therapist and points towards him and he nods. The utterance and 
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the non-verbal gestures give permission to continue and serves as an acknowledgment of 
past shared experience (the therapist remembers the dream). When the therapist nods at 
line 80 he does so prior to any description of the dream. She goes on to describe the 
dream stating: “where I yelled at John’s mother, and they all went to her, like THAT, that 
is what happens in my head. It is like the second I say something back, or the second I am 
like, ‘you need to stop this,’ then—ya” (lines 79-83). As she begins to describe the dream 
the therapist offers an acknowledgment token after which the client’s speech speeds up 
slightly as she becomes more animated. Her gloss of the dream is short and succinct. She 
describes yelling at her boyfriend’s mother, causing them all to go to her side. She then 
connects the dream to what happens ‘in her head’ the second she says something back or 
tells someone that they need to stop. This is another complex construction. The client 
takes the dream experience, where she was in a social situation with an unknown number 
of other individuals, and then uses this to describe what happens in her head. By using the 
dream to demonstrate what happens in her head the client uses material that is familiar to 
both her and the therapist. This familiarity increases the persuasive power of her 
utterance. Furthermore, she utilizes preferred clinical material such as a dream to 
elaborate her understanding of the problem. 
After the client’s elaboration the therapist makes an interpretive third turn. The 
therapist begins by using the neutral epistemic marker “it sounds like” (line 84). He has 
used this phrase previously to mark interpretations. There is a familiarity to the 
construction of the interpretation, but here he introduces some new content. He states: “It 
sounds like you…move between…being the victim of other people being an asshole, and 
then you being the asshole, and then all the sudden being the victim like the dream” (lines 
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84-87). Up to this point there has been no discussion of “being the victim”. Yet, the 
therapist uses it to describe the client’s position relative to the actions of others whether 
they be real or imagined. Earlier, the therapist used his interpretation to create a 
correspondence between the client and her coworker. Her coworker was the asshole and 
the client was becoming an asshole. Here the relationships are becoming more complex. 
When other people are being assholes then the client is “being the victim”, which leads 
the client to be an “asshole” and then she returns back to the position of “the victim”. 
This last stage of victimization is different. It is like “the dream” where the client 
becomes the victim of other peoples’ disapproval rather than their anger. These complex 
interpersonal relationships are being constituted in this interpretation and throughout S1. 
In this last interpretation the therapist utilizes not only the client’s most immediate speech 
— by referring to the dream and using it to elaborate his interpretation — but also 
continues to circulate the figure of “being an asshole,” which was introduced by the 
client and has become an important part of this session. 
For S1, I have chosen to include the elaboration and interpretive 3rd because it 
powerfully expands on the constitutional work across the sequence. The interpretive 
ending of S1 continues to problematize the client as an emotional being. Her problems 
are found in her own personal experience of what she feels when she gets angry. The 
interpretation expands this personal experience to involve comparisons with others. As 
was shown above, the emotional transaction that was brought forward by the therapist’s 
initial formulation was a movement from anger and contempt to shame. This movement 
is used to structure the interpretation, the elaboration, and the interpretative 3rd. These all 
rely on the transformation of the modes of distancing. Meaning, that in anger you move 
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against the other, in contempt the other retreats from your critical gaze, and in shame you 
retreat from the other’s critical gaze. Hence, these emotional movements are used by the 
client to pull in the dream that she shared with the therapist. The dream has the same 
kinds of emotional shifts as the formulation and hence the dream becomes a well 
designed tool that can be used to understand herself as an emotional being. This is 
reinforced by the therapist’s interpretive 3rd, which again relies on the same emotional 
transformations. Hence, S1 demonstrates how problematizing the client as an emotional 
being allows for an increased scope of collaboration. Diverse material such as co-worker 
difficulties and dreams can be identified and utilized by the participants as relevant and 
creative associations that constitute the client as a deep reservoir of emotion that needs to 
be understood in order for her to become a more conscious and ethical being.  
Sequence 2 (S2) 
S2 is a short sequence where we see a more explicit display of resistance in the 
form of topic changes and disagreement responses (see the basic conversational structure 
below). After the first part of the therapist’s interpretative 3rd turn, the client gives a 
strong acknowledgment token. This is offered right after the therapist pauses for a brief 
moment, opens his hands, nods and says “being an asshole”(line 86, see excerpt 36). The 
strong agreement token offered by the client projects agreement with the idea that she is 
the victim of other peoples “being an asshole”. Yet, once the therapist finishes the 
interpretation she offers a weaker agreement token and then begins to elaborate her 
disagreement with the interpretation. She states: “it’s not like there….is a victim…[to] 
my bad driving, there is no victim to my bad driving, I just feel like a stupid ass” (lines 
88-89). Hence, the client resists the therapist’s interpretation by bringing in previously 
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Question (5:40). The therapist uses his next turn to ask: “What comes to mind 
when you think of the word asshole?” (line 93). As a therapist, I recognize this as a free 
association question. Empirically we can say the question selects the word “asshole” out 
of the previous material and leaves behind the recent topic of victimization (given the 
resistance that this topic engendered, it was probably a good move). Hence the question 
initiates a slight topic change and leads into some interesting moments. First, the client 
says that an asshole is “not a good thing,” someone that “doesn’t have their shit together” 
(lines 94-95). Yet, she says her co-worker is “profoundly worse” than an asshole, she is 
“a tire fire. Just noxious and nasty and serves absolutely no purpose but to give 
people..cancer…she is not an asshole” (lines 116-118). She then makes a topic change 
and begins to talk about how to time the traffic lights just right so you don’t hit any red 
lights. And last, she ends the utterance by again trying to define what asshole means in 
general. 
Interpretation (S2) 8:44. The therapist then uses a familiar two-part interpretive 
sequence, beginning with a speculative assertion and ending with an interpretation. As we 
have seen in session A, he uses this sequence to focus the talk on the client, rather than 
the co-worker or timing traffic lights. He asks: “I’m wondering what that word meant, 
what meaning it has for you?” (excerpt 37, line 128). To this the client shakes her hands 
around in confusion, which allows the therapist to interpret: “Cause I was wondering if 
you’re feeling that way, it brings up a lot?” (line 130). This ends S2 and on a whole the 
sequence was less eventfully than S1. However, the circulation of “asshole” is important 
as we shall see in S3. Furthermore, the explicit resistance displayed in S2, leads into a 
rare emotional transaction between the client and the therapist at the beginning of S3.   
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client’s utterance is powerful because it is a subtle transaction of anger. The client gets 
angry at the therapist in this moment and challenges the direction of his question. This 
can be seen in the subtle confrontational language she uses along with the change in tone 
and rate of speech. Furthermore, the client’s utterance forces the therapist to abandon his 
position and approach the subject in a different way. Although subtle and fleeting, this is 
a moment where there is an emotional transaction between the client and therapist. 
Furthermore, it is the emotion — anger — which has been a subject of conversation 
across the two sessions of the dataset. It is an emotion that the client struggles to 
experience and even define. And yet, we see it manifesting here in a way that seems 
appropriate. The questioning by the therapist during this small section does feel like 
badgering at times. She forces a topic change with her anger and in response both the 
therapist and client refocus the problematizing on the client’s emotions.   
Formulation (9:11). In response to the client’s subtle anger the therapist asks that 
they go “back to the story… and what happened last session” (see transcript, line 137). 
He then offers a formulation of what occurred during the last session. The formulation 
occurs in two parts. In the first, he states: “you were talking about this woman who is 
worse than an asshole” and then opens up his hands (line 138). At this point she offers a 
strong agreement token that stands out because of the up and down tone changes as she 
says “↑Oh ↓Ya” (line 140). On the one hand, the strong agreement token seems to give 
the therapist permission to proceed and he finishes the formulation by saying: “but 
then…something happened” (line 141). However, this strong agreement token also 
contrasts with the previous transaction of anger. This indicates that the shift the therapist 
made was appropriate and accepted. De Riviera might say that this is the coming back 
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together after the distancing that was created during the subtle anger of the previous 
exchange. Possibly this renewed closeness contributes to the emotionality of the next 
section. What follows from this point is a long elaboration where the client talks about 
subject matter that should be painful (see conversational structure below). Watching the 
tape this section feels more emotional than any other section in this dataset. However, 
there are no clear transactions of emotion. Hence, as we walk through this section of the 
session we have to attend to the subtleties of tone, content, and non-verbal ques, in order 
to assess why this section feels so deep and emotionally laden. 
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Rejection trouble talk (9:11-15:33). The client begins her elaboration (on the 
therapist’s formulation) with the turn indicator “And then” which makes the utterance 
feel like it’s a continuation of what has previously been said (excerpt 38, line 142). It is 
not an extension per se, but the turn indicator does reinforce this new alignment that has 
occurred after the subtle anger expressed earlier. She continues by saying: “I always feel 
like if I get upset, if I say something back, I always worry that I’m…overly sensitive” 
(lines 142-143). Notice that again she does not talk about the event in therapy that the 
therapist is referring to in his formulation. Like before, she changes the temporal 
dimension and refers to this in the continuous present. This is something she “always 
feel[s] like” (line 142). However, here she refers to another event(s) that causes her to 
think she is “overly sensitive.” She does not indicate what this event was and instead 
hints that there is a story behind her feelings (“Probably because I've been told I'm overly 
sensitive,” lines 143-144). This is another gloss used to assess whether it is okay to 
transition into a trouble talk sequence. The therapist recognizes this and quickly asks: 
“Who said it?” (line 146, 9;47). And this leads into a powerful commentary on how her 
parents were dismissive of her difficulties when she was being abused during junior high 
and high school. 
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incongruent laughter ( e.g. “… it’s not funny…((laugh)…” at line 153), intonation 
changes, and sharply emphasized words. She ventriloquates him mocking her saying: 
“He got upset with me for being sullen. He was like, ‘Ooh so moody, ooh so 
melodramatic, ooh leave me alone’” (lines 148-151). She follows this by saying that: “it's 
not funny if the joke is me” and goes to describe herself as the “punchline” of his jokes 
(lines 152-153). At the end of this utterance her tone changes. Her speech is softer as she 
drops the sharp accentuations and instead starts to draw out her vowels. She says, “So 
there is that….Ya that always sucks by the way, it always sucks” (lines 153-154). This is 
another gloss. It has two indexes “that” and “it”, which point back to the mocking 
interaction between herself and her father. Yet, instead of simply nodding the therapist 
asks: “What always sucks?” (lines 155-156). This should not be seen as a call for clarity; 
rather it is an invitation to expand on the emotionality of the “it always sucks” gloss. 
The client responds to the therapist’s question without sarcasm. She speaks 
directly at first and incorporates long pauses that we have not seen previously. She states: 
“He never got why I didn't think it was funny, he just thought it was more of the same. 
(7) And so asking someone to stop becomes fodder for it to keep happening.63 (3) And 
that su(h)cks ((looks a therapist and squints))” (lines 157-159). When she says “sucks” 
there is a breathy, slightly broken quality, as if the emotion of the utterance impaired her 
ability to say the word. This moment is followed by a few words, a deep breath and 6 
seconds of silence. It is a short moment that could easily be abandoned. However, the 
client chooses to do something novel. Similar to a what we saw in session A, the client 
                                                            
63 Here, as a therapist, I can't help but hear the parallel to the "abusive relationships" mention 
previously. The inability to stop someone from continually abusing you is a common theme, 
especially the idea that "asking someone to stop just becomes fodder for it to keep happening." 
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turns her attention on the therapist and asks: “What?” (line 160). Then using an endearing 
tone she offers a noticing: “Ahh, you have the furrowed eyebrows” (line 160). This is 
quickly followed by a series of apologies and dismissals. She states: “I am sorry, I have a 
hard, it is not, nothing, it is nothing” (lines 161-163). To this the therapist asks: “What are 
you apologizing about?” (line 164, 11:16). She responds with a clear confident 
declarative statement: “For making it about you.” She then moves to a more humorous 
tone and offers a ventriloquation of herself saying: “‘hey, let’s talk about what your face 
is doing’” (line 165). She ends by stating: “I don’t exactly know how to handle 
compassion or…complements, or attempts at understanding, it just feels sort of foreign 
and weird to me” (lines 166-168). 
This is a complex interaction where something new happens. It has many facets 
so let’s begin by breaking it down piece by piece. First, as we discussed previously the 
client is the object of interpretation during psychotherapy, meaning that her utterances 
and behaviors, both past and present, are being talked about and examined. This is 
primarily done by the therapist, but at times also done by the client. This is the primary 
reason why the therapist uses many different types of utterances, where as the client 
primarily just responds with elaboration. However, here the client briefly makes the 
therapist an object whose behavior is to be wondered about. She begins by asking a 
quick, punctuated question (“What?”) that indicates that he is doing something worth 
noticing. She then elaborates the question with the noticing itself, starting with an “ahh” 
token that conveys a sense of something being endearing. She then points out that it was 
his “furrowed eyebrows.” Hence, not only is the client taking on the role of interpreter, 
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she is making the therapist the object of interpretation rather than herself. Yet, this 
changes quickly. 
There are two points in the next utterance where she indicates that she is shifting 
from talking about the therapist’s behavior to talking about her own. First she offers a 
quick, yet cut off, statement saying: “I am sorry, I have a hard….”. She does not 
complete the thought, but by using the first-person pronoun “I” she indicates that she is 
now talking about herself. Moments later, she follows up by ventriloquating herself 
saying: “‘Hey, let’s talk about what your face is doing.’” Hence, by ventriloquating 
herself she indicates that she is now the object of interpretation. Furthermore, what she is 
interpreting is her difficulty talking about herself during the present interaction. Given the 
context of both session A and session B we know that the client and therapist have been 
talking about how she “skips along the surface” (SA, line 694). Furthermore, our in-depth 
analysis has shown that she often shifts topics when things get emotional or when 
emotion is even brought up. Hence, what we see happening here is the client interpreting 
this tendency as it occurs. From the therapist’s perspective we might say that the client is 
interpreting her own defenses. What this research shows is that she is reflecting on a 
tendency that manifest both explicitly in the conversation and implicitly throughout the 
data of this case study. Here, she is using the hermeneutics of therapy as a technology of 
self understanding. This technology is being used to constitute her as an emotional being 
who relates to her emotions in ways that need to be understood in order for her to heal 
and become a good, ethical subject. 
Second, the interaction has many indicators of emotion. Remember, less than 
three minutes ago there was a display of subtle anger on the part of the client toward the 
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therapist. This was followed by indications of a realignment between the client and 
therapist, which lead into trouble talk introduced by an emotional gloss. The trouble talk 
that was introduced—being mocked about her “sullen” mood while being abused outside 
of the home—is an emotional topic (or at least should be). She shifts from sarcastically 
talking about how her father’s behavior “sucks” when she displays emotion, as she says 
“sucks” in a breathy, broken tone. The emotional transaction happens at that moment 
when the client says the word sucks and the therapist responds with a look that the client 
later described as “compassion”. Her questioning of this look is because she does not 
“know exactly how to handle compassion, compliments, or attempts at understanding.” 
De Rivera (1984) describes the emotional movement of compassion as akin to 
acceptance. “Acceptance is the emotional relationship that is involved when we do not 
insist that the other be what we want…her to be, do not dictate….but simply allow the 
other to be what… she is, without our withdrawing or distancing” (p. 135). Both 
compassion and acceptance are considered Being emotions because they transpire in 
moments where who we are, our very existence, is affirmed or denied. However, 
compassion differs from acceptance. Compassion implies “a willingness to suffer with 
the other,” which, as de Rivera notes, is vital to “alleviating suffering” (p. 135). 
Third, the positioning that gets worked out over the course of the next few turns 
creates a contrary relational structure between the characters (Sarah and her father) and 
the participants (Sarah and the therapist). Emotions, by our definition, are the 
“transformation of our relation to the world-to the persons, objects, events, and actions 
that are important to us” (de Rivera, 1977, p. 35). The emotional transaction (lines 157-
164, 10:34-11:16) that occurs transforms the relationship between the client and the 
 therap
upset
“com
raw d
differ
figure
Figur
Posit
sessio
focus
the ‘d
you t
ist in a way
” and made 
passion.” Th
ifference. T
ent from the
 1). 
e 21 
ioning Diag
The three
n. However
 his utteranc
efensive’ as
hink about w
 that contra
her the “pun
ese differen
he emotiona
 narrated re
ram , S3 Ses
 aspects liste
, in respons
e, what to h
pect of the t
hen…some
sts with clie
chline” of h
ces get refin
l relationshi
lationship b
sion B: Com
d above ma
e to the clien
ighlight and
urn. He issu
one is trying
323 
nt’s relation
is jokes, wh
ed over the
p between t
etween the c
passion Ve
ke this is a v
t’s turn, the
 open up for
es a comma
 to understa
ship with he
ile the thera
 next few tu
he therapist 
lient and he
rsus Rejecti
ery powerfu
 therapist ha
 elaboration
nd to: “Say
nd or to be 
r father. Th
pist shows 
rns, but here
and client is
r father (see
on 
 
l moment i
s to choose
. Initially, h
…more abou
compassion
e father “got
 we see the
 very 
 positioning
n the 
 where to 
e chooses 
t…what 
ate” (line 
 
 
 
 
 324 
 
169-170). The client complies and says that there is a “spectrum,” on the one hand 
“nothing sticks like Teflon” and on the other it “promotes a…very aggressive response” 
like what is being said is “‘horseshit’” (lines 174-175). This elaboration was not about 
what she was experiencing with the therapist, but what she generally feels. This was 
established by the therapist during his command when he asked what she thinks when 
“someone” is trying to be compassionate. The client’s turn initiator “Umm it varies” 
indexes the more general experience (line 171). 
However, the therapist then tries to apply this general experience to the here-and-
now. He asks: “Did you feel like that was what I was conveying?” (line 177, 12:31). The 
client tries to avoid talking about the experience by first generalizing (“someone,” line 
178), then confusing the object of analysis (“I didn’t want to make this about you,” when 
the therapist is trying to focus on her experience, line 181), but eventually she agrees that 
the therapist had “just a look of compassion” (line 182). Again the therapist asks about 
the experience, but this time implicates himself (with a “that” index) and the emotional 
transaction: “what did that bring up for you?” (see transcript, line 183, 12:59). The client 
states that it makes her feel “uncomfortable” because she is “missing something” and 
others see how “bad” things are (lines 184-192). Hence, the emotional transaction has 
become understood as “a look of compassion” toward the client, which produced an 
“uncomfortable” feeling where she became aware that others recognize her as having it 
“bad.”  
At line 193, the client creates a turn relevant place indicating that the utterance 
about her response to compassion is complete. However, instead of giving the floor to the 
therapist she inserts a commentary about her mother. She says that her mother always 
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told her that “things are going to be okay,” however “she was always wrong” and this is 
“where the horseshit part comes from” (lines 195-196). The client frames it as a 
“dismissal” (line 197). She describes her mother as never wanting her “to be upset” so 
her mother would “deny things for me” (lines 199-200). She states “I need my own 
special denial for that…I can’t borrow yours” (lines 199-202). After this there is a long 
pause lasting 19 seconds. She then offers a summarizing statement that describes how 
both her mother and father relate to her problem in a way that contrasts with the 
therapist’s response. She states: “It made it very hard for a long time, to talk to either of 
them. Because my dad made fun of my problems and my mom refused to admit that I had 
any problems” (lines 202-204). This is followed by another 19 seconds of silence. These 
long silences are important.    
Although there is some laughter in this commentary, the long silences and the 
content of the utterance convey an emotional weight. The presence of silence in this 
sequence is unique. In session-A there were few silences, the longest lasting 8 seconds 
(SA, line 735). At the end of SA the client and therapist explicitly address this as they 
formulated some of the things they would need to change going forward (SA, line 694). 
Here we see long silences (some lasting nearly 20 seconds) that accompany emotionally 
provocative content (abuse and neglect). Furthermore, the content stands out because it 
contrasts with the emotional transaction of compassion between the client and therapist. 
Her parents’ responses are lacking compassion. Compassion is the acceptance of another 
regardless of how you feel towards them, combined with the ability to feel suffering. The 
client’s father mocks her and her mother denies that her problems exist. If we were to 
conceptualize the relationship between the client and parents as emotional relationships 
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according to de Rivera, we could describe the father’s relationship as one of contempt 
and shame and the mother’s relationship as one of denial and rage. Hence, the emotional 
transaction creates a relationship that differs from the relationships being described by the 
client. As a therapist, I would describe this as a corrective emotional experience, which 
is, according to many authors, essential for change (Bernier & Dozier, 2002; Greenberg 
& Safran, 1989; J. P. Miller, 1990; Safran & Greenberg, 1991). Even though the client is 
unable to fully accept the compassionate look, she is aware of it, and recognizes it as a 
different response than what she’s describing as she talks about her parents. 
What is important to attend to is how emotion, as an ethical substance, can be 
related to, experienced, and understood in many different ways and how this allows for a 
rich constitutional process which produces in the client a deep self. During SAS7, lines 
687-689, the therapist and the client talk about how hard it is for Sarah to be silent during 
session. At that time, it was not clear how this was relevant to the overall constitutional 
strategy, but it seemed important. Here we can see how silence is a way to doing 
emotion. The silences during this section are long, dwarfing anything we saw in session 
A. Hence, the problematizing of silence that we saw at the end of SA was in fact a tactic 
aimed at constituting the client as an emotional being. The problematizing centered on 
her ability to be silent. Hence, it is her relationship with her own behavior and feelings 
during the behavior that becomes an object of curiosity and interpretation. Silence, or 
lack thereof, can be questioned for meaning. Furthermore, silence can be used to 
demonstrate ethical activity. The client is doing emotion. She is engaged in the practice 
of emotion which has been problematized at what needs to be worked on in order to heal. 
During the interaction described above this is all present. Yet, there is also emotion 
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transacting between the client and therapist, as well as, emotion being transacted between 
the characters in the client’s commentary. The client is the one who makes these 
transactions explicit and available for thought, for problematizing. Reflecting on the 
number of ways that emotion is used during psychotherapy, it is justified to argue that the 
depth of the emotional subject is the vast expansion of variation that emotion, as an 
ethical substance, makes possible; rather than what lies beneath the lived surface of life.   
Questions and Elaboration on “Wounds” (15:33). After the long silence the client 
makes a topic change towards physical injuries inflicted by herself, accidents, and her 
parents. The transition is ambiguous. She casually says, “rough week” and then says, “I 
don’t have any,” while wiggling her fingers in front of the therapist (lines 204-206). She 
points out that she does not “have any nails” and this leads into conversation about not 
having any nails because she “aggressively…tear[s]” them and they don’t “heal 
properly”(lines 206-212). At line 217, she makes another topic change abruptly. She 
comments: “My mom broke my finger twice and never apologized,” which is followed 
by an awkward laugh. She then describes the experience while also showing the therapist 
her fingers and talks about how they “never got set, because, ‘I was fine. I was making a 
big fuss out of nothing’” (lines to 224-226). At line 234, the therapist offers a formulation 
(17:05) saying: “You’ve got some wounds.” The client uses this to list even more injuries 
and the therapist offers another formulation saying, “Some of your wounds are self-
inflicted” (line 240, 17:22).  
Initially, the client disagrees with this formulation but the therapist points out that 
her nails are self-inflicted wounds and then she begins to talk about her self-inflicted cuts 
that have healed on her forearm. She discusses other injuries as well. She offers a 
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narrative (N2) about a time when she was building a “terrarium” and she accidentally cut 
herself, which is quickly transitioned into a short commentary about when she smashed 
her toe and the “top popped off” (lines 254-275). While talking about her smashed toe 
she makes a brief comment that is not clearly connected to the previous material. She 
says: “she never apologized” (line 277). The client goes on to describe how, presumably, 
her mother told her that she was making a “fuss” and how she never took her to the 
doctor: “I never got a splint, we didn’t go to the doctor, we didn’t get an x-ray” (excerpt 
39, lines 284-285). 
Formulation (20:25). At line 286, the therapist makes a formulation to summarize 
the client’s prior speech and says, “Completely ignored.” This formulation also utilizes 
the client’s prior talk by re-circulating a partial figure of speech. The client, referring to 
her broken pinky finger, states that her entire nail was “completely purple” (line 279). 
The therapist recirculates “completely” in his formulation. This circulation of figures is 
interesting in that it draws from a section of the client’s speech that references the 
wounds that she has endured during her life. This is a major aspect of the prior sequence. 
Yet, the therapist uses this phrase to focus on the more interpersonal (and personal) 
aspects of the previous sequence, hence constraining the client’s next turn. 
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ventriloquation and instead questions her about wanting an apology. If we look at the 
turn-taking organization of these utterances we see that the therapist offers an 
overlapping acknowledgment token at line 294 and then initiates a turn request in the 
form of a deep inhale (it is common for this therapist to signal/claim his turn with a deep 
inhale). However, instead of giving up her turn, she adds the assertive response quoted 
above and then yields her speakership. 
The therapist takes the floor and asks: “Do you think that there is a part of you 
that is still waiting for an apology?” (line 296,20:54). As he finishes his question the 
client utters a neutral token (ahh at line 297) just before the therapist continues his turn 
and qualifies his original question by asking if there is a part of her: “That still wants 
recognition of...?” He trails off and doesn’t finish the question, leaving it highly 
ambiguous. I draw this out in detail because it shows the way in which the client can 
influence the speech of the therapist. By extending her turn and not allowing him to 
speak, she influences his turn, compelling him to contend with the new material that is 
more assertive then her previous talk. Furthermore, by initially offering the neutral token 
(ahh at line 297), rather than the more preferred acknowledge token, she nudges the 
therapist to qualify his original question. Although the qualification is unclear, there is 
some compelling evidence that the client’s neutral token pushed the therapist to respond 
to her assertive statement. 
In response to the therapist’s question the client offers an agreement token, which 
is then elaborated. In her elaboration she discusses: “The whole apology thing” (line 
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299)64 by saying that she was forced to apologize for everything, rather than talking about 
wanting an apology from her parents. For her the “whole apology thing” is complex. She 
states: “I was in a position where, I was told I had to apologize even if I was sure I was 
right and I was not allowed to ask for apologies and that really... made me feel sort of like 
an untouchable, like ‘you always have to be in a state of...being sorry [and] always be in 
a state of either feeling shame or...feigning shame’” (lines 300-304). Notice that her 
utterance is focused on her feelings. No longer is she talking about her physical injuries; 
rather the interpersonal dynamics of her family relationships and her feelings are being 
foregrounded. Interestingly, this is not because she responds directly to the therapist’s 
questions. Rather, she makes use of his question, shaping her response around the 
proceeding material and then moves in a new direction. She borrows his focus on 
apologies and uses this to bring in previous clinical material. Then she shifts the focus, 
emphasizing how she was made to “feel...like an untouchable.65”  
In terms of emotion, the “wounds” elaboration above is a commentary on 
rejection. “In rejection, the imperfect being of the other’s existence is denied by making 
the other meaningless — by denying that there is an essence to the other’s existence or 
any meaning to the occurrence of an event” (de Rivera, 1977, p. 64). Although parts of 
                                                            
64 She creates an index indicating that this was something discussed previously: “I think I touched 
on last time.” 
65 This utterance has a number of temporal dimensions. First, at line 299 the client indexes a 
previous session where she discussed “the whole apology thing.” This is an event that both 
participants share. The “whole apology thing” is also a gloss that the client then unpacks by using 
a temporal reference (“I was in a position”) to talk about the position that she was in, presumably, 
during childhood. Yet, the index is unclear. In a sense the index is floating: it refers to an 
unknown period of time. This response demonstrates how a client can form a response by 
weaving together multiple temporal indexes to produce an utterance that goes beyond the original 
thrust of the therapist’s question. 
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the elaboration deal with self injury or accidents, prominent throughout are commentaries 
on parental rejection of an aspect of the client—namely her suffering. Whether she was 
being mocked by her father for her suffering or having her suffering denied by her 
mother, there are numerous examples of rejection. The movement of rejection is to push 
the other away to such a degree or distance that they no longer exist. It is the opposite 
movement of compassion, where we move toward the other even though there are 
elements of their existence that might be unpleasant or unappealing. Hence, after the 
emotional transaction of compassion we see the client move into a commentary on her 
long history of rejection, which is the emotional movement opposing compassion (p. 69). 
Rejection is an emotional transaction that her parents enact against her. At the end 
of the “wounds” elaboration there are two indications of her response to their rejection. 
First, there is the assertive statement prior to the therapist’s last question where she states: 
“No, my finger is broken and I get to react this way.” If we think about this last line in 
terms of emotional movement we see that it is a moving against her parents. She declares 
that she has the right to “react this way.” This is a declaration that challenges the way her 
parents “ought” to behave. Hence, this last line stands out because it is an attempt to 
respond to rejection with anger. However, there is no clear indication that the client ever 
said this to her parents. Meaning, it is not proceeded by, “so I said to them…”. Hence, the 
line comes across as something that she would like to say, but has not. On the other hand, 
when the client discusses the “whole apology thing” she makes a reference to the past 
and discusses explicitly “feeling shame” and always be in a state of “being sorry.” 
Because this directly references the past there is a sense that this is how the client 
responded to her parents’ rejection. Namely, she felt ashamed, like “an untouchable.” 
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Interpretation S3 (21:35). As the client is talking about “feeling shame or 
feigning shame” the therapist offers a loud acknowledgment token and then takes a deep 
breath. His inhalation overlaps the client’s closing line: “And never being able to say: 
‘you’ve hurt me, I demand recompense’” (line 306). Much like the previous exchange, 
the client ends with a more assertive statement just as the therapist is calling for his turn. 
Hence, the interpretation starts prior to the closing line and does not seem to take its 
content into account. Instead, the therapist indexes a “tension” in the client’s previous 
speech that was also present in the “story with your coworker” (lines 309-312). In the 
excerpt above you can see the entire interpretation. It begins with a neutral epistemic 
marker, “And it sounds like,” which indicates that what is being said is independent from 
the client's previous speech. Then he uses “that’s” to index a “tension” in the previous 
speech that is connected to the “story” about the coworker. However, as the interpretation 
unfolds he indicates that the connection is not to the story per se, but what she feels when 
she tells the story. Namely, “You feel like: ‘If…I think about this too long, I’m going to 
start thinking I’m the asshole.’”  
This line closes the interpretation and its power comes from its construction. The 
therapist designs this as a ventriloquation of the client’s speech and also recirculates the 
word “asshole.” This word was first used by the client at line 43 in response to the 
therapist’s formulation about co-worker “difficulties.” There she spoke the word with a 
sarcastic smile saying: “If I get upset or if I let that feeling be known I'm going to be 
wrong and an ((gaze )) £asshole£.” In S2, the therapist asked the client “What comes to 
mind” when she thinks of the word and this continued until the client displayed subtle 
anger and made the therapist shift course at the beginning of S3. Since that point the 
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word has not been used, yet the therapist brings it back for the interpretation. The word 
creates a link to these moments of the session, giving a sense of coherence and 
connection between the vastly complex preceding context (Peräkylä, 2004). Furthermore, 
the interpretation is a temporal reference that again points back to the emotional 
transaction that occurred in the previous session (which is itself another reference to an 
event that occurred outside the session). Hence, the interpretation has the same temporal 
construction and emotionality as the original formulation. As we have seen, the client 
uses different tactics to distance herself from this event, but the therapist continually 
points back to it. The interpretation creates links throughout the session by continuing to 
utilizing this unique temporal construction. Last, by indexing a “tension” the therapist 
introduces metaphorical language that can be used to interpret the client’s previous 
speech and the event indexed in the initial formulation of the session. Tension implies a 
mutual pulling of opposite forces. However, what those forces are is not entirely clear. As 
we have seen throughout the dataset, the interpretation leaves a lot to be filled in. This is 
part of its power. The client is called to elaborate on what that tension is and how it 
applies to her understanding of herself, her emotions, and her relations to others. 
However, the elaboration after an interpretation is different than the elaboration 
after a formulation. Formulations gloss shared experience and compel agreement. 
Interpretation introduces something new that comes from outside the shared experience 
of the client-therapist dyad as well as the client’s personal experience (type AB and A 
events respectively). Hence, interpretation calls for more than just elaboration: it calls for 
contestation, modification, partial agreement, agreement, reflection, and so on. 
Interpretations are openly disputable claims (D events) and therefore interpretation 
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requires interpretation. There is no set way to interpret an interpretation; however 
psychotherapy as a constitutional practice problematizes the client as an emotional being 
who is asked to be curious about her emotion. The client can avoid talking about 
emotion, but this is problematized as a way of relating to herself that also needs to be 
understood. The only way out is through the use of the therapeutic hermeneutic as a 
technology of self understanding. By interpreting one’s own emotions the client places 
herself on the ethical path, which is the path toward goodness and health. Hence, this 
analysis has shown that psychotherapy constitutes the client as a deep emotional subject 
that requires hermeneutic understanding in order to heal. This hermeneutic healing 
process is the rediscovery of the ethical within the pathological. 
Closing Sequence 
S3 elaboration. The client offers a series of strong agreement tokens and then uses 
an index to connect the S3 interpretation to a “notion…that I’m not supposed to get angry 
and I’m not supposed to want things from others” (lines 314-315). This does not utilize 
the metaphor of opposing forces that creates tension. However, the therapist quickly uses 
a question that can also be read as an extension. He asks: “And if you do?” (line 317). 
The client seamlessly extends the therapists turn and says, “Then, now I have the 
problem”(line 318). This is a wonderful moment of collaboration where the therapist and 
the client work together in order to elaborate on the metaphor of tension. Hence, if we 
imagined their turns as one unit of speech it might look like this: “I’m not supposed to 
get angry or want things from other people, and if I do then I have the problem.” Tension 
is created because if the client has a problem with someone else she immediately 
becomes the problem herself. Hence, the problem is located in the client regardless of 
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what she does and this tendency is now being further problematized as something 
therapeutically important.  
Throughout session B the client has thoughts about the problem as something that 
is personal and emotional. Only during S2 did she focus more on what was problematic 
about others and this was quickly abandoned. The S3 interpretative elaboration would be 
considered highly collaborated according to Peräkylä’s research (Peräkylä, 2008). The 
extensions that create seamless speech are present just as Peräkylä has found elsewhere. 
What this analysis reveals is that here the client and therapist are talking in the language 
of personal emotion. They are talking about how the client relates to herself as an 
emotional being. Here, the client is interpreting the S3 interpretation in order to think 
about herself as an emotional subject, which has been the overall strategy identified by 
this analysis. Hence, it is possible that moments of high collaboration, indicative of 
strong therapeutic alliance, are constituted by the client’s use of the hermeneutic tools in 
ways that align with the strategic deployment of power within psychotherapy.    
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discussed, transacted, and problematized in psychotherapy. The next chapter will review 
the finding identified during the analysis of both session A and session B. After this, 
there will be a discussion of what the findings say about psychotherapy, as well as, a 
reflection on this research project as a whole.  
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Chapter 7 
A DETAILED INTERACTION ANALYSIS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AS 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE: FINDINGS 
   
 
 
"We should not be surprised that….in the twentieth century, madness 
should have discovered at the center of itself a primitive nucleus of guilt 
and aggression…this is not the gradual discovery of the true nature of 
madness, but simply the sedimentation of what the history of the West has 
made of it for the last three hundred years. Madness is much more 
historical than is usually believed, and much younger too.” 
Michel Foucault, Mental 
Illness and Psychology, 
(1987, p. 6). 
 
 
 
 
Overview of the Findings 
An analysis of this size and depth produces a number of interesting findings. 
However, some findings standout because they directly concern the research question or 
are important in terms of evaluating the overall project. In this chapter I cover two major 
findings (findings 1 and 2), which answer my research question: How is the client 
constituted as a certain kind of subject during psychotherapy? In the following chapter, I 
discuss two major findings (findings 4 and 5) that help to illustrate the success of DIA as 
methodology capable of explicating the constitutional change process in psychotherapy. 
The findings are as follows. (1) Interpretation was shown to be a pragmatic practice that 
asserts the therapist’s subjective perspective into the conversation. This allows the client 
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to respond with her own interpretation. This collaborative process was found to be an 
important change process in psychotherapy and these findings conform to the more 
interactional understanding of interpretation (Aron, 1992; Winnicott, 1971). (2) The 
study shows how psychotherapy constitutes the client as a deep emotional subject who 
must understand her emotions in order to be an ethical being. (3) The analysis provides a 
description of how Foucauldian problematizing occurs through the deployment of 
conversational actions that shift the location of the therapeutic problem and encourage the 
client to think about herself as an emotional being. (4) This study demonstrates how the 
indeterminacy of talk is used as a creative resource for both the therapist and client 
during problematizing.  
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Table 1  
Major Findings from the Detailed Interaction Analysis of the Constitutional Change 
Process in Psychotherapy 
Findings Description 
 
(1) Interpretation asserts the therapist’s 
subjectivity and calls for the client’s 
interpretation. 
 
Related to Labov’s description of D-event 
actions, interpretations were shown to be 
actions that assert the therapist own 
subjective experience and call for a 
subjective response from the client. In 
response to the interpretation the client can 
respond by using the hermeneutic 
technology of therapy as a tool for self 
understanding. Interpretation can be seen as 
an emancipatory process as described by 
Habermas. 
(2) Psychotherapy constitutes the client 
as a deep emotional subject 
Emotion was identified by both the 
therapist and the client as the substance that 
needed to be worked on and understood in 
order to heal. Healing is synonymous with 
becoming an ethical being. Hence, in 
psychotherapy, emotion is what Foucault 
referred to as the substance èthique. 
(3) Conversational actions shift the 
location of the therapeutic problem 
and encourage the client to think 
about herself as an emotional being  
This process is an example of Foucauldian 
problematizing. Throughout the dataset this 
was accomplished, by the therapist, 
through selective questions, formulations, 
indexing, foregrounding emotion, subject 
positioning, and interpretation. The client 
engaged in problematizing through 
narration, commentary, temporal shifts, 
topic changes, and interpretation.  
(4) The indeterminacy of talk is used as 
a creative resource for both the 
therapist and client during 
problematizing. 
The analysis shows how problems arise as 
implicit possibilities that are later made 
explicit. These problems are always subject 
to change and numerous possibilities exist. 
Hence, psychotherapy is a creative task that 
both the client and therapist engage in as 
they constitute the clinical problem.  
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Interpretation as Constitutional Practice 
At the beginning of this dissertation I discussed my desire to examine 
psychotherapy in a way that best captured its subtleties, while demonstrating its 
humanity. I explained how interpretation is a way into psychotherapy because it is a 
pivotal construct that can be reinterpreted and put to work for both the researcher and the 
practitioner. This research has shown that it is not only a pivotal construct, but an 
organizing tactic used to constitute the client as an intentional being capable of self 
interpretation and understanding. As was discussed above, many of the therapist’s turns 
were used to problematize the client as an emotional being. If we return to the analysis 
we see that the kind of emotional being that was foregrounded was one whose emotions 
are intentional. The interpretations of the case study are, for the most part, used for this 
general purpose. However, my interest in interpretation goes beyond the therapist’s 
tactics. Interpretation is important to the constitution of the client as an intentional subject 
because (1) it is the site where subjectivity is claimed and therefore constituted explicitly, 
(2) it is where the hermeneutic technology of therapy is utilized, and (3) it is where the 
solution to the interpretive problem as an ethical transformation that demands the 
incorporation of the interpretive technology as a means for achieving the good. 
Previously in chapter 3, the distinction was drawn been A-events and AB-events. 
This distinction was derived from the work of Labov and Fanshel (1977). Labov stated 
that in order to understand psychotherapeutic discourse we have to view each utterance as 
an action. The type A-event is a representation of the speaker’s past, where the speaker 
has sole ownership of the experience. We can see this in the narratives and commentary 
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offered by the client during this case study. On the other hand, AB-events involve shared 
experience. Here, both participants have ownership of the experience. Formulations have 
been identified as a type of AB-event that glosses a shared experience between the client 
and therapist (Antaki, 2008). As we saw in the analysis, formulation was a common tactic 
used by the therapist.  
AB-events occur in both everyday conversation and psychotherapy, but as my 
analysis has shown, AB-events are used tactically by the therapist. In psychotherapy, 
these AB-events begin to accumulate quite quickly. As a therapist learns more and more 
about the patient’s experience he or she has greater access to the patient’s biography and 
are able to comment on these experiences. As with the case study, formulations can be 
directed toward what has just been said or what was said in previous sessions. As was 
discussed in Chapter 3, formulations are the most non-coercive type of therapeutic 
intervention, but they are extremely powerful because they selectively foreground 
elements of the previous talk and they project agreement, making them very difficult to 
contradict. This ability to project agreement rests on the subtle manipulation of the 
ownership of experience. The formulation concerns shared experience, but it is uttered as 
if it concerns the client’s experience. This can be seen in the design of the utterance. 
Formulations start with some variation of personal pronoun that indexes the client as the 
owner of experience (“So, you say you are tired of all this”). There is a key distinction 
between a formulation and an interpretation: interpretations assert the therapist’s 
perspective on the client’s experience (“It seems to me that you are tired of all this”) 
(Bercelli et al., 2008). 
As shown in the case study, psychotherapy precedes as a series of actions 
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volleying between A-events and AB-events. There are norms dictating who should use 
A-event actions and AB-event actions in psychotherapy. The client’s role is typically to 
elaborate further and further on A-events. The therapist encourages this with questions 
and extensions, but much of the therapeutic work is done through the intentional use of 
AB-event actions such as formulations, which selectively foreground certain elements of 
speech in order to constitute the client in specific ways. This was demonstrated in 
chapters 5 and 6; however, there were also moments where other types of actions were 
utilized. Furthermore, there were a few moments where the client used utterances that are 
most often wielded by the therapist. 
The first was where the client used AB-event utterances to formulate what was 
happening during the session. These events stood out when I first began looking at the 
dataset. I remember feeling as if these were powerful moments where the therapy 
deepened. This initial reaction was important because it indicated that something 
different was going on during these brief moments. The client shifts from a common type 
of action and begins to act in ways that are more typical of the therapist. She does this in 
order to gloss what they are doing in therapy (“Ya got me,” SAS1, line 59 and “I'm 
supposed to be going in [emotion], that is probably purpose of all this,” SAS6, line 594), 
and to gloss what she is trying to do during her commentary (“For making it about you,” 
SBS3, line 165). My initial reaction was a response to this shift. In these moments the 
client was no longer elaborating on her own biographical experience for the therapist. 
Instead, she was formulating on a shared experience between the therapist and herself. 
Hence, she was no longer offering up her own story in order for it to be selectively 
formulated and problematized, but selectively formulating and problematizing the shared 
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experience of psychotherapy. During these moments she clearly declared herself not 
simply as an object of psychotherapeutic understanding, but as a subject who shares 
ownership of the psychotherapeutic relationship, which then became an object for her to 
interpret.  
As mentioned in chapter 3, A–events and AB–events are only two of the many 
different types of actions that take place in psychotherapy. Traditionally, the distinction 
between A-events and B-events has been the most useful in terms of generating CA 
research on psychotherapy (Peräkylä et al., 2008a). Utterances that pertain to another’s 
experience are B-events. These utterances have the form of “B believes that A believes” 
(Labov & Fanshel, 1977, p. 80). What has interested conversation analysts is how the 
ownership of experience influences sequential organization. Typically, the owner of the 
experience is given the chance to respond to B-event statements. Furthermore, new 
research has shown how the ownership of experience can be shifted depending on the 
type of social practice in which the participants are engaged. Vehviläinen (2008) has 
argued that psychoanalysis modifies the common rights given to the owner of experience 
and he speculates that this is due to the way the therapist uses his turns to display a co-
ownership of experience. Furthermore, conversation analysts have recently become 
interested in a third type of action called a D-event. According to Labov (1977), D-events 
are disputable events because both participants recognize that the truth of the utterance is 
not certain and hence further action is required, whether this be to deny, agree with, 
support, or completely reinterpret the original action as required. Labov states that the 
most common type of D-event is an assertion. He goes on to say that in psychotherapy 
there are two particular assertions “an evaluation….[and] an interpretation” (p. 63). For 
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Labov, an evaluation highlights the emotional or interpersonal aspects of the previous 
speech, whereas the interpretation treats the previous speech as symbolic. This distinction 
between an evaluation and interpretation has all but collapsed for modern day 
conversation analysts. D-event actions are collectively referred to as reinterpretations, or 
interpretations depending on the researcher (Bercelli et al., 2008; Vehviläinen, 2008). In 
this case study we have referred to D-event actions as interpretations. 
From this perspective we can see interpretation as an action directed toward A–
events and AB–events. Because the bulk of psychotherapy consists of A and AB-events, 
interpretations stand out because of their unique design and sparsity. Interpretations come 
from the therapist’s perspective and this can be seen in the “epistemic markers” used in 
the design of the utterance (Bercelli et al., 2008, p. 49). The therapist’s perspective is 
openly displayed in a way that is overt, yet not definitive. Unlike a formulation, the 
interpretation does not project agreement, nor does it claim to be a reflection of the 
client’s experience. Rather, it is an expression of the therapist’s own subjective 
experience of the client and it therefore calls for “a response” (Labov & Fanshel, 1977, p. 
63).This call to respond is a call to subjectivity: the interpretation demands that the client 
claim her position as a subject, the “I am,” and respond to the subjectivity of the 
therapist. This is why interpretation is a site where subjectivity is constituted explicitly. 
Clients are called to interpret themselves as objects. Their interpretation takes their own 
autobiographical past, and the lived experience of being with the therapist as its object. 
Hence, the client forms a subject-object relationship to herself-in-relation-to-others as she 
interprets the interpretation.  
This conforms to Habermas’ (1968) understanding of depth therapy as an 
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emancipatory practice where the therapist must first take the client as the object of 
interpretation and then the client must then take on a subjective position towards herself 
as an object: “The subject cannot obtain knowledge of the object unless it becomes 
knowledge for the object—and unless the latter thereby emancipate itself by becoming a 
subject” (p. 262). The client’s subject-object relationship is a way of understanding 
herself, but it is also a way of positioning herself in relation to the therapist as a certain 
kind of subject. Much like the therapist’s interpretation, the client’s interpretive 
elaboration is a claiming of subjectivity. This makes the interpretive adjacency pair a site 
where the participants can act with or against one another’s actions in order to constitute 
each other as subjects. The number of responses available is quite large. Clients can 
openly disagree or modify the interpretation and in this they create a subject position in 
relation to the therapist. Moving away from the traditional perspective that clients never 
interpret (Loewenstein, 1951), Lewis Aron (1992) argued “that the optimal way for the 
analyst to establish himself or herself as a subject is through the use of interpretations, 
which, while being explicitly about the patient, carry a great deal of implicit data about 
the subjectivity of the analyst” (p. 479). This study provides solid evidence for the notion 
that interpretation is important because it creates a site where client can change because 
she is called to interpret herself in relation to others and her world. In line with Aron, 
interpretation is important because it provides the client with an opportunity to be 
different; rather than simply receive different information about who she is from the 
therapist.  
Interpretation, Ethical Self-Constitution, and Collaboration 
When researchers analyze what clients do in response to interpretations, they see 
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a number of different tactics, most of which were described by Peräkylä (2008). Much of 
Peräkylä’s work has been focused on this topic. As discussed in Chapter 2, clients 
elaborate on interpretations in ways that are complementary and non-complementary to 
the therapist’s interpretation. Peräkylä has shown how both the client and the therapist 
use extensions to add to the elaboration in ways that are complementary with one 
another. According to Peräkylä: “Further explication of the interactional ways in which 
the matching and mismatching, the complementarity and non-complementarity of the 
therapist’s and client’s actions takes place, is probably one of the central tasks of 
conversation analysts investigating psychotherapy" (p. 118). Peräkylä’s description of 
how therapists and clients move together and apart is quite powerful. However, what is 
needed is a theory of how these movements are part of an overall constitutional strategy. 
This is important because as Bercelli (2008) points out, a client’s elaboration to an 
interpretation is “something more than accepting the therapist proposals….[it is] the 
possibility for clients to show what they make of the therapist's proposals, and how, by 
extensively responding to them, they possibly change their perspectives about their own 
events and experiences" (italics added p. 61).  
Turning to the case study, we see a number of different ways that the client 
interprets the therapist’s interpretations. We see her agreeing, disagreeing, as well as 
elaborating in ways that initiate topic changes. Furthermore, when we look at the 
moments where there is more complementarity, we see something unique occur. In these 
instances the client begins to interpret herself in a way that is similar to the depth 
hermeneutic of the therapist. She does this in response to the therapist’s interpretation 
that her “clown” story was really about her anger towards the therapist (SAS6, lines 681-
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682). A more profound example is after the interpretation that ends session B. Here, the 
client and the therapist work together to extend an interpretative understanding of the 
client’s own anger and its relation to herself (SBS3 elaboration, line 307-318). In chapter 
6, I asserted that the collaborative spirit of this moment was due to the client’s use of the 
therapeutic hermeneutic, used, more often, by the therapist. In both cases the client began 
by directing her own D-event action (interpretation) towards herself. From a therapeutic 
perspective she was becoming her own analyst. Hence, it was during these 
complementary elaborations that a client performed a type of action that is institutionally 
granted to the therapist. However, her use of this type of action was not something that 
was dissuaded or discouraged. On the contrary, these are the moments that felt the most 
collaborative, deep, and meaningful. These were my reactions as a listener. Furthermore, 
these were my reactions as a therapist and as a client. My initial impression of depth and 
meaning is telling. These are the kinds of moments one looks for as a therapist and the 
moments that feel most profound as a client. They are the moments remembered as 
evidence that you were onto something, that you were moving in the right direction, and 
that you were doing real therapeutic work.  
Hence, these moments are ethical because they point us in the direction of ‘the 
good’ as Foucault described (Foucault, 1983). In other words, these moments are 
inscribed with a telos. Furthermore, these are the moments where the client takes up and 
use a “technology of the self,” which she uses to decipher herself and determine how to 
be a good and ethical being. Hence, one of the possible responses to an interpretation is 
this constitutional move where the client begins to interpret herself and internalize the 
therapeutic technology of self in order to orient herself on the path towards becoming a 
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good ethical subject. 
Although we see no evidence in this case study of the classic psychoanalytic 
depth hermeneutic that directs its aim towards the vicissitudes of sexual desire, we do see 
the remnants of the confessional technology of self that Foucault associated with 
psychotherapy (Foucault, 1983). For example, the therapist emphasizes that the client is 
different from her mother-in-law because she is “curious” about herself. The therapist 
does not give her moral instructions about who she should be as a person, but how she 
should relate to herself as a kind of object. Here, what it means to be a good and moral 
person is to be curious about yourself and about the intentions of your actions. 
Interpretation encourages a self reflection or curiosity. Therefore, psychotherapeutic 
interpretation is the keystone of a strategy that constitutes clients as deep emotional 
beings who are often unaware of their own intentional acts towards themselves, others 
and world. The ethical substance that must be worked on is one’s emotions or feelings. 
This is something that Foucault predicted in one of his last interviews, and we see 
evidence of that quite clearly in this case study (Foucault, 1983). Other researchers have 
pointed out how this focus on emotion as personal rather than social is something that can 
be seen across psychotherapy (Goicoechea, 2013). They have also pointed out that in 
some ways this can be used to obscure gender-based power relations (p. 115). This study 
has shown that interpretation is a unique and important therapeutic action that can be 
described empirically. Furthermore, it is central to the constitutional strategy of 
psychotherapy because it is a site of overt power where the therapeutic technology of self 
can be taken up by the client and used to further collaboration, resulting in an increase of 
therapeutic meaning. Collaboration as an interactional process, and therapeutic meaning 
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as an emotional transaction, are both part of the constitutional field and are often 
described by therapists and clients as moments where the therapy deepened. These 
moments are indicators of the way in which self interpretation is a solution to the 
hermeneutics of psychotherapy—a solution that places us on the path to becoming a good 
and ethical being, which, as Foucault points out is a fundamental element of any 
constitutional practice. 
Psychotherapy and the Deep Emotional Subject 
The major finding of this study is that the client was constituted as a deep 
emotional subject who needed to be understood in order to heal. Researchers have been 
able to show that emotion is vital to understanding change in psychotherapy (Gendlin, 
1969; Greenberg & Safran, 1989; Safran & Greenberg, 1991). The notion that emotion is 
important for change goes back to the beginning of psychotherapy, when Anna O. 
jokingly referred to her cathartic sessions with Breuer and Freud (1955/2000) as 
“chimney-sweeping” (p. 30).66 I argue that emotion is fundamental to psychotherapeutic 
change not because of a universal connection between emotion and psychopathology, but 
because psychotherapy as a practice is interwoven with an understanding of human 
beings as emotional creatures and emotion as intrinsic to psychopathology. This 
understanding has occurred over centuries, a process that Foucault (1988a) describes in 
Madness and Civilization. Psychotherapy is part of this historical process. It is based on 
                                                            
66 Those familiar with the case of Anna O. will recall the emotionally intensive sessions that 
Breuer describes. A later case study, recounted by Freud (1955/2000) is more telling. In his work 
with Miss Lucy R., he elicits talk about emotion in order to understand her illness. In a footnote 
he states: “I turned to psychical analysis and requested her to tell me what emotion had preceded 
the onset of her illness” (p. 101). Here, emotion is a source of insight for Freud. Yet this 
elicitation of talk about emotion also constitutes the patient as an emotional being. 
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the confessional practices of Christianity, but focuses its constitutional work on the 
irrational emotion of the symptom, rather than the sinfulness of the soul (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1982; Foucault, 1978).  
Hence, even when emotion has been a secondary concern in psychotherapy, it has 
still been a concern. It was telling that as I began this study I felt that CA alone could not 
explicate the constitutional processes in psychotherapy. I felt strongly that emotion had to 
be accounted for in order to understand psychotherapeutic change. This has been 
identified as an implicit assumption of the researcher that arose during the practice of 
research and became fundamental to the results. This assumption is not just an 
idiosyncratic preoccupation. It is an assumption that arose out of  my own constitutional 
process of becoming—being—a psychotherapist, a researcher, and a client. Hence, the 
focus of emotion in this study should be understood as a working out of the implicit 
assumptions embedded in the practice of psychotherapy and the constitutional effects this 
has on those involved in the practice. The ‘deepness’ of psychotherapy can be defined as 
the active problematizing of emotion as a type of ethical substance that needs to be 
worked on in order to gain self understanding and health. This is the ethical path for the 
modern patient, the pathos to becoming “the kind of being to which we aspire” whether 
that be the “pure, or immortal, or free, or masters of ourselves, and so on” (Foucault, 
1983, p. 239). What we see in this data set is emotion being problematized as that which 
must be understood in order to be manage. However, the controlling of the emotion is not 
done in and for itself. Rather, it is done in the service of being in ethical relationships 
with others. This constitutional work is at a high arc at the end of SA when the client 
delivers her compelling ‘doorknob’ statement: 
 353 
 
I don't want to be a big ball of crazy, and I don't want to be unable to give Wanda 
something to look to. Like she is very smart and she's very aware and she's gonna 
pick things up very quickly. …I don't want her getting to the place where she 
can’t, I I don’t want her thinking that something not done perfectly isn't worth 
doing. And I don’t want her thinking that not being perfect makes her worthless. I 
don't want her not being able to, you know, get it out without breaking things or 
hurting herself. And I don’t want her seeing, and I don't want her being afraid of 
me, I don't want her being afraid of setting me off because half of what John does 
is just trying to damage control his mom. (lines 834-844) 
The client has been called to be the ‘master of herself’ because this impacts her 
relationships with others. During therapy, the client’s relation to her emotional depth is 
brought into a triadic relationship with others and in this way she constitutes herself as a 
deep self, teleologically aimed toward fostering ethical relations with others.  
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Chapter 8 
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
"Thought is questioning, a stepping back from what one is doing, a posing 
of problems. It is what Heidegger called 'circumspection.' Diverse 
solutions may be the result, but what is at the root is the problematization 
(itself a result of social, economic, or political processes) which they 
attend to.” 
Martin Packer, The Science 
of Qualitative Research, 
(2011, p. 376). 
 
 
 
 
 
Psychotherapy as Thought; Thought as Problematizing 
The research question that guided this project was how clients are constituted as 
certain kinds of subjects during psychotherapy. In answering this question I hoped to 
achieve two goals. First, I wanted to develop a methodology that could be used to 
empirically explicate the actions on actions of constitutional practices. And second, I 
wanted to provide an account of how psychotherapy can produce constitutional change. 
Let’s begin by reflecting on the methodology. After many roadblocks and dead ends I 
developed what I call Detailed Interaction Analysis (DIA). This new methodology is 
based on conversation analysis, but incorporates a relational theory of emotion as action 
(STE), as well as, an action based understanding of narrative (NIA). As I argued in 
chapter 4, these three aspects of DIA are ontologically compatible with radical realism 
and are therefore well suited for constitutional analysis. What both distinguishes and 
binds them is the assumption that language, narrative, and emotion are all actions that can 
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be used to problematize oneself in relationship to others and world.  
This understanding of thought has implications for psychotherapy and beyond. 
Foremost, it requires us to understand thought as a sociocultural phenomenon that is 
historical and constitutive. Thought can be seen all around us and cannot be limited to 
internal cognitive processes: Buildings, tools, books, calendars, and cable TV are all 
thought materialized; the professional institutions in which we work and live are thought 
enacted; and everyday conversation, whether it be in our homes or in the institutional 
practices in psychotherapy, is thought in action. All of this has arisen out of a history 
where people stepped back and began to ask questions about their form-of-life and 
problematize their existence. This questioning allows the world to light up in different 
ways, allowing new possibilities and problems to be discovered. Through this process the 
world is changed.  
However, so are we—problematization not only changes the world, but changes 
the people-in-the-world. As Packer (2011) points out: 
Thought assumes ‘concrete forms’ in institutions, practices, and systems of 
representation (maps, calculi, etc.). ‘Internal’ action on mental representations is 
only one form of thought, and it requires the formation of a particular kind of self 
as a knowing subject. Foucault reminds us that, for Kant, becoming a Cartesian 
subject required a certain kind of ethical stance, a stance in which one viewed 
oneself as a universal subject. Thinking for Kant should be individual, detached, 
and formal. But Foucault emphasized….that thought is found in all action, 
whether it is intellectual, ethical, or self-conscious. (p. 375) 
Hence, psychotherapy needs to be understood as a form of thought. From the large-scale 
institutions all the way down to the conversational turns in a single session, 
psychotherapy is a way of problematizing people within their form of life. 
One advantage of seeing thought in this way is that it becomes visible and 
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available for empirical research. This project has been an example of how this research 
can be conducted. What the methodology has allowed me to show is how thought occurs 
within the practice of psychotherapy. I have demonstrated how therapeutic thought is a 
social and interpersonal phenomenon, rather than an internal and individual experience. 
Psychotherapy is a unique way of thinking about problems and it differs from everyday 
conversation. We have seen the way in which the therapist and the client work together to 
constitute the therapeutic problem as emotional and personal. The client’s life was 
problematized in such a way that the most important problems were located in the client 
herself. This locating was done by directing thought toward the client’s feelings and her 
response to her feelings, rather than her boyfriend’s difficulty holding a job, or her 
mother-in-law’s disregard of others. CA alone would have been able to produce a 
penetrating account of the conversational actions, but the insight into the location of the 
problem and role of emotion required an expanded methodology. This methodology 
allows us to see psychotherapy as a strategic constitutional practice that locates the 
problem in the client. The problems are hers, and psychotherapy, at every level of 
analysis, is strategically designed to constitute problems in such a way. Confidentiality, 
private space, minimal (in the service of therapy) therapist disclosure, and the expectation 
to share honestly what you are thinking and feeling (Freud's rule of analysis) are all 
normative practices that foster a type of problematization that locates the problem in the 
individual.  
Yet, psychotherapy as a way of thinking and problematizing oneself begins before 
the client even comes to therapy. Expectancy effects have been used to explain why 
people get better in psychotherapy (Lambert & Barley, 2001; Wilkins, 1984). The idea is 
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that if you expect psychotherapy to work, then you will likely benefit from treatment. The 
notion here is that psychotherapy works because of a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, if 
we understand psychotherapy as a socio-historical practice that begins when people 
recognize their life as a type of problem, we can then state that psychotherapy begins at 
this point. This is when therapeutic thinking begins and it is at this point that the 
therapeutic conversation is made explicit. Hence, expectancy effects are the way in which 
the problem is recognized as a therapeutic problem that can be answered, understood, and 
healed. To recognize a problem as a therapeutic problem is to understand it as 
idiopathic, yet capable of comprehension—comprehension being a near equivalence to 
cure. It is no wonder that when the individual recognizes they have a problem that needs 
to be understood, therapy is often, at least in my experience, most effective. The problem 
has to be constituted as one’s own in order for therapy to occur and this is something that 
permeates not only the moment-to-moment actions during a psychotherapy session, but 
also the design of our therapeutic tools (small cozy office spaces, practices of 
confidentiality and so on), the formal knowledge of psychotherapy (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000), and theories of psychotherapeutic change (Orlinsky et al., 2004; 
Rogers & Dymond, 1954; Snyder & Ingram, 2000). 
Conversational Mapping and Indeterminacy of Talk  
One challenge I faced during this project was to develop a methodology capable 
of making a highly complex and ambiguous interaction sensible without oversimplifying. 
By looking at speech as action, I was able to classify different types of speech based on 
the actions it accomplished. Largely, this typology was taken from conversation analysis 
and to some degree linguistics (C. Goodwin & Heritage, 1990; Labov & Fanshel, 1977; 
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ten Have, 1999). The conversational maps were an attempt to simplify the interaction in 
order to best explicate how utterances were linked together as actions on actions 
unfolding across time. However, the conversational maps are misleading. They give the 
reader a sense that utterances can be clearly cataloged, and yet, this is not the case. As I 
discussed in chapter 5, many of the utterances could have been classified in different 
ways. For example, an utterance could simultaneously be understood as an extension, 
question, or interpretation. Conversation analysts have long recognized that this is the 
case (Bercelli et al., 2008). By using an inductive approach, conversation analysts are 
able to collect different examples of a species and then often use the most ideal specimen 
to illustrate the conversational mechanisms that they are describing (Jefferson, 1988). 
This study differs from conventional CA studies. The ambiguity did make mapping the 
sessions difficult. However, through the process I came to understand the importance of 
this ambiguity as a therapeutic resource. 
The conversational maps are important because they allow us to see connections 
and patterns within individual sequences and between sequences. Although they tend to 
obscure the conversational ambiguity, conversational maps, ironically, allow us to 
understand the importance of ambiguity as a therapeutic resource. For example, SAS3 is 
a highly ambiguous sequence. Both participants make unexpected topic changes and 
deploy utterances that can be understood in many different ways. The sequence also 
concerns cutting, which was later identified as the original problem bringing the client 
into therapy. Furthermore, the sequence has many emotional undertones; namely anger 
and frustration. However, because of the ambiguity of the sequence it is unclear how the 
client and therapist understand the problem. However, as the client and therapist 
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transition from SAS3 to SAS4 the ambiguity lessens. Although SAS4 does not feel as 
spontaneous or emotional, the client and therapist are able to talk about emotion in ways 
that feel very important. This sequence (SAS4) stands out, not only because of what is 
being said, but also because of its relation to SAS3 and the shift from ambiguity to clarity 
when discussing emotion. Hence, the conversational mapping allows us to see how 
sequences and adjacency pairs relate to each other in organic ways that constitute certain 
moments as therapeutically important. Approaches that do not attend to the unfolding 
context miss the hermeneutic interrelation of participant and context as it unfolds across 
time, which could lead to misunderstanding. 
Another reason why conversational ambiguity and uncertainty should not be 
‘analyzed out of the data’ is because they are used as a creative resource for the 
participants. Again, this is most prominent in SAS3, but can be seen elsewhere 
throughout the dataset. Ambiguity and uncertainty about what one participant means with 
his or her speech allows for an open dialogue where new understandings of the problem 
can be brought to light. As is shown in SAS3, much of the ambiguity arises from the fact 
that a number of possibilities are implied by any given utterance. These possibilities 
become available for both participants to be used later on and made explicit. For 
example, in SA, emotion is constantly being brought to the foreground and discussed, but 
how emotion is a problem for the client remains implicit until it is later discussed as an 
explicit problem. These later moments draw from the former, selecting certain ways of 
problematizing emotion, while neglecting others.  
Within any given sequence there are many problems that seem connected, yet 
these connections are not given. Instead connections have to be forged. According to 
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Donald Spence (1982), this is the central work of therapy: forging connections and 
creating themes across a brimming surface of therapeutic conversation. This research 
concurs with Peräkylä’s (2004) work, showing that connections are often made by 
circulating figures of speech that link together similar topics, emotions, or relationship 
across a session. This linkage can be seen in the circulation of “chaos” or “chaotic” 
feelings in SA. The focus of SA was on emotion and the circulation of “chaos” linked 
together by different emotional transactions. This tactic was used to constitute the 
problem of SA as emotional and personal. The problem became how the client could not 
express, experience, or describe her emotions. In session B we see a different tactic, 
namely the use of interpretation to forge connections and create themes across sequences. 
For example, the final interpretation, the SBS3-interpretation, brought back in the 
“coworker difficulties” to make sense of problems that had arisen in SBS1, SBS2, and 
SBS3. Hence, interpretation was used to link together multiple problems. Last, there were 
a handful of occasions where the client or the therapist used classic formulations to make 
the implicit problematizing that had been occurring explicit. For example, the therapist’s 
SAS6-formulation at 32:09, and the client’s SAS6-speculative assertion/question at line 
602 are moments when the problematization of expressing emotion was made explicit. 
This is more profound given that the problematizing of emotion was so prominent, yet 
implicit prior to this point.  
In summary, this research has shown how the therapist uses specific tactics — 
questions, formulations, and interpretations—to constitute the client’s problem as 
personal and emotional. The therapist’s constant foregrounding of the personal, 
emotional aspects of the problem was not, however, an act of domination. The therapist 
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was not simply prescribing a view for the client. The natural indeterminacy of speech 
always leaves open possibilities for the problem to be understood differently. A therapist 
might foreground emotion as a personal problem, but how the client relates to the 
problem — relates to her emotion — is an open ended process. In this dataset, we saw the 
client, at times, avoid talking outright about the problem as something emotional and 
personal. At other times, she seemed to grab on to the problem as emotional and personal, 
and yet how she related to emotion was continually being constituted. Hence, even when 
the therapist’s tactics are clear, therapy still has a certain degree of ambiguity, which 
allows the problem to continually be constituted, problematized, and understood. DIA 
and conversational mapping allow us to produce a coherent account of the constitutional 
processes in such a way that the indeterminacy of language becomes a key factor in the 
change process, rather than something that needs to be controlled and eliminated from the 
research.   
Research as Genealogy; Research as Ethics 
The next question is whether this research methodology has provided a 
convincing account of constitutional processes and given us some insight into how 
psychotherapy produces change. Each reader will have to answer this for themselves, but 
let me conclude with some clarifying remarks. This research should be understood as a 
genealogy. As was described in chapter 2, Foucault used archaeology, genealogy, and 
ethics as related, yet differing, approaches aimed at creating a “historical ontology” of 
modern human beings (Packer, 2011, p. 378). Foucault’s “project,” as it has been 
described, was meant to include an examination of “power in its materiality, its day to 
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day operation….[at the] level of micropractices” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 185). 
However, because of Foucault’s early death in 1984, this research was never completed. 
My research is a continuation of the problematizing that Foucault, as well as 
Heidegger, brought into existence with their work. My project’s contribution is to refine a 
methodology that brings to the surface how a client is constituted during the practice of 
psychotherapy. Chapters 5 and 6 can be seen as a mapping of the clear tactics, as well as 
the mistakes, mishaps, ambiguities, and accidents that contributed to the constitutional 
effects of the practice. The method is a genealogy because it creates of record, mapping 
myriad ways in which people—in a given culture, in a given practice—become 
constituted as certain kinds of subjects. Just as “a family tree is a record of chance 
encounters, irrational attractions, and accidents of fertility and mortality. A genealogy 
discloses these accidents and the coincidences, surprises, and struggles that produced a 
descendant” (Packer, 2011, p. 356). Hence, a genealogy exposes the conditionality of that 
which seems unconditional. People and the problems that become deemed as therapeutic 
concerns are not given—they are constituted. This research shows what that 
constitutional process looks like at the ground-level. It is true that psychotherapy has to 
be understood as a practice that exceeds the confines of the consulting room, but it is at 
the level of micro-practice—moment-to-moment actions at the everyday level—that 
constitution and therefore power occur.     
According to Foucault (1978) power is everywhere and it deploys not from the 
top down, but from the bottom up. That to say, that power, in its modern form, is best 
understood as a productive force that is used to create certain kinds of people. Hence, it is 
in day-to-day interactions that power is most potent. It can be seen in the concrete ways 
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people act on one another and themselves in order to produce certain ways of relating and 
certain ways of existing. These actions are often complex. Actions are always met with 
other actions. Actions can align, break, shift and counter one another. These shifts can be 
quick, the result of clear tactics or fortuitous accidents. Genealogy maps the field of 
power—the actions on actions—as it manifests within the domain of research. Chapters 5 
and 6 provide such a map, charting tactics, counter-tactics, and accidents as they unfolded 
temporally in the psychotherapy of the dataset.  
Power is ever-present because it occurs whenever we problematize our existence 
(i.e. think). Problems require actions and because all problems, even those related to 
objects, are ways of working out our own existence, power is always present (Heidegger, 
1927/1962; Packer, 2011). However, power is not a transcendental force, rather it is the 
result of uncoordinated actions on actions that align and oppose, creating a field of forces 
in which people become certain kinds of people. Hence, the ‘nature’ of power is 
dependent on the concrete actions used in everyday practices. In chapters 5 and 6, I 
demonstrated how problematizing can occur in psychotherapy. The turn by turn analysis 
showed how the client and therapist resisted each other’s actions, as well as, used each 
other’s actions to elaborate, foreground (SAS1), and avoid certain topics and emotions 
(SBS1-temporal defense against emotion; narratives to resist, SAS4-N3). These actions 
on actions, the way the client and therapist worked with and against each other is the 
living anatomy of the therapeutic alliance.  
Fifty years of process and outcome research has shown that the alliance is a major 
factor that leads to change in psychotherapy (Orlinsky et al., 2004). However, as Kazdin 
(2009) points out, we still do not know what the alliance is and how it works. I argue that 
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if therapy is viewed as a type of problematizing then the nature of the therapeutic alliance 
becomes clear: it is a dynamic flow of actions that unfolds as we problematize who we 
are as certain kinds of people. Similar process studies show how the alliance is strengthen 
or weakened based on how the participants agree on common problems and work 
collaboratively (Saladin & Grimmer, 2009; Voutilainen et al., 2010). Kozart (1996) 
argued that researchers wanting to understand the therapeutic alliance should use 
conversation analysis because it provides “a set of ideas and terms that focus the 
researcher's attention on subtle, and often overlooked methods by which interactants 
jointly negotiate a sense of ordinary purpose” (p. 397). Kozart went on to state that a 
focus on how the pragmatics of therapeutic conversation affects collaboration would 
greatly advance our understanding of the alliance.67  
As discussed in chapter 3, conversation analysts have indeed focused on the 
subtleties of collaboration and resistance produced by the pragmatics of the participants’ 
speech. This current research retains that focus on pragmatics while also attending to the 
strategic deployment of power. Hence, this research, in part, adds to the study of change 
in psychotherapy because it shows how collaboration and the therapeutic alliance can be 
understood as constitutional processes of productive actions on actions through which the 
client shapes herself as a deep emotional subject who uses the hermeneutics of therapy in 
order to understand herself and live a more ethical life. The prime example of this is the 
elaboration after the SBS3 interpretation. As I show, the client and therapist extend each 
                                                            
67 This claim is connected to Kozart’s advocacy of Bordin’s (1994) theory of the alliance, which 
instructs the researcher to focus on collaboration when studying the therapeutic alliance. Kozart 
(1996) states that “Bordin forged a pantheoretical vision of the alliance based on the principle of 
patient-therapist collaboration (expressed as the bond)” (p. 369).  
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other’s speech in a manner that has been shown to be highly collaborative and alliance 
building (Peräkylä, 2008). Yet, by using DIA to attend to the constitutional strategy we 
see that this collaborative moment is where the client is interpreting herself as an 
emotional being. Through her collaborative elaboration with the therapist she constitutes 
the problem as: not wanting to get angry and if she does become angry then, instantly, 
she becomes the problem. This is a problem of how she relates to her emotions and 
therefore relates to herself. Hence, it is a problem of Ethics. Possibly, with future 
research, we will find that many of these moments of collaboration and alliance building 
occur when the client begins to understand herself in ways that align with the strategic 
deployment of power within any given therapy. 
In sum, my research allows us to see the psychotherapeutic alliance as a non-
egalitarian relationship that is productive, rather than domineering. In his later years, 
Foucault (1982) turned away from genealogy towards ethics. He became interested in 
studying how people constitute themselves as certain kinds of subjects. He did this by 
looking at what people do in order to become the of kind people they believe they should 
be (Foucault, 1983). Psychotherapy is such a practice. The ethical moment begins when 
the person’s life becomes problematized as a personal psychological problem that therapy 
can address. We do not have direct access to the moment, or the moments in which the 
client recognized herself as having a therapeutic problem. However, the client does 
reflect back on the original problem that brought her into therapy. In session A (line 203), 
she says that she originally came in for “cutting.” Cutting (or self-injury) was discussed 
across the dataset; however, it was not addressed as a behavioral issue. Instead, the 
therapist encouraged the client to understand the cutting as something “expressive” (SA, 
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line 472). Hence, the cutting is a problem of expression; it is a maladaptive form of 
communication that needs to be understood. Why has this maladaptive expression arisen? 
The answer seems to do with how the client relates to her emotions.  
Throughout both sessions the therapist continually brought emotion to the 
foreground, problematizing the way the client experienced and expressed her feelings. 
This research showed how feelings, or emotions, can be constituted as the “substance 
ethique” or “ethical substance” that needs to be worked on in order to understand the 
therapeutic problem (p. 238). It is emotion that becomes problematized in a unique way 
throughout the dataset and it is here that the constitutional work is aimed. The problem is 
that the client has difficulty expressing emotion or even understanding why this is 
difficult for her. This is the ethical problem that needs to be resolved in order the client to 
heal and live the good life. It is not the same depth hermeneutic of Freud. There’s no 
digging back into the ever-growing roots of sexual desire. As Foucault predicted shortly 
before his death, the modern person has to understand and know their feelings in order to 
be an ethical being. 
Final Reflections and Future Research 
At first glance, the case study approach has obvious limitations. Typically, the 
results from case studies are assumed not to be generalizable and so the claims made in 
chapters 4-7 may or may not be case specific. Yet, this assumption is based on a 
representational ontology where data from surveys, testing protocols, and interviews are 
taken to be facts that represent the outside world. This study arises from different 
ontological assumptions. As discussed in chapter 3, radical realism assumes that the real 
world is right before us and becomes visible through our practical activity. This practical 
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activity is visible and therefore available to empirical research. Naturally occurring 
practices are therefore not facts or representations, but specimens that can be examined in 
order to bring to light real constitutional processes. Hence, despite the case study 
approach, these results are valid processes that occur in psychotherapy. It is true that 
other types of therapy exist. Furthermore, all practices, including psychotherapy, evolve 
and, therefore, new therapies will arise as old practices fade. However, this specimen is 
part of the fabric of modern therapy and one would expect this type of therapy—a 
therapy that constitutes the client as a deep emotional subject— to be prevalent in 
contemporary practice. Hence, I argue that the constitutional change process explicated in 
this study is prominent in modern psychotherapy and future research examining 
constitution in psychotherapy would back up this claim. An expansive research project 
would find different types of constitutional specimens, for sure, but this would only serve 
to richen the discussion of how psychotherapy is a dynamic constitutional process that 
exists in a larger field power where all actions transpire with and against prevailing 
cultural winds. 
Detailed Interaction Analysis (DIA) is my contribution to this project. This 
methodology, discussed in chapter 4 and implemented in chapters 5 and 6, can be used in 
future research aimed at similar questions of constitution and change. The field of 
psychotherapy research as a whole is searching for a way to explain how change happens 
in therapy. The constitutional approach to change is promising. This methodology 
provides a fine grain analysis through which real of practices that can be understood 
within an overarching theory of change. The incorporation of the Structural theory of 
Emotion and a theory of subject positioning through narration addresses the problems 
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that arises when strictly using conversation analysis to studied constitution.68 However, 
acceptance by mainstream psychotherapy research is uncertain. The ontological 
foundation of this approach is contrary to the representationalism and positivism found in 
mainstream psychology. Therefore, the appeal of this approach and its ability to influence 
research remains to be seen. However, there are some signs that change is on the horizon. 
I believe that developing a constitutionally-based approach to psychotherapeutic 
change would benefit the field in ways that aligns with the aspirations of many prominent 
psychotherapy researchers. First, Gottman’s SPAFF coding shares many the ontological 
assumptions found in the Structural Theory of Emotion and in the constitutional approach 
to change (Coan & Gottman, 2007). Therefore, a future project integrating SPAFF coding 
with a detailed interaction analysis of constitutional change would be an inspiring project 
that might be of interest to the field of psychotherapy research as a whole. Furthermore, 
prominent researchers such as Kazdin (2009) and Orinsky (2006) have both indicated 
their desire to see research that describes how change happens in psychotherapy and for 
research that reflects the humanity of psychotherapy meaning, that research, which 
breaks down a highly complex contextual practice into numbers and self-report scales, is 
inadequate to capture what actually happens in psychotherapy. The constitutional 
approach to change is a step in the right direction because it provides analytical power 
while also retaining a sense of the holistic encounter that occurs during a psychotherapy 
session.  
                                                            
68 In chapter 4, I argue that by not having a theory of emotion, conversation analysts limit their 
ability to talk about the variety of emotion and relationships between emotions. Furthermore, 
some researchers might unknowingly rely on subjectivist assumptions about emotion when 
designing studies. In chapter 3 and chapter 4, I also point out the importance of analyzing subject-
positioning as discussed by Korobov (2001) and Wortham (2001). 
 369 
 
One barrier that needs to be overcome is the large amount of data that is required 
and generated during this type of research. The inductive approach commonly used in 
pure CA is important because it makes data analysis and data presentation manageable. 
As Orlinsky (2004) indicates, very few studies have used fine grain analysis to look at 
psychotherapy because of the massive amount of data that it generates (p. 6). The 
preferred method is to break the therapy sessions into parts, which again interferes with 
the desire to capture the holistic contextual nature of the practice. These questions still 
need to be resolved if a constitutional approach to psychotherapy is going to become 
influential in the field of psychotherapy research. 
Last, a constitutional approach to psychotherapy always has an element of 
critique. I’ve tried to repress the side of me that wants to defend psychotherapy from any 
detraction. Psychotherapy researchers and psychotherapists need to see the constitutional 
approach as something creative rather than simply destructive. Genealogy is aimed at 
exposing the historical contingency of what we do and who we are. The same impetus is 
the guiding impulse of psychotherapy, starting with Freud, and to turn this critique on 
ourselves is only natural. Remaining open to critique is vital when doing research and 
when considering psychotherapy from within. What would the field of psychotherapy 
research look like if creative critique was the general goal of research? Where might this 
lead in terms of our understanding of psychotherapy and how psychotherapy can change 
given future research? These are all unanswered questions that future researchers, 
clinicians, and clients will need to explore. 
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APPENDIX: TRANSCRIPTION KEY AND TRANSCRIPTS 
TRANSCRIPTION KEY 
 
 
(.) Just noticeable pause 
(.3), (2.6) example of time pauses 
Word word [word] 
                  [word] 
Square brackets denote the start of  
overlapping talk 
.hh hh In-breath (note the preceding fullstop) and ou
breath respectively
Wo(h)rd shows that the word has breath in this (or 
 perhaps laughter or crying) bubbling within 
Wor- a dash shows a sharp cutoff 
(word) a guess at what might have been said 
() Unclear talk 
Word WORD underlying sounds are louder, capitals are  
still louder 
((sniffs)) attempt at representing something hard, or 
impossible to read phonetically 
ºwordº  material between "degree signs" is quiet
↑word,↓word  pitch rising or falling 
wo:rd Colons indicate that the speaker has 
stretched the preceding sound. 
>word word<  <word word> Inwards arrows show faster speech, 
outward slower
((gaze)) One participant looks directly at the other 
participant 
((LA)) Look away: Participant looks away for the 
other participant
£word£ 
 
Talk was delivered with a smile 
 
Based on the Jefferson transcription system (2004), and excerpt, in part, from 
Conversation Analysis and Psychotherapy (Peräkylä et al., 2008b, pp. 198-199). The 
notation for gaze and look away are unique to this study.
  
3
8
7
 
 
 
1 
2 
C  ((Yawn for 6 seconds)) ah ((laughs and grabs back)) umh I have a twitchiness bugging 
me…ahh.. it is a hectic week. ((laugh)) 
3  T  Mhh What is going on? 
4 
5 
C  It is a three ring circus, I've got John's mom coming in and my family coming in, but they’re 
not clear on who's coming, or how they're coming, or when they're coming ((laughs)) 
6  T                                                                                                                                      Hmm 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
C  And umh try to coordinate Wanda's birthday party and the new move and yea (1) ah(h)h 
((clinches fists))  and this job stuff on top.  ((gaze)) John got let go (.) at work.  Hum his boss 
is meeting with him today to try and re relocate him if they he said “I don't think I'm a good 
fit for this position;” they agreed and they're going to try to (1)) see  if they can’t put him 
somewhere else and put ˚him to use.˚ Hum I don't think it's a great idea, but (.) ((gaze)) its 
its you got to try, >you know.< ˚So˚ (2) and it's a job I think that he’d be really good at, but.. 
13  T                                  ((Nods)) 
14 
15 
16 
17 
C  . . he’s not he is>having some difficulty getting a call back. < Someone approached ↑him 
about doing a job. And because at the time he had a job he (.) said, “well let me think about 
it,” but he didn't do anything really conclusive so there is a chance that the job’s not there 
anymore but hum 
18  T  This is kind of what you feared last week 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
C                                                                            Ya I was I was (.) fearing slash im‐ uh anticipating 
this. (.) Hum because, (2) ah, it was very clear that he was quitting. Umm, on the a‐, 
mentally he was (1) he was quitting. Things were getting to be too hard and he was getting 
to the point where he says, “˚Ya know.˚” You know, that moment of like relaxation when 
you finally say, “Okay, I'm going to let this go”? He was getting to that sort of checked out..  
24  T                                                                                     hum 
25 
26 
27 
C  .. place. It wasn't you know, he wasn't barreling into the w‐, barreling into the work 
anymore. He was sort of just saying, "if I didn't make it to this meeting, I think I’d be okay 
with that. And if, and if they let me go (1) I'm okay with that. [And] hum [(.)] 
28  T                                                                                                              h[um]            [((inhale))] But that 
T
R
A
N
S
C
R
I
P
T
 
S
E
S
S
I
O
N
 
A
*
 
*
C
o
n
v
e
r
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
l
a
n
d
s
c
a
p
e
 
t
o
 
m
e
e
t
 
E
T
D
 
f
o
r
m
a
t
t
i
n
g
 
g
u
i
d
e
l
i
n
e
s
,
 
c
o
n
t
a
c
t
 
a
u
t
h
o
r
 
f
o
r
 
p
o
r
t
r
a
i
t
 
c
o
p
y
.
 
 
  
3
8
8
 
29  wasn't okay with you.  
30  C  He was sort of looking for permission to to stop working 
31  T  Hum 
32  C  He wante‐ he was looking to get fired. And I think that’s unfortunate. 
33  T  Hum 
34 
35 
C  I:, I do ahh I I don’t  and it is not so much that I think it was a bad decision, because I think 
actually it was: (.) I think not working, what he was doing is, is probably for the best 
36  T   Hum 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
C  Hum not just because, it was, he was miserable because of everything else that is on his 
plate. He's got all these incompletes and he's got, you know, oth‐ you know other things to, 
other things to take care of and so it's (.) For, for me it’s, it’s less of a big deal. My biggest 
sort of ((makes grunting noise and gestures outward with both fists)) about it is, uhmm the 
fact that we just, now we have (1) no: jobs again. Now nobody is employed again. And so 
that, it’s much more me‐like I have ((laughs)) two stages of reaction here. One is the (.) the 
sort of like, “no one has a job” and that the the shitstorm that that creates in my mind. And 
then there's the, well this wasn't a very good fit for him and (.) hum he wasn't getting paid 
and it was really shaking his confidence [and] he was having panic attacks and so I like, like.. 
46  T                                                                          [hum] 
47 
48 
C  .. from that, (viewpoint) like you know, this is, you know, ((hands waving from head)) it is a 
good thing, it is a good thing that this job is over, but it is a bad thing you're unemployed.. 
49  T                                                                                       hum                                                                hum 
50 
51 
C  .. Like I try to sort ((laughs)) of, like that that is what I want to say to him, “it's like it sucks 
your, it sucks that your unemployed, but that job is bad for you, I wish you had some other.. 
52  T                                                                                                                   Hum 
53  C  ..job” You ((laughs )) know? But, hum yea. 
54  T  So, how have you been dealing with it? 
55 
56 
C  <I've applied to some more work,> which I, I really have a hard time with. I always feel like 
an asshole. [((laughs))] 
57  T                       [((swiftly turns head towards client))] Why? 
58 
59 
C  ((laughs)) hummm I'm really bad at (2) hum at at at hum, I feel I am really bad at the whole 
process. Not that necessarily people are bril:liant at it, but ahh I feel ya oh, um, um, ahh, I 
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60 
61 
62 
63 
don't know how to explain this (.) ahh (1) y:a got me. Um (3) ah ah ahh maybe I'll come up 
with something brilliant, but for now I'll just say like, the the w:hole like, “this is why you 
should hire me” and trying to spin (.) what I have done and trying to talk myself up >I am 
really,< (.) I, I really have a hard time (.) time doing that 
64  T  Hum 
65  C  Umm 
66  T  What do you make of that? 
67  C  Ahh It ((laughs, gaze))probably doesn’t speak good things to me. Hum  
68  T  I'm sorry it didn't catch that. 
69 
70 
71 
C  (I‐ saying), it probably isn’t saying very much good about me to be honest, that I can’t (.) ahh 
say (4). I don't have a follow‐up for that, I can say, “Hire me, I am hard‐working” and that’s 
pretty much it (.) ahh its its hum yea (.)((laughs)) (.). “Hire me, I won't steal things or set..  
72  T                             Hum                               hum 
73    ..fires” ((gestures with both fists looking at therapist)) (.) “Hire me I could figure things out..  
74  C           Hum 
75  T  .. on my own.” And then it feels like: “prove it,” and I'd be like (.) smile ((tilt head to the..  
76                                                                                                                                   Hum 
77 
78 
79 
80 
C  .. side and smiles))(.) ahh I, I don't know, I don't know. Most places I've worked, I kind of did 
my career backwards and in the most rewarding and fulfilling work humm in the most sort 
of impressive work early on in my life, like I was I was a manager at a movie theater when I 
was, (.) 18 years old (.)  And the last job I had was.. the last two jobs I had were under the..  
81  T                                       Hum 
82 
83 
C  .. table data entry at a place I would never put on my resume because the job there was 
nightmarish (.) I have nothing positive to say ((laughs))about the experience,.. 
84  T                          hum    
85  C  and food service. (.)Like ((chortle)) and ahh the movie theater I worked for .. 
86  T                                  Hum 
87 
88 
C  got ↓sold to another, like their east, all of their (.) ((smacking sound, makes hand gesture 
around head)) East Coast theaters got sold to another company and everybody got fired.. 
89  T                                                                                                                                                            [hum] 
90  C  ..so I don't have a boss, I'm not (.) I don’t have a reference, I don't have the reference for 
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91  that. The things I've done further back [I am losing] contact with. I worked for, I proofread.. 
92  T                                                                        [Hum]  
93 
94 
C  .. for one of my professors and he is retired and now that I don't have a way of getting ahold 
of him (.) 
95  T  Hum 
96 
97 
C  And so it's just this very (3) ((shifts hand back and forth)) >Chaotic thing< (1) And I:  I don't 
like feeling judged and I don't like, really having to explain myself a whole lot. 
98  T                                                                                                                        Hum so [yo‐] 
99 
100 
101 
C                                                                                                                                       [Not] not that I 
don't like describing things like that ((smile)), (  ) narrative awesome, fine with that, but 
when it comes to justifying myself I have a hard time with that.  
102  T  Being evaluated. 
103  C  Ya I don't like it, I don't like it at all, it makes me qu↓easy. 
104  T  Hum 
105  C  Hum yea 
106 
107 
T  ((deep breath)) You know, I'm thinking back to, ahh when we're talking about, how it is 
difficult for you to talk about yourself. 
108  C  Yea 
109  T  I'm wondering if it's related to (.) this uncomfortable feeling that you're being evaluated 
110 
111 
112 
113 
C  Yea and I I don't feel like I do a terribly good job of it hum (.) I don't know if you've had a 
chance to read through my, my notes or if Jackson even bothered to write it down (.) cause I 
said it like, ↑forever ago, but hum. It was <sort of> taught to me, hum when I was younger, 
that you don't do things you don't do well. (1) ((gaze)) That you ((nods head as she looks  
114  T                                                                                 hum 
115  C  .. away)) don't enjoy things you don't do well, and you don't do things you don't do well 
116  T  And what don't you do well? 
117  C  I:, umh I, I don't really know ((laughs)) 
118  T                                                  hum       
119  C  Umh but (2) ahh that was always my understanding, my m:om wasn't good at sports (.).. 
120  T                                                                                                                                                          Hum 
121  C  ..and she refused to let me participate because she thought I would be bad at them too (.).. 
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122  T                                                                                                                                                               hum 
123  C  ..Because it's genetic apparently, being able to hit a tee‐ball is gent‐ is genetic ((laughs)) 
124  T  Hum 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
C  Ah ((long outbreath)) so it is very hard for me, when I  t‐ t‐ (1) to keep at things if I feel like 
I'm fai↓ling, and umh. The adjudicaƟon process for me really, sort of, highlights the 
potential for failure because if no one is really watching, if you’re not keeping score no one 
loses and you know, which is strangely enough the way I play most of my games, there’s 
there is no, I, you know, nobody keeps score and things are just for, for just shits and giggles 
and half the rules get thrown out of the way because they just make the game overly,.. 
131 
132 
T                                                                                                                          ((uncrosses legs and 
repositions away from the client)) 
133 
134 
C  .. competent you know overly complicated or competitive like I'm much more sort of 
copacetic in nature [and ahh] 
135 
136 
137 
T                                     [hum] ((deep breath)) you know, I remember maybe a couple sessions 
ago you said that you have your standards for everybody else and you have your standards 
for yourself 
138 
139 
140 
C  Oh yea, ahh I was really hard on myself with ahh, I have a distinct memory and uhm being 
ahh middle school or maybe early high school and I, umh in a math class and I had gotten 
like a 97 on an exam and I was (.) a: w:reck ((gaze)) (.) >I was a wreck< I was a complete.. 
141  T                                                                                 hum 
142 
143 
144 
  .. and utter chaotic mess, ahh it eventually worked itself ou‐ out a little bit because I ended 
up with a C on one of my physics exams, one of my physics classes towards the end of high 
school, ya’know, I got over it a little [but,] but hum yea. 
145 
146 
T                                                                    [Hum]                           What do you make of being so 
hard on yourself? 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
C  I want things to be right (1) and, ahh (1) ahh yea (.) yea I want things to be right, I want 
them to be huh ((Laughs and gestures with hands together)) like, “how could I miss that,” 
like, “I know this, I can do this. Why, why am I failing?” You know, and ahh sort of ahh for 
me it feels like a lot of loss of big picture kind of things like, “You didn't fail. You got a 97.” 
“Ya but you failed question number 2, (.) you failed that,” you know, ((laughs)) if if you're.. 
152  T                                                                  hum    
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153 
154 
C  .. looking for failure you could subdivide things, you know, until the piece you have is 
nothing but failur[e hum] 
155  T                                  [Hum↓] ((pulls head away)) And that’s what you seem to do? 
156 
157 
C  Hum (.) I, I have done in the past, I think I’m slightly better at it, like I said I got a, I almost 
failed physics (.) which wasn’t my fault by the way ((pointing at therapist)) it was the..  
158  T                           Hum                                                                hum 
159  C  teacher’s fault. (.) He didn't teach (.) [and hum] the first half, the first half of the semester..  
160  T                                                                   [hum]                                                   
161 
162 
C  ..he would give out problems for you to work and then at the end of the class he would 
write the answers down and uhm (.) He got tired of writing, either he got tired of writing..  
163  T                                                                 hum 
164 
165 
C  ..the answers down or people weren’t working, and so said he stopped writing the answers 
down and (.) I started failing (.).. 
166  T                                                                                                                                                               hum 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
C  .. Ah Because he didn't teach. So the only way that I, so the way that I was learning physics 
was he would give me the answer, I would work the problem out until that was the answer 
that I got. I’d work the other problem out using the same steps I done for, for problem one 
and if I got the answer that was the correct answer to number two, that was the way you 
solved the problem (.) [uh]mm 
172  T                                     Uh[um] ((nodding) 
173  C  .. But without the answers I didn't know if I was learning the right thing or not, it was just..  
174  T                                                                                                                                               hum 
175 
176 
C  .. yea I, I can give you an answer to problem two, but I don't know, if it is right now, I don’t 
know why it would be right (.) Um yea so, that was a little frustrating (.) I got, C‐   I got.. 
177  T                                                       Hum                                                                hum 
178 
179 
C  ..an A in the first half and like a D ((laughs)) in the, a low D in the second half and ended up 
with a [high C] in the course. ahh which didn't b↑reak me up all that much I got to say (1)..  
180  T              [hum]                                                                                                                                       
181  C  ..((laughs)) 
182 
183 
T  hum well I wonder if in that situation ahh you see that it was maybe not a reflection on you, 
but a reflection on the teacher (.) But it sounds like a lot of things, that if things don't go.. 
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184  C                                                           Yea 
185  T  .. right you, you see them as a reflection on yourself 
186 
187 
188 
189 
190 
C                                                                                       Ahh definitely, definitely, “Why couldn't I 
have  held it down.” “Why couldn't I have made it,” you know “things happen.” “Why 
couldn't I have fixed things.” I have a lot of fix ((leans forward and makes fists)) in me, I want 
to fix things. Um (1) and ahh which, which is a good thing in some ways and a t↑erri↓ble 
thing ((laughs)) in other ways (.)  because I drive myself  crazy humm 
191 
192 
T                                                                              uhum                                                           ((deep 
breath))Yea because I remember last week, um,  you said that you, you hit yourself 
193  C  Yea 
194  T  That you’ve hit yourself 
195  C  Yea, Ya Rr‐((brushes fingers over left forearm))there are remnants of that still ((gaze)) 
196 
197 
T                                                                                                                                               Hum and 
what do you make of [that?] 
198 
199 
200 
C                                          [Ahh] hh I just (.) it’s it’s the no(h)ise that she makes. There is this 
particular ahh it’s ju‐, And I, I’ve heard other babies cr↑y and it doesn't bother me: (.)  
nearly as much as when Wanda cries, [when] Wanda does it [and] especially,  
201 
202 
T                                                                       [Uhum]                             [hh]                   So this started 
when Wanda was born?  
203  C  Ah no I had ah, I, I ar‐ initially started therapy for cutt↓ing (.) uhum (.) and it just when I feel 
204  T                                                                                                          hum 
205  C  .. completely overwhelmed, it's just a way of releasing, uhum (.) yea 
206  T  Overwhelmed and releasing (.) what com[˚es˚ ˚t‐˚] 
207 
208 
209 
210 
211 
C                                                     Yeah           [it is sort of] like like you’re just full of chaos 
((shaking hands back and forth)) and ˚ah˚ I don't know why it works it just did. Uhum and it 
disa‐ Yea it is not being able to sort of like £reason£ with her drives me crazy. To be like, 
“Listen, you need to stop screaming because you're not dy:ing, you just your threw juice and 
that is why you don't have juice right now. So if you could please, just don't hit me I'm..  
212  T                                                                             Hm 
213 
214 
C  .. trying to give you your juice back.” >Because that will happen< she’ll work herself into 
such a l‐  like she’ll she’ll work herself into such a lather that she won't let you give: her 
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215  what what she's demanding (.) A:nd yea. Sometimes I can make jokes about it, you know,..  
216  T                                                      hum 
217  C  .. slightly lighthearted, like “Wah wah wah, I'm gonna die of mild discom[fort”]. I’ve said..  
218  T                                                                                                                                    [hum] 
219  C  .. that to her a Coup[le of] times, which I think is okay as long as she can’t hear me..  
220  T                                      [((laughs))] 
221  C  .. mo:ck↑ing her. If‐  I'm going to have to stop that pretty so[on be]cause she's pretty it.. 
222  T                                                                                                               [hum]                                            
223 
224 
C  .. cle:ver, but ahh like I think really (hard) like ((hand to face)) “Wah wah, ((hand as puppet)) 
[mild discomfort, I’m going to] die I'm going to starve to death, you haven’t fed me.. 
225  T  [hh  ((laughs))]                                                              
226  C  .. in an hour, those kind of things is like ˚okay, okay˚ ahh (.) 
227  T  But when things feel chaotic 
228 
229 
230 
231 
232 
C  Ahh really, really, sort of overwhelming ((brings hands to face and has stranded look)) like, 
that’s sort of like, “a:hh I don’t know what‐ to do, I don't know how to make this situation 
better.” Like (.) everything just stops, something stopped, cause there's too many, too many 
things happening (.) uhum (2) I am I am par‐ I have mentioned that I am partially deaf in this 
ear ((points to left ear)) I think, ah sometimes though my hearing comes back (.) and.. 
233  T                     uhum 
234  C  .. it’s, it's strange because then all of a sudden everything is loud (.) It feels like I'm..  
235  T                                                                                                                    hum                                              
236 
237 
238 
239 
240 
241 
242 
243 
  .. swimming in sounds. Like everybody and everything is like right (.) on ((holds hands to 
head)) in my head. So like the noises we are able to filter out, like the the musak the in the 
room ((pointing to left)), the sounds of air brakes ((points to right as air brakes are heard on 
recording)), the the buzz of the lights, all those kinds of things (.) are just oppressively loud 
and it is like being, it's like drowning in an ocean of sound. And it's sort of similar to that but 
only more panicked for me, so sort of like just feeling like you're going to drown because all 
of these things are just bombarding you. And ahh yea that’s that’s definitely what It feels 
like. 
244  T  And so cutting and or hitting yourself (.) breaks [that] 
245  C                                                                                        [It] g‐ yea it, I’ll, it lets me sort of vent my 
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246 
247 
248 
249 
250 
251 
frustra:tion, so then, cause I think that's probably what a large bit of the torrent is is just (.) 
Not the, the sound thing, but ˚sort of˚, I feel I am making this much more (muddled) than it 
needs to be. hh uhum (.) Yea it’s it’s (1) For whatever reason it relaxes me. It gets, you know 
a sort of, I guess I get an:gry at being overwhelmed or just frus:trated at the situation but it 
gets, it gets something out. I am physically doing something that gets me out of the 
moment. Umm 
252  T  ((deep breath)) I also wonder if you t‐ turn that anger and frustration towards yourself? 
253 
254 
255 
C  I do, I totally do, I totally do, cause I don't want’a  I don't want’a, you know, do anything to 
my child (.) I don't want’a, you know, hit John or break dishes because the dishwasher is not 
working, you know I don't want to ((laugh)) yea it feels like the only safe place to vent 
256 
257 
T  Hum a‐ and that brings me back to where there’s a different set of rules for you than there 
are for other people. (.) That ahh that they can't be objects of your aggression, but.. 
258  C                                          Yea                                                                                              Yea 
259  T  ..you can be your own object of aggression. 
260  C  I think that is one of the things I hate about John's mom. (.) ((laughs)) And that’s that she.. 
261  T                                                                                                        Hum 
262 
263 
C  .. acts with such impunity. (.) That she doesn't c‐, it doesn't, she doesn't have to explain, or 
justify, or even apologize fo:r just crapping all over people. (2) A:nd, and like: “No, you.. 
264  T                                                                                                         Hum 
265 
266 
C  .. don't get to do that. No one gets to do that.” And a:hh ya, I hate that about he(h)r. 
((laughs)) 
267 
268 
T                   ((quick deep breath) and and what do you think it is about expressing anger that (.) 
ahh is difficult, that uh, it has to be directed towards you? 
269  C  Uhum you're not supposed to get an((gaze))gry. (1) [((LA))] U:hum yea (.) ahhh that’s  
270  T                                                                                            H[u:m] 
271 
272 
C  ((laughs and gestures with hands)) that’s you know like, that’s what crazy and mad people 
do. (1) Yea, ↑ya hum. Like I said, I don't really have, you know, like the most.. 
273  T                        hum 
274 
275 
C  .. my mom ever gets close to angry is like a disapproving look or a chiding tone, like my 
mom is ((motions hands across her face ‐‐ flat faced)) 
276  T  What about your dad? 
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277  C  My dad s:wears, but is really lighthearted (.) [So] he will be like, "God dammit" and then.. 
278  T                                                                             Hu[m] 
279  C  .. he's fine. There's never like "Mother fucking piece of shit [why doesn’t a god damn thing.. 
280 
281 
T                 Um                                                                                     [ ((laughs and adjusts position))]     
((laughs)) 
282 
283 
C  .. ever go right and one more thing." £Yea and meanwhile I'm, I am one to, like, break 
furniture and and like tra(h):sh, trash your place, like I'm in an 80s rock band, like I,.. 
284  T                 hum                                                                                                                 hum 
285  C  ..want to just decimate something. (.)£ And a:h I decimate me ((gaze)) instead, [like]..  
286  T                                                                  Hu:m                                                                    [mm] 
287  C  ya↓ a(h)h I a(h) ((croaking)) (.) Yea I just get really angry. I guess it’s anger? Uhum [ahh] 
288  T  [I bet] it's a lot of things. 
289 
290 
C  Ya pro(h)bably, I just, yea I, just, like <sometimes I do just want to be like>, “Fucking 
dishwasher,” and just be like, “No more plates” ((gaze)). Yea, I did that.. 
291  T                                                                                         hum 
292 
293 
294 
295 
296 
C  ..once actually, I threw away some plates, I pulled them out eventually, but (.) John had, 
John had made a mess, had cooked, and he made a huge mess in the kitchen and had made 
food, and had, but had made more food than he could eat, and he said he was going to put 
it a↑way, and I said okay this, you know, we have two cats that are kind of assholes, 
because cats are kind of assholes, and uhum, because they don’t..  
297  T                                                                                   Hum 
298  C  understand personal ownership beyond what they own. They own things and and nuts to..  
299  T                                                                                                      hum 
300 
301 
302 
303 
304 
305 
C  .. the rest of you. Hum so, but he had left it out and he had left, you know this, this dirty 
cooking, cooking thing, with food in it on top of the hutch  where we keep all of Wanda's 
things. And I like to keep Wanda's clean things in a (.)  as close to, not a sterile environment, 
but to a sanitary environment as possible, only clean things go with Wanda's clean dishes, 
no food goes there, no nothing, the only thing that goes were Wanda's clean dishes go is 
also clean dishes. (.) And he left food there and the cats had jumped on top of..  
306  T                                    hum 
307  C  .. the hutch with their dirty feet and were making a mess and fighting over food (.) right.. 
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308  T                                                                                                                                                   Hum 
309 
310 
C  ..next to all this stuff. And I went, “Go:d da:mmit” and just threw the whole ((hand gestures 
up)), “Fuck this” ((hand gestures down and makes noise dummm)) 
311  T  You threw it away? Or the‐ 
312  C  I threw the food away, I ch‐ I threw the plates away. 
313  T  Hummmm 
314 
315 
316 
317 
C  I, they didn't bre:ak and I eventually fished them out when I calmed down a little, but I was 
like, "Would have it been so fucking hard to walk 10 extra feet” because there's only, 
there’s a 10 foot span from the hutch to the far side of the kitchen like to just “put this in 
the god damn fridge, would it have really taken that much more effort out of your stupid..  
318  T                                       hum 
319  C  .. day to just do things properly.” 
320  T                                                   <And how did he respond?> 
321 
322 
323 
324 
C  (3) Ahh he said he was sorry, he said he didn't think it would be a problem. And I said, “How 
could you not think it was a problem, you have met our cats, you can't leave food out that 
they want to eat, that they would have want to eat, and expect them to behave themselves. 
(.) mhuf If if you, you you can't leave temptation out with with,..  
325  T   hum                                                                                                                                                              
326 
327 
C  ..with a creature that doesn't have any sense of morality, they'll just ((makes noise gestures 
out ward mmnnnaa)), you know? 
328 
329 
T                                                               Hum                                    Were you satisfied with the, the 
outcome of that ahh (.) conflict between you and John? 
330 
331 
C  No, I'm never really satisfied with those kinds of things, because really what I want is for the 
situation not to have happened. (.) And no amount of me ↓yel↑ling or Geƫng Ma:d.. 
332  T                                                            Hum 
333 
334 
335 
336 
337 
338 
C  ..fixes the fact that, you know now I have to scrub this whole area and you've wasted food 
and, you know, you’re <cutting corners when> you don't need to. I have a re:al issue with 
people cutting corners. Like, cause, it ↑real↓ly doesn't take a whole lot of effort to do 
thing:s (.) in an efficient, (.) thoughtful kind of way, you know, and so it drives me a:hh a 
little bit off my, off my keel when someone cuts corners in a:a way that (.) ahh that a:h is 
bad for the situati[on and there is this ()] 
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339  T                                  [So so, you do feel] that you can get angry with John? 
340  C  Ya, I totally (laughs) do 
341  T  Hum 
342  C  Oh yeah definitely 
343  T  Hum 
344 
345 
C  But Ummhh (2) Ya and I, “I am sorry I yelled, please don't do this again,” and he’s like, “I 
forgot that the cats are assholes. I didn't m[ean] for that to happen.” [And I am] like okay,.. 
346  T                                                                                                                               [hum] 
347 
348 
C  .. okay and that, like that part feels better, but I always wonder, ahh wer‐ John and I are 
pretty good at talking but I worry that it doesn't do enough (.) 
349  T                                                                                                             Hum 
350  C  Like ahh (.) cause I, there are things that I told him <100 times> and you know it is like .. 
351  T                                                                                                              Hum 
352 
353 
354 
C  ..like, "Don't put dirty dishes were Wanda's clean dishes are when I” its , she has a drying 
stand, we have we have a narrow kind of kinda of probably about that wide ((holds hands 
about a foot apart)) on one side of the sink and a big counter that’s like this big on the..  
355  T  humm 
356 
357 
C  .. other side, so we have a pretty sma‐, like the kitchen is the length of this sofa really, and 
((laughs) hum ahh, ahum I was like just dirty dishes.. 
358  T     hum 
359  C  .. on that side of the sink, only clean dishes by Wanda’s stuff because I don't want to..  
360  T                                             Hum 
361 
362 
363 
364 
C  .. have to re‐scrub things that are already clean (.)..you know. (.) And he doesn't care. And 
ahh and he gets mad that I say that. I am like “Well, if you cared, you’d either say this 
doesn't work for me and here’s why, let's figure out something different,” or you, or when 
you say “Okay babe I got it” you would mean it, and I wouldn't have to keep telling you...  
365  T                                                                                     hum 
366 
367 
C  .. this If you were listening and if you were caring, we wouldn't have to keep having this 
discussion. 
368  T  I wonder if that is reminiscent of how you felt with Jake? 
369  C  Definitely, definitely. And (2) ahh John doesn't kn:ow how to deal with angry <people>. He 
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370 
371 
really doesn't have a lot of good means for dealing with angry people. Cau:se ah with his 
mom he sort of just blocks everything out. (.) Ahh he just kind of just, it’s like a computer in..
372  T                                                                                hum 
373 
374 
C  ..sleep mode, it s↑its ↑there and it is techni↓cally working . (.) But it is not present, you 
know. 
375  T  <Do you ever feel guilty after getting angry with John>? 
376 
377 
C  (3) No actually cause I don't, I make a point of not saying things that I think are hurtful. And 
ahh  
378  T  Do you want to say those things? 
379 
380 
381 
382 
C  ↑No ((shakes head)), no I really don't uhum sometimes I tend to say something shocking 
just to see if I can get his stupid attention, but hum I don't want to hurt him, I don't. Hum, 
yea .(2.) Cause I don't really think that he is, I think that he's inconsiderate but not bad.   
[So] I don’t like, I don't want to hurt him. Ahh (.) yea (.) 
383  T   [Hum]                                                                                      But you'll hurt yourself. 
384  C  ˚Yea˚, yea I , I don't know, what to do with that. Uhum (1) £Something's ((gaze)) got..  
385  T                                                                                        Hum                                                                          
386  C  .. to give£ you know, it just boils over, >something's got to give< (.) and ahh I I want.. 
387  T                                     hum                                                                          Uhum 
388 
389 
390 
C  .. to get that under control, because I don't want to: you know , have Wanda see me like 
screaming and storm out of a room and just you know like, ((laughs)) furiously unmake the 
whole bed or you know kick things, or break things, though it is tempting.. 
391  T                                                                Hum 
392 
393 
394 
395 
C  .. ((laughs)). When I was in college we had to, like, design our own, like, our dream house for 
one of these sort of writing Project things. And mine was a, mine included a room th‐, a 
room  in the house that was a, you know how, like how in a church you pay quarter and you 
get to light a candle or something like that, it is a similar thing you pay a dollar and there.. 
396  T                                                                  hum 
397  C  .. is a box full of figurines from the dollar store, you just buy them in bulk, and you.. 
398  T                                                                                                                                  Hum 
399  C  .. just break the ever living shit out of it, you know, and then you g‐ “Okay” ((makes.. 
400  T                                                                                          Hum                       hum 
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401  C  .. noise ummmm and hand geustures away)). Let the cupie doll have it. 
402  T  So there is some intense anger? 
403  C  Ah well I guess ((open hands and shrugs)) that is anger, I don't ((laughs )) this is this is, I.. 
404  T                              Hum                                                                                
405  C  ..feel silly, I, I don’t know, I ,I, I 
406  T  What makes you feel silly? 
407  C  That I wouldn’t, like, cause it seems like, like I should know what I'm feeling (.) If it is.. 
408  T                                                                                                                                           hum 
409  C  ..something so visceral that I should have some semblance of what's going on. [a‐ I, I] 
410 
411 
T                                                                                                                                                [ ((deep 
breath as if preparing for speech))] 
412 
413 
C  don't know if it is anger, like, I just feel, I, I just feel  overwhelmed and then just like this  
desire to break things. 
414 
415 
T  I wonder if that's what maybe gives it kinda this chaotic feel is that you’re not really sure 
what you're feeling. (.) You just know you want it to sto[p]. 
416 
417 
C                                     Yea                                                          [Li]ke sometimes I can tell John like 
this pisses me off, when you do this, this pisses me off, I can say that. (.) Which is kind of,..  
418  T                                                                                                                              Hum 
419 
420 
C  .. kind of nice (1) ˚ya˚ (1) I know sa‐ I know he tries to >listen too.< I will give him that, but 
uhum, it is sometimes I worry we talk too much (.) (( makes “chaaa” moving head toward..  
421  T                                                                                          hum 
422 
423 
424 
425 
426 
427 
428 
429 
430 
C  .. therapist))we are always sort of like, “Do you want to talk about this,” “Well yes, yes I do.” 
And I'm not, but it never feels like we have, I guess I want some point in timefor there to be 
like a, we talk about it and then one of us goes “Okay” and the next course of action, it’s like 
I want it to be more than just, “Let’s talk about what we are feeling” I want it to be like, 
“Okay, I didn't like when this happened.” “You didn’t like when this happened.” And it feels 
like that's when the conversation stops. I want to go to the level of, ahh I would love it to go 
to the level of (.) “And this is how are going to, what were going to do differently. What I 
can do differently, what you can do differently.” Because just talking about it doesn't keep 
us from going back to a place that really neither of us want to go. ahum It doesn't help.. 
431  T                                                                                                                      hum 
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432  C  .. us get there and ahum. (3) I think it is good that we are able to talk.. 
433  T                                                  hum 
434 
435 
C  ..about things that like, "You drive me crazy, it’s not always easy to live with you," and be 
like, "You drive me crazy, and it’s not always easy to live with with you." And neither of us..  
436  T                                            ((laughs))                                               
437  C  ..mean that  in a, neither of us mean that in a me:an‐spirited way, just being honest about.. 
438  T                                                                                                                       h:um 
439  C  .. the nature of the each other and this relationship [and that] were not going anywhere..  
440  T                                                                                               [hum]  
441 
442 
C  we still love being here but, sometimes you're a bear and that's okay,  
you know and uhum. (2) 
443 
444 
T   Hum                                   I wonder if there is something also kind of expre:ssive about the 
way you hurt yourself. (2) 
445  C  ((shrugs and hands open)) (2) I , I don’t ↑know. 
446 
447 
T  ((deep breath) cause one of things I was thinking, cause I don’t,  I don’t think I would have 
noticed unless you pointed it out to me. 
448  C  The bruise? 
449  T  Yeah. 
450 
451 
C  £Everybody£ else I've seen pointed it out, they were like ((deep in breath with sucking 
sound)) “What happened, what happened? ( (makes SSSS SSSS noise))"  I, I guess it.. 
452  T                                              hum 
453  C  .. got bigger, ((traced bruise with finger)) it got like really dark purple and this whole like,.. 
454  T                                                                                                                                                     hum 
455  C  .. it look like I got hit with a golf ball going like 90 ((laughs)) miles an hour, and umm..  
456                                                                                                                                       hum 
457    .. you know, that kinda of thing. [umm] 
458 
459 
T                                                            [ ((deep breath))] And I kn‐, and I remember talking about  
how it is hard for you to talk about yourself (.) Umm that y‐ that you're                                          
460  C                                                                                                      Yes 
461  T  .. aware of kind of other people's suffering, uhum but you you decided to share that..  
462  C                                                                           umhum 
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463  T  ..with me. 
464 
465 
C  Umhum well I, I I made it a point in (.) in a previous session since part of the reason why I'm 
here, is for self harm to make mention (.) when it happens. Because I don’t, I think..  
466  T                                                                          hum  
467 
468 
469 
470 
C  it is important that (.) you know as my counselor that ahhh when I'm having any sort of back 
fall or side steps or however you want to  ahh conceptualize it, because ahh I imagine it 
changes the nature of things <I imagine it does,> if I':m (.) simply in recovery or if I'm (.) 
having these, these, these moments, so. 
471 
472 
T  ((deep breath )) And I guess I'm curious what comes to mind if we are to entertain the idea 
that maybe there is something expressive about it? 
473  C  (2) I'm really not thinking about anybody else when I'm doing it. Uhum (1) I'm really not.. 
474  T                                                                                                                                Hum 
475 
476 
477 
C  .. uhum. (1) <As cause like I said> I am just as likely to, much more likely nowadays to (1) 
bang ((place heel of hand to head)) as I am to do anything else. I'm much more likely to 
bang. 
478  T  What about to yourself? 
479  C  What do you mean? 
480  T  What are you trying to express to yourself? 
481 
482 
C  It doesn’t really feel like I'm making £any£ big statement, it's just (.) ((motions hands away 
from the body twice)) getting, like the desire out of me. [(.) Yea]. 
483 
484 
485 
T                                                                                                        [Hum (.)] I guess you know I kind of 
operate on the, the assumption that the symptom speaks. And I'm wondering what it’s 
saying? 
486 
487 
488 
C  ((hands open)) Ahh “£ever(h)ything£ sucks.” That’s, that’s the way it feels when it's 
˚happening.˚ Ahum I don't, ˚I don't know if there is something (  ) or poetic to be said for it. 
But I don’t know.˚ ˚(We) can ahh (we) can think about that.˚ 
489 
490 
T  Cause I remember asking you, “Do you get angry in session,” and you said, “No probably 
not,” and if you can cry in session, and you said, “[((laugh))] Not if I can help it.” 
491 
492 
493 
C           ((looks down))                                                      [((laugh))]                                 Yea, I'm not, 
I'm not, I'm not one for the waterworks, uhum, I which is strange because I'm ↑preƩy 
↑senƟmental, uhum but [ahh yea]. 
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494  T            Hum [((deep breath))] Yeah, and I have seen you actively [try to hold the tears in.] 
495 
496 
C                                                                                                                   [((deep breath, smiling, open 
hands wave towards face as she nods)) Yea,] yea, yea I do that. 
497  T  And I wonder what that's about? 
498  C  ˚I,˚ I like to put a, a brave, tough face on things. 
499  T  And why is that so important to you? 
500  C  I don't know, uhum the way I was raised I guess, you kind of soldier through and ahh… 
501  T                                                                                         Hum 
502 
503 
504 
C  .. and you don’t complain a lot, about a lot of things. (2) I had some pretty terrible shit 
happen ((gaze laughs)) as we discussed earlier and hum, (1) I think that's part of it. And also 
sort of I, when I was growing up I was one of the guys. (1) I‐ 
505 
506 
T                                                                                                               Hum (1) and £guys don't talk 
about their feelings£? 
507  C  <No they don't>, no they talk about that that that that, you know that swe:et ollie you did,..  
508  T                                                                                                                                                              hmm 
509  C  .. or how,…how you, how you tweeked your arm when you fell that time. They, they don't.. 
510  T                                                                                                                                    Hum                      
511  C  .. talk [about that stuff], “Yea, it Didn't hurt, didn't hurt.” “Yes it did, Wuss” [((laugh))]  (4) 
512  T            [ “It , it didn't hurt.”]                                                                      ((laughs)) [hum] 
513 
514 
C  ..Yea, I was one of the guys. I didn’t have an‐, I had hardly any female friends for most my 
life, hum,  almost  all of my friends are guys, <even now> most my friends are guys. (.)..  
515  T                                                                                                                                                       hum 
516 
517 
C  ..hum (2) <I don't know why that is> ↑hum could be coincidence, could be something else, I 
don't know, I don't know. 
518  T                     Hum                   Sounds like you think something might be there? 
519 
520 
C  Just that sort of hum (2) that sort of ahh, (1) you're supposed to be £tough£. And you get 
tough o:r (1) life and everybody else will get you down and get on top of you. (.) hum (1) yea 
521  T  Hum and where did you get tha‐ conclusion, where did you come to that conclusion? 
522 
523 
524 
C  I don't have a, an instance ((curt)), or an ahh (1) ahh or a particular ((rubs hands together)), 
you know, paradigm shift in mind, ˚just˚ seems to be (.) the way things go. (3) If you are 
tough you can take care of yourself, and if you:'re ↓not then you’re a burden to.. 
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525  T   hum 
526  C  ..others. (2) Need someone, you know, co:ddl[ing] you all the time, well, what the..  
527  T                  Hum                                                           [((eyebrow ↑))]                             
528  C  ..fuck’s [the] point of that? (2)  
529  T                 [((eyebrow ↑))]       hum 
530 
531 
C  ((gaze)) £I sa(h)id something bigger than I think I did, didn’t I, because..you made a face? 
[((laughs))] Yea that one, with the eyebrow ((hand toward eye and makes noise “Bink”)). 
532  T   [hum ((eyebrow ↑)) ]                                  Hum  what did you make of it?              [You said] 
533 
534 
535 
C                                                                                                                         I don't know, [I don't] 
know, I want you to tell me what it is, ((LA sheepishly)) if I said something big. (.) You tell me 
what it is. (1) £I don’t know£. Hum 
536  T                    Hum                                   What comes to mind? 
537 
538 
539 
C  (2) It seems like an a: (.) a very strange mentality to have had as a child. I think that is kind of 
the point of being a kid is to be sort of nurtured and coddled, and get your booboos kissed 
and things like that. (.) Not run around with, you know, gaping wounds and gravel on your..  
540  T                                     hum           
541  C  .. knee,  and, “ I am good” [you] know. (.) ↑I don’t know, I don’t know. (3) #ah# Man,.. 
542  T                                                  [hum] 
543  C  .. childhood su(h)cks. ((laughs)) 
544  T  Humm?  
545  C  I said, “Man, childhood sucks.” (2) Kids are vicious, kids are VICious. 
546  T  What are you referencing? 
547 
548 
549 
550 
C   Oh just being, I got picked on my whole life, whole life. uhum I was very isolated and very 
lonely, and being isolated and lonely also makes you we:ird on top of, ((laughs)) whatever 
else is going on, because then you have a vocabulary that is too big for your pe:ers and you 
make jokes that nobody gets, and (2) 
551 
552 
T                                                   Hum               How long, how far back can you remember being 
picked on? 
553  C  Ahh, <elementary school>. I can remember being picked on in elementary school. 
554 
555 
T                                               Hum                                                                                           What is 
coming to mind? 
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556 
557 
558 
C  Ahh just ah being teased, <it was kinda one of these like> I had been teased about my 
weight for almost my whole life, and I was thinking back to it and like, in, in the, in like the 
second grade, I wasn’t heavy, I was just an Amazon, ((looks at therapist)) like I was..  
559  T                                                                                                  hum 
560 
561 
C  .. fi:ve fee:t tall in like the first, in like the first and second grade. I was a hu:ge kid and it 
wasn't that I was, you know, like barrel, like a barrel or anything like that. I was actually on.. 
562  T                                                                                                                                     hum 
563 
564 
C  .. the athletic side, but hum I got made fun of for being so: big, and for dressing like a dork 
because my mom dressed me. And didn’t, she, my mom really wanted to preserve my..  
565  T                                                        hum 
566 
567 
C  .. childhood and preserve my my innocence, and in the way that she chose to do that was by 
dressing me, like an overgrown toddler, like I wore, did not wear jeans until I was in middle.. 
568  T                                                                      hum 
569 
570 
C  .. school. So that made me £re(h)al popular£. "˚You look like a clown˚ ((spoken in a 
whisper)).” Like, “Yea, yea I know. I know, and I read at a fifth‐grade level. Don't you..  
571  T                   Hum 
572 
573 
C  .. want to talk to me?” “No, we don’t. You don’t you don’t watch enough thunder rangers 
[and] we don’t like you.” Sad face ((makes mock sad face laughs)) 
574 
575 
T  [Hum]                                                                                                       Hum.  You say sad face, but 
you don't make a sad face. 
576 
577 
578 
579 
580 
581 
C  Yea, well I don’t want to make a sad face. I don’t want to go there because it <sucks hu:m>. 
And  also having like friends that would be friends with you, but only when (.) like, no one 
else was there. Cause I went to a daycare center, and somedays the other kids would get, 
like like the kids in my age group, like within like a grade or two (above me) would all, all of 
the other, like all of their other friends would go and they would be like, “Oh, let’s you and I 
play, and we’ll have a grand old time. But tomorrow yo:u stink.”(.)  Ahh granted these are,..  
582  T                                                                                                                      hum 
583 
584 
585 
586 
C  .. boys and so like around other boys they had to do the whole “girls are yucky” kind of 
thing, and they didn't hang out with any girls during, during the daytime hours so the sort of 
like the everybody else watching you kind of times, but ahh yea. I was a girl that didn't have 
any female friends and I was we:ird because I was a:rtsy and dressed like a do:rk and was £5 
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587  foot tall£. [((laugh))] That's a big kid (.) that's like, there on me now ((holding hands and.. 
588  T                     [hum]                                                                                            hum 
589 
590 
591 
C  .. neck)). In like in the first and second grade, that is a huge kid. hum Yea. So: that kind of 
sucked, all of that su:cked, ((moving hands back and forth past each other)), all of that 
sucked. 
592  T  You say that ahh you didn't want to go there? 
593 
594 
C  Yea, <I don't want  to>,  I don't want  to  think  too hard on  it. £Not something  I particularly 
enjo:y ruminating on.£ Hum (1) I suppose I'm supposed to be ˚going in, that is probably the.. 
595  T                                         hum 
596  C  .. purpose of all this˚ but ahh 
597 
598 
599 
T                                                       We:ll I'm not here to, you know to force you into anything, but 
I think we need to explore why it is difficult to go, or what what gets in the way of going 
there. 
600 
601 
C  Humm, I don't want to get, I feel myself going, getting um (2) emotional and I really don't 
want to do that, ˚so I’m putting the, putting the brakes on.˚ 
602 
603 
T                               Hum                                                                   And why is it important to put the 
brakes on when you start feeling emotional? 
604  C  ˚Cause you gotta be tough.˚ ((holds hands up)) Like the thing I joked to John is, like, “£I.. 
605  T                                                   hum 
606 
607 
C  .. am actually pink and squishy like, I am not tough at all.£” I'm such a pushover. (2) Yea (1)  
I'm not tough at all. £And also I hate spiders and snakes, I hate snakes ((making a point to..  
608  T                                                                                                     Hum                  hum                                   
609 
610 
611 
C  .. stare at therapist)),I hate snakes and clowns. Hum ((laughs)) yea ah ah I mean that 
completely ((motions hands)) with all seriousness completely un‐ironically, I hate clowns, 
categorically speaking all clowns are bad people, all clowns are bad people. And I can't.. 
612  T                                                                                                                                       hum 
613  C  .. even stand (.) pictures of snakes. Like if I touch, like if I'm like going through a like like a..  
614  T                          Hum 
615 
616 
617 
C  .. book and there's a picture of a snake, if I touch the picture of the snake without, like, 
because I didn't know it was on the next page, I, I  get the heebie jeebies and like, my whole 
skin crawls, and like it is really, yeah I can’t handle snakes. Yea I can't even handle dead.. 
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618  T                    Hum                                                                                                                                   
619  C  .. snakes. Like, I went somewhere and they had these pelts hanging up and >they're.. 
620  T                hum 
621  C  .. like, their rattlesnake pelts< and, their like “No, it’s okay these are dead.” I’d be like, “No,  
622                                                               hum 
623 
624 
  see because this means that at some point in time there were at least three snakes. 
Goodness knows how many there are [now].” #Ya know# “There was not a snake, but.. 
625  T                                                                      [Hum] 
626 
627 
C  multiple Snakes.” (1) Yea <#I hate snakes# I Hate snakes, hate snakes.> £I hate their faces. 
(.) Hate that they can kill you.£ ((laughing)) I hate snakes. £And for whatever reason in..  
628  T                                                Hum                                                                                             
629  C  .. my mind they are always spring‐loaded£ [Like] ((Motions hands towards therapist.. 
630  T                                                                                [Hum] ((smiling and adjusting position)) 
631 
632 
C  .. and begins to laugh, making pwwuuu sound)) Snake. Yea, yea I hate snakes. ˚I hate 
snakes.˚ I forgot how I got on this topic. 
633 
634 
T  ((Deep breath)) You are talking about how you don’t like to get emotional and you have to 
be strong. 
635  C  Yea, and then I'm not because I'm afraid of snakes, I'm not strong because I’m afraid of..  
636  T                                                                                          Hum                                             
637  C  .. snakes. I'm a big old wuss because I’m afraid of snakes, clowns, but mostly snakes..  
638  T                  Hum                                                                            hum 
639  C  .. (.)£ I punched a clown once, not my fault (.) I had some friends that thought it would be a.. 
640  T     Hum                                                                   hum 
641  C  .. great idea to get me over being unhappy with clowns, by surprising me with a trip..  
642  T                                                                                                            hum 
643  C  .. to the circus. I didn't want to get out of the car, and I was persuaded to get out of the  
644  T                           hum 
645  C  .. ca:r by the way. “Pussy,.. pussy, [pussy]” ((motioning her in a back and forth..  
646  T                                                                [hum] 
647 
648 
C  .. tomahawk motion)) gets me to do an enormous number of things that I really oughtn’t do. 
Hum. Don’t know why, but it does. And probably that inner fourth grade boy mindset..             
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649  T    Hum                                                                                                                                            hum 
650 
651 
652 
653 
654 
655 
656 
C  .. that I seem to have. And ahh I got invited to be, like they were doing their ((waves hands 
together and says da‐ da‐da‐ da‐)) and the clowns came out and they came up into the 
audience to try to bring some people down to do like, to be props, to be essentially props in 
one of their, one of their bits. And ahh my friends made such a hooping and hollering and I 
was on the end, of course I was on the end, and they came up to us and the guy’s like trying 
to get ahold of me, and I don't know if he can’t hear me or if I'm speaking too fast cause I’m, 
I can ((motions hands forward and makes noise brabrabra indicating really fast speaking)).. 
657  T        uhum 
658 
659 
C  .. if I'm really agitated. Uhum, and he grabs me by the, he grabs me. (.) “I know you're doing 
your job, but I don't think you're funny, let go of me right now, let go of me right now,.. 
660  T                                                                                                                  hum 
661 
662 
C  .. I don't think you're funny, let go of me right now. (.) Let go” and I punched him in the nuts, 
a:nd he let ↑go. But ((point at therapist)) he was asking for it ((points and wags finger..  
663  T                               Hum                         hm                                                             hm 
664  C  .. toward therapist)),because I said don’t touch me. 
665 
666 
667 
T                                                                                                Mmm   ((deep breath)) You know, it's 
interesting, I'm wondering if you are trying to tell me something that this, with this story as 
well. 
668  C  Ahh ((gaze aand points to therapist) £I'm not trying to threaten you. Despite the thoug‐,..  
669  T                                                                                                                            umm 
670 
671 
C  .. despite the fact that I’m, I’m  punching somebody, I am, £I am not trying to threaten you.£ 
((laughs)) 
672 
673 
674 
T  But, I coul‐ you said “I wonder how we got on this topic.” And that you know, we started 
talking about emotions, things that are difficult for you to ahh (1) [To] talk about here, and 
maybe..  
675  C                                                                                                           [Rig]‐ ((LA)) 
676 
677 
T  .. I'm the clo:wn kind of dragging you towards talking about emotions, talking about things 
that are difficult and you're [sa:ying] “Slow up.” ((laugh briefly)) 
678 
679 
C                                                    [I don’t wan‐]           £I don't want to punch you, I really don't.£ 
umm (1)  ˚There might be something to that˚ I supp↓ose (2) I‐ suppose.  
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680  T  Umm 
681 
682 
C  Ahh (.) yea, I really don't want to make it seem like a threat but the fact that I was so quick 
fire back "£it's not a threat, it's not a threat, [you’re] not the clown.£” You..  
683  T                                                                                  [umm]                                                                   
684  C  .. probably are the Clown, you probably are the clown. 
685 
686 
T  No but I I think I have picked up that ahh, I mean I remember one of the first (sessions) we 
had a (.) <moment of si:lence>, and you're like, "Please say something, (.) anything.” 
687 
688 
689 
C  umhum     Ya ya, it is ↑awk↓ward. (1) Because I feel like I'm supposed to be (1) going and 
going and going and going, ((flailing hands around head )) like, “Am I supposed to be 
↑talk↓ing?” I don't know, necessarily see ahh how producƟve silence is, and I don't want.. 
690  T                                                                                 umm 
691  C  to (.) put up a whole bunch of walls, but I'm, I’m increasingly aware that I certainly must.. 
692  T       umm 
693  C  .. be. (.)     [ahh] 
694  T          umm [Well] I think also we kind of (1) ahh >skip along the surface. < You like to stay at .. 
695  C                                                                                  Umm                                                   
696    .. a spa[ce for] only so long. And I think a that maybe you fear that if we  spend too much.. 
697  C            [((deep breath)) Ya] 
698 
699 
T  .. time umm talking or just reflecting on (.) some of the things we talked about, ahh that 
maybe if some of the, I don't know what you call this ((Gaze holds hands up touching..  
700  C                                                                                                   Ya ((LA)) 
701  T  ..together his index fingers and thumbs)) may not hold everything back. 
702 
703 
704 
C  I, I don't know why I want to, but I, its like I've been i:n, in therapy for almost thr:ee ye:ars 
and it is very mu‐ and almost always wanted to (.) ((Clench his fists and rocks forward 
twice)) you know, keep a lid on the jar. 
705  T  And I think that yo‐ ahh I think that’s <I mean> I am awa:re of that [and] ahh given that.. 
706  C                                                                                                                          [hum] 
707  T  .. you you’ve worked with Jackson for a while and I only have a year in this program..  
708  C                                                                                 ((nodding))                                             umhum 
709  T  .. that I may be stepping on the gas a little ↓bit. [umm] And I don't want you to think that..  
710  C                                                                                    Ya [umm] 
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711  T  .. you have to kind of abandon, umm you have to just, kinda spill your guts to me,..  
712  C                                                                                                                           Okay 
713 
714 
T  .. that's not what I'm asking you do. But I am asking you to be curious about why it's so 
important that you do put those brakes on. 
715  C  (3) £Nobody likes the crying ((gaze)) lady. £ umm 
716  T                                                                         hum          Whose nobody? 
717  C  £Everybody. ((laughs)) The everybody that is nobody. (1) See nobody becomes..  
718  T                          hum 
719  C  .. everybody who doesn't like a crying lady.£ (.) ahum I've just always had this notion..  
720  T                                                                                hum 
721  C  .. that you will be a bother if you, if you do that, that [your] 
722 
723 
T                                                                                                [You ]feel like it’s going to be a bother 
to me? 
724  C  That that you’re just a nuisance. (.) Or [th]at your, like I I, it has been really impressed.. 
725  T                                                                I se[e] 
726  C  .. upon me not to complain too too much. (.) And, people have it so much worse than..  
727  T                                                                          umm 
728 
729 
C  .. you, and and I never never had tantrums when I was a kid because my mom 
£preemptively gui:lted me.£ ((laughs)) That is the way I see it and umm ya. And so.. 
730  T                          umm 
731 
732 
C  .. there ahh ya know, you just don't do certain things and letting myself get overwrought 
feels like one of those things you just don't do. (1) umm yea and I mean that with..  
733  T                                                                                                            umm 
734 
735 
C  .. all the sort of ((gestures up and down with hands in a stepping motion)) hard stepping 
percussiveness that I'm implying now, you just don't. (5) ya (3) ↑Are ↑we here on.. 
736  T                                                                                             umm 
737  C  .. Thursday? 
738  T  We are not, we’re off, but the week after that we’ll be going to twice a week. 
739  C  ((Fake laugh)) <˚Then John’s mom is coming to town [Tomorrow].˚> ((exhale))                      
740  T                                                                                                 [Umm]                                Do you wish 
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741  that we were meeting on Thursday? 
742  C  Ahhhh, £if only to give me an excuse to get away from her.£ ((laughs)) Not that that,.. 
743  T                                                                                                           umm 
744  C  .. your, that this isn’t productive, but I would sit in the lobby just to get away from her. 
745  T  Hum 
746 
747 
C  We are always in the position where we have to lie to her. Because the truth tends to make 
her insane. Like s:he does not yet know that John doesn't have a job and when it.. 
748  T                     hum 
749 
750 
751 
C  ..comes time to tell her that John doesn’t have a job, we are going to tell her that the 
program, that that the program itself lost its, that the funding for the program itself fell 
through, and so the job disappeared, because (2) she has a sort of hard‐line  of this.. 
752  T                                                                                      hm 
753 
754 
755 
C  .. always follows this and this always follows this and this always comes from this and so if 
Jo:hn doesn't have a job, if John is fired from his job it means that he is lazy and worthless 
and will never amount to anything and he didn't care about what he was doing. (.) And..  
756  T                                                                                                                                                  hum 
757 
758 
759 
760 
761 
762 
763 
764 
C  .. that is so far from the truth because Jo:hn, umm John has anxieties and things that I 
talked to you about before a little bit. He is actually is bald in patches from pulling out his 
hair. umm He gets stressed out and he just fiddles until he has this big raw bare patch and 
so we have had to shave his head every year when he gets a big problem, we end up, I end 
up saying, “˚Honey we need to shave your hair˚” so you don't give yourself a sort of molted 
look. And umm I g‐ £it is not the fact that he doesn't care, it is that he doesn't care 
productively.£ He cares a tremendous amount, so much so that he doesn't sleep, that he 
can't eat and that he, you know, he he goes bald (.) from fretting over how much stuff he.. 
765  T                                     hum                                              hum   
766 
767 
C  .. has to do, it’s not that he doesn't care, he doesn't know what to do with himself. But she 
doesn't, see that. In her mind's eye is, “If you work hard you succeed, and if you're.. 
768  T                              hum 
769  C  .. failing then it’s your fault” (.) a:nd, “If you have opportunity and you Fail then you’re.. 
770  T                                                       hum 
771  C  ..wasteful and ungrateful.” “Because how could you fail, because you only fail if you.. 
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772  T                                                hum 
773 
774 
C  ..don't care, and how could you not care if someone's giving you something.” And that’s, 
those are the only  terms she sees things in, unless. She always reads.. 
775  T                                                                                           hum 
776  C  ..the most negative thing into every situation. Nothing is ever, and nothing is ever her.. 
777  T                                                                                 hum 
778 
779 
780 
781 
782 
783 
C  ..fault as well. There's never any role that she plays in anything that goes on around her, and 
she never admits to her own, her own issues, or her own feelings. Like she'll call us and be 
like, “You guys are irresponsible with my money.” And really what’s happening is that she 
has overextended herself, she has made promises to us, and to, I don’t know, bigger than 
she can afford and rather than say, "Guys, I feel bad, I don't think I can do what I promised 
you," she says, “How dare you still need my money.” Like well you promised us the money.. 
784  T                                                                                             hum 
785 
786 
787 
788 
C  .. that's why we're banking on it. If you had said you couldn't give it to us, we would've, you 
know, we hopefully would have been able to make other arrangements. But we certainly 
would've been working on it. (.) And so, she like ya, it’s it’s never in terms of, “I am feeling 
this way, .. 
789  T                                  hum 
790 
791 
792 
C  .. let me h‐” you know, “I apologize, we need to do something different.” It is always (2) you 
know. (1) And so umm I think we're trying to avoid relaying bad news  to her has really sort 
of complicated John’s language. (.)  Because now he doesn't, he doesn't say.. 
793  T                                                              hum 
794 
795 
796 
797 
798 
799 
C  ..many declarative things. Like he won’t say, “I'm hungry.” He will say: “it's getting to be 
lunchtime.” And I’ll be like, "Do you want food? Or you’re remarking on the hour of the day?  
>What is it you want?<” He gives me all of the, all of the, support but not the thesis. "Tell 
me what it is. And then, and then we can see if you need to justify what is.” But or he’ll lay 
out the justification for something and not say what it is. Because if you say what something 
is, if you try to talk directly to her she's a torrent. If you let her kind of, if you give her the..  
800  T                                                                                hum 
801 
802 
C  .. information and see what she pieces out, and then you talk about whatever she figures 
out and that's the way he's gotten around dealing with her, it drives me fucking crazy. 
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803 
804 
T  ((Deep breath)) I wonder if there's something about what drives you so crazy about that is 
something that you recognize in yourself. (.)                       
805    ˚I don’t know˚ 
806  T  Cause as you described that, I was thinking of about when you got that 97 (.) and all you..  
807  C                                                                                                                                       Oh 
808  T  .. could focus on was the question that you got wrong. 
809  C  Ya but I'm, I’m only only harming myself, by,  I think, Sandy (.) is the other way around,..  
810  T                                                                                                           Hum 
811  C  ..Sandy is hard on everybody ↓but herself. (2) Ahh it is that that she doesn’t..      
812  T                                                                                ((laughs)) 
813  C  .. cause she doesn’t, Sandy does not have to apologize, [she] can say horrible horrible..  
814  T                                                                                                    [Um]                                                              
815 
816 
C  .. things and she said it point blank, "I'm your mother and you should know I don't mean 
it"(.)  and like, can I say whatever I want back to you? And you should what I do and don't.. 
817  T       Hum  
818  C  .. mean because of our relationship? [Is] that, is that, a.. trump card I can pla[y]? 
819 
820 
821 
T                                                                     [ya]                                                                    ((Adjusting 
the seating position and smiling))  [So] maybe she's like that to everybody else ahh, but I 
guess what I am trying to point out is that you are that way to yourself.  
822 
823 
824 
825 
C  Ya, ah I concede that, and umm it drives me crazy because I think, ahh I guess, of the two of 
us I thought I had a better handle on things. Like a I think of the two of us I am closer to 
doing things the right way, which is cutting everybody a reasonable amount of slack, but all I 
have to do is add just one person to the mix and I've got it made you know.  
826  T                                                                                                                                   Um          umhum 
827 
828 
C  She got to add the whole rest of the world to her recipe, she is only serving Sandy right now. 
And ahh I think I am close to having a good handle on things and I think its better, I think.. 
829  T   Hum                      
830  C  .. my way of doing things is better than her way of doing things, (.) objectively speaking. 
831 
832 
833 
T                                                                                                                    Hmm                                 Well 
I do think that (.) you are curious about the way you do things. And I think that is one of the 
reasons why you're here is to explore those things. 
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834 
835 
836 
837 
C  I don't want to be a big ball of cra:zy, and I don't want <to be> unable to gi:ve Wanda 
something to look to. Like she is very smart and she's very aware and she's gonna pick 
things up very quickly. And if I am, I don't want her get:ing (.) to the place where she can’t, 
(.) >I I don’t want her thinking< that something not done perfectly isn't worth doing. (.).. 
838  T  Umm                                                                                                                                         um 
839 
840 
841 
842 
C  .. And I don’t want her thinking that not being perfect makes her worthless. I don't want her 
not being able to, you know,(3) get it out without breaking things or hurting herself.  And I 
don’t want her seeing, and >I don't want her being afraid of ↑me<, I don't want her being 
afraid of setting me off because half of what (.) John does is just trying to damage control..  
843                                                                          Um 
844 
845 
  .. his mom, he never feels like he can say, “Hey this is what my problem actually is.” You 
know (3) ((deep breath)) 
846  T  Umm                         Well, we’ll have to continue next week . 
847  C  Okay 
848  T  umm So are we on for Tuesday?         And Thursday next week. 
849  C                                                             Yes.                                                 Sounds great. 
850  T   28th and the 30th. 
851 
852 
C                               Ummm and hopefully, and hopefully I’ll have work soon. That is what I'm 
working on. That’s what I am working on.     
853  T  Hum umm (2) and I think maybe maybe, part of this is kinda of my style, but I do.. 
854  C                                                                                                                                umhum 
855  T  ..tend to ask a lot of questions, ahh but I don’t expect kind of [immediate] packaged..  
856  C                                                       Umhum                                          [((laughs))]                          
857  T  ..answers. ((laughs)) 
858  C                     oh                                 [I'm] so used to that, sort of like ((makes noise mmrt)) [Iike ] 
859 
860 
861 
T                                                           [Ya] and I, and I again I kind of noticed that we skip along 
very quickly, I, kind of, ask a question, get an answer, and then I ask another question. And 
I..  
862  C                     ˚ya˚ 
863 
864 
T  .. think part of what I'm gonna try to be mindful of is maybe slowing things down a bit.  
(.) And umm staying [with] the, and I think, and I think..  
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865  C   Okay                            [ya] 
866 
867 
T  .. here again that part of it is kind of my style for me, cause I am curious I ask a lot of 
questions. (1) But I think ahh again slowing things down and seeing what's there,..  
868  C                  That’s ok.           
869  T  ..reflecting, and that may involve some silence. 
870  C  Okay, I will try to be okay with that hum. 
871  T  And if it’s not let me know, and we will explore that . 
872 
873 
C                                                Ok‐                     I think that if it's not okay I think I'm pretty good at 
showing what I'm, when  I’m uncomfortable with things. Hum so but yea. Here is to hoping.  
874 
875 
T                                                                                                  Hum                                                   Okay, 
well I will see you next week Sarah. 
876  C  Alright, sounds good. 
  
4
1
6
 
 
1  C  £<John was my ride in and my alarm clock today.>£ (.) £Ya we are not going to do that.. 
2  T                                                                                          hm 
3  C  ..again.£ [((laughs))] 
4  T                  [Humm], What happened? 
5 
6 
7 
C  Umm, he set the alarm clock for himself and snoozed, (1)  and then star‐ and then got up 
and slept in a different room. So I kept snoozing, so tha‐ the snooze is at like a nine  
minute interval so it would wake me up, and I (go out to) him, >I have to get closer<, until.. 
8  T                          Hmm 
9  C  .. I was in the room where he was, till he’d be, he was completely sound asleep in that, in..  
10  T                                                                                                                                           hmm 
11 
12 
C  .. that interval. (.) I nudge him, I’d say, <“The alarm clock is going off”>, he’d say <“I need a  
little more time,”> (.) ((laugh)) shelp myself back and hit the button. And ahh (1) normally..  
13  T                             hmm                                                                                                                                  
14  C  .. he wakes me up before he leaves cause (.) I've asked him to. (.) ((laughs)) And today he.. 
15  T                                                                             hmm 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
C  .. didn’t and he started calling me, but (.) he didn't call me until after  11:00, cause his, his 
meeting was late. So it’s like mm he is like, “I ↑thought ↓that the ↑phone ↓call would 
↑wake↓ you up.” I’m like, “It doesn’t count” if if you're waking me up when I'm supposed 
to be somewhere else. I'm like (.) ↑ahh↓ tha‐ NO, there is no, even if I would have 
answered the phone I still would've overslept and.. been late. (.) ((laughs)) So no, it does.. 
21  T                                                                                                                      hm       
22  C  .. not work that way. ((LA)) (.) <I've been ↓sick>, so: 
23  T                                                                                                     Still? 
24  C  Oh yea , I still have the frog ((points to throat)) ahh in the back of my throat just a little bit. 
25  T  hh I wanted to pick up on something hmm that we talked about ahh last, last week.    
26  C  ((LA)) Okay. ((rolls eyes))        
27  T  You were talking about the coworker you had (.) and umm (.) and you said after kind of.. 
28 
29 
C                                                                                  >Ye:a< ((gaze: stares motionlessly at the 
therapist )) T
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30 
31 
T  .. ahh of talking about kinda of um (.) ahh  all the kinda difficulties  you have had with her  
you were like: “If I keep talking about this I’ll blame myself." 
32 
33 
C  <Yea>, ((LA)) umm it, it’s a kind of a thing that I have that keeps me from ((gaze)) (.) really 
making changes or confronting people because I go “ ((makes shrrrch noise and points)).. 
34  T                                                                                                Hm 
35 
36 
37 
38 
C  ..You are probably overreacting. (.) ((schrch noise and points)) You're being an ass,..you're 
((points)) not acknowledging your fault in this, you're ((points upward)), you're probably 
((points)) as big of perso‐, you know, as big a problem ((swings pointing hand to 
horizontally)) as she is. ((LA))[ <You know>, this ((point)),and this ((point)), and this.. 
39  T                                                     [((quickly rubs his eye and looks away))] 
40  C   .. ((point)), and this ((point)), and this. Umm (.)] I‐ it, that always happens. ((laughs)) 
41  T  Hmm    
42 
43 
C  Umm and I'm convinced that if I get upset or if I let that feeling be known I'm going to be 
wrong and an ((gaze)) £asshole.£ (.) £>And I really don’t want that.<£ (.) ((LA)) And..  
44  T                                                                                                                          Umhm 
45  C  .. it ahh it’s enough to normally keep me pretty (1) ((gaze)) £>angry on the inside and..  
46  C  .. nowhere else.<£ (.) ((LA)) Umm yea. (4) Feeling like an asshole really just kind of it’s it’s..  
47  T                                   Hm               
48 
49 
C  ..very good at oh stopping me from doing all kinds of things. (.) £It is why I do not parallel 
park in traffic.£  
50  T  Hm ((gaze with playful, overly‐curious look))                             
51  C  Cause I feel instantly like an asshole, [as] it takes me forever and.. I'm blocking the way and 
52  T                                                                    [hm]                                          
53  C  .. I have no, (  ) I instantly ((snaps fingers)) feel like I have no fucking clue what I'm.. 
54  T                                                         Hm 
55 
56 
C  .. doing. ((laughs)) And I'm actually an elegant parallel parker. (1) Ahh, (.) it was the only 
thing on the driver’s test that I needed, I‐ just just did with complete finesse, and hmm.. 
57  T                                                                                             Hmm 
58  C  .. I can't do it even unless there is only cones around me though. (.) Actual cars, ((makes..  
59  T                                                                                 Hm    
60  C  .. noise hhhmm)) actual cars with traffic, oh fuck no, I'll just walk from four blocks away. (.) 
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61  <John makes fun of my driving>. I don’t, I almost never make left turns that aren’t..  
62  T                                                         hm 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
C  .. protected (.).. cause my ((beats chest with open hand making a slapping sound like a 
heartbeat)). ((laughs)) Ahh, I also transition from lanes as SOON as I need to, like if I'm, if I 
if I, the second I wanna, like okay, ((gestures forward with hand)) I have to make a left turn 
four miles down, (.) so, as soon as I'm able to, without getting run over, get left. Or making 
a right turn you know, you know in, in 3 miles, “Okay, I'm going to get in the right lane 
now." 
69  T  And this would be something to do with not wanting to feel like an asshole? 
70 
71 
72 
C  Yea (.) ahh, that is one of the things that happens when I’m panicked, my brain goes, "You 
are fucking this up and you are an asshole." ((laughs)) “You don't do anything right and you 
are a stupid asshole, look at how you're driving.” 
73 
74 
75 
T  Hmm,  cause wha‐ what I kinda noticed with your story about your  co‐worker, it was kind 
of like, for the first part of it she was the asshole, (.) and then you were afraid if you 
thought about it too long you would be the asshole. 
76 
77 
78 
79 
C  I don’t think‐ ah, I feel like ya, I feel like if I, if I put it out there, that I'm an asshole. Umm if 
I, if I snap then it, then perspective change, and you know, a paradigm shift kinda thing and 
now I'm the asshole. >Sort of like hmm< ((starts snapping fingers as if trying to get the 
words out)) the, the dream <I was talking about> wher‐ where I yelled at John's mother,..  
80  T                                                 ((Nods))                                                                                          umhm 
81 
82 
83 
C  .. and they all went to her like THAT, that is what happens in my head. It is like (.) the 
second I say something back, or the second I am like, “You need to stop this,” then, (.) 
((hands up facing forward at about shoulder level)) ya.  
84 
85 
T  ((Deep breath)) It sounds like you kind of move between kind of being the victim of other 
people (.) ((opens hands and nods twice toward client)) being an asshole, and then you..  
86  C                                                                                                                                       Ya 
87  T  ..being the asshole, and then all of a sudden being the victim like the dream.  
88 
89 
C  Ya, it’s a, it is sometimes even it’s not like there would be, there is a victim, like my bad 
driving, there is no victim to my bad driving, °I just feel like a stupid ass. Umm° (.) ahh, (1).. 
90  T                                                                                                                                             hum 
91  C  I don't know quite how to make a leap from, from the two, but it is a similar concept, ahh. 
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92 
93 
T                                                                                                                                                      Yea      
What comes to mind when you think of the word asshole? 
94 
95 
96 
97 
C  Well I don't know, it's, it's very it's, it's, it's not a good thing ((laughs)) obviously hmm just 
ah for me sort of like doesn’t, doesn't have their shit together at all, like someone who 
drives, like, like let's go back to the driving thing, like someone who drives for 12 miles with 
their left turn signal on in the, in the left lane of traffic, but with their right tires over the..  
98  T                                                                                                   hmm 
99  C  .. line in the slow lane, now that’s an asshole. Hmm a person who tailgates the whole..   
100  T                                                                                hmm 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
C  ..Fucking time to, on the road where, there’s like stoplights every block. Like someone, 
someone tailgating on Fifth Avenue going through Winston like, doesn't make any sense, if 
you're not gonna beat the lights. In fact the only way to get out of, I actually figured this 
out, if you go down Winston at the speed limit to four miles over the speed limit, you can’t 
go to five because you will ruin, ruin the rhythm, but that is the timing for all of the lights. If 
you do that you never have to break all. If everybody, if you keep the proper speed through 
that, you know, you stop once. It is almos‐ once to never for the entirety of Winston. Hmm 
but yea, hmm. Yea, it is kind of weird when you see it, because if you know what you're 
looking for as you're driving through, the numbers on all the crosswalks are all the same 
too, the countdown is instantly the same. And you know if you're going too fast because.. 
111  T        Hmm 
112 
113 
114 
C  .. of the number, you don't even have to look at your speedometer to know if you're 
speeding up or slowing down because of the past, the, the crosswalk will shift on you. 
hmmm (.) yea. Just ahh I guess an asshole is someone who I, I wouldn't say my coworker..  
115  T                Hmm 
116  C  ... is an asshole, I would say that she is something profoundly worse than that. Like, a tire.. 
117  T                             Mmm 
118  C  .. fire. Just noxious and nasty and serves absolutely no purpose but to give people around.. 
119  T           Mmm 
120  C  .. it,cancer. Umm she is not an asshole. Umm, for for me the, an asshole isn’t necessarily..  
121  T                                                                       umm 
122  C  .. mean‐spirited. Umm, wrong but sel‐, wrong, self‐involved, but also a complete lack of 
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123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
self‐awareness, I guess is what an asshole is for me. Umm and then in the sense of just as a 
big old swear word. Your swear word of choice. Ahh it doesn't have to have any sort of, 
you know, nuanced meaning in that sense. Sometimes when I say I feel like an asshole, it's, 
“Whatever you can can't imprint,” you know, whatever other ((laughs)) word of that will 
(get the spot you want) for the most part, umm. 
128  T  Umm ((deep breath)) I'm wondering what that word meant, what meaning it has for you? 
129  C  Umm ummm ((moves hands around and shakes head as if displaying confusion)) 
130  T  Cause I was wondering (if you’re feeling that way, it brings up a lot) 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
C  ((small cough)) Ya, (.) I don't know, I, I I guess sort of that a person that completely doesn’t 
have their shit about them is an inconvenience to others. And sometimes, and I guess also 
that sort of an ignorance to thei‐, to ahh like the guy tailgating ((eye roll)) with his blinker 
on in the wrong lane. (1) Like that sort of thing I guess, umm I ((LA)) >˚I don't know a better 
way of articulating it without more examples, but I feel like (we’re) getting a little˚< 
((shakes hand back and forth as if signaling uneasiness)). ((laughs) 
137 
138 
139 
T  Well, let's go back to the story that you were telling and and, what happened last session 
when ahh, you know, you were talking about this woman who is worse than an asshole. 
((hands open) 
140  C  ↑Okay ↓Ya 
141  T  Hum, but then you, then ↓some↑thing happened. 
142 
143 
144 
145 
C  And then something, I always feel like if I get upset, if I say something back, that’s (when 
it), I always worry that I’m, that I'm overly sensitive. (.) Umm >probably because I've been 
told I'm overly sensitive.<  Although I probably should take that with a grain of salt cause it 
was not something that was terribly thoughtfully said. umm 
146  T  Who said it? 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
C  ↑My ↑dad. Umm, when I was in high school. And, no, actually when I was in middle 
school and was being bullied and was in multiple abusive ↑re↓laƟon↑ships. And he got 
upset with me for being ↓sullen. ((begins waving hands back and forth, a gesture 
reminiscent of one used to indicate a spell being cast)) He was all like, “Ooh so moody, ooh 
so melodramatic, ooh leave me a:lone.” ((laugh)) Like it's not funny if the joke is me. If if 
you want to make me feel ↓bet↑ter you can tell me a joke but don't make me a joke, 
because I ar‐ I already get the punch line and it's not funny. Umm ((laughs)) yea, so there's 
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154  that. Umm ahh yea, it’s ahh. (3) Ya that always sucks by the way, it a:lways sucks (.)  
155 
156 
T         umm                                                                                                                                     What 
always sucks? 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
C  He never got why I didn't think it was funny, he just thought it was more of the same. (7) 
And so asking someone to stop just becomes fodder for it to keep happening. (3) And that 
su(h)cks ((looks a therapist and squints)). Pretty, pretty uniformly. Ahh pretty sucks.  ((deep 
breath)) (6) ((Looks at therapist)) What? Ahh, you have the furrowed eyebrows. ((motions 
fingers back and forth next to her own eyebrows)) tissss ((laughs)) I am sorry I have a..  
162  T                                                                            ((smiles))               
163  C  .. hard, it is not ((places hand up with palm facing therapist)) ˚nothing, it is nothing˚. 
164  T  What are you apologizing about? 
165 
166 
167 
168 
C  For making it about yo:u. You’re like, £“Hey, let’s talk about what your face is doing.”£ 
That’s, that’s not ˚nice.˚ (3) ˚That’s not nice.˚ (7) I don't know exactly how to handle 
compassion, or ahh complements, or attempts at understanding, it just feels sort of foreign 
and weird to me, ahh ˚by and large.˚ ahh () ((scratches face)) 
169 
170 
T  Say some more about what, what you think about when, you know, someone is trying to 
understand or be compassionate. 
171 
172 
173 
174 
175 
176 
C  Umm it it varies, it sometimes, it just, I don't hear it at all, it’s like, “Oh that's nice,” you 
know, and ya. And it real‐ kinda like someone saying, you know, "Have a nice day," it’s like 
a pleasantry, a pleasantry exchange, like okay good, and other times it is like: “That is just 
horseshit.” Most of the time somewhere in that spectrum of ahh, not ahh sort of nothing 
sticks like Teflon, or it’s, ahh promotes a sort of like very aggressive response in my system. 
(.) Y[ea] 
177  T          [Di]d you feel like that, that was what I was (conveying)?     
178 
179 
C  ↓No, ahh (2) I just ahh, if someone looks like they’re, like they’re empathizing I don't know 
what to do. ((laughs))                                        [((cough))] 
180  T                                             Do you feel like that’s [what it], what I look like? 
181 
182 
C  Not necessarily, umm (2) see I didn't want to make this about you. ((laughs)) Umm ahh, 
just a look of compassion, you know. 
183  T  And what did that bring up for you? 
184  C  Ahh, it makes me uncomfortable. Hence the reason why I was like, "You're doing this. Did 
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185 
186 
187 
you know you're doing this?” Umm yea, “Why are you doing that? Why is your face doing 
that? ((laughs)) What did I say? What did I say that means more than what I think it does? 
What is it? What is it?" 
188  T  What comes to mind? 
189 
190 
C  Ahh, I'm wondering what I'm missing, like (1) ahh looking like something is particularly 
thought provoking makes me go, "Wait, what did I say?" Umm, also it makes me sort of..  
191  T                                                                                                    umm 
192 
193 
C  .. acutely aware of when things aren't that way for other people. Be like, “Oh, that's bad,” 
I’d be like, “I didn't realize. That's Tuesday for me.” You know, like (2) ahh (1) yea. My..  
194  T                                                                                         hum 
195 
196 
197 
C  .. mom used to tell me that things are going to be okay, or that things were okay, £and she 
was always wrong.£ ((laughs)) <She was always wrong.> (9) That's where the horseshit part 
comes from. The insta‐dismissal. (3) 
198  T  Umm 
199 
200 
C  You know she never wants me to be upset, but she ahh, I don't think she's quite realized 
that she can't deny things for me. ((gaze laugh)) You know I need my own special denial..  
201  T                                                               Hmm 
202 
203 
204 
C  .. for that, you know, you know, I can't borrow yo:urs. Umm ya. (19) It made it very hard 
for a long time, to talk to either of them. Because my dad made fun of my problems, and 
my mom refused to admit that I had any problems. (19) Hum rough week. I don't have any.. 
205  T                                                                                                 Umm                                                  hmm
206 
207 
C  .. ((wiggles fingers for therapist to see)) (1)˚I don’t have any nails.˚ ((continues to wave 
fingernails and starts looking at her nails)) (4) I've actually stunted them. [Years]   
208 
209 
T                                                                                                                                     [You’ve] stunted 
them? 
210 
211 
212 
213 
C   Ya, Ye:ars of drastically pulling them back, umm and ripping the under‐dermis 
some↑Ɵmes, oh oŌen, ((giggle)) from how aggressively I tear my (.) nails:, so it's actually 
made my nails, my nail bed shorter, cause it doesn't heal, it doesn't heal ˚properly every 
time˚. 
214  T  Umhum       That happened this past week? 
215  C   Oh, no no, I just was remarking that I don’t have (.) ((shows the therapist her hands palms 
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216 
217 
218 
up facing him )) any nails at all like I have almost no nail at all on most of these fingers.  
What looks like nail is actually that exposed under‐dermis, are most of these. (5) £My mom 
broke my finger twice and never apologized. ((laughs)) (2) The same way..  
219  T                                                                                             Hmm 
220 
221 
222 
C  ..actually,£ she broke it, like if you, the the knuckles ((leaning over to show the therapist 
her knuckles and the therapist leans over also)) don’t line up. See how the knuckle, this 
knuckle is pointing this way and this knuckle is pointing that way, versus that one, how.. 
223  T                                                                                                                   Hmm 
224  C  .. they sit on top of each other. I have breaks in here. ((laughs)) And never got set,.. 
225  T                                                         Hmm 
226  C  .. because I was fine. I was making a big fuss out of nothing. The only good part was that I..  
227  T                                                                              hmm 
228  C  .. got to cuss without getting punished for it. ((laugh)) But ya, see how they, ((showing.. 
229  T                                                                                    hmm 
230 
231 
C  .. fingers again))part of my fingers are only, like that is my natural finger. ((holding fingers 
extended)) (2) 
232  T                                                                                                Hmm 
233  C  £One of these things is not like the other.£ ((singing))  
234  T  Hmm, you've got some wounds. 
235 
236 
237 
C  Oh yea definitely, definitely. Umm, my ankle wasn't a problem until they had to rebuild it. 
My finger wasn’t wasn't a problem until, until the fact that I ((shows hand again to the 
therapist))  
238  T  Hmm 
239  C  ((laughs)) Ya.  
240  T  Some of your wounds are self‐inflicted. 
241  C  Ah not many of them I gotta say. 
242  T  We:ll, your nails. 
243 
244 
C  I don't think of those as wounds, but, yeah, yeah. (2) ((looking at her forearms and wrists)) 
I don't have any scars left from, from the cutting and the ones I did, I covered. ((showing a.. 
245  T                                                                                                                       Hmm 
246  C  .. tattoo on left forearm)) That's where they were and you could still see a couple arrant.. 
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247  T                                                                          Hmm                                                                     hmm 
248  C  .. marks. You’d have to know they were there ((coughs)) to see them. (1) Umm naa, and..  
249  T                                                                                                                                 Hmm 
250  C  .. they use to go almost the entire way around. ((runs her hand around her forearm.. 
251  T                                                                                     hmm 
252 
253 
254 
C  .. multiple times and makes a shshshs sound)) There are three or four that I can still see at 
this point. (3) £I'm a cutter not a maimer.£ So, so not a whole lot of scarring. (.) I had worse 
ones from cat scratches. (6 while looking at hands). Terrarium wound, I cut myself dow‐.. 
255  T                                            Hmm 
256  C  .. down to there ((pointing to a spot between her fingers))  I think, up doing unsupervised..  
257  T                                                                                                          hmm 
258  C  .. art projects and science projects because everyone else was asleep. ((laughs)) You had.. 
259  T                                                                                                                               Hmm 
260 
261 
C  .. to ahh, to get a knife and ahh, this is back when soda bottles had like a black base that 
was flat on it’s, so so before they created them with feet, there was this black plastic.. 
262  T                                                                                                        hmm 
263 
264 
265 
266 
267 
C  .. base,that you can pull off. And umm, what you would do is you pull that base off, cut the 
bottle right around the neck where the taper was, and then (invert) the whole thing over 
the black base and seal it up with glue, and then it would be a self‐sustaining terrarium. 
And ahh mine hit umm the (glue) that had been holding the, the label on, the knife slid and 
like ((using one hand to show where she was cut on the other)) I dug in deep here and.. 
268  T     Hmm  
269  C  .. then lightly across there. ((pointing to hand)) Ah, the tips of one of my toes is square, of.. 
270  T                                                                                                                                                          hmm     
271 
272 
C  .. my big toe is just squared off at the top cause, I smashed it ahh really hard and the top of 
it..  
273  T                                                                                hmm                              
274 
275 
C  .. popped off. (.) Like I ((smacks hands)) smashed it so hard that top came off. And it is 
really gross inside your toe, I don’t know, inside mine at the very least. I'm assuming it is. .. 
276  T                                                                         Hmm 
277  C  .. the norm. But just blood pooled everywhere, yeah. >She never apologized< (.) There was, 
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278 
279 
280 
281 
282 
“Let me see it, you're making a fuss.” ((laughs)) And my nail was like, ((grabs pinky finger 
and begins looking at nail)) the entire, like you know, was completely purple, my nail bed 
was just instantly full of blood and there, you get like speckling from where everything else 
around it is crushed and gone. (.) The bruise went on all the way around ((traces finger 
around pinky)), which is how I know it was broken. [You don’t] get an get an all‐around..  
283  T                                                                                                [Hmm]                                                            
284 
285 
C  .. bruise, ah unless there's a break. (1) And (2)) yeah, >I didn’t g‐<  I never even got a splint, 
we didn't go to the doctor, we didn't get an x‐ray. 
286  T  Completely ignored. 
287  C  Yeah, they’re like, “Oh, I have done that 100 times.” (.) “I I have slammed my finger plenty.. 
288  T                                                                                              Hmm 
289 
290 
291 
C  .. of times, it’s fine.” I’m like ((holds arm up with a limp wrist and then flicks finger and 
makes the noise Mmmnt and then laughs)), so, yeah. (.) Same thing with my seizures, I’m, 
I'm just tired. I don't have a problem, I'm just tired. I, I, my finger’s not broken I'm ju:st (.)..     
292  T  Hmm 
293    .. being a baby. [I am] just overreacting. No, my finger is broken and I get to react this..  
294                                 [hmm]                        ((deep breath))                                                                          
295    ..way. ((laughing)) 
296  T            Do you think that there is a part of you that is still waiting for an apology? [That] still.. 
297                                                                                                                                                 A[hh]              
298    .. wants recognition o:f:? 
299 
300 
C                                Yeah, I do. Umm (1) I do. Umm, the whole apology thing <I think I touched 
on last time>. I was in a position where, I was told I had to apologize even if I: was sure I.. 
301  T                                                                                                                            umm 
302 
303 
304 
C  .. was right and I was not allowed to ask for apologies, and that re:ally (.) for me it made 
me feel sort of like an untouchable, like, “You, (.) always be in a state of, of being sorry. 
Always be in a state of either feeling shame or fe‐ or feigning shame. (.) Always do this.”..  
305  T                                                                                         Umhum                                
306  C  .. A:nd (.) [never being]able to say, “You've hurt me. I demand recompense.” [((laughs))] 
307 
308 
T                    [((deep breath))]                                                                                           [And] it 
sounds like that’s one of the tensions you’ve had the, in the story with your coworker is 
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309  that, (1) I mean you were (.) outraged towards this woman. And when you think about it, 
310  C                                                umhum          
311 
312 
T  .. even when you talk about it when she's not even in the room,  you feel like: (1) “If, if I 
think about this too long, I'm going to start thinking I'm the asshole.” 
313 
314 
315 
C                                                                                                                             Yeah, yeah. (.) Umm 
yeah. And I think it’s, it's tied in to that, this sort of notion that I'm not suppo‐ both that I'm 
not supposed to get angry and I'm not supposed to want things from other people. 
316 
317 
T                                                                                                                                                    ((breath)) 
And if you do? 
318 
319 
320 
321 
322 
323 
324 
C  Then, now I have the problem, now I have the problem. (2) Ahh sort of, kind of like, I I 
guess a rageaholic,  like you go from ahh some guy cut you off and your mad and that’s 
okay, but if you, you let it out, or if you vent, then then you’re the problem. It's all like good 
for you to be mad as hell, you know, you follow a guy home and break out his taillights, like 
(2) but ahh ya, that was a really bad metaphor. I could come up with one a little bit less 
groggy. ((laughs)) Umm, it is the sense of feeling like, ahh, it's all well and good to be upset, 
but it's never okay to do anything about it. (2) Because you’re not supposed to be mad. (3)  
325  T                                                                             hmm 
326 
327 
328 
329 
330 
331 
332 
333 
334 
C  Again, I don't really know, I don't really have a good sense of what it's like to just be angry. 
I know what it looks like to be, you know, furious, and I don't know what it looks, but then I 
know what it looks like to be mostly okay. I don't really have a good sense of the in‐
betweens. Umm, ((coughs)) and I notice that there's always this, this worry for me that I'm 
overreacting. That's always in my head, that it's, I'm making something out of nothing, I'm 
reading into something, I am being too sensitive. And ahh, and I never quite, have never 
had the presence or idea like, "No‐no, it's okay. No, you're not acting like, you know, like 
this person murdered your family, you’re just acting like they cut you off in traffic or they 
were rude to you.” Like, I don't have a good sense of those kinds of things, and umh yea. 
335 
336 
T  So on the one hand you feel this intense anger rage, and on the other hand you feel like 
the problem’s with you, you’ve got to either control this, umm, and it's all your fault. 
337 
338 
339 
C                                                                                   Umhum                                 umhum  umhum 
Yeah it is sort of a weird thing I grew up with actually, in the sense that, ahh, if you pick a 
fight with someone who's, like someone says something stupid and hateful and hurtful, like 
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340 
341 
342 
343 
344 
someone says something, ahh, some sort of terrible stereotype, something racial, 
something genderist, something whatever, umm, if you say something back to them in a 
way that fuels the argument fire then it's your fault. Whatever happens is your fault 
because they’re a big ugly, you know, crazy person, so it's like they have a pass. And that's 
what I take from being told that I’m not allowed to speak my mind even when I'm sure I..  
345  T                                                                                                                               Umhum 
346 
347 
348 
349 
350 
C  .. am right. Because that means that, cause apparently me saying anything just makes 
things worse and then it's my fault. That is like the person who says the, says the first initial 
stupid, hateful, argumentative thing, it is like they get fre‐ like one freebie, go ahead and 
ruin how things go. And umm yea, I feel I can't really say a whole lot, and that drives me 
crazy, a little bit. ((laughs)) umm 
351  T  Cause it sounds like you have a lot to say. 
352 
353 
354 
355 
356 
357 
358 
359 
360 
361 
C  I do and ah, at the same time there's this decided lack of confidence in most things. So I’m 
like well,  “Maybe I’m underin‐, I'm underinformed” you know, or there's a deep 
recognition of the fact that I don't know everything. Umm, I have problems with myself in 
that regard. Umm, I can't think of anything that I do better than anybody else. I feel always 
replaceable. Pretty much always replaceable. And it makes it also harder for me to, not just 
because of the fear of being wrong, but the fear of, or the sort of notion I've got nothing 
worth saying, nothing someone else wouldn’t say that was a good idea, and nothing you 
know, noth‐ I hav‐ I have nothing novel to bring to the table. Like a second of reflection 
anybody would know what I'm thinking. You know, and ahh so, makes the job hunt 
particularly annoying. 
362  T  Umm 
363 
364 
365 
366 
C  Because, ah, you have to be confident, they want you to really always sell yourself and I 
feel like such a sham, such a fraud, and sometimes it's just, I don't ever feel like myself, like 
I read things I write for, for job things, and it takes me like six times longer, cause I am like, 
"No, this doesn't sound like me, this sounds like me trying to sound like someone who.. 
367  T                                                      Umm 
368  C  .. wants to sound like a buzz word robot.” Like this is not good. And also at this point the..  
369  T                                                                        Umm 
370  C  .. j ob search being so long, it's been ((breath out)) (.) ahh Pretty much a year, it has been..  
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371  T                                                                                                hmm 
372 
373 
374 
375 
C  .. a year since I've had any kind of income and it's been 18 months since I had umm a 
regular paying, like a regular job where I came on a regular schedule and I had a 
guaranteed paycheck every week. Umm, it's been 18 months since that happened, and.. 
376  T                                                              Umm 
377 
378 
C  .. it's very hard to say with great confidence, “I'll do whatever you say, I’ll be whoever you 
want me to be, just pay me.” ((laughs)) And there’s ahh, which is really where sort of my.. 
379  T                                                                Umm 
380 
381 
382 
383 
384 
385 
C  .. head is right now, it’s the like, “I will be excited about whatever product you want me to 
s‐ you want me to sell. I will, I will love and believe in it with every fiber of my being. I will, I 
am happy to take calls. I am happy to do things that are, that are contrary to each other. If 
you tell me my job is to, ah, is to clean bathrooms, and ahh to ahh, to run tours, those will 
be the two things I'm most passionate about. You tell me what it is and I'll do it.” And ah, 
yeah, it is the kind of thing that smacks of desperation, but that’s where I am. umm 
386 
387 
T                           Hum                                                                                                                    hum 
I'm sorry, Sarah, but we're going to have to stop. 
388  C  Yea 
389  T  And we are off next week. 
390  C  And also Thursday, right? 
391  T  Ahh, Thursday as in the week after that? 
392  C  No, no we are off this Thursday. 
393  T  Yes, yeah, umm but we'll resume on the week of the 15th. 
394  C  Okay, I think I can remember that. 
395 
396 
T  Okay, and umm my schedule will change then, umm so just maybe think of some times 
that would be best for us to meet, umm. 
397 
398 
C  Okay I’m, I’m available, for now, for all those days. I just put in an application yesterday to 
() a job, and I am not sure if he’ll take me or not, but fingers pretty much crossed. 
399  T  Okay. Well I will see you the week after next. 
400  C  Alright, sounds good. 
401  T  Okay. 
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402  C  Sounds good. 
 
 
 
